t1_lib.c revision 326663
1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112#include <stdio.h> 113#include <openssl/objects.h> 114#include <openssl/evp.h> 115#include <openssl/hmac.h> 116#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 117#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 118# include <openssl/ec.h> 119#endif 120#endif 121#include <openssl/ocsp.h> 122#include <openssl/rand.h> 123#include "ssl_locl.h" 124 125const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 126 127#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 128static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 129 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 130 SSL_SESSION **psess); 131static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s); 132int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); 133#endif 134 135#define CHECKLEN(curr, val, limit) \ 136 (((curr) >= (limit)) || (size_t)((limit) - (curr)) < (size_t)(val)) 137 138SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { 139 tls1_enc, 140 tls1_mac, 141 tls1_setup_key_block, 142 tls1_generate_master_secret, 143 tls1_change_cipher_state, 144 tls1_final_finish_mac, 145 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 146 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 147 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 148 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 149 tls1_alert_code, 150 tls1_export_keying_material, 151 0, 152 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 153 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 154 ssl3_handshake_write 155}; 156 157SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = { 158 tls1_enc, 159 tls1_mac, 160 tls1_setup_key_block, 161 tls1_generate_master_secret, 162 tls1_change_cipher_state, 163 tls1_final_finish_mac, 164 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 165 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 166 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 167 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 168 tls1_alert_code, 169 tls1_export_keying_material, 170 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV, 171 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 172 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 173 ssl3_handshake_write 174}; 175 176SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = { 177 tls1_enc, 178 tls1_mac, 179 tls1_setup_key_block, 180 tls1_generate_master_secret, 181 tls1_change_cipher_state, 182 tls1_final_finish_mac, 183 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 184 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 185 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 186 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 187 tls1_alert_code, 188 tls1_export_keying_material, 189 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF 190 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS, 191 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 192 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 193 ssl3_handshake_write 194}; 195 196long tls1_default_timeout(void) 197{ 198 /* 199 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for 200 * http, the cache would over fill 201 */ 202 return (60 * 60 * 2); 203} 204 205int tls1_new(SSL *s) 206{ 207 if (!ssl3_new(s)) 208 return (0); 209 s->method->ssl_clear(s); 210 return (1); 211} 212 213void tls1_free(SSL *s) 214{ 215#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 216 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) { 217 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); 218 } 219#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ 220 ssl3_free(s); 221} 222 223void tls1_clear(SSL *s) 224{ 225 ssl3_clear(s); 226 s->version = s->method->version; 227} 228 229#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 230 231static int nid_list[] = { 232 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 233 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 234 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 235 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 236 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 237 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 238 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 239 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 240 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 241 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 242 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 243 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 244 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 245 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 246 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 247 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 248 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 249 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 250 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 251 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 252 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 253 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 254 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 255 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 256 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 257 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 258 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 259 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 260}; 261 262static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = { 263 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed, 264 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime, 265 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 266}; 267 268/* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */ 269static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = { 270 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ 271 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 272 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ 273 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 274 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 275 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 276 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 277 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 278 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 279# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 280 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ 281 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 282 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 283 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 284 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 285 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 286 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 287# endif 288}; 289 290static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = { 291 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ 292 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 293 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ 294 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 295 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 296 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 297 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 298 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 299 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 300# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 301 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ 302 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 303 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 304 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 305 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 306 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 307 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 308# endif 309 /* 310 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set 311 * via an explicit callback or parameters. 312 */ 313 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 314 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 315 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 316 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 317 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 318 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 319 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 320# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 321 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 322 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 323 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 324 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 325 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 326 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 327 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 328 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 329# endif 330}; 331 332static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = { 333 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 334 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384 335}; 336 337# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 338/* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */ 339static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = { 340# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 341 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 342 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 343# endif 344 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 345# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 346 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 347 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 348# endif 349 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 350# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 351 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 352 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 353# endif 354 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 355 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 356# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 357 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 358 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 359 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 360# endif 361 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 362 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 363# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 364 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 365 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 366# endif 367 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 368 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 369# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 370 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 371 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 372 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 373# endif 374 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 375 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 376 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 377}; 378# endif 379 380int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) 381{ 382 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ 383 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > 384 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0]))) 385 return 0; 386 return nid_list[curve_id - 1]; 387} 388 389int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 390{ 391 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ 392 switch (nid) { 393 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 394 return 1; 395 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 396 return 2; 397 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 398 return 3; 399 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 400 return 4; 401 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 402 return 5; 403 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 404 return 6; 405 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 406 return 7; 407 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 408 return 8; 409 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 410 return 9; 411 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 412 return 10; 413 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 414 return 11; 415 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 416 return 12; 417 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 418 return 13; 419 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 420 return 14; 421 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 422 return 15; 423 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 424 return 16; 425 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 426 return 17; 427 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 428 return 18; 429 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 430 return 19; 431 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 432 return 20; 433 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 434 return 21; 435 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 436 return 22; 437 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 438 return 23; 439 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 440 return 24; 441 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 442 return 25; 443 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 444 return 26; 445 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 446 return 27; 447 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 448 return 28; 449 default: 450 return 0; 451 } 452} 453 454/* 455 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise 456 * preferred list. 457 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e., 458 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves. 459 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format. 460 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such 461 * lists in the first place. 462 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly 463 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility 464 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.) 465 */ 466static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, 467 const unsigned char **pcurves, 468 size_t *num_curves) 469{ 470 size_t pcurveslen = 0; 471 if (sess) { 472 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 473 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 474 } else { 475 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */ 476 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 477 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: 478 *pcurves = suiteb_curves; 479 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves); 480 break; 481 482 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: 483 *pcurves = suiteb_curves; 484 pcurveslen = 2; 485 break; 486 487 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: 488 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2; 489 pcurveslen = 2; 490 break; 491 default: 492 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 493 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 494 } 495 if (!*pcurves) { 496# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 497 if (FIPS_mode()) { 498 *pcurves = fips_curves_default; 499 pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default); 500 } else 501# endif 502 { 503 if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { 504 *pcurves = eccurves_auto; 505 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto); 506 } else { 507 *pcurves = eccurves_all; 508 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all); 509 } 510 } 511 } 512 } 513 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */ 514 if (pcurveslen & 1) { 515 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 516 *num_curves = 0; 517 return 0; 518 } else { 519 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2; 520 return 1; 521 } 522} 523 524/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */ 525int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) 526{ 527 const unsigned char *curves; 528 size_t num_curves, i; 529 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); 530 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) 531 return 0; 532 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */ 533 if (suiteb_flags) { 534 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; 535 if (p[1]) 536 return 0; 537 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) { 538 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256) 539 return 0; 540 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) { 541 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384) 542 return 0; 543 } else /* Should never happen */ 544 return 0; 545 } 546 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) 547 return 0; 548 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) { 549 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1]) 550 return 1; 551 } 552 return 0; 553} 554 555/*- 556 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match. 557 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches 558 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for 559 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match. 560 */ 561int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) 562{ 563 const unsigned char *pref, *supp; 564 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j; 565 int k; 566 /* Can't do anything on client side */ 567 if (s->server == 0) 568 return -1; 569 if (nmatch == -2) { 570 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 571 /* 572 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know 573 * these are acceptable due to previous checks. 574 */ 575 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; 576 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) 577 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */ 578 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) 579 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */ 580 /* Should never happen */ 581 return NID_undef; 582 } 583 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */ 584 nmatch = 0; 585 } 586 /* 587 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int 588 * but s->options is a long... 589 */ 590 if (!tls1_get_curvelist 591 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp, 592 &num_supp)) 593 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */ 594 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; 595 if (!tls1_get_curvelist 596 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, 597 &num_pref)) 598 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; 599 600 /* 601 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them 602 * are allowed. 603 */ 604 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) { 605 supp = eccurves_all; 606 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; 607 } else if (num_pref == 0 && 608 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) { 609 pref = eccurves_all; 610 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; 611 } 612 613 k = 0; 614 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) { 615 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp; 616 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) { 617 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) { 618 if (nmatch == k) { 619 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1]; 620 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id); 621 } 622 k++; 623 } 624 } 625 } 626 if (nmatch == -1) 627 return k; 628 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */ 629 return NID_undef; 630} 631 632int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, 633 int *curves, size_t ncurves) 634{ 635 unsigned char *clist, *p; 636 size_t i; 637 /* 638 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve 639 * ids < 32 640 */ 641 unsigned long dup_list = 0; 642# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 643 EC_GROUP *curve; 644# endif 645 646 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2); 647 if (!clist) 648 return 0; 649 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) { 650 unsigned long idmask; 651 int id; 652 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]); 653# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 654 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */ 655 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) { 656 OPENSSL_free(clist); 657 return 0; 658 } 659# endif 660# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 661 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]); 662 if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve)) 663 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) { 664 if (curve) 665 EC_GROUP_free(curve); 666 OPENSSL_free(clist); 667 return 0; 668 } else 669 EC_GROUP_free(curve); 670# endif 671 idmask = 1L << id; 672 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) { 673 OPENSSL_free(clist); 674 return 0; 675 } 676 dup_list |= idmask; 677 s2n(id, p); 678 } 679 if (*pext) 680 OPENSSL_free(*pext); 681 *pext = clist; 682 *pextlen = ncurves * 2; 683 return 1; 684} 685 686# define MAX_CURVELIST 28 687 688typedef struct { 689 size_t nidcnt; 690 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST]; 691} nid_cb_st; 692 693static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) 694{ 695 nid_cb_st *narg = arg; 696 size_t i; 697 int nid; 698 char etmp[20]; 699 if (elem == NULL) 700 return 0; 701 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST) 702 return 0; 703 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) 704 return 0; 705 memcpy(etmp, elem, len); 706 etmp[len] = 0; 707 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp); 708 if (nid == NID_undef) 709 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp); 710 if (nid == NID_undef) 711 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp); 712 if (nid == NID_undef) 713 return 0; 714 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++) 715 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid) 716 return 0; 717 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid; 718 return 1; 719} 720 721/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */ 722int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, 723 const char *str) 724{ 725 nid_cb_st ncb; 726 ncb.nidcnt = 0; 727 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb)) 728 return 0; 729 if (pext == NULL) 730 return 1; 731 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt); 732} 733 734/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */ 735static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id, 736 EC_KEY *ec) 737{ 738 int is_prime, id; 739 const EC_GROUP *grp; 740 const EC_METHOD *meth; 741 if (!ec) 742 return 0; 743 /* Determine if it is a prime field */ 744 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); 745 if (!grp) 746 return 0; 747 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp); 748 if (!meth) 749 return 0; 750 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) 751 is_prime = 1; 752 else 753 is_prime = 0; 754 /* Determine curve ID */ 755 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); 756 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id); 757 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */ 758 if (id) { 759 curve_id[0] = 0; 760 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id; 761 } else { 762 curve_id[0] = 0xff; 763 if (is_prime) 764 curve_id[1] = 0x01; 765 else 766 curve_id[1] = 0x02; 767 } 768 if (comp_id) { 769 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) 770 return 0; 771 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { 772 if (is_prime) 773 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 774 else 775 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 776 } else 777 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 778 } 779 return 1; 780} 781 782/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */ 783static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, 784 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id) 785{ 786 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves; 787 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i; 788 int j; 789 /* 790 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is 791 * supported (see RFC4492). 792 */ 793 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 794 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 795 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 796 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) { 797 if (*comp_id == *pformats) 798 break; 799 } 800 if (i == num_formats) 801 return 0; 802 } 803 if (!curve_id) 804 return 1; 805 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */ 806 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) { 807 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves)) 808 return 0; 809 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) { 810 /* 811 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check. 812 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension 813 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve. 814 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves 815 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension. 816 */ 817 break; 818 } 819 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { 820 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1]) 821 break; 822 } 823 if (i == num_curves) 824 return 0; 825 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */ 826 if (!s->server) 827 return 1; 828 } 829 return 1; 830} 831 832static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats, 833 size_t *num_formats) 834{ 835 /* 836 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default 837 */ 838 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 839 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 840 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 841 } else { 842 *pformats = ecformats_default; 843 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */ 844 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) 845 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1; 846 else 847 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default); 848 } 849} 850 851/* 852 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC 853 * certificates have compatible curves and compression. 854 */ 855static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) 856{ 857 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2]; 858 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 859 int rv; 860 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); 861 if (!pkey) 862 return 0; 863 /* If not EC nothing to do */ 864 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) { 865 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 866 return 1; 867 } 868 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec); 869 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 870 if (!rv) 871 return 0; 872 /* 873 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported 874 * curves extension. 875 */ 876 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id); 877 if (!rv) 878 return 0; 879 /* 880 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or 881 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary. 882 */ 883 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) { 884 int check_md; 885 size_t i; 886 CERT *c = s->cert; 887 if (curve_id[0]) 888 return 0; 889 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */ 890 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) 891 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256; 892 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) 893 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384; 894 else 895 return 0; /* Should never happen */ 896 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) 897 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) 898 break; 899 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen) 900 return 0; 901 if (set_ee_md == 2) { 902 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) 903 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256(); 904 else 905 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384(); 906 } 907 } 908 return rv; 909} 910 911# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 912/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */ 913int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) 914{ 915 unsigned char curve_id[2]; 916 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp; 917# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 918 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */ 919 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) 920 return 1; 921# endif 922 /* 923 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other 924 * curves permitted. 925 */ 926 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 927 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */ 928 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) 929 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256; 930 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) 931 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384; 932 else 933 return 0; 934 curve_id[0] = 0; 935 /* Check this curve is acceptable */ 936 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL)) 937 return 0; 938 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */ 939 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) 940 return 1; 941 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */ 942 else { 943 unsigned char curve_tmp[2]; 944 if (!ec) 945 return 0; 946 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec)) 947 return 0; 948 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1]) 949 return 1; 950 return 0; 951 } 952 953 } 954 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { 955 /* Need a shared curve */ 956 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0)) 957 return 1; 958 else 959 return 0; 960 } 961 if (!ec) { 962 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) 963 return 1; 964 else 965 return 0; 966 } 967 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec)) 968 return 0; 969/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */ 970# if 0 971 return 1; 972# else 973 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL); 974# endif 975} 976# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 977 978#else 979 980static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) 981{ 982 return 1; 983} 984 985#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 986 987#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 988 989/* 990 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this 991 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. 992 */ 993 994# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 995# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ 996# else 997# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, 998# endif 999 1000# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 1001# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ 1002# else 1003# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, 1004# endif 1005 1006# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 1007# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 1008 /* */ 1009# else 1010# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, 1011# endif 1012 1013# define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ 1014 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ 1015 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ 1016 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 1017 1018static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { 1019# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 1020 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) 1021 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 1022# endif 1023# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 1024 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 1025 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) 1026# endif 1027# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 1028 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) 1029# endif 1030}; 1031 1032# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 1033static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = { 1034 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 1035 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 1036}; 1037# endif 1038size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned char **psigs) 1039{ 1040 /* 1041 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other 1042 * preferences. 1043 */ 1044# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1045 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 1046 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: 1047 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; 1048 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs); 1049 1050 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: 1051 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; 1052 return 2; 1053 1054 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: 1055 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2; 1056 return 2; 1057 } 1058# endif 1059 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */ 1060 if (s->server == sent && s->cert->client_sigalgs) { 1061 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs; 1062 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen; 1063 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) { 1064 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs; 1065 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen; 1066 } else { 1067 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs; 1068 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 1069 } 1070} 1071 1072/* 1073 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature 1074 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest. 1075 */ 1076int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, 1077 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey) 1078{ 1079 const unsigned char *sent_sigs; 1080 size_t sent_sigslen, i; 1081 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 1082 /* Should never happen */ 1083 if (sigalg == -1) 1084 return -1; 1085 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 1086 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) { 1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 1088 return 0; 1089 } 1090# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1091 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 1092 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id; 1093 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */ 1094 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec)) 1095 return 0; 1096 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) { 1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); 1098 return 0; 1099 } 1100 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */ 1101 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 1102 if (curve_id[0]) 1103 return 0; 1104 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) { 1105 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) { 1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, 1107 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); 1108 return 0; 1109 } 1110 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) { 1111 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) { 1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, 1113 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); 1114 return 0; 1115 } 1116 } else 1117 return 0; 1118 } 1119 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) 1120 return 0; 1121# endif 1122 1123 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */ 1124 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs); 1125 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) { 1126 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1]) 1127 break; 1128 } 1129 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */ 1130 if (i == sent_sigslen 1131 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 1132 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { 1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 1134 return 0; 1135 } 1136 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]); 1137 if (*pmd == NULL) { 1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 1139 return 0; 1140 } 1141 /* 1142 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish. 1143 */ 1144 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert) 1145 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd; 1146 return 1; 1147} 1148 1149/* 1150 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't 1151 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike 1152 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global 1153 * settings. 1154 */ 1155void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) 1156{ 1157 CERT *c = s->cert; 1158 const unsigned char *sigalgs; 1159 size_t i, sigalgslen; 1160 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0; 1161 c->mask_a = 0; 1162 c->mask_k = 0; 1163 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */ 1164 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) 1165 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; 1166 else 1167 c->mask_ssl = 0; 1168 /* 1169 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for 1170 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. 1171 */ 1172 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs); 1173 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) { 1174 switch (sigalgs[1]) { 1175# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1176 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 1177 have_rsa = 1; 1178 break; 1179# endif 1180# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 1181 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 1182 have_dsa = 1; 1183 break; 1184# endif 1185# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 1186 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 1187 have_ecdsa = 1; 1188 break; 1189# endif 1190 } 1191 } 1192 /* 1193 * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate 1194 * signature algorithms. 1195 */ 1196 if (!have_rsa) { 1197 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; 1198 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr; 1199 } 1200 if (!have_dsa) { 1201 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS; 1202 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd; 1203 } 1204 if (!have_ecdsa) { 1205 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; 1206 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe; 1207 } 1208# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 1209 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) { 1210 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5; 1211 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5; 1212 } 1213# endif 1214# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1215 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ 1216 if (!s->psk_client_callback) { 1217 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; 1218 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; 1219 } 1220# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1221# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1222 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) { 1223 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; 1224 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; 1225 } 1226# endif 1227 c->valid = 1; 1228} 1229 1230unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, 1231 unsigned char *limit, int *al) 1232{ 1233 int extdatalen = 0; 1234 unsigned char *orig = buf; 1235 unsigned char *ret = buf; 1236# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1237 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ 1238 int using_ecc = 0; 1239 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1240 int i; 1241 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 1242 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 1243 1244 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { 1245 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 1246 1247 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 1248 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 1249 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe) 1250 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { 1251 using_ecc = 1; 1252 break; 1253 } 1254 } 1255 } 1256# endif 1257 1258 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 1259 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 1260 return orig; 1261 1262 ret += 2; 1263 1264 if (ret >= limit) 1265 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 1266 1267 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { 1268 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 1269 size_t size_str; 1270 1271 /*- 1272 * check for enough space. 1273 * 4 for the servername type and entension length 1274 * 2 for servernamelist length 1275 * 1 for the hostname type 1276 * 2 for hostname length 1277 * + hostname length 1278 */ 1279 size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname); 1280 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + size_str, limit)) 1281 return NULL; 1282 1283 /* extension type and length */ 1284 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); 1285 s2n(size_str + 5, ret); 1286 1287 /* length of servername list */ 1288 s2n(size_str + 3, ret); 1289 1290 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 1291 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 1292 s2n(size_str, ret); 1293 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 1294 ret += size_str; 1295 } 1296 1297 /* Add RI if renegotiating */ 1298 if (s->renegotiate) { 1299 int el; 1300 1301 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { 1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1303 return NULL; 1304 } 1305 1306 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 1307 return NULL; 1308 1309 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); 1310 s2n(el, ret); 1311 1312 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1314 return NULL; 1315 } 1316 1317 ret += el; 1318 } 1319# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1320 /* Add SRP username if there is one */ 1321 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the 1322 * Client Hello message */ 1323 1324 size_t login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); 1325 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { 1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1327 return NULL; 1328 } 1329 1330 /*- 1331 * check for enough space. 1332 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length 1333 * 1 for the srp user identity 1334 * + srp user identity length 1335 */ 1336 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + login_len, limit)) 1337 return NULL; 1338 1339 /* fill in the extension */ 1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); 1341 s2n(login_len + 1, ret); 1342 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len; 1343 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); 1344 ret += login_len; 1345 } 1346# endif 1347 1348# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1349 if (using_ecc) { 1350 /* 1351 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message 1352 */ 1353 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats; 1354 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len; 1355 1356 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); 1357 1358 if (num_formats > 255) { 1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1360 return NULL; 1361 } 1362 /*- 1363 * check for enough space. 1364 * 4 bytes for the ec point formats type and extension length 1365 * 1 byte for the length of the formats 1366 * + formats length 1367 */ 1368 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + num_formats, limit)) 1369 return NULL; 1370 1371 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); 1372 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */ 1373 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret); 1374 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats; 1375 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats); 1376 ret += num_formats; 1377 1378 /* 1379 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message 1380 */ 1381 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 1382 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) 1383 return NULL; 1384 1385 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) { 1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1387 return NULL; 1388 } 1389 curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves; 1390 /*- 1391 * check for enough space. 1392 * 4 bytes for the ec curves type and extension length 1393 * 2 bytes for the curve list length 1394 * + curve list length 1395 */ 1396 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + curves_list_len, limit)) 1397 return NULL; 1398 1399 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); 1400 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret); 1401 s2n(curves_list_len, ret); 1402 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len); 1403 ret += curves_list_len; 1404 } 1405# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1406 1407 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { 1408 size_t ticklen; 1409 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 1410 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 1411 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 1412 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { 1413 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 1414 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 1415 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 1416 return NULL; 1417 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, 1418 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); 1419 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 1420 } else 1421 ticklen = 0; 1422 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 1423 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 1424 goto skip_ext; 1425 /* 1426 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for 1427 * ticket 1428 */ 1429 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + ticklen, limit)) 1430 return NULL; 1431 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); 1432 s2n(ticklen, ret); 1433 if (ticklen > 0) { 1434 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 1435 ret += ticklen; 1436 } 1437 } 1438 skip_ext: 1439 1440 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1441 size_t salglen; 1442 const unsigned char *salg; 1443 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg); 1444 1445 /*- 1446 * check for enough space. 1447 * 4 bytes for the sigalgs type and extension length 1448 * 2 bytes for the sigalg list length 1449 * + sigalg list length 1450 */ 1451 if (CHECKLEN(ret, salglen + 6, limit)) 1452 return NULL; 1453 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); 1454 s2n(salglen + 2, ret); 1455 s2n(salglen, ret); 1456 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen); 1457 ret += salglen; 1458 } 1459# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1460 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1461 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 1462 1463 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) 1464 return NULL; 1465 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 1466 return NULL; 1467 1468 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 1469 s2n(col + 2, ret); 1470 s2n(col, ret); 1471 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); 1472 ret += col; 1473 } 1474# endif 1475 1476 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { 1477 int i; 1478 size_t extlen, idlen; 1479 int lentmp; 1480 OCSP_RESPID *id; 1481 1482 idlen = 0; 1483 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { 1484 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 1485 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); 1486 if (lentmp <= 0) 1487 return NULL; 1488 idlen += (size_t)lentmp + 2; 1489 } 1490 1491 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { 1492 lentmp = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); 1493 if (lentmp < 0) 1494 return NULL; 1495 extlen = (size_t)lentmp; 1496 } else 1497 extlen = 0; 1498 1499 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) 1500 return NULL; 1501 /* 1502 * 2 bytes for status request type 1503 * 2 bytes for status request len 1504 * 1 byte for OCSP request type 1505 * 2 bytes for length of ids 1506 * 2 bytes for length of extensions 1507 * + length of ids 1508 * + length of extensions 1509 */ 1510 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + idlen + extlen, limit)) 1511 return NULL; 1512 1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 1514 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); 1515 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 1516 s2n(idlen, ret); 1517 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { 1518 /* save position of id len */ 1519 unsigned char *q = ret; 1520 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 1521 /* skip over id len */ 1522 ret += 2; 1523 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); 1524 /* write id len */ 1525 s2n(lentmp, q); 1526 } 1527 s2n(extlen, ret); 1528 if (extlen > 0) 1529 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); 1530 } 1531# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1532 /* Add Heartbeat extension */ 1533 1534 /*- 1535 * check for enough space. 1536 * 4 bytes for the heartbeat ext type and extension length 1537 * 1 byte for the mode 1538 */ 1539 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit)) 1540 return NULL; 1541 1542 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); 1543 s2n(1, ret); 1544 /*- 1545 * Set mode: 1546 * 1: peer may send requests 1547 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 1548 */ 1549 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 1550 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1551 else 1552 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1553# endif 1554 1555# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1556 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { 1557 /* 1558 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support 1559 * for Next Protocol Negotiation 1560 */ 1561 1562 /*- 1563 * check for enough space. 1564 * 4 bytes for the NPN ext type and extension length 1565 */ 1566 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) 1567 return NULL; 1568 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); 1569 s2n(0, ret); 1570 } 1571# endif 1572 1573 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { 1574 /*- 1575 * check for enough space. 1576 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length 1577 * 2 bytes for the ALPN protocol list length 1578 * + ALPN protocol list length 1579 */ 1580 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, limit)) 1581 return NULL; 1582 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); 1583 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); 1584 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); 1585 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len); 1586 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len; 1587 s->cert->alpn_sent = 1; 1588 } 1589# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1590 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { 1591 int el; 1592 1593 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 1594 1595 /*- 1596 * check for enough space. 1597 * 4 bytes for the SRTP type and extension length 1598 * + SRTP profiles length 1599 */ 1600 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) 1601 return NULL; 1602 1603 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); 1604 s2n(el, ret); 1605 1606 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1608 return NULL; 1609 } 1610 ret += el; 1611 } 1612# endif 1613 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext); 1614 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */ 1615 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al)) 1616 return NULL; 1617 1618 /* 1619 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See 1620 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this 1621 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always 1622 * appear last. 1623 */ 1624 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { 1625 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1626 /* 1627 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the 1628 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c 1629 * does not. 1630 */ 1631 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) 1632 hlen -= 5; 1633 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { 1634 hlen = 0x200 - hlen; 1635 if (hlen >= 4) 1636 hlen -= 4; 1637 else 1638 hlen = 0; 1639 1640 /*- 1641 * check for enough space. Strictly speaking we know we've already 1642 * got enough space because to get here the message size is < 0x200, 1643 * but we know that we've allocated far more than that in the buffer 1644 * - but for consistency and robustness we're going to check anyway. 1645 * 1646 * 4 bytes for the padding type and extension length 1647 * + padding length 1648 */ 1649 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + hlen, limit)) 1650 return NULL; 1651 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); 1652 s2n(hlen, ret); 1653 memset(ret, 0, hlen); 1654 ret += hlen; 1655 } 1656 } 1657 1658 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) 1659 return orig; 1660 1661 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 1662 return ret; 1663} 1664 1665unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, 1666 unsigned char *limit, int *al) 1667{ 1668 int extdatalen = 0; 1669 unsigned char *orig = buf; 1670 unsigned char *ret = buf; 1671# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1672 int next_proto_neg_seen; 1673# endif 1674# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1675 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1676 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1677 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) 1678 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 1679 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 1680# endif 1681 /* 1682 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation 1683 */ 1684 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 1685 return orig; 1686 1687 ret += 2; 1688 if (ret >= limit) 1689 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 1690 1691 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 1692 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { 1693 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 1694 return NULL; 1695 1696 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); 1697 s2n(0, ret); 1698 } 1699 1700 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { 1701 int el; 1702 1703 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { 1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1705 return NULL; 1706 } 1707 1708 /*- 1709 * check for enough space. 1710 * 4 bytes for the reneg type and extension length 1711 * + reneg data length 1712 */ 1713 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) 1714 return NULL; 1715 1716 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); 1717 s2n(el, ret); 1718 1719 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1721 return NULL; 1722 } 1723 1724 ret += el; 1725 } 1726# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1727 if (using_ecc) { 1728 const unsigned char *plist; 1729 size_t plistlen; 1730 /* 1731 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message 1732 */ 1733 1734 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); 1735 1736 if (plistlen > 255) { 1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1738 return NULL; 1739 } 1740 1741 /*- 1742 * check for enough space. 1743 * 4 bytes for the ec points format type and extension length 1744 * 1 byte for the points format list length 1745 * + length of points format list 1746 */ 1747 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + plistlen, limit)) 1748 return NULL; 1749 1750 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); 1751 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret); 1752 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen; 1753 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen); 1754 ret += plistlen; 1755 1756 } 1757 /* 1758 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves 1759 * extension 1760 */ 1761# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1762 1763 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { 1764 /*- 1765 * check for enough space. 1766 * 4 bytes for the Ticket type and extension length 1767 */ 1768 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) 1769 return NULL; 1770 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); 1771 s2n(0, ret); 1772 } else { 1773 /* if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket later */ 1774 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 1775 } 1776 1777 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { 1778 /*- 1779 * check for enough space. 1780 * 4 bytes for the Status request type and extension length 1781 */ 1782 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) 1783 return NULL; 1784 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 1785 s2n(0, ret); 1786 } 1787# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1788 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1789 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 1790 1791 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) 1792 return NULL; 1793 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 1794 return NULL; 1795 1796 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 1797 s2n(sol + 2, ret); 1798 s2n(sol, ret); 1799 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); 1800 ret += sol; 1801 } 1802# endif 1803 1804# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1805 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { 1806 int el; 1807 1808 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 1809 1810 /*- 1811 * check for enough space. 1812 * 4 bytes for the SRTP profiles type and extension length 1813 * + length of the SRTP profiles list 1814 */ 1815 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) 1816 return NULL; 1817 1818 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); 1819 s2n(el, ret); 1820 1821 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1823 return NULL; 1824 } 1825 ret += el; 1826 } 1827# endif 1828 1829 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 1830 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) 1831 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) { 1832 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 1833 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ 1834 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ 1835 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 1836 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 1837 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 1838 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 1839 }; 1840 1841 /* check for enough space. */ 1842 if (CHECKLEN(ret, sizeof(cryptopro_ext), limit)) 1843 return NULL; 1844 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext)); 1845 ret += sizeof(cryptopro_ext); 1846 1847 } 1848# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1849 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ 1850 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) { 1851 /*- 1852 * check for enough space. 1853 * 4 bytes for the Heartbeat type and extension length 1854 * 1 byte for the mode 1855 */ 1856 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit)) 1857 return NULL; 1858 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); 1859 s2n(1, ret); 1860 /*- 1861 * Set mode: 1862 * 1: peer may send requests 1863 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 1864 */ 1865 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 1866 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1867 else 1868 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1869 1870 } 1871# endif 1872 1873# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1874 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; 1875 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1876 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { 1877 const unsigned char *npa; 1878 unsigned int npalen; 1879 int r; 1880 1881 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, 1882 s-> 1883 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); 1884 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 1885 /*- 1886 * check for enough space. 1887 * 4 bytes for the NPN type and extension length 1888 * + length of protocols list 1889 */ 1890 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + npalen, limit)) 1891 return NULL; 1892 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); 1893 s2n(npalen, ret); 1894 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); 1895 ret += npalen; 1896 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1897 } 1898 } 1899# endif 1900 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al)) 1901 return NULL; 1902 1903 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { 1904 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected; 1905 size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; 1906 1907 /*- 1908 * check for enough space. 1909 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length 1910 * 2 bytes for ALPN data length 1911 * 1 byte for selected protocol length 1912 * + length of the selected protocol 1913 */ 1914 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 7 + len, limit)) 1915 return NULL; 1916 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); 1917 s2n(3 + len, ret); 1918 s2n(1 + len, ret); 1919 *ret++ = (unsigned char)len; 1920 memcpy(ret, selected, len); 1921 ret += len; 1922 } 1923 1924 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) 1925 return orig; 1926 1927 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 1928 return ret; 1929} 1930 1931# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1932/*- 1933 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X 1934 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. 1935 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: 1936 * SNI, 1937 * elliptic_curves 1938 * ec_point_formats 1939 * 1940 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, 1941 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. 1942 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from 1943 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). 1944 */ 1945static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 1946 const unsigned char *limit) 1947{ 1948 unsigned short type, size; 1949 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 1950 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 1951 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 1952 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 1953 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 1954 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 1955 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 1956 1957 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 1958 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 1959 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 1960 0x00, /* uncompressed */ 1961 }; 1962 1963 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 1964 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { 1965 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 1966 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 1967 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 1968 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 1969 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 1970 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 1971 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 1972 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ 1973 }; 1974 1975 if (limit - data <= 2) 1976 return; 1977 data += 2; 1978 1979 if (limit - data < 4) 1980 return; 1981 n2s(data, type); 1982 n2s(data, size); 1983 1984 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1985 return; 1986 1987 if (limit - data < size) 1988 return; 1989 data += size; 1990 1991 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 1992 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 1993 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); 1994 1995 if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2)) 1996 return; 1997 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) 1998 return; 1999 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) 2000 return; 2001 } else { 2002 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 2003 2004 if (limit - data != (int)(len)) 2005 return; 2006 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) 2007 return; 2008 } 2009 2010 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; 2011} 2012# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2013 2014/* 2015 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to save the ALPN extension in a 2016 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type 2017 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the 2018 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on 2019 * success. 2020 */ 2021static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 2022 unsigned data_len, int *al) 2023{ 2024 unsigned i; 2025 unsigned proto_len; 2026 2027 if (data_len < 2) 2028 goto parse_error; 2029 2030 /* 2031 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit, 2032 * length-prefixed strings. 2033 */ 2034 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]); 2035 data_len -= 2; 2036 data += 2; 2037 if (data_len != i) 2038 goto parse_error; 2039 2040 if (data_len < 2) 2041 goto parse_error; 2042 2043 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) { 2044 proto_len = data[i]; 2045 i++; 2046 2047 if (proto_len == 0) 2048 goto parse_error; 2049 2050 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len) 2051 goto parse_error; 2052 2053 i += proto_len; 2054 } 2055 2056 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) 2057 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed); 2058 s->cert->alpn_proposed = OPENSSL_malloc(data_len); 2059 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed == NULL) { 2060 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2061 return -1; 2062 } 2063 memcpy(s->cert->alpn_proposed, data, data_len); 2064 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = data_len; 2065 return 0; 2066 2067 parse_error: 2068 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2069 return -1; 2070} 2071 2072/* 2073 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. 2074 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. 2075 * returns 1 on success, 0 on failure: al set only on failure 2076 */ 2077static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al) 2078{ 2079 const unsigned char *selected = NULL; 2080 unsigned char selected_len = 0; 2081 2082 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) { 2083 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, 2084 s->cert->alpn_proposed, 2085 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len, 2086 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); 2087 2088 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 2089 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2090 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 2091 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { 2092 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2093 return 0; 2094 } 2095 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len); 2096 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; 2097# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2098 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ 2099 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 2100# endif 2101 } 2102 } 2103 2104 return 1; 2105} 2106 2107static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, 2108 unsigned char *limit, int *al) 2109{ 2110 unsigned short type; 2111 unsigned short size; 2112 unsigned short len; 2113 unsigned char *data = *p; 2114 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 2115 2116 s->servername_done = 0; 2117 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 2118# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2119 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 2120# endif 2121 2122 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { 2123 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2124 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; 2125 } 2126 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0; 2127 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed) { 2128 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed); 2129 s->cert->alpn_proposed = NULL; 2130 } 2131 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = 0; 2132# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2133 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 2134 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 2135# endif 2136 2137# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2138 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) 2139 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit); 2140# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2141 2142 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ 2143 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) { 2144 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs); 2145 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL; 2146 } 2147# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2148 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { 2149 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); 2150 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; 2151 } 2152# endif 2153 2154 s->srtp_profile = NULL; 2155 2156 if (data == limit) 2157 goto ri_check; 2158 2159 if (limit - data < 2) 2160 goto err; 2161 2162 n2s(data, len); 2163 2164 if (limit - data != len) 2165 goto err; 2166 2167 while (limit - data >= 4) { 2168 n2s(data, type); 2169 n2s(data, size); 2170 2171 if (limit - data < size) 2172 goto err; 2173# if 0 2174 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); 2175# endif 2176 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 2177 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); 2178/*- 2179 * The servername extension is treated as follows: 2180 * 2181 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 2182 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 2183 * in which case an fatal alert is generated. 2184 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 2185 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 2186 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 2187 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 2188 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 2189 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 2190 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 2191 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 2192 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 2193 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 2194 * the value of the Host: field. 2195 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 2196 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the 2197 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername 2198 * extension. 2199 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 2200 * 2201 */ 2202 2203 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { 2204 unsigned char *sdata; 2205 int servname_type; 2206 int dsize; 2207 2208 if (size < 2) 2209 goto err; 2210 n2s(data, dsize); 2211 size -= 2; 2212 if (dsize > size) 2213 goto err; 2214 2215 sdata = data; 2216 while (dsize > 3) { 2217 servname_type = *(sdata++); 2218 n2s(sdata, len); 2219 dsize -= 3; 2220 2221 if (len > dsize) 2222 goto err; 2223 2224 if (s->servername_done == 0) 2225 switch (servname_type) { 2226 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: 2227 if (!s->hit) { 2228 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) 2229 goto err; 2230 2231 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { 2232 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2233 return 0; 2234 } 2235 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = 2236 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { 2237 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2238 return 0; 2239 } 2240 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); 2241 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; 2242 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { 2243 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); 2244 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 2245 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2246 return 0; 2247 } 2248 s->servername_done = 1; 2249 2250 } else 2251 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname 2252 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 2253 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, 2254 (char *)sdata, len) == 0; 2255 2256 break; 2257 2258 default: 2259 break; 2260 } 2261 2262 dsize -= len; 2263 } 2264 if (dsize != 0) 2265 goto err; 2266 2267 } 2268# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2269 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { 2270 if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) 2271 goto err; 2272 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 2273 goto err; 2274 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) 2275 return -1; 2276 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); 2277 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; 2278 2279 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) 2280 goto err; 2281 } 2282# endif 2283 2284# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2285 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { 2286 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2287 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 2288 2289 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 2290 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) 2291 goto err; 2292 if (!s->hit) { 2293 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 2294 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 2295 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; 2296 } 2297 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 2298 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = 2299 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { 2300 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2301 return 0; 2302 } 2303 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 2304 ecpointformatlist_length; 2305 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, 2306 ecpointformatlist_length); 2307 } 2308# if 0 2309 fprintf(stderr, 2310 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", 2311 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 2312 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 2313 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 2314 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 2315 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 2316# endif 2317 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { 2318 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2319 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); 2320 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); 2321 2322 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || 2323 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 || 2324 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */ 2325 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) 2326 goto err; 2327 2328 if (!s->hit) { 2329 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) 2330 goto err; 2331 2332 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 2333 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = 2334 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { 2335 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2336 return 0; 2337 } 2338 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 2339 ellipticcurvelist_length; 2340 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, 2341 ellipticcurvelist_length); 2342 } 2343# if 0 2344 fprintf(stderr, 2345 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", 2346 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 2347 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 2348 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) 2349 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 2350 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 2351# endif 2352 } 2353# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2354# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2355 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) { 2356 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2357 2358 if (size < 2) { 2359 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2360 return 0; 2361 } 2362 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 2363 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { 2364 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2365 return 0; 2366 } 2367 2368 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2369 /* shouldn't really happen */ 2370 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 2371 } 2372 2373 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2374 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 2375 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 2376 else 2377 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = 2378 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 2379 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2380 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2381 return 0; 2382 } 2383 } 2384# endif 2385 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 2386 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 2387 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, 2388 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 2389 { 2390 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2391 return 0; 2392 } 2393 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { 2394 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2395 return 0; 2396 renegotiate_seen = 1; 2397 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { 2398 int dsize; 2399 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) 2400 goto err; 2401 n2s(data, dsize); 2402 size -= 2; 2403 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) 2404 goto err; 2405 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) 2406 goto err; 2407 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { 2408 2409 if (size < 5) 2410 goto err; 2411 2412 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; 2413 size--; 2414 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { 2415 const unsigned char *sdata; 2416 int dsize; 2417 /* Read in responder_id_list */ 2418 n2s(data, dsize); 2419 size -= 2; 2420 if (dsize > size) 2421 goto err; 2422 2423 /* 2424 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake 2425 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 2426 */ 2427 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, 2428 OCSP_RESPID_free); 2429 if (dsize > 0) { 2430 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); 2431 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) { 2432 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2433 return 0; 2434 } 2435 } else { 2436 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; 2437 } 2438 2439 while (dsize > 0) { 2440 OCSP_RESPID *id; 2441 int idsize; 2442 if (dsize < 4) 2443 goto err; 2444 n2s(data, idsize); 2445 dsize -= 2 + idsize; 2446 size -= 2 + idsize; 2447 if (dsize < 0) 2448 goto err; 2449 sdata = data; 2450 data += idsize; 2451 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); 2452 if (!id) 2453 goto err; 2454 if (data != sdata) { 2455 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 2456 goto err; 2457 } 2458 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { 2459 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 2460 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2461 return 0; 2462 } 2463 } 2464 2465 /* Read in request_extensions */ 2466 if (size < 2) 2467 goto err; 2468 n2s(data, dsize); 2469 size -= 2; 2470 if (dsize != size) 2471 goto err; 2472 sdata = data; 2473 if (dsize > 0) { 2474 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { 2475 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, 2476 X509_EXTENSION_free); 2477 } 2478 2479 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = 2480 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); 2481 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) 2482 goto err; 2483 } 2484 } 2485 /* 2486 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. 2487 */ 2488 else 2489 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 2490 } 2491# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2492 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { 2493 switch (data[0]) { 2494 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ 2495 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2496 break; 2497 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ 2498 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2499 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 2500 break; 2501 default: 2502 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2503 return 0; 2504 } 2505 } 2506# endif 2507# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2508 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 2509 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 2510 /*- 2511 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a 2512 * renegotiation. 2513 * 2514 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we 2515 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on 2516 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when 2517 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an 2518 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing 2519 * anything like that, but this might change). 2520 * 2521 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake 2522 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 2523 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen 2524 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new 2525 * Finished message could have been computed.) 2526 */ 2527 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 2528 } 2529# endif 2530 2531 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation && 2532 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 2533 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0) 2534 return 0; 2535 } 2536 2537 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 2538# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 2539 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) 2540 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { 2541 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2542 return 0; 2543 } 2544# endif 2545 2546 data += size; 2547 } 2548 2549 /* Spurious data on the end */ 2550 if (data != limit) 2551 goto err; 2552 2553 *p = data; 2554 2555 ri_check: 2556 2557 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 2558 2559 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && 2560 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 2561 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 2563 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 2564 return 0; 2565 } 2566 2567 return 1; 2568err: 2569 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2570 return 0; 2571} 2572 2573/* 2574 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data 2575 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking. 2576 */ 2577 2578static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, 2579 const unsigned char *data, 2580 const unsigned char *limit, 2581 int *al) 2582{ 2583 unsigned short type, size, len; 2584 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */ 2585 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0) 2586 return 1; 2587 2588 if (limit - data <= 2) 2589 return 1; 2590 n2s(data, len); 2591 2592 if (limit - data < len) 2593 return 1; 2594 2595 while (limit - data >= 4) { 2596 n2s(data, type); 2597 n2s(data, size); 2598 2599 if (limit - data < size) 2600 return 1; 2601 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0) 2602 return 0; 2603 2604 data += size; 2605 } 2606 2607 return 1; 2608} 2609 2610int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, 2611 unsigned char *limit) 2612{ 2613 int al = -1; 2614 unsigned char *ptmp = *p; 2615 /* 2616 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled 2617 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically 2618 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions 2619 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure. 2620 */ 2621 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, limit, &al) <= 0) { 2622 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2623 return 0; 2624 } 2625 2626 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 2628 return 0; 2629 } 2630 2631 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext); 2632 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, limit, &al) <= 0) { 2633 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2634 return 0; 2635 } 2636 2637 return 1; 2638} 2639 2640# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2641/* 2642 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No 2643 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly 2644 * fill the length of the block. 2645 */ 2646static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) 2647{ 2648 unsigned int off = 0; 2649 2650 while (off < len) { 2651 if (d[off] == 0) 2652 return 0; 2653 off += d[off]; 2654 off++; 2655 } 2656 2657 return off == len; 2658} 2659# endif 2660 2661static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, 2662 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 2663{ 2664 unsigned short length; 2665 unsigned short type; 2666 unsigned short size; 2667 unsigned char *data = *p; 2668 int tlsext_servername = 0; 2669 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 2670 2671# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2672 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 2673# endif 2674 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 2675 2676 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { 2677 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2678 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; 2679 } 2680# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2681 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 2682 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 2683# endif 2684 2685 if ((d + n) - data <= 2) 2686 goto ri_check; 2687 2688 n2s(data, length); 2689 if ((d + n) - data != length) { 2690 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2691 return 0; 2692 } 2693 2694 while ((d + n) - data >= 4) { 2695 n2s(data, type); 2696 n2s(data, size); 2697 2698 if ((d + n) - data < size) 2699 goto ri_check; 2700 2701 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 2702 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); 2703 2704 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { 2705 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { 2706 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2707 return 0; 2708 } 2709 tlsext_servername = 1; 2710 } 2711# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2712 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { 2713 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2714 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 2715 2716 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { 2717 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2718 return 0; 2719 } 2720 if (!s->hit) { 2721 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 2722 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 2723 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 2724 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = 2725 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { 2726 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2727 return 0; 2728 } 2729 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 2730 ecpointformatlist_length; 2731 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, 2732 ecpointformatlist_length); 2733 } 2734# if 0 2735 fprintf(stderr, 2736 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); 2737 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 2738 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 2739 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 2740 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 2741# endif 2742 } 2743# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2744 2745 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 2746 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 2747 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, 2748 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 2749 { 2750 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2751 return 0; 2752 } 2753 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 2754 || (size > 0)) { 2755 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2756 return 0; 2757 } 2758 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2759 } 2760# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2761 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) { 2762 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2763 2764 if (size < 2) { 2765 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2766 return 0; 2767 } 2768 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 2769 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { 2770 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2771 return 0; 2772 } 2773 2774 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2775 /* shouldn't really happen */ 2776 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 2777 } 2778 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 2779 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2780 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 2781 } else { 2782 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = 2783 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 2784 } 2785 2786 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2787 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2788 return 0; 2789 } 2790 } 2791# endif 2792 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { 2793 /* 2794 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status 2795 * request message. 2796 */ 2797 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { 2798 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2799 return 0; 2800 } 2801 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ 2802 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 2803 } 2804# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2805 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 2806 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 2807 unsigned char *selected; 2808 unsigned char selected_len; 2809 2810 /* We must have requested it. */ 2811 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { 2812 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2813 return 0; 2814 } 2815 /* The data must be valid */ 2816 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) { 2817 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2818 return 0; 2819 } 2820 if (s-> 2821 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, 2822 size, 2823 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != 2824 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 2825 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2826 return 0; 2827 } 2828 /* 2829 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in 2830 * a single Serverhello 2831 */ 2832 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); 2833 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 2834 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { 2835 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2836 return 0; 2837 } 2838 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); 2839 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; 2840 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 2841 } 2842# endif 2843 2844 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) { 2845 unsigned len; 2846 2847 /* We must have requested it. */ 2848 if (!s->cert->alpn_sent) { 2849 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2850 return 0; 2851 } 2852 if (size < 4) { 2853 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2854 return 0; 2855 } 2856 /*- 2857 * The extension data consists of: 2858 * uint16 list_length 2859 * uint8 proto_length; 2860 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; 2861 */ 2862 len = data[0]; 2863 len <<= 8; 2864 len |= data[1]; 2865 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) { 2866 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2867 return 0; 2868 } 2869 len = data[2]; 2870 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) { 2871 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2872 return 0; 2873 } 2874 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) 2875 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2876 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len); 2877 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) { 2878 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2879 return 0; 2880 } 2881 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len); 2882 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; 2883 } 2884 2885 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { 2886 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2887 return 0; 2888 renegotiate_seen = 1; 2889 } 2890# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2891 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { 2892 switch (data[0]) { 2893 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ 2894 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2895 break; 2896 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ 2897 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2898 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 2899 break; 2900 default: 2901 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2902 return 0; 2903 } 2904 } 2905# endif 2906# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 2907 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { 2908 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2909 return 0; 2910 } 2911# endif 2912 /* 2913 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a 2914 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback 2915 */ 2916 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0) 2917 return 0; 2918 2919 data += size; 2920 } 2921 2922 if (data != d + n) { 2923 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2924 return 0; 2925 } 2926 2927 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { 2928 if (s->tlsext_hostname) { 2929 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { 2930 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 2931 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { 2932 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2933 return 0; 2934 } 2935 } else { 2936 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2937 return 0; 2938 } 2939 } 2940 } 2941 2942 *p = data; 2943 2944 ri_check: 2945 2946 /* 2947 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid 2948 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello 2949 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. 2950 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which 2951 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on 2952 * initial connect only. 2953 */ 2954 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) 2955 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 2956 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 2958 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 2959 return 0; 2960 } 2961 2962 return 1; 2963} 2964 2965int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2966{ 2967 2968# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2969 { 2970 int r = 1; 2971 2972 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { 2973 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, 2974 s-> 2975 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 2976 if (!r) 2977 return -1; 2978 } 2979 2980 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2981 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2982 /* shouldn't really happen */ 2983 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 2984 } 2985 2986 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 2987 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2988 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 2989 } else { 2990 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = 2991 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, 2992 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 2993 } 2994 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 2996 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2997 return -1; 2998 } 2999 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = 3000 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 3001 } 3002 3003 if (r == 2) 3004 /* 3005 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate 3006 * server opaque PRF input 3007 */ 3008 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = 3009 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 3010 } 3011# endif 3012 3013 s->cert->alpn_sent = 0; 3014 return 1; 3015} 3016 3017int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 3018{ 3019 return 1; 3020} 3021 3022static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) 3023{ 3024 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 3025 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 3026 3027# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 3028 /* 3029 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely 3030 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 3031 */ 3032 /* 3033 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely 3034 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 3035 */ 3036# endif 3037 3038 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 3039 ret = 3040 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 3041 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 3042 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL 3043 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 3044 ret = 3045 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 3046 s-> 3047 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 3048 3049# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 3050 { 3051 /* 3052 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we 3053 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this 3054 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). 3055 */ 3056 3057 int r = 1; 3058 3059 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { 3060 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, 3061 s-> 3062 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 3063 if (!r) { 3064 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3065 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3066 goto err; 3067 } 3068 } 3069 3070 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 3071 /* shouldn't really happen */ 3072 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 3073 } 3074 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; 3075 3076 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 3077 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 3078 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 3079 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) { 3080 /* 3081 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF 3082 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! 3083 */ 3084 3085 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 3086 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 3087 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 3088 } else { 3089 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = 3090 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, 3091 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 3092 } 3093 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 3094 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3095 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3096 goto err; 3097 } 3098 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = 3099 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 3100 } 3101 } 3102 3103 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 3104 /* 3105 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we 3106 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the 3107 * handshake. 3108 */ 3109 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3110 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3111 } 3112 } 3113 3114 err: 3115# endif 3116 switch (ret) { 3117 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 3118 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3119 return -1; 3120 3121 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 3122 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 3123 return 1; 3124 3125 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 3126 s->servername_done = 0; 3127 default: 3128 return 1; 3129 } 3130} 3131 3132int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) 3133{ 3134 int al; 3135 size_t i; 3136 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */ 3137 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { 3138 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs); 3139 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL; 3140 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0; 3141 } 3142 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ 3143 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { 3144 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL; 3145 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0; 3146 } 3147 3148 /* If sigalgs received process it. */ 3149 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) { 3150 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { 3151 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3152 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3153 goto err; 3154 } 3155 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */ 3156 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { 3157 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, 3158 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS); 3159 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 3160 goto err; 3161 } 3162 } else 3163 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert); 3164 return 1; 3165 err: 3166 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3167 return 0; 3168} 3169 3170/* 3171 * Upon success, returns 1. 3172 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert. 3173 */ 3174int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al) 3175{ 3176 3177 /* 3178 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be 3179 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, 3180 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may 3181 * influence which certificate is sent 3182 */ 3183 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { 3184 int ret; 3185 CERT_PKEY *certpkey; 3186 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); 3187 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ 3188 if (certpkey != NULL) { 3189 /* 3190 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate 3191 * et al can pick it up. 3192 */ 3193 s->cert->key = certpkey; 3194 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 3195 switch (ret) { 3196 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 3197 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 3198 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 3199 break; 3200 /* status request response should be sent */ 3201 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 3202 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 3203 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 3204 break; 3205 /* something bad happened */ 3206 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 3207 default: 3208 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3209 return 0; 3210 } 3211 } 3212 } 3213 3214 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) { 3215 return 0; 3216 } 3217 3218 return 1; 3219} 3220 3221int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 3222{ 3223 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 3224 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 3225 3226# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 3227 /* 3228 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 3229 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it 3230 * must contain uncompressed. 3231 */ 3232 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 3233 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 3234 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 3235 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) 3236 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 3237 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) 3238 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) 3239 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { 3240 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 3241 size_t i; 3242 unsigned char *list; 3243 int found_uncompressed = 0; 3244 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 3245 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { 3246 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { 3247 found_uncompressed = 1; 3248 break; 3249 } 3250 } 3251 if (!found_uncompressed) { 3252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 3253 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 3254 return -1; 3255 } 3256 } 3257 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 3258# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 3259 3260 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 3261 ret = 3262 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 3263 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 3264 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL 3265 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 3266 ret = 3267 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 3268 s-> 3269 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 3270 3271# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 3272 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) { 3273 /* 3274 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on 3275 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a 3276 * value from the server too. 3277 */ 3278 3279 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 3280 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3281 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3282 } 3283 3284 /* 3285 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to 3286 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. 3287 */ 3288 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || 3289 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != 3290 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) { 3291 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3292 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 3293 } 3294 } 3295# endif 3296 3297 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); 3298 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; 3299 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; 3300 /* 3301 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the 3302 * callback 3303 */ 3304 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) 3305 && !(s->hit) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { 3306 int r; 3307 /* 3308 * Call callback with resp == NULL and resplen == -1 so callback 3309 * knows there is no response 3310 */ 3311 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 3312 if (r == 0) { 3313 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; 3314 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3315 } 3316 if (r < 0) { 3317 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3318 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3319 } 3320 } 3321 3322 switch (ret) { 3323 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 3324 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3325 return -1; 3326 3327 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 3328 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 3329 return 1; 3330 3331 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 3332 s->servername_done = 0; 3333 default: 3334 return 1; 3335 } 3336} 3337 3338int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, 3339 int n) 3340{ 3341 int al = -1; 3342 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) 3343 return 1; 3344 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) { 3345 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3346 return 0; 3347 } 3348 3349 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { 3350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 3351 return 0; 3352 } 3353 return 1; 3354} 3355 3356/*- 3357 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the 3358 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle 3359 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. 3360 * 3361 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will 3362 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket 3363 * extension, if any. 3364 * len: the length of the session ID. 3365 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. 3366 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 3367 * point to the resulting session. 3368 * 3369 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key 3370 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will 3371 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. 3372 * 3373 * Returns: 3374 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 3375 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). 3376 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports 3377 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. 3378 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but 3379 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. 3380 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. 3381 * 3382 * Side effects: 3383 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue 3384 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support 3385 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have 3386 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if 3387 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. 3388 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. 3389 */ 3390int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, 3391 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) 3392{ 3393 /* Point after session ID in client hello */ 3394 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; 3395 unsigned short i; 3396 3397 *ret = NULL; 3398 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 3399 3400 /* 3401 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful 3402 * resumption. 3403 */ 3404 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 3405 return 0; 3406 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) 3407 return 0; 3408 if (p >= limit) 3409 return -1; 3410 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 3411 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 3412 i = *(p++); 3413 3414 if (limit - p <= i) 3415 return -1; 3416 3417 p += i; 3418 } 3419 /* Skip past cipher list */ 3420 n2s(p, i); 3421 if (limit - p <= i) 3422 return -1; 3423 p += i; 3424 3425 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ 3426 i = *(p++); 3427 if (limit - p < i) 3428 return -1; 3429 p += i; 3430 3431 /* Now at start of extensions */ 3432 if (limit - p <= 2) 3433 return 0; 3434 n2s(p, i); 3435 while (limit - p >= 4) { 3436 unsigned short type, size; 3437 n2s(p, type); 3438 n2s(p, size); 3439 if (limit - p < size) 3440 return 0; 3441 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 3442 int r; 3443 if (size == 0) { 3444 /* 3445 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have 3446 * one. 3447 */ 3448 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 3449 return 1; 3450 } 3451 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { 3452 /* 3453 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than 3454 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger 3455 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to 3456 * calculate the master secret later. 3457 */ 3458 return 2; 3459 } 3460 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); 3461 switch (r) { 3462 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ 3463 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 3464 return 2; 3465 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ 3466 return r; 3467 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ 3468 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 3469 return 3; 3470 default: /* fatal error */ 3471 return -1; 3472 } 3473 } 3474 p += size; 3475 } 3476 return 0; 3477} 3478 3479/*- 3480 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. 3481 * 3482 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. 3483 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. 3484 * sess_id: points at the session ID. 3485 * sesslen: the length of the session ID. 3486 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 3487 * point to the resulting session. 3488 * 3489 * Returns: 3490 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 3491 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. 3492 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. 3493 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. 3494 */ 3495static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, 3496 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, 3497 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) 3498{ 3499 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3500 unsigned char *sdec; 3501 const unsigned char *p; 3502 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 3503 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 3504 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3505 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3506 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3507 3508 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 3509 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3510 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3511 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 3512 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 3513 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 3514 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 3515 if (rv < 0) 3516 return -1; 3517 if (rv == 0) 3518 return 2; 3519 if (rv == 2) 3520 renew_ticket = 1; 3521 } else { 3522 /* Check key name matches */ 3523 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 3524 return 2; 3525 if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3526 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0 3527 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3528 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 3529 etick + 16) <= 0) { 3530 goto err; 3531 } 3532 } 3533 /* 3534 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity 3535 * checks on ticket. 3536 */ 3537 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 3538 if (mlen < 0) { 3539 goto err; 3540 } 3541 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */ 3542 if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) { 3543 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3544 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3545 return 2; 3546 } 3547 3548 eticklen -= mlen; 3549 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 3550 if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 3551 || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { 3552 goto err; 3553 } 3554 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3555 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { 3556 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3557 return 2; 3558 } 3559 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 3560 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 3561 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3562 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3563 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 3564 if (sdec == NULL 3565 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { 3566 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3567 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 3568 return -1; 3569 } 3570 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { 3571 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3572 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 3573 return 2; 3574 } 3575 slen += mlen; 3576 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3577 p = sdec; 3578 3579 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 3580 slen -= p - sdec; 3581 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 3582 if (sess) { 3583 /* Some additional consistency checks */ 3584 if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) { 3585 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3586 return 2; 3587 } 3588 /* 3589 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect 3590 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session 3591 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by 3592 * standard. 3593 */ 3594 if (sesslen) 3595 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 3596 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 3597 *psess = sess; 3598 if (renew_ticket) 3599 return 4; 3600 else 3601 return 3; 3602 } 3603 ERR_clear_error(); 3604 /* 3605 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. 3606 */ 3607 return 2; 3608err: 3609 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3610 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3611 return -1; 3612} 3613 3614/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ 3615 3616typedef struct { 3617 int nid; 3618 int id; 3619} tls12_lookup; 3620 3621static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { 3622 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, 3623 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, 3624 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, 3625 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, 3626 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, 3627 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} 3628}; 3629 3630static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { 3631 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, 3632 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, 3633 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} 3634}; 3635 3636static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 3637{ 3638 size_t i; 3639 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { 3640 if (table[i].nid == nid) 3641 return table[i].id; 3642 } 3643 return -1; 3644} 3645 3646static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 3647{ 3648 size_t i; 3649 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { 3650 if ((table[i].id) == id) 3651 return table[i].nid; 3652 } 3653 return NID_undef; 3654} 3655 3656int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, 3657 const EVP_MD *md) 3658{ 3659 int sig_id, md_id; 3660 if (!md) 3661 return 0; 3662 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, 3663 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3664 if (md_id == -1) 3665 return 0; 3666 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); 3667 if (sig_id == -1) 3668 return 0; 3669 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; 3670 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; 3671 return 1; 3672} 3673 3674int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) 3675{ 3676 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, 3677 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3678} 3679 3680const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) 3681{ 3682 switch (hash_alg) { 3683# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 3684 case TLSEXT_hash_md5: 3685# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 3686 if (FIPS_mode()) 3687 return NULL; 3688# endif 3689 return EVP_md5(); 3690# endif 3691# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 3692 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: 3693 return EVP_sha1(); 3694# endif 3695# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 3696 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: 3697 return EVP_sha224(); 3698 3699 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: 3700 return EVP_sha256(); 3701# endif 3702# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 3703 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: 3704 return EVP_sha384(); 3705 3706 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: 3707 return EVP_sha512(); 3708# endif 3709 default: 3710 return NULL; 3711 3712 } 3713} 3714 3715static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) 3716{ 3717 switch (sig_alg) { 3718# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3719 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 3720 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; 3721# endif 3722# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3723 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 3724 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; 3725# endif 3726# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3727 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 3728 return SSL_PKEY_ECC; 3729# endif 3730 } 3731 return -1; 3732} 3733 3734/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */ 3735static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, 3736 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data) 3737{ 3738 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef; 3739 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) 3740 return; 3741 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) { 3742 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, 3743 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3744 if (phash_nid) 3745 *phash_nid = hash_nid; 3746 } 3747 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) { 3748 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, 3749 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3750 if (psign_nid) 3751 *psign_nid = sign_nid; 3752 } 3753 if (psignhash_nid) { 3754 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef 3755 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, 3756 sign_nid) <= 0) 3757 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef; 3758 } 3759} 3760 3761/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */ 3762static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig, 3763 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen, 3764 const unsigned char *allow, 3765 size_t allowlen) 3766{ 3767 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp; 3768 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0; 3769 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) { 3770 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */ 3771 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL) 3772 continue; 3773 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1) 3774 continue; 3775 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) { 3776 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) { 3777 nmatch++; 3778 if (shsig) { 3779 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0]; 3780 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1]; 3781 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid, 3782 &shsig->sign_nid, 3783 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp); 3784 shsig++; 3785 } 3786 break; 3787 } 3788 } 3789 } 3790 return nmatch; 3791} 3792 3793/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */ 3794static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) 3795{ 3796 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf; 3797 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen; 3798 size_t nmatch; 3799 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL; 3800 CERT *c = s->cert; 3801 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s); 3802 if (c->shared_sigalgs) { 3803 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); 3804 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL; 3805 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0; 3806 } 3807 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */ 3808 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { 3809 conf = c->client_sigalgs; 3810 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen; 3811 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { 3812 conf = c->conf_sigalgs; 3813 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen; 3814 } else 3815 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf); 3816 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) { 3817 pref = conf; 3818 preflen = conflen; 3819 allow = c->peer_sigalgs; 3820 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen; 3821 } else { 3822 allow = conf; 3823 allowlen = conflen; 3824 pref = c->peer_sigalgs; 3825 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen; 3826 } 3827 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); 3828 if (nmatch) { 3829 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS)); 3830 if (!salgs) 3831 return 0; 3832 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); 3833 } else { 3834 salgs = NULL; 3835 } 3836 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs; 3837 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch; 3838 return 1; 3839} 3840 3841/* Set preferred digest for each key type */ 3842 3843int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) 3844{ 3845 CERT *c = s->cert; 3846 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */ 3847 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 3848 return 1; 3849 /* Should never happen */ 3850 if (!c) 3851 return 0; 3852 3853 if (c->peer_sigalgs) 3854 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs); 3855 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize); 3856 if (!c->peer_sigalgs) 3857 return 0; 3858 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize; 3859 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize); 3860 return 1; 3861} 3862 3863int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) 3864{ 3865 int idx; 3866 size_t i; 3867 const EVP_MD *md; 3868 CERT *c = s->cert; 3869 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr; 3870 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s)) 3871 return 0; 3872 3873# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 3874 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { 3875 /* 3876 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest, 3877 * ignoring any peer preferences. 3878 */ 3879 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL; 3880 if (s->server) 3881 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs; 3882 else 3883 sigs = c->client_sigalgs; 3884 if (sigs) { 3885 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]); 3886 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]); 3887 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 3888 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3889 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { 3890 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = 3891 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3892 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 3893 } 3894 } 3895 } 3896# endif 3897 3898 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs; 3899 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) { 3900 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign); 3901 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) { 3902 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash); 3903 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 3904 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3905 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { 3906 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = 3907 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3908 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 3909 } 3910 } 3911 3912 } 3913 /* 3914 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use 3915 * the certificate for signing. 3916 */ 3917 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { 3918 /* 3919 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not 3920 * supported it stays as NULL. 3921 */ 3922# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3923 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) 3924 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3925# endif 3926# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3927 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) { 3928 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3929 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3930 } 3931# endif 3932# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3933 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) 3934 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3935# endif 3936 } 3937 return 1; 3938} 3939 3940int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, 3941 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, 3942 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) 3943{ 3944 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs; 3945 if (psig == NULL) 3946 return 0; 3947 if (idx >= 0) { 3948 idx <<= 1; 3949 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen) 3950 return 0; 3951 psig += idx; 3952 if (rhash) 3953 *rhash = psig[0]; 3954 if (rsig) 3955 *rsig = psig[1]; 3956 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig); 3957 } 3958 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2; 3959} 3960 3961int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, 3962 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, 3963 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) 3964{ 3965 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs; 3966 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) 3967 return 0; 3968 shsigalgs += idx; 3969 if (phash) 3970 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid; 3971 if (psign) 3972 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid; 3973 if (psignhash) 3974 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid; 3975 if (rsig) 3976 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign; 3977 if (rhash) 3978 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash; 3979 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; 3980} 3981 3982# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 3983int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) 3984{ 3985 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; 3986 unsigned short hbtype; 3987 unsigned int payload; 3988 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 3989 3990 if (s->msg_callback) 3991 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 3992 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, 3993 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 3994 3995 /* Read type and payload length first */ 3996 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 3997 return 0; /* silently discard */ 3998 hbtype = *p++; 3999 n2s(p, payload); 4000 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 4001 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ 4002 pl = p; 4003 4004 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { 4005 unsigned char *buffer, *bp; 4006 int r; 4007 4008 /* 4009 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type, 4010 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding 4011 */ 4012 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 4013 if (buffer == NULL) 4014 return -1; 4015 bp = buffer; 4016 4017 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ 4018 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; 4019 s2n(payload, bp); 4020 memcpy(bp, pl, payload); 4021 bp += payload; 4022 /* Random padding */ 4023 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { 4024 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 4025 return -1; 4026 } 4027 4028 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 4029 3 + payload + padding); 4030 4031 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) 4032 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 4033 buffer, 3 + payload + padding, 4034 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 4035 4036 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 4037 4038 if (r < 0) 4039 return r; 4040 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { 4041 unsigned int seq; 4042 4043 /* 4044 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 4045 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number 4046 */ 4047 n2s(pl, seq); 4048 4049 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { 4050 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 4051 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 4052 } 4053 } 4054 4055 return 0; 4056} 4057 4058int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) 4059{ 4060 unsigned char *buf, *p; 4061 int ret = -1; 4062 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ 4063 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 4064 4065 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ 4066 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || 4067 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { 4068 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); 4069 return -1; 4070 } 4071 4072 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ 4073 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { 4074 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); 4075 return -1; 4076 } 4077 4078 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ 4079 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) { 4080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 4081 return -1; 4082 } 4083 4084 /* 4085 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14 4086 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. 4087 */ 4088 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); 4089 4090 /*- 4091 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number 4092 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add 4093 * some random stuff. 4094 * - Message Type, 1 byte 4095 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) 4096 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) 4097 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) 4098 * - Padding 4099 */ 4100 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 4101 if (buf == NULL) 4102 return -1; 4103 p = buf; 4104 /* Message Type */ 4105 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; 4106 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ 4107 s2n(payload, p); 4108 /* Sequence number */ 4109 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); 4110 /* 16 random bytes */ 4111 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) { 4112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4113 goto err; 4114 } 4115 p += 16; 4116 /* Random padding */ 4117 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) { 4118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4119 goto err; 4120 } 4121 4122 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); 4123 if (ret >= 0) { 4124 if (s->msg_callback) 4125 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 4126 buf, 3 + payload + padding, 4127 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 4128 4129 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; 4130 } 4131 4132err: 4133 OPENSSL_free(buf); 4134 4135 return ret; 4136} 4137# endif 4138 4139# define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2) 4140 4141typedef struct { 4142 size_t sigalgcnt; 4143 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN]; 4144} sig_cb_st; 4145 4146static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) 4147{ 4148 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg; 4149 size_t i; 4150 char etmp[20], *p; 4151 int sig_alg, hash_alg; 4152 if (elem == NULL) 4153 return 0; 4154 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN) 4155 return 0; 4156 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) 4157 return 0; 4158 memcpy(etmp, elem, len); 4159 etmp[len] = 0; 4160 p = strchr(etmp, '+'); 4161 if (!p) 4162 return 0; 4163 *p = 0; 4164 p++; 4165 if (!*p) 4166 return 0; 4167 4168 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA")) 4169 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA; 4170 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA")) 4171 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA; 4172 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA")) 4173 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC; 4174 else 4175 return 0; 4176 4177 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p); 4178 if (hash_alg == NID_undef) 4179 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p); 4180 if (hash_alg == NID_undef) 4181 return 0; 4182 4183 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) { 4184 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg) 4185 return 0; 4186 } 4187 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg; 4188 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg; 4189 return 1; 4190} 4191 4192/* 4193 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the 4194 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 4195 */ 4196int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client) 4197{ 4198 sig_cb_st sig; 4199 sig.sigalgcnt = 0; 4200 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig)) 4201 return 0; 4202 if (c == NULL) 4203 return 1; 4204 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client); 4205} 4206 4207int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, 4208 int client) 4209{ 4210 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr; 4211 int rhash, rsign; 4212 size_t i; 4213 if (salglen & 1) 4214 return 0; 4215 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen); 4216 if (sigalgs == NULL) 4217 return 0; 4218 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) { 4219 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, 4220 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 4221 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, 4222 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 4223 4224 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1) 4225 goto err; 4226 *sptr++ = rhash; 4227 *sptr++ = rsign; 4228 } 4229 4230 if (client) { 4231 if (c->client_sigalgs) 4232 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); 4233 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs; 4234 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen; 4235 } else { 4236 if (c->conf_sigalgs) 4237 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); 4238 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs; 4239 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen; 4240 } 4241 4242 return 1; 4243 4244 err: 4245 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs); 4246 return 0; 4247} 4248 4249static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid) 4250{ 4251 int sig_nid; 4252 size_t i; 4253 if (default_nid == -1) 4254 return 1; 4255 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); 4256 if (default_nid) 4257 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0; 4258 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) 4259 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) 4260 return 1; 4261 return 0; 4262} 4263 4264/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */ 4265static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x) 4266{ 4267 X509_NAME *nm; 4268 int i; 4269 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 4270 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) { 4271 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i))) 4272 return 1; 4273 } 4274 return 0; 4275} 4276 4277/* 4278 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by 4279 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before 4280 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before 4281 * attempting to use them. 4282 */ 4283 4284/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */ 4285 4286# define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \ 4287 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM) 4288/* Strict mode flags */ 4289# define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \ 4290 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \ 4291 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) 4292 4293int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, 4294 int idx) 4295{ 4296 int i; 4297 int rv = 0; 4298 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode; 4299 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL; 4300 CERT *c = s->cert; 4301 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); 4302 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */ 4303 if (idx != -1) { 4304 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */ 4305 if (idx == -2) { 4306 cpk = c->key; 4307 idx = cpk - c->pkeys; 4308 } else 4309 cpk = c->pkeys + idx; 4310 x = cpk->x509; 4311 pk = cpk->privatekey; 4312 chain = cpk->chain; 4313 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT; 4314 /* If no cert or key, forget it */ 4315 if (!x || !pk) 4316 goto end; 4317# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 4318 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */ 4319 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { 4320 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | 4321 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 4322 cpk->valid_flags = rv; 4323 return rv; 4324 } 4325# endif 4326 } else { 4327 if (!x || !pk) 4328 return 0; 4329 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk); 4330 if (idx == -1) 4331 return 0; 4332 cpk = c->pkeys + idx; 4333 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT) 4334 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS; 4335 else 4336 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS; 4337 strict_mode = 1; 4338 } 4339 4340 if (suiteb_flags) { 4341 int ok; 4342 if (check_flags) 4343 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; 4344 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags); 4345 if (ok == X509_V_OK) 4346 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; 4347 else if (!check_flags) 4348 goto end; 4349 } 4350 4351 /* 4352 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature 4353 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode. 4354 */ 4355 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) { 4356 int default_nid; 4357 unsigned char rsign = 0; 4358 if (c->peer_sigalgs) 4359 default_nid = 0; 4360 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */ 4361 else { 4362 switch (idx) { 4363 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC: 4364 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN: 4365 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA: 4366 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa; 4367 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption; 4368 break; 4369 4370 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: 4371 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA: 4372 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa; 4373 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1; 4374 break; 4375 4376 case SSL_PKEY_ECC: 4377 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa; 4378 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1; 4379 break; 4380 4381 default: 4382 default_nid = -1; 4383 break; 4384 } 4385 } 4386 /* 4387 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set 4388 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1. 4389 */ 4390 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) { 4391 size_t j; 4392 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs; 4393 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) { 4394 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign) 4395 break; 4396 } 4397 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) { 4398 if (check_flags) 4399 goto skip_sigs; 4400 else 4401 goto end; 4402 } 4403 } 4404 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */ 4405 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) { 4406 if (!check_flags) 4407 goto end; 4408 } else 4409 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE; 4410 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 4411 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 4412 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) { 4413 if (check_flags) { 4414 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 4415 break; 4416 } else 4417 goto end; 4418 } 4419 } 4420 } 4421 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */ 4422 else if (check_flags) 4423 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 4424 skip_sigs: 4425 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */ 4426 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2)) 4427 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM; 4428 else if (!check_flags) 4429 goto end; 4430 if (!s->server) 4431 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 4432 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */ 4433 else if (strict_mode) { 4434 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 4435 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 4436 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 4437 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) { 4438 if (check_flags) { 4439 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 4440 break; 4441 } else 4442 goto end; 4443 } 4444 } 4445 } 4446 if (!s->server && strict_mode) { 4447 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn; 4448 int check_type = 0; 4449 switch (pk->type) { 4450 case EVP_PKEY_RSA: 4451 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN; 4452 break; 4453 case EVP_PKEY_DSA: 4454 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN; 4455 break; 4456 case EVP_PKEY_EC: 4457 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN; 4458 break; 4459 case EVP_PKEY_DH: 4460 case EVP_PKEY_DHX: 4461 { 4462 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk); 4463 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA) 4464 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH; 4465 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA) 4466 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH; 4467 } 4468 } 4469 if (check_type) { 4470 const unsigned char *ctypes; 4471 int ctypelen; 4472 if (c->ctypes) { 4473 ctypes = c->ctypes; 4474 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num; 4475 } else { 4476 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype; 4477 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num; 4478 } 4479 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) { 4480 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) { 4481 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 4482 break; 4483 } 4484 } 4485 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags) 4486 goto end; 4487 } else 4488 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 4489 4490 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names; 4491 4492 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn)) 4493 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 4494 4495 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { 4496 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x)) 4497 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 4498 } 4499 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { 4500 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 4501 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 4502 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) { 4503 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 4504 break; 4505 } 4506 } 4507 } 4508 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) 4509 goto end; 4510 } else 4511 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 4512 4513 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags) 4514 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID; 4515 4516 end: 4517 4518 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 4519 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN) 4520 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 4521 else if (cpk->digest) 4522 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 4523 } else 4524 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 4525 4526 /* 4527 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the 4528 * chain is invalid. 4529 */ 4530 if (!check_flags) { 4531 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) 4532 cpk->valid_flags = rv; 4533 else { 4534 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */ 4535 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 4536 return 0; 4537 } 4538 } 4539 return rv; 4540} 4541 4542/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */ 4543void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s) 4544{ 4545 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC); 4546 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN); 4547 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN); 4548 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA); 4549 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA); 4550 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC); 4551} 4552 4553/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */ 4554int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 4555{ 4556 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1); 4557} 4558 4559#endif 4560