t1_lib.c revision 306195
1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112#include <stdio.h> 113#include <openssl/objects.h> 114#include <openssl/evp.h> 115#include <openssl/hmac.h> 116#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 117#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 118# include <openssl/ec.h> 119#endif 120#endif 121#include <openssl/ocsp.h> 122#include <openssl/rand.h> 123#include "ssl_locl.h" 124 125const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 126 127#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 128static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 129 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 130 SSL_SESSION **psess); 131static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s); 132int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); 133#endif 134 135SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { 136 tls1_enc, 137 tls1_mac, 138 tls1_setup_key_block, 139 tls1_generate_master_secret, 140 tls1_change_cipher_state, 141 tls1_final_finish_mac, 142 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 143 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 144 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 145 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 146 tls1_alert_code, 147 tls1_export_keying_material, 148 0, 149 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 150 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 151 ssl3_handshake_write 152}; 153 154SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = { 155 tls1_enc, 156 tls1_mac, 157 tls1_setup_key_block, 158 tls1_generate_master_secret, 159 tls1_change_cipher_state, 160 tls1_final_finish_mac, 161 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 162 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 163 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 164 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 165 tls1_alert_code, 166 tls1_export_keying_material, 167 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV, 168 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 169 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 170 ssl3_handshake_write 171}; 172 173SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = { 174 tls1_enc, 175 tls1_mac, 176 tls1_setup_key_block, 177 tls1_generate_master_secret, 178 tls1_change_cipher_state, 179 tls1_final_finish_mac, 180 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 181 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 182 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 183 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 184 tls1_alert_code, 185 tls1_export_keying_material, 186 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF 187 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS, 188 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 189 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 190 ssl3_handshake_write 191}; 192 193long tls1_default_timeout(void) 194{ 195 /* 196 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for 197 * http, the cache would over fill 198 */ 199 return (60 * 60 * 2); 200} 201 202int tls1_new(SSL *s) 203{ 204 if (!ssl3_new(s)) 205 return (0); 206 s->method->ssl_clear(s); 207 return (1); 208} 209 210void tls1_free(SSL *s) 211{ 212#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 213 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) { 214 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); 215 } 216#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ 217 ssl3_free(s); 218} 219 220void tls1_clear(SSL *s) 221{ 222 ssl3_clear(s); 223 s->version = s->method->version; 224} 225 226#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 227 228static int nid_list[] = { 229 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 230 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 231 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 232 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 233 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 234 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 235 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 236 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 237 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 238 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 239 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 240 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 241 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 242 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 243 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 244 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 245 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 246 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 247 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 248 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 249 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 250 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 251 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 252 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 253 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 254 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 255 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 256 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 257}; 258 259static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = { 260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed, 261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime, 262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 263}; 264 265/* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */ 266static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = { 267 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ 268 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 269 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ 270 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 271 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 272 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 273 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 274 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 275 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 276# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 277 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ 278 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 279 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 280 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 281 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 284# endif 285}; 286 287static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = { 288 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ 289 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 290 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ 291 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 292 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 293 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 294 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 295 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 296 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 297# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 298 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ 299 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 300 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 301 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 302 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 303 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 304 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 305# endif 306 /* 307 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set 308 * via an explicit callback or parameters. 309 */ 310 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 311 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 312 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 313 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 314 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 315 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 316 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 317# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 318 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 319 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 320 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 321 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 322 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 323 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 324 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 325 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 326# endif 327}; 328 329static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = { 330 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 331 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384 332}; 333 334# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 335/* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */ 336static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = { 337# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 338 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 339 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 340# endif 341 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 342# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 343 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 344 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 345# endif 346 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 347# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 348 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 349 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 350# endif 351 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 352 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 353# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 354 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 355 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 356 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 357# endif 358 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 359 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 360# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 361 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 362 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 363# endif 364 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 365 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 366# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 367 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 368 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 369 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 370# endif 371 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 372 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 373 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 374}; 375# endif 376 377int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) 378{ 379 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ 380 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > 381 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0]))) 382 return 0; 383 return nid_list[curve_id - 1]; 384} 385 386int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 387{ 388 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ 389 switch (nid) { 390 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 391 return 1; 392 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 393 return 2; 394 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 395 return 3; 396 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 397 return 4; 398 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 399 return 5; 400 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 401 return 6; 402 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 403 return 7; 404 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 405 return 8; 406 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 407 return 9; 408 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 409 return 10; 410 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 411 return 11; 412 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 413 return 12; 414 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 415 return 13; 416 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 417 return 14; 418 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 419 return 15; 420 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 421 return 16; 422 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 423 return 17; 424 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 425 return 18; 426 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 427 return 19; 428 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 429 return 20; 430 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 431 return 21; 432 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 433 return 22; 434 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 435 return 23; 436 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 437 return 24; 438 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 439 return 25; 440 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 441 return 26; 442 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 443 return 27; 444 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 445 return 28; 446 default: 447 return 0; 448 } 449} 450 451/* 452 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise 453 * preferred list. 454 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e., 455 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves. 456 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format. 457 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such 458 * lists in the first place. 459 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly 460 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility 461 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.) 462 */ 463static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, 464 const unsigned char **pcurves, 465 size_t *num_curves) 466{ 467 size_t pcurveslen = 0; 468 if (sess) { 469 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 470 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 471 } else { 472 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */ 473 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 474 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: 475 *pcurves = suiteb_curves; 476 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves); 477 break; 478 479 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: 480 *pcurves = suiteb_curves; 481 pcurveslen = 2; 482 break; 483 484 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: 485 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2; 486 pcurveslen = 2; 487 break; 488 default: 489 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 490 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 491 } 492 if (!*pcurves) { 493# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 494 if (FIPS_mode()) { 495 *pcurves = fips_curves_default; 496 pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default); 497 } else 498# endif 499 { 500 if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { 501 *pcurves = eccurves_auto; 502 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto); 503 } else { 504 *pcurves = eccurves_all; 505 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all); 506 } 507 } 508 } 509 } 510 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */ 511 if (pcurveslen & 1) { 512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 513 *num_curves = 0; 514 return 0; 515 } else { 516 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2; 517 return 1; 518 } 519} 520 521/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */ 522int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) 523{ 524 const unsigned char *curves; 525 size_t num_curves, i; 526 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); 527 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) 528 return 0; 529 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */ 530 if (suiteb_flags) { 531 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; 532 if (p[1]) 533 return 0; 534 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) { 535 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256) 536 return 0; 537 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) { 538 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384) 539 return 0; 540 } else /* Should never happen */ 541 return 0; 542 } 543 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) 544 return 0; 545 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) { 546 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1]) 547 return 1; 548 } 549 return 0; 550} 551 552/*- 553 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match. 554 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches 555 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for 556 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match. 557 */ 558int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) 559{ 560 const unsigned char *pref, *supp; 561 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j; 562 int k; 563 /* Can't do anything on client side */ 564 if (s->server == 0) 565 return -1; 566 if (nmatch == -2) { 567 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 568 /* 569 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know 570 * these are acceptable due to previous checks. 571 */ 572 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; 573 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) 574 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */ 575 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) 576 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */ 577 /* Should never happen */ 578 return NID_undef; 579 } 580 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */ 581 nmatch = 0; 582 } 583 /* 584 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int 585 * but s->options is a long... 586 */ 587 if (!tls1_get_curvelist 588 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp, 589 &num_supp)) 590 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */ 591 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; 592 if (!tls1_get_curvelist 593 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, 594 &num_pref)) 595 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; 596 597 /* 598 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them 599 * are allowed. 600 */ 601 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) { 602 supp = eccurves_all; 603 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; 604 } else if (num_pref == 0 && 605 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) { 606 pref = eccurves_all; 607 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; 608 } 609 610 k = 0; 611 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) { 612 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp; 613 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) { 614 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) { 615 if (nmatch == k) { 616 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1]; 617 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id); 618 } 619 k++; 620 } 621 } 622 } 623 if (nmatch == -1) 624 return k; 625 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */ 626 return NID_undef; 627} 628 629int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, 630 int *curves, size_t ncurves) 631{ 632 unsigned char *clist, *p; 633 size_t i; 634 /* 635 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve 636 * ids < 32 637 */ 638 unsigned long dup_list = 0; 639# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 640 EC_GROUP *curve; 641# endif 642 643 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2); 644 if (!clist) 645 return 0; 646 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) { 647 unsigned long idmask; 648 int id; 649 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]); 650# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 651 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */ 652 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) { 653 OPENSSL_free(clist); 654 return 0; 655 } 656# endif 657# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 658 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]); 659 if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve)) 660 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) { 661 if (curve) 662 EC_GROUP_free(curve); 663 OPENSSL_free(clist); 664 return 0; 665 } else 666 EC_GROUP_free(curve); 667# endif 668 idmask = 1L << id; 669 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) { 670 OPENSSL_free(clist); 671 return 0; 672 } 673 dup_list |= idmask; 674 s2n(id, p); 675 } 676 if (*pext) 677 OPENSSL_free(*pext); 678 *pext = clist; 679 *pextlen = ncurves * 2; 680 return 1; 681} 682 683# define MAX_CURVELIST 28 684 685typedef struct { 686 size_t nidcnt; 687 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST]; 688} nid_cb_st; 689 690static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) 691{ 692 nid_cb_st *narg = arg; 693 size_t i; 694 int nid; 695 char etmp[20]; 696 if (elem == NULL) 697 return 0; 698 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST) 699 return 0; 700 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) 701 return 0; 702 memcpy(etmp, elem, len); 703 etmp[len] = 0; 704 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp); 705 if (nid == NID_undef) 706 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp); 707 if (nid == NID_undef) 708 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp); 709 if (nid == NID_undef) 710 return 0; 711 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++) 712 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid) 713 return 0; 714 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid; 715 return 1; 716} 717 718/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */ 719int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, 720 const char *str) 721{ 722 nid_cb_st ncb; 723 ncb.nidcnt = 0; 724 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb)) 725 return 0; 726 if (pext == NULL) 727 return 1; 728 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt); 729} 730 731/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */ 732static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id, 733 EC_KEY *ec) 734{ 735 int is_prime, id; 736 const EC_GROUP *grp; 737 const EC_METHOD *meth; 738 if (!ec) 739 return 0; 740 /* Determine if it is a prime field */ 741 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); 742 if (!grp) 743 return 0; 744 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp); 745 if (!meth) 746 return 0; 747 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) 748 is_prime = 1; 749 else 750 is_prime = 0; 751 /* Determine curve ID */ 752 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); 753 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id); 754 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */ 755 if (id) { 756 curve_id[0] = 0; 757 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id; 758 } else { 759 curve_id[0] = 0xff; 760 if (is_prime) 761 curve_id[1] = 0x01; 762 else 763 curve_id[1] = 0x02; 764 } 765 if (comp_id) { 766 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) 767 return 0; 768 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { 769 if (is_prime) 770 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 771 else 772 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 773 } else 774 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 775 } 776 return 1; 777} 778 779/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */ 780static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, 781 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id) 782{ 783 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves; 784 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i; 785 int j; 786 /* 787 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is 788 * supported (see RFC4492). 789 */ 790 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 791 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 792 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 793 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) { 794 if (*comp_id == *pformats) 795 break; 796 } 797 if (i == num_formats) 798 return 0; 799 } 800 if (!curve_id) 801 return 1; 802 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */ 803 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) { 804 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves)) 805 return 0; 806 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) { 807 /* 808 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check. 809 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension 810 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve. 811 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves 812 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension. 813 */ 814 break; 815 } 816 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { 817 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1]) 818 break; 819 } 820 if (i == num_curves) 821 return 0; 822 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */ 823 if (!s->server) 824 return 1; 825 } 826 return 1; 827} 828 829static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats, 830 size_t *num_formats) 831{ 832 /* 833 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default 834 */ 835 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 836 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 837 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 838 } else { 839 *pformats = ecformats_default; 840 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */ 841 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) 842 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1; 843 else 844 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default); 845 } 846} 847 848/* 849 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC 850 * certificates have compatible curves and compression. 851 */ 852static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) 853{ 854 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2]; 855 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 856 int rv; 857 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); 858 if (!pkey) 859 return 0; 860 /* If not EC nothing to do */ 861 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) { 862 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 863 return 1; 864 } 865 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec); 866 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 867 if (!rv) 868 return 0; 869 /* 870 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported 871 * curves extension. 872 */ 873 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id); 874 if (!rv) 875 return 0; 876 /* 877 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or 878 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary. 879 */ 880 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) { 881 int check_md; 882 size_t i; 883 CERT *c = s->cert; 884 if (curve_id[0]) 885 return 0; 886 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */ 887 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) 888 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256; 889 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) 890 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384; 891 else 892 return 0; /* Should never happen */ 893 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) 894 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) 895 break; 896 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen) 897 return 0; 898 if (set_ee_md == 2) { 899 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) 900 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256(); 901 else 902 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384(); 903 } 904 } 905 return rv; 906} 907 908# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 909/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */ 910int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) 911{ 912 unsigned char curve_id[2]; 913 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp; 914# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 915 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */ 916 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) 917 return 1; 918# endif 919 /* 920 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other 921 * curves permitted. 922 */ 923 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 924 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */ 925 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) 926 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256; 927 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) 928 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384; 929 else 930 return 0; 931 curve_id[0] = 0; 932 /* Check this curve is acceptable */ 933 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL)) 934 return 0; 935 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */ 936 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) 937 return 1; 938 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */ 939 else { 940 unsigned char curve_tmp[2]; 941 if (!ec) 942 return 0; 943 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec)) 944 return 0; 945 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1]) 946 return 1; 947 return 0; 948 } 949 950 } 951 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { 952 /* Need a shared curve */ 953 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0)) 954 return 1; 955 else 956 return 0; 957 } 958 if (!ec) { 959 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) 960 return 1; 961 else 962 return 0; 963 } 964 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec)) 965 return 0; 966/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */ 967# if 0 968 return 1; 969# else 970 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL); 971# endif 972} 973# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 974 975#else 976 977static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) 978{ 979 return 1; 980} 981 982#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 983 984#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 985 986/* 987 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this 988 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. 989 */ 990 991# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 992# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ 993# else 994# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, 995# endif 996 997# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 998# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ 999# else 1000# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, 1001# endif 1002 1003# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 1004# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 1005 /* */ 1006# else 1007# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, 1008# endif 1009 1010# define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ 1011 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ 1012 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ 1013 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 1014 1015static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { 1016# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 1017 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) 1018 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 1019# endif 1020# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 1021 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 1022 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) 1023# endif 1024# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 1025 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) 1026# endif 1027}; 1028 1029# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 1030static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = { 1031 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 1032 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 1033}; 1034# endif 1035size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs) 1036{ 1037 /* 1038 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other 1039 * preferences. 1040 */ 1041# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1042 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 1043 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: 1044 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; 1045 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs); 1046 1047 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: 1048 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; 1049 return 2; 1050 1051 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: 1052 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2; 1053 return 2; 1054 } 1055# endif 1056 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */ 1057 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) { 1058 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs; 1059 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen; 1060 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) { 1061 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs; 1062 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen; 1063 } else { 1064 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs; 1065 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 1066 } 1067} 1068 1069/* 1070 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature 1071 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest. 1072 */ 1073int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, 1074 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey) 1075{ 1076 const unsigned char *sent_sigs; 1077 size_t sent_sigslen, i; 1078 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 1079 /* Should never happen */ 1080 if (sigalg == -1) 1081 return -1; 1082 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 1083 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) { 1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 1085 return 0; 1086 } 1087# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1088 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 1089 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id; 1090 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */ 1091 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec)) 1092 return 0; 1093 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) { 1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); 1095 return 0; 1096 } 1097 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */ 1098 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 1099 if (curve_id[0]) 1100 return 0; 1101 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) { 1102 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) { 1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, 1104 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); 1105 return 0; 1106 } 1107 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) { 1108 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) { 1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, 1110 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); 1111 return 0; 1112 } 1113 } else 1114 return 0; 1115 } 1116 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) 1117 return 0; 1118# endif 1119 1120 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */ 1121 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs); 1122 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) { 1123 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1]) 1124 break; 1125 } 1126 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */ 1127 if (i == sent_sigslen 1128 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 1129 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { 1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 1131 return 0; 1132 } 1133 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]); 1134 if (*pmd == NULL) { 1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 1136 return 0; 1137 } 1138 /* 1139 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish. 1140 */ 1141 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert) 1142 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd; 1143 return 1; 1144} 1145 1146/* 1147 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't 1148 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike 1149 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global 1150 * settings. 1151 */ 1152void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) 1153{ 1154 CERT *c = s->cert; 1155 const unsigned char *sigalgs; 1156 size_t i, sigalgslen; 1157 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0; 1158 c->mask_a = 0; 1159 c->mask_k = 0; 1160 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */ 1161 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) 1162 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; 1163 else 1164 c->mask_ssl = 0; 1165 /* 1166 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for 1167 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. 1168 */ 1169 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs); 1170 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) { 1171 switch (sigalgs[1]) { 1172# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1173 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 1174 have_rsa = 1; 1175 break; 1176# endif 1177# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 1178 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 1179 have_dsa = 1; 1180 break; 1181# endif 1182# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 1183 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 1184 have_ecdsa = 1; 1185 break; 1186# endif 1187 } 1188 } 1189 /* 1190 * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate 1191 * signature algorithms. 1192 */ 1193 if (!have_rsa) { 1194 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; 1195 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr; 1196 } 1197 if (!have_dsa) { 1198 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS; 1199 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd; 1200 } 1201 if (!have_ecdsa) { 1202 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; 1203 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe; 1204 } 1205# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 1206 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) { 1207 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5; 1208 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5; 1209 } 1210# endif 1211# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1212 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ 1213 if (!s->psk_client_callback) { 1214 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; 1215 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; 1216 } 1217# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1218# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1219 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) { 1220 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; 1221 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; 1222 } 1223# endif 1224 c->valid = 1; 1225} 1226 1227unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, 1228 unsigned char *limit, int *al) 1229{ 1230 int extdatalen = 0; 1231 unsigned char *orig = buf; 1232 unsigned char *ret = buf; 1233# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1234 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ 1235 int using_ecc = 0; 1236 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1237 int i; 1238 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 1239 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 1240 1241 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { 1242 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 1243 1244 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 1245 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 1246 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe) 1247 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { 1248 using_ecc = 1; 1249 break; 1250 } 1251 } 1252 } 1253# endif 1254 1255 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 1256 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 1257 return orig; 1258 1259 ret += 2; 1260 1261 if (ret >= limit) 1262 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 1263 1264 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { 1265 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 1266 unsigned long size_str; 1267 long lenmax; 1268 1269 /*- 1270 * check for enough space. 1271 * 4 for the servername type and entension length 1272 * 2 for servernamelist length 1273 * 1 for the hostname type 1274 * 2 for hostname length 1275 * + hostname length 1276 */ 1277 1278 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 1279 || (size_str = 1280 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 1281 return NULL; 1282 1283 /* extension type and length */ 1284 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); 1285 s2n(size_str + 5, ret); 1286 1287 /* length of servername list */ 1288 s2n(size_str + 3, ret); 1289 1290 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 1291 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 1292 s2n(size_str, ret); 1293 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 1294 ret += size_str; 1295 } 1296 1297 /* Add RI if renegotiating */ 1298 if (s->renegotiate) { 1299 int el; 1300 1301 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { 1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1303 return NULL; 1304 } 1305 1306 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 1307 return NULL; 1308 1309 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); 1310 s2n(el, ret); 1311 1312 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1314 return NULL; 1315 } 1316 1317 ret += el; 1318 } 1319# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1320 /* Add SRP username if there is one */ 1321 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the 1322 * Client Hello message */ 1323 1324 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); 1325 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { 1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1327 return NULL; 1328 } 1329 1330 /*- 1331 * check for enough space. 1332 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length 1333 * 1 for the srp user identity 1334 * + srp user identity length 1335 */ 1336 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) 1337 return NULL; 1338 1339 /* fill in the extension */ 1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); 1341 s2n(login_len + 1, ret); 1342 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len; 1343 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); 1344 ret += login_len; 1345 } 1346# endif 1347 1348# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1349 if (using_ecc) { 1350 /* 1351 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message 1352 */ 1353 long lenmax; 1354 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats; 1355 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len; 1356 1357 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); 1358 1359 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) 1360 return NULL; 1361 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax) 1362 return NULL; 1363 if (num_formats > 255) { 1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1365 return NULL; 1366 } 1367 1368 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); 1369 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */ 1370 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret); 1371 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats; 1372 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats); 1373 ret += num_formats; 1374 1375 /* 1376 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message 1377 */ 1378 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 1379 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) 1380 return NULL; 1381 1382 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) 1383 return NULL; 1384 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2) 1385 return NULL; 1386 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) { 1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1388 return NULL; 1389 } 1390 curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves; 1391 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); 1392 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret); 1393 s2n(curves_list_len, ret); 1394 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len); 1395 ret += curves_list_len; 1396 } 1397# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1398 1399 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { 1400 int ticklen; 1401 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 1402 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 1403 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 1404 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { 1405 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 1406 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 1407 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 1408 return NULL; 1409 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, 1410 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); 1411 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 1412 } else 1413 ticklen = 0; 1414 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 1415 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 1416 goto skip_ext; 1417 /* 1418 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for 1419 * ticket 1420 */ 1421 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) 1422 return NULL; 1423 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); 1424 s2n(ticklen, ret); 1425 if (ticklen) { 1426 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 1427 ret += ticklen; 1428 } 1429 } 1430 skip_ext: 1431 1432 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1433 size_t salglen; 1434 const unsigned char *salg; 1435 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg); 1436 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6) 1437 return NULL; 1438 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); 1439 s2n(salglen + 2, ret); 1440 s2n(salglen, ret); 1441 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen); 1442 ret += salglen; 1443 } 1444# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1445 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1446 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 1447 1448 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) 1449 return NULL; 1450 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 1451 return NULL; 1452 1453 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 1454 s2n(col + 2, ret); 1455 s2n(col, ret); 1456 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); 1457 ret += col; 1458 } 1459# endif 1460 1461 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { 1462 int i; 1463 long extlen, idlen, itmp; 1464 OCSP_RESPID *id; 1465 1466 idlen = 0; 1467 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { 1468 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 1469 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); 1470 if (itmp <= 0) 1471 return NULL; 1472 idlen += itmp + 2; 1473 } 1474 1475 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { 1476 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); 1477 if (extlen < 0) 1478 return NULL; 1479 } else 1480 extlen = 0; 1481 1482 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) 1483 return NULL; 1484 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 1485 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) 1486 return NULL; 1487 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); 1488 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 1489 s2n(idlen, ret); 1490 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { 1491 /* save position of id len */ 1492 unsigned char *q = ret; 1493 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 1494 /* skip over id len */ 1495 ret += 2; 1496 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); 1497 /* write id len */ 1498 s2n(itmp, q); 1499 } 1500 s2n(extlen, ret); 1501 if (extlen > 0) 1502 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); 1503 } 1504# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1505 /* Add Heartbeat extension */ 1506 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) 1507 return NULL; 1508 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); 1509 s2n(1, ret); 1510 /*- 1511 * Set mode: 1512 * 1: peer may send requests 1513 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 1514 */ 1515 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 1516 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1517 else 1518 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1519# endif 1520 1521# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1522 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { 1523 /* 1524 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support 1525 * for Next Protocol Negotiation 1526 */ 1527 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 1528 return NULL; 1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); 1530 s2n(0, ret); 1531 } 1532# endif 1533 1534 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { 1535 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len) 1536 return NULL; 1537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); 1538 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); 1539 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); 1540 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len); 1541 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len; 1542 s->cert->alpn_sent = 1; 1543 } 1544# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1545 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { 1546 int el; 1547 1548 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 1549 1550 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 1551 return NULL; 1552 1553 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); 1554 s2n(el, ret); 1555 1556 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1558 return NULL; 1559 } 1560 ret += el; 1561 } 1562# endif 1563 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext); 1564 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */ 1565 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al)) 1566 return NULL; 1567 1568 /* 1569 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See 1570 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this 1571 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always 1572 * appear last. 1573 */ 1574 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { 1575 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1576 /* 1577 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the 1578 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c 1579 * does not. 1580 */ 1581 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) 1582 hlen -= 5; 1583 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { 1584 hlen = 0x200 - hlen; 1585 if (hlen >= 4) 1586 hlen -= 4; 1587 else 1588 hlen = 0; 1589 1590 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); 1591 s2n(hlen, ret); 1592 memset(ret, 0, hlen); 1593 ret += hlen; 1594 } 1595 } 1596 1597 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) 1598 return orig; 1599 1600 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 1601 return ret; 1602} 1603 1604unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, 1605 unsigned char *limit, int *al) 1606{ 1607 int extdatalen = 0; 1608 unsigned char *orig = buf; 1609 unsigned char *ret = buf; 1610# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1611 int next_proto_neg_seen; 1612# endif 1613# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1614 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1615 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1616 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) 1617 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 1618 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 1619# endif 1620 /* 1621 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation 1622 */ 1623 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 1624 return orig; 1625 1626 ret += 2; 1627 if (ret >= limit) 1628 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 1629 1630 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 1631 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { 1632 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 1633 return NULL; 1634 1635 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); 1636 s2n(0, ret); 1637 } 1638 1639 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { 1640 int el; 1641 1642 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { 1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1644 return NULL; 1645 } 1646 1647 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 1648 return NULL; 1649 1650 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); 1651 s2n(el, ret); 1652 1653 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1655 return NULL; 1656 } 1657 1658 ret += el; 1659 } 1660# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1661 if (using_ecc) { 1662 const unsigned char *plist; 1663 size_t plistlen; 1664 /* 1665 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message 1666 */ 1667 long lenmax; 1668 1669 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); 1670 1671 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) 1672 return NULL; 1673 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) 1674 return NULL; 1675 if (plistlen > 255) { 1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1677 return NULL; 1678 } 1679 1680 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); 1681 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret); 1682 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen; 1683 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen); 1684 ret += plistlen; 1685 1686 } 1687 /* 1688 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves 1689 * extension 1690 */ 1691# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1692 1693 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { 1694 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 1695 return NULL; 1696 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); 1697 s2n(0, ret); 1698 } 1699 1700 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { 1701 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 1702 return NULL; 1703 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 1704 s2n(0, ret); 1705 } 1706# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1707 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1708 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 1709 1710 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) 1711 return NULL; 1712 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 1713 return NULL; 1714 1715 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 1716 s2n(sol + 2, ret); 1717 s2n(sol, ret); 1718 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); 1719 ret += sol; 1720 } 1721# endif 1722 1723# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1724 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { 1725 int el; 1726 1727 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 1728 1729 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 1730 return NULL; 1731 1732 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); 1733 s2n(el, ret); 1734 1735 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1737 return NULL; 1738 } 1739 ret += el; 1740 } 1741# endif 1742 1743 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 1744 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) 1745 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) { 1746 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 1747 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ 1748 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ 1749 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 1750 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 1751 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 1752 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 1753 }; 1754 if (limit - ret < 36) 1755 return NULL; 1756 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36); 1757 ret += 36; 1758 1759 } 1760# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1761 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ 1762 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) { 1763 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) 1764 return NULL; 1765 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); 1766 s2n(1, ret); 1767 /*- 1768 * Set mode: 1769 * 1: peer may send requests 1770 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 1771 */ 1772 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 1773 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1774 else 1775 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1776 1777 } 1778# endif 1779 1780# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1781 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; 1782 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1783 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { 1784 const unsigned char *npa; 1785 unsigned int npalen; 1786 int r; 1787 1788 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, 1789 s-> 1790 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); 1791 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 1792 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) 1793 return NULL; 1794 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); 1795 s2n(npalen, ret); 1796 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); 1797 ret += npalen; 1798 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1799 } 1800 } 1801# endif 1802 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al)) 1803 return NULL; 1804 1805 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { 1806 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected; 1807 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; 1808 1809 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0) 1810 return NULL; 1811 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); 1812 s2n(3 + len, ret); 1813 s2n(1 + len, ret); 1814 *ret++ = len; 1815 memcpy(ret, selected, len); 1816 ret += len; 1817 } 1818 1819 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) 1820 return orig; 1821 1822 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 1823 return ret; 1824} 1825 1826# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1827/*- 1828 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X 1829 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. 1830 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: 1831 * SNI, 1832 * elliptic_curves 1833 * ec_point_formats 1834 * 1835 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, 1836 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. 1837 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from 1838 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). 1839 */ 1840static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 1841 const unsigned char *limit) 1842{ 1843 unsigned short type, size; 1844 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 1845 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 1846 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 1847 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 1848 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 1849 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 1850 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 1851 1852 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 1853 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 1854 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 1855 0x00, /* uncompressed */ 1856 }; 1857 1858 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 1859 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { 1860 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 1861 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 1862 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 1863 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 1864 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 1865 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 1866 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 1867 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ 1868 }; 1869 1870 if (limit - data <= 2) 1871 return; 1872 data += 2; 1873 1874 if (limit - data < 4) 1875 return; 1876 n2s(data, type); 1877 n2s(data, size); 1878 1879 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1880 return; 1881 1882 if (limit - data < size) 1883 return; 1884 data += size; 1885 1886 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 1887 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 1888 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); 1889 1890 if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2)) 1891 return; 1892 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) 1893 return; 1894 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) 1895 return; 1896 } else { 1897 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 1898 1899 if (limit - data != (int)(len)) 1900 return; 1901 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) 1902 return; 1903 } 1904 1905 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; 1906} 1907# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1908 1909/* 1910 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to save the ALPN extension in a 1911 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type 1912 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the 1913 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on 1914 * success. 1915 */ 1916static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 1917 unsigned data_len, int *al) 1918{ 1919 unsigned i; 1920 unsigned proto_len; 1921 1922 if (data_len < 2) 1923 goto parse_error; 1924 1925 /* 1926 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit, 1927 * length-prefixed strings. 1928 */ 1929 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]); 1930 data_len -= 2; 1931 data += 2; 1932 if (data_len != i) 1933 goto parse_error; 1934 1935 if (data_len < 2) 1936 goto parse_error; 1937 1938 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) { 1939 proto_len = data[i]; 1940 i++; 1941 1942 if (proto_len == 0) 1943 goto parse_error; 1944 1945 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len) 1946 goto parse_error; 1947 1948 i += proto_len; 1949 } 1950 1951 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) 1952 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed); 1953 s->cert->alpn_proposed = OPENSSL_malloc(data_len); 1954 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed == NULL) { 1955 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1956 return -1; 1957 } 1958 memcpy(s->cert->alpn_proposed, data, data_len); 1959 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = data_len; 1960 return 0; 1961 1962 parse_error: 1963 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1964 return -1; 1965} 1966 1967/* 1968 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. 1969 * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_* 1970 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. 1971 * returns 1 on success, 0 on failure: al/ret set only on failure 1972 */ 1973static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al) 1974{ 1975 const unsigned char *selected = NULL; 1976 unsigned char selected_len = 0; 1977 1978 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) { 1979 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, 1980 s->cert->alpn_proposed, 1981 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len, 1982 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); 1983 1984 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 1985 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 1986 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 1987 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { 1988 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1989 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1990 return 0; 1991 } 1992 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len); 1993 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; 1994# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1995 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ 1996 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1997# endif 1998 } 1999 } 2000 2001 return 1; 2002} 2003 2004static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, 2005 unsigned char *limit, int *al) 2006{ 2007 unsigned short type; 2008 unsigned short size; 2009 unsigned short len; 2010 unsigned char *data = *p; 2011 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 2012 2013 s->servername_done = 0; 2014 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 2015# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2016 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 2017# endif 2018 2019 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { 2020 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2021 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; 2022 } 2023 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0; 2024 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed) { 2025 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed); 2026 s->cert->alpn_proposed = NULL; 2027 } 2028 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = 0; 2029# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2030 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 2031 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 2032# endif 2033 2034# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2035 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) 2036 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit); 2037# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2038 2039 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ 2040 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) { 2041 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs); 2042 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL; 2043 } 2044# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2045 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { 2046 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); 2047 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; 2048 } 2049# endif 2050 2051 s->srtp_profile = NULL; 2052 2053 if (data == limit) 2054 goto ri_check; 2055 2056 if (limit - data < 2) 2057 goto err; 2058 2059 n2s(data, len); 2060 2061 if (limit - data != len) 2062 goto err; 2063 2064 while (limit - data >= 4) { 2065 n2s(data, type); 2066 n2s(data, size); 2067 2068 if (limit - data < size) 2069 goto err; 2070# if 0 2071 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); 2072# endif 2073 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 2074 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); 2075/*- 2076 * The servername extension is treated as follows: 2077 * 2078 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 2079 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 2080 * in which case an fatal alert is generated. 2081 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 2082 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 2083 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 2084 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 2085 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 2086 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 2087 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 2088 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 2089 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 2090 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 2091 * the value of the Host: field. 2092 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 2093 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the 2094 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername 2095 * extension. 2096 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 2097 * 2098 */ 2099 2100 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { 2101 unsigned char *sdata; 2102 int servname_type; 2103 int dsize; 2104 2105 if (size < 2) 2106 goto err; 2107 n2s(data, dsize); 2108 size -= 2; 2109 if (dsize > size) 2110 goto err; 2111 2112 sdata = data; 2113 while (dsize > 3) { 2114 servname_type = *(sdata++); 2115 n2s(sdata, len); 2116 dsize -= 3; 2117 2118 if (len > dsize) 2119 goto err; 2120 2121 if (s->servername_done == 0) 2122 switch (servname_type) { 2123 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: 2124 if (!s->hit) { 2125 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) 2126 goto err; 2127 2128 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { 2129 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2130 return 0; 2131 } 2132 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = 2133 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { 2134 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2135 return 0; 2136 } 2137 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); 2138 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; 2139 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { 2140 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); 2141 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 2142 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2143 return 0; 2144 } 2145 s->servername_done = 1; 2146 2147 } else 2148 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname 2149 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 2150 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, 2151 (char *)sdata, len) == 0; 2152 2153 break; 2154 2155 default: 2156 break; 2157 } 2158 2159 dsize -= len; 2160 } 2161 if (dsize != 0) 2162 goto err; 2163 2164 } 2165# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2166 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { 2167 if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) 2168 goto err; 2169 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 2170 goto err; 2171 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) 2172 return -1; 2173 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); 2174 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; 2175 2176 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) 2177 goto err; 2178 } 2179# endif 2180 2181# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2182 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { 2183 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2184 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 2185 2186 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 2187 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) 2188 goto err; 2189 if (!s->hit) { 2190 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 2191 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 2192 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; 2193 } 2194 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 2195 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = 2196 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { 2197 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2198 return 0; 2199 } 2200 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 2201 ecpointformatlist_length; 2202 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, 2203 ecpointformatlist_length); 2204 } 2205# if 0 2206 fprintf(stderr, 2207 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", 2208 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 2209 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 2210 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 2211 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 2212 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 2213# endif 2214 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { 2215 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2216 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); 2217 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); 2218 2219 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || 2220 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 || 2221 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */ 2222 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) 2223 goto err; 2224 2225 if (!s->hit) { 2226 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) 2227 goto err; 2228 2229 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 2230 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = 2231 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { 2232 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2233 return 0; 2234 } 2235 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 2236 ellipticcurvelist_length; 2237 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, 2238 ellipticcurvelist_length); 2239 } 2240# if 0 2241 fprintf(stderr, 2242 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", 2243 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 2244 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 2245 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) 2246 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 2247 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 2248# endif 2249 } 2250# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2251# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2252 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) { 2253 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2254 2255 if (size < 2) { 2256 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2257 return 0; 2258 } 2259 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 2260 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { 2261 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2262 return 0; 2263 } 2264 2265 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2266 /* shouldn't really happen */ 2267 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 2268 } 2269 2270 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2271 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 2272 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 2273 else 2274 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = 2275 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 2276 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2277 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2278 return 0; 2279 } 2280 } 2281# endif 2282 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 2283 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 2284 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, 2285 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 2286 { 2287 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2288 return 0; 2289 } 2290 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { 2291 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2292 return 0; 2293 renegotiate_seen = 1; 2294 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { 2295 int dsize; 2296 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) 2297 goto err; 2298 n2s(data, dsize); 2299 size -= 2; 2300 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) 2301 goto err; 2302 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) 2303 goto err; 2304 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { 2305 2306 if (size < 5) 2307 goto err; 2308 2309 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; 2310 size--; 2311 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { 2312 const unsigned char *sdata; 2313 int dsize; 2314 /* Read in responder_id_list */ 2315 n2s(data, dsize); 2316 size -= 2; 2317 if (dsize > size) 2318 goto err; 2319 2320 /* 2321 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake 2322 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 2323 */ 2324 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, 2325 OCSP_RESPID_free); 2326 if (dsize > 0) { 2327 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); 2328 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) { 2329 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2330 return 0; 2331 } 2332 } else { 2333 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; 2334 } 2335 2336 while (dsize > 0) { 2337 OCSP_RESPID *id; 2338 int idsize; 2339 if (dsize < 4) 2340 goto err; 2341 n2s(data, idsize); 2342 dsize -= 2 + idsize; 2343 size -= 2 + idsize; 2344 if (dsize < 0) 2345 goto err; 2346 sdata = data; 2347 data += idsize; 2348 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); 2349 if (!id) 2350 goto err; 2351 if (data != sdata) { 2352 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 2353 goto err; 2354 } 2355 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { 2356 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 2357 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2358 return 0; 2359 } 2360 } 2361 2362 /* Read in request_extensions */ 2363 if (size < 2) 2364 goto err; 2365 n2s(data, dsize); 2366 size -= 2; 2367 if (dsize != size) 2368 goto err; 2369 sdata = data; 2370 if (dsize > 0) { 2371 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { 2372 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, 2373 X509_EXTENSION_free); 2374 } 2375 2376 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = 2377 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); 2378 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) 2379 goto err; 2380 } 2381 } 2382 /* 2383 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. 2384 */ 2385 else 2386 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 2387 } 2388# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2389 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { 2390 switch (data[0]) { 2391 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ 2392 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2393 break; 2394 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ 2395 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2396 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 2397 break; 2398 default: 2399 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2400 return 0; 2401 } 2402 } 2403# endif 2404# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2405 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 2406 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 2407 /*- 2408 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a 2409 * renegotiation. 2410 * 2411 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we 2412 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on 2413 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when 2414 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an 2415 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing 2416 * anything like that, but this might change). 2417 * 2418 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake 2419 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 2420 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen 2421 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new 2422 * Finished message could have been computed.) 2423 */ 2424 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 2425 } 2426# endif 2427 2428 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation && 2429 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 2430 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0) 2431 return 0; 2432 } 2433 2434 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 2435# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 2436 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) 2437 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { 2438 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2439 return 0; 2440 } 2441# endif 2442 2443 data += size; 2444 } 2445 2446 /* Spurious data on the end */ 2447 if (data != limit) 2448 goto err; 2449 2450 *p = data; 2451 2452 ri_check: 2453 2454 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 2455 2456 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && 2457 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 2458 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 2460 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 2461 return 0; 2462 } 2463 2464 return 1; 2465err: 2466 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2467 return 0; 2468} 2469 2470/* 2471 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data 2472 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking. 2473 */ 2474 2475static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, 2476 const unsigned char *data, 2477 const unsigned char *limit, 2478 int *al) 2479{ 2480 unsigned short type, size, len; 2481 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */ 2482 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0) 2483 return 1; 2484 2485 if (limit - data <= 2) 2486 return 1; 2487 n2s(data, len); 2488 2489 if (limit - data < len) 2490 return 1; 2491 2492 while (limit - data >= 4) { 2493 n2s(data, type); 2494 n2s(data, size); 2495 2496 if (limit - data < size) 2497 return 1; 2498 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0) 2499 return 0; 2500 2501 data += size; 2502 } 2503 2504 return 1; 2505} 2506 2507int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, 2508 unsigned char *limit) 2509{ 2510 int al = -1; 2511 unsigned char *ptmp = *p; 2512 /* 2513 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled 2514 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically 2515 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions 2516 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure. 2517 */ 2518 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, limit, &al) <= 0) { 2519 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2520 return 0; 2521 } 2522 2523 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 2525 return 0; 2526 } 2527 2528 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext); 2529 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, limit, &al) <= 0) { 2530 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2531 return 0; 2532 } 2533 2534 return 1; 2535} 2536 2537# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2538/* 2539 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No 2540 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly 2541 * fill the length of the block. 2542 */ 2543static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) 2544{ 2545 unsigned int off = 0; 2546 2547 while (off < len) { 2548 if (d[off] == 0) 2549 return 0; 2550 off += d[off]; 2551 off++; 2552 } 2553 2554 return off == len; 2555} 2556# endif 2557 2558static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, 2559 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 2560{ 2561 unsigned short length; 2562 unsigned short type; 2563 unsigned short size; 2564 unsigned char *data = *p; 2565 int tlsext_servername = 0; 2566 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 2567 2568# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2569 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 2570# endif 2571 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 2572 2573 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { 2574 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2575 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; 2576 } 2577# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2578 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 2579 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 2580# endif 2581 2582 if ((d + n) - data <= 2) 2583 goto ri_check; 2584 2585 n2s(data, length); 2586 if ((d + n) - data != length) { 2587 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2588 return 0; 2589 } 2590 2591 while ((d + n) - data >= 4) { 2592 n2s(data, type); 2593 n2s(data, size); 2594 2595 if ((d + n) - data < size) 2596 goto ri_check; 2597 2598 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 2599 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); 2600 2601 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { 2602 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { 2603 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2604 return 0; 2605 } 2606 tlsext_servername = 1; 2607 } 2608# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2609 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { 2610 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2611 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 2612 2613 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { 2614 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2615 return 0; 2616 } 2617 if (!s->hit) { 2618 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 2619 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 2620 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 2621 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = 2622 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { 2623 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2624 return 0; 2625 } 2626 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 2627 ecpointformatlist_length; 2628 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, 2629 ecpointformatlist_length); 2630 } 2631# if 0 2632 fprintf(stderr, 2633 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); 2634 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 2635 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 2636 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 2637 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 2638# endif 2639 } 2640# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2641 2642 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 2643 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 2644 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, 2645 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 2646 { 2647 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2648 return 0; 2649 } 2650 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 2651 || (size > 0)) { 2652 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2653 return 0; 2654 } 2655 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2656 } 2657# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2658 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) { 2659 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2660 2661 if (size < 2) { 2662 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2663 return 0; 2664 } 2665 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 2666 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { 2667 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2668 return 0; 2669 } 2670 2671 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2672 /* shouldn't really happen */ 2673 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 2674 } 2675 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 2676 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2677 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 2678 } else { 2679 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = 2680 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 2681 } 2682 2683 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2684 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2685 return 0; 2686 } 2687 } 2688# endif 2689 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { 2690 /* 2691 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status 2692 * request message. 2693 */ 2694 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { 2695 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2696 return 0; 2697 } 2698 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ 2699 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 2700 } 2701# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2702 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 2703 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 2704 unsigned char *selected; 2705 unsigned char selected_len; 2706 2707 /* We must have requested it. */ 2708 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { 2709 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2710 return 0; 2711 } 2712 /* The data must be valid */ 2713 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) { 2714 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2715 return 0; 2716 } 2717 if (s-> 2718 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, 2719 size, 2720 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != 2721 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 2722 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2723 return 0; 2724 } 2725 /* 2726 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in 2727 * a single Serverhello 2728 */ 2729 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); 2730 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 2731 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { 2732 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2733 return 0; 2734 } 2735 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); 2736 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; 2737 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 2738 } 2739# endif 2740 2741 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) { 2742 unsigned len; 2743 2744 /* We must have requested it. */ 2745 if (!s->cert->alpn_sent) { 2746 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2747 return 0; 2748 } 2749 if (size < 4) { 2750 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2751 return 0; 2752 } 2753 /*- 2754 * The extension data consists of: 2755 * uint16 list_length 2756 * uint8 proto_length; 2757 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; 2758 */ 2759 len = data[0]; 2760 len <<= 8; 2761 len |= data[1]; 2762 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) { 2763 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2764 return 0; 2765 } 2766 len = data[2]; 2767 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) { 2768 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2769 return 0; 2770 } 2771 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) 2772 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2773 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len); 2774 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) { 2775 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2776 return 0; 2777 } 2778 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len); 2779 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; 2780 } 2781 2782 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { 2783 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2784 return 0; 2785 renegotiate_seen = 1; 2786 } 2787# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2788 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { 2789 switch (data[0]) { 2790 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ 2791 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2792 break; 2793 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ 2794 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2795 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 2796 break; 2797 default: 2798 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2799 return 0; 2800 } 2801 } 2802# endif 2803# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 2804 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { 2805 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2806 return 0; 2807 } 2808# endif 2809 /* 2810 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a 2811 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback 2812 */ 2813 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0) 2814 return 0; 2815 2816 data += size; 2817 } 2818 2819 if (data != d + n) { 2820 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2821 return 0; 2822 } 2823 2824 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { 2825 if (s->tlsext_hostname) { 2826 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { 2827 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 2828 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { 2829 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2830 return 0; 2831 } 2832 } else { 2833 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2834 return 0; 2835 } 2836 } 2837 } 2838 2839 *p = data; 2840 2841 ri_check: 2842 2843 /* 2844 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid 2845 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello 2846 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. 2847 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which 2848 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on 2849 * initial connect only. 2850 */ 2851 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) 2852 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 2853 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 2855 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 2856 return 0; 2857 } 2858 2859 return 1; 2860} 2861 2862int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2863{ 2864 2865# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2866 { 2867 int r = 1; 2868 2869 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { 2870 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, 2871 s-> 2872 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 2873 if (!r) 2874 return -1; 2875 } 2876 2877 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2878 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2879 /* shouldn't really happen */ 2880 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 2881 } 2882 2883 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 2884 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2885 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 2886 } else { 2887 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = 2888 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, 2889 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 2890 } 2891 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 2893 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2894 return -1; 2895 } 2896 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = 2897 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 2898 } 2899 2900 if (r == 2) 2901 /* 2902 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate 2903 * server opaque PRF input 2904 */ 2905 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = 2906 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 2907 } 2908# endif 2909 2910 s->cert->alpn_sent = 0; 2911 return 1; 2912} 2913 2914int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2915{ 2916 return 1; 2917} 2918 2919static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) 2920{ 2921 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 2922 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2923 2924# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2925 /* 2926 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely 2927 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 2928 */ 2929 /* 2930 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely 2931 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 2932 */ 2933# endif 2934 2935 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2936 ret = 2937 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 2938 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2939 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL 2940 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2941 ret = 2942 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 2943 s-> 2944 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2945 2946# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2947 { 2948 /* 2949 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we 2950 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this 2951 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). 2952 */ 2953 2954 int r = 1; 2955 2956 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { 2957 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, 2958 s-> 2959 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 2960 if (!r) { 2961 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2962 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2963 goto err; 2964 } 2965 } 2966 2967 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2968 /* shouldn't really happen */ 2969 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 2970 } 2971 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; 2972 2973 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2974 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 2975 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 2976 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) { 2977 /* 2978 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF 2979 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! 2980 */ 2981 2982 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 2983 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2984 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 2985 } else { 2986 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = 2987 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, 2988 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 2989 } 2990 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2991 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2992 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2993 goto err; 2994 } 2995 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = 2996 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 2997 } 2998 } 2999 3000 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 3001 /* 3002 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we 3003 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the 3004 * handshake. 3005 */ 3006 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3007 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3008 } 3009 } 3010 3011 err: 3012# endif 3013 switch (ret) { 3014 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 3015 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3016 return -1; 3017 3018 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 3019 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 3020 return 1; 3021 3022 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 3023 s->servername_done = 0; 3024 default: 3025 return 1; 3026 } 3027} 3028 3029int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) 3030{ 3031 int al; 3032 size_t i; 3033 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */ 3034 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { 3035 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs); 3036 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL; 3037 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0; 3038 } 3039 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ 3040 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { 3041 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL; 3042 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0; 3043 } 3044 3045 /* If sigalgs received process it. */ 3046 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) { 3047 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { 3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3049 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3050 goto err; 3051 } 3052 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */ 3053 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { 3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, 3055 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS); 3056 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 3057 goto err; 3058 } 3059 } else 3060 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert); 3061 return 1; 3062 err: 3063 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3064 return 0; 3065} 3066 3067int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) 3068{ 3069 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 3070 int al; 3071 3072 /* 3073 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be 3074 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, 3075 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may 3076 * influence which certificate is sent 3077 */ 3078 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { 3079 int r; 3080 CERT_PKEY *certpkey; 3081 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); 3082 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ 3083 if (certpkey == NULL) { 3084 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 3085 return 1; 3086 } 3087 /* 3088 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate 3089 * et al can pick it up. 3090 */ 3091 s->cert->key = certpkey; 3092 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 3093 switch (r) { 3094 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 3095 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 3096 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 3097 break; 3098 /* status request response should be sent */ 3099 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 3100 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 3101 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 3102 else 3103 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 3104 break; 3105 /* something bad happened */ 3106 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 3107 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3108 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3109 goto err; 3110 } 3111 } else 3112 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 3113 3114 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) { 3115 goto err; 3116 } 3117 3118 err: 3119 switch (ret) { 3120 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 3121 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3122 return -1; 3123 3124 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 3125 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 3126 return 1; 3127 3128 default: 3129 return 1; 3130 } 3131} 3132 3133int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 3134{ 3135 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 3136 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 3137 3138# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 3139 /* 3140 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 3141 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it 3142 * must contain uncompressed. 3143 */ 3144 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 3145 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 3146 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 3147 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) 3148 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 3149 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) 3150 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) 3151 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { 3152 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 3153 size_t i; 3154 unsigned char *list; 3155 int found_uncompressed = 0; 3156 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 3157 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { 3158 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { 3159 found_uncompressed = 1; 3160 break; 3161 } 3162 } 3163 if (!found_uncompressed) { 3164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 3165 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 3166 return -1; 3167 } 3168 } 3169 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 3170# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 3171 3172 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 3173 ret = 3174 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 3175 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 3176 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL 3177 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 3178 ret = 3179 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 3180 s-> 3181 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 3182 3183# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 3184 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) { 3185 /* 3186 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on 3187 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a 3188 * value from the server too. 3189 */ 3190 3191 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 3192 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3193 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3194 } 3195 3196 /* 3197 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to 3198 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. 3199 */ 3200 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || 3201 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != 3202 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) { 3203 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3204 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 3205 } 3206 } 3207# endif 3208 3209 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); 3210 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; 3211 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; 3212 /* 3213 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the 3214 * callback 3215 */ 3216 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) 3217 && !(s->hit) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { 3218 int r; 3219 /* 3220 * Call callback with resp == NULL and resplen == -1 so callback 3221 * knows there is no response 3222 */ 3223 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 3224 if (r == 0) { 3225 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; 3226 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3227 } 3228 if (r < 0) { 3229 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3230 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3231 } 3232 } 3233 3234 switch (ret) { 3235 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 3236 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3237 return -1; 3238 3239 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 3240 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 3241 return 1; 3242 3243 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 3244 s->servername_done = 0; 3245 default: 3246 return 1; 3247 } 3248} 3249 3250int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, 3251 int n) 3252{ 3253 int al = -1; 3254 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) 3255 return 1; 3256 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) { 3257 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3258 return 0; 3259 } 3260 3261 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { 3262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 3263 return 0; 3264 } 3265 return 1; 3266} 3267 3268/*- 3269 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the 3270 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle 3271 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. 3272 * 3273 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will 3274 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket 3275 * extension, if any. 3276 * len: the length of the session ID. 3277 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. 3278 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 3279 * point to the resulting session. 3280 * 3281 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key 3282 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will 3283 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. 3284 * 3285 * Returns: 3286 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 3287 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). 3288 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports 3289 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. 3290 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but 3291 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. 3292 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. 3293 * 3294 * Side effects: 3295 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue 3296 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support 3297 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have 3298 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if 3299 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. 3300 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. 3301 */ 3302int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, 3303 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) 3304{ 3305 /* Point after session ID in client hello */ 3306 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; 3307 unsigned short i; 3308 3309 *ret = NULL; 3310 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 3311 3312 /* 3313 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful 3314 * resumption. 3315 */ 3316 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 3317 return 0; 3318 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) 3319 return 0; 3320 if (p >= limit) 3321 return -1; 3322 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 3323 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 3324 i = *(p++); 3325 3326 if (limit - p <= i) 3327 return -1; 3328 3329 p += i; 3330 } 3331 /* Skip past cipher list */ 3332 n2s(p, i); 3333 if (limit - p <= i) 3334 return -1; 3335 p += i; 3336 3337 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ 3338 i = *(p++); 3339 if (limit - p < i) 3340 return -1; 3341 p += i; 3342 3343 /* Now at start of extensions */ 3344 if (limit - p <= 2) 3345 return 0; 3346 n2s(p, i); 3347 while (limit - p >= 4) { 3348 unsigned short type, size; 3349 n2s(p, type); 3350 n2s(p, size); 3351 if (limit - p < size) 3352 return 0; 3353 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 3354 int r; 3355 if (size == 0) { 3356 /* 3357 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have 3358 * one. 3359 */ 3360 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 3361 return 1; 3362 } 3363 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { 3364 /* 3365 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than 3366 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger 3367 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to 3368 * calculate the master secret later. 3369 */ 3370 return 2; 3371 } 3372 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); 3373 switch (r) { 3374 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ 3375 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 3376 return 2; 3377 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ 3378 return r; 3379 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ 3380 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 3381 return 3; 3382 default: /* fatal error */ 3383 return -1; 3384 } 3385 } 3386 p += size; 3387 } 3388 return 0; 3389} 3390 3391/*- 3392 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. 3393 * 3394 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. 3395 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. 3396 * sess_id: points at the session ID. 3397 * sesslen: the length of the session ID. 3398 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 3399 * point to the resulting session. 3400 * 3401 * Returns: 3402 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 3403 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. 3404 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. 3405 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. 3406 */ 3407static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, 3408 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, 3409 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) 3410{ 3411 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3412 unsigned char *sdec; 3413 const unsigned char *p; 3414 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 3415 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 3416 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3417 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3418 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3419 3420 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 3421 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3422 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3423 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 3424 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 3425 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 3426 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 3427 if (rv < 0) 3428 return -1; 3429 if (rv == 0) 3430 return 2; 3431 if (rv == 2) 3432 renew_ticket = 1; 3433 } else { 3434 /* Check key name matches */ 3435 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 3436 return 2; 3437 if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3438 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0 3439 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3440 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 3441 etick + 16) <= 0) { 3442 goto err; 3443 } 3444 } 3445 /* 3446 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity 3447 * checks on ticket. 3448 */ 3449 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 3450 if (mlen < 0) { 3451 goto err; 3452 } 3453 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */ 3454 if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) { 3455 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3456 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3457 return 2; 3458 } 3459 3460 eticklen -= mlen; 3461 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 3462 if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 3463 || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { 3464 goto err; 3465 } 3466 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3467 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { 3468 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3469 return 2; 3470 } 3471 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 3472 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 3473 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3474 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3475 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 3476 if (sdec == NULL 3477 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { 3478 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3479 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 3480 return -1; 3481 } 3482 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { 3483 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3484 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 3485 return 2; 3486 } 3487 slen += mlen; 3488 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3489 p = sdec; 3490 3491 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 3492 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 3493 if (sess) { 3494 /* 3495 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect 3496 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session 3497 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by 3498 * standard. 3499 */ 3500 if (sesslen) 3501 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 3502 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 3503 *psess = sess; 3504 if (renew_ticket) 3505 return 4; 3506 else 3507 return 3; 3508 } 3509 ERR_clear_error(); 3510 /* 3511 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. 3512 */ 3513 return 2; 3514err: 3515 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3516 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3517 return -1; 3518} 3519 3520/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ 3521 3522typedef struct { 3523 int nid; 3524 int id; 3525} tls12_lookup; 3526 3527static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { 3528 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, 3529 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, 3530 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, 3531 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, 3532 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, 3533 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} 3534}; 3535 3536static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { 3537 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, 3538 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, 3539 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} 3540}; 3541 3542static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 3543{ 3544 size_t i; 3545 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { 3546 if (table[i].nid == nid) 3547 return table[i].id; 3548 } 3549 return -1; 3550} 3551 3552static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 3553{ 3554 size_t i; 3555 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { 3556 if ((table[i].id) == id) 3557 return table[i].nid; 3558 } 3559 return NID_undef; 3560} 3561 3562int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, 3563 const EVP_MD *md) 3564{ 3565 int sig_id, md_id; 3566 if (!md) 3567 return 0; 3568 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, 3569 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3570 if (md_id == -1) 3571 return 0; 3572 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); 3573 if (sig_id == -1) 3574 return 0; 3575 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; 3576 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; 3577 return 1; 3578} 3579 3580int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) 3581{ 3582 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, 3583 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3584} 3585 3586const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) 3587{ 3588 switch (hash_alg) { 3589# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 3590 case TLSEXT_hash_md5: 3591# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 3592 if (FIPS_mode()) 3593 return NULL; 3594# endif 3595 return EVP_md5(); 3596# endif 3597# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 3598 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: 3599 return EVP_sha1(); 3600# endif 3601# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 3602 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: 3603 return EVP_sha224(); 3604 3605 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: 3606 return EVP_sha256(); 3607# endif 3608# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 3609 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: 3610 return EVP_sha384(); 3611 3612 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: 3613 return EVP_sha512(); 3614# endif 3615 default: 3616 return NULL; 3617 3618 } 3619} 3620 3621static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) 3622{ 3623 switch (sig_alg) { 3624# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3625 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 3626 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; 3627# endif 3628# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3629 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 3630 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; 3631# endif 3632# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3633 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 3634 return SSL_PKEY_ECC; 3635# endif 3636 } 3637 return -1; 3638} 3639 3640/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */ 3641static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, 3642 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data) 3643{ 3644 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef; 3645 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) 3646 return; 3647 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) { 3648 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, 3649 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3650 if (phash_nid) 3651 *phash_nid = hash_nid; 3652 } 3653 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) { 3654 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, 3655 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3656 if (psign_nid) 3657 *psign_nid = sign_nid; 3658 } 3659 if (psignhash_nid) { 3660 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef 3661 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, 3662 sign_nid) <= 0) 3663 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef; 3664 } 3665} 3666 3667/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */ 3668static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig, 3669 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen, 3670 const unsigned char *allow, 3671 size_t allowlen) 3672{ 3673 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp; 3674 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0; 3675 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) { 3676 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */ 3677 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL) 3678 continue; 3679 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1) 3680 continue; 3681 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) { 3682 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) { 3683 nmatch++; 3684 if (shsig) { 3685 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0]; 3686 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1]; 3687 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid, 3688 &shsig->sign_nid, 3689 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp); 3690 shsig++; 3691 } 3692 break; 3693 } 3694 } 3695 } 3696 return nmatch; 3697} 3698 3699/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */ 3700static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) 3701{ 3702 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf; 3703 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen; 3704 size_t nmatch; 3705 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL; 3706 CERT *c = s->cert; 3707 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s); 3708 if (c->shared_sigalgs) { 3709 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); 3710 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL; 3711 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0; 3712 } 3713 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */ 3714 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { 3715 conf = c->client_sigalgs; 3716 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen; 3717 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { 3718 conf = c->conf_sigalgs; 3719 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen; 3720 } else 3721 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf); 3722 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) { 3723 pref = conf; 3724 preflen = conflen; 3725 allow = c->peer_sigalgs; 3726 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen; 3727 } else { 3728 allow = conf; 3729 allowlen = conflen; 3730 pref = c->peer_sigalgs; 3731 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen; 3732 } 3733 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); 3734 if (nmatch) { 3735 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS)); 3736 if (!salgs) 3737 return 0; 3738 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); 3739 } else { 3740 salgs = NULL; 3741 } 3742 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs; 3743 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch; 3744 return 1; 3745} 3746 3747/* Set preferred digest for each key type */ 3748 3749int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) 3750{ 3751 CERT *c = s->cert; 3752 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */ 3753 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 3754 return 1; 3755 /* Should never happen */ 3756 if (!c) 3757 return 0; 3758 3759 if (c->peer_sigalgs) 3760 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs); 3761 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize); 3762 if (!c->peer_sigalgs) 3763 return 0; 3764 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize; 3765 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize); 3766 return 1; 3767} 3768 3769int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) 3770{ 3771 int idx; 3772 size_t i; 3773 const EVP_MD *md; 3774 CERT *c = s->cert; 3775 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr; 3776 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s)) 3777 return 0; 3778 3779# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 3780 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { 3781 /* 3782 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest, 3783 * ignoring any peer preferences. 3784 */ 3785 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL; 3786 if (s->server) 3787 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs; 3788 else 3789 sigs = c->client_sigalgs; 3790 if (sigs) { 3791 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]); 3792 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]); 3793 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 3794 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3795 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { 3796 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = 3797 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3798 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 3799 } 3800 } 3801 } 3802# endif 3803 3804 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs; 3805 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) { 3806 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign); 3807 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) { 3808 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash); 3809 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 3810 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3811 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { 3812 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = 3813 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3814 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 3815 } 3816 } 3817 3818 } 3819 /* 3820 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use 3821 * the certificate for signing. 3822 */ 3823 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { 3824 /* 3825 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not 3826 * supported it stays as NULL. 3827 */ 3828# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3829 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) 3830 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3831# endif 3832# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3833 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) { 3834 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3835 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3836 } 3837# endif 3838# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3839 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) 3840 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3841# endif 3842 } 3843 return 1; 3844} 3845 3846int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, 3847 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, 3848 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) 3849{ 3850 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs; 3851 if (psig == NULL) 3852 return 0; 3853 if (idx >= 0) { 3854 idx <<= 1; 3855 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen) 3856 return 0; 3857 psig += idx; 3858 if (rhash) 3859 *rhash = psig[0]; 3860 if (rsig) 3861 *rsig = psig[1]; 3862 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig); 3863 } 3864 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2; 3865} 3866 3867int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, 3868 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, 3869 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) 3870{ 3871 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs; 3872 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) 3873 return 0; 3874 shsigalgs += idx; 3875 if (phash) 3876 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid; 3877 if (psign) 3878 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid; 3879 if (psignhash) 3880 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid; 3881 if (rsig) 3882 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign; 3883 if (rhash) 3884 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash; 3885 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; 3886} 3887 3888# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 3889int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) 3890{ 3891 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; 3892 unsigned short hbtype; 3893 unsigned int payload; 3894 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 3895 3896 if (s->msg_callback) 3897 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 3898 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, 3899 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 3900 3901 /* Read type and payload length first */ 3902 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 3903 return 0; /* silently discard */ 3904 hbtype = *p++; 3905 n2s(p, payload); 3906 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 3907 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ 3908 pl = p; 3909 3910 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { 3911 unsigned char *buffer, *bp; 3912 int r; 3913 3914 /* 3915 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type, 3916 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding 3917 */ 3918 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 3919 if (buffer == NULL) 3920 return -1; 3921 bp = buffer; 3922 3923 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ 3924 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; 3925 s2n(payload, bp); 3926 memcpy(bp, pl, payload); 3927 bp += payload; 3928 /* Random padding */ 3929 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { 3930 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 3931 return -1; 3932 } 3933 3934 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3935 3 + payload + padding); 3936 3937 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) 3938 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 3939 buffer, 3 + payload + padding, 3940 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 3941 3942 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 3943 3944 if (r < 0) 3945 return r; 3946 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { 3947 unsigned int seq; 3948 3949 /* 3950 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 3951 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number 3952 */ 3953 n2s(pl, seq); 3954 3955 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { 3956 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 3957 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 3958 } 3959 } 3960 3961 return 0; 3962} 3963 3964int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) 3965{ 3966 unsigned char *buf, *p; 3967 int ret = -1; 3968 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ 3969 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 3970 3971 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ 3972 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || 3973 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { 3974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); 3975 return -1; 3976 } 3977 3978 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ 3979 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { 3980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); 3981 return -1; 3982 } 3983 3984 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ 3985 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) { 3986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 3987 return -1; 3988 } 3989 3990 /* 3991 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14 3992 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. 3993 */ 3994 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); 3995 3996 /*- 3997 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number 3998 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add 3999 * some random stuff. 4000 * - Message Type, 1 byte 4001 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) 4002 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) 4003 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) 4004 * - Padding 4005 */ 4006 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 4007 if (buf == NULL) 4008 return -1; 4009 p = buf; 4010 /* Message Type */ 4011 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; 4012 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ 4013 s2n(payload, p); 4014 /* Sequence number */ 4015 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); 4016 /* 16 random bytes */ 4017 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) { 4018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4019 goto err; 4020 } 4021 p += 16; 4022 /* Random padding */ 4023 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) { 4024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4025 goto err; 4026 } 4027 4028 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); 4029 if (ret >= 0) { 4030 if (s->msg_callback) 4031 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 4032 buf, 3 + payload + padding, 4033 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 4034 4035 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; 4036 } 4037 4038err: 4039 OPENSSL_free(buf); 4040 4041 return ret; 4042} 4043# endif 4044 4045# define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2) 4046 4047typedef struct { 4048 size_t sigalgcnt; 4049 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN]; 4050} sig_cb_st; 4051 4052static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) 4053{ 4054 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg; 4055 size_t i; 4056 char etmp[20], *p; 4057 int sig_alg, hash_alg; 4058 if (elem == NULL) 4059 return 0; 4060 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN) 4061 return 0; 4062 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) 4063 return 0; 4064 memcpy(etmp, elem, len); 4065 etmp[len] = 0; 4066 p = strchr(etmp, '+'); 4067 if (!p) 4068 return 0; 4069 *p = 0; 4070 p++; 4071 if (!*p) 4072 return 0; 4073 4074 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA")) 4075 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA; 4076 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA")) 4077 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA; 4078 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA")) 4079 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC; 4080 else 4081 return 0; 4082 4083 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p); 4084 if (hash_alg == NID_undef) 4085 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p); 4086 if (hash_alg == NID_undef) 4087 return 0; 4088 4089 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) { 4090 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg) 4091 return 0; 4092 } 4093 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg; 4094 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg; 4095 return 1; 4096} 4097 4098/* 4099 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the 4100 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 4101 */ 4102int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client) 4103{ 4104 sig_cb_st sig; 4105 sig.sigalgcnt = 0; 4106 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig)) 4107 return 0; 4108 if (c == NULL) 4109 return 1; 4110 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client); 4111} 4112 4113int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, 4114 int client) 4115{ 4116 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr; 4117 int rhash, rsign; 4118 size_t i; 4119 if (salglen & 1) 4120 return 0; 4121 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen); 4122 if (sigalgs == NULL) 4123 return 0; 4124 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) { 4125 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, 4126 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 4127 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, 4128 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 4129 4130 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1) 4131 goto err; 4132 *sptr++ = rhash; 4133 *sptr++ = rsign; 4134 } 4135 4136 if (client) { 4137 if (c->client_sigalgs) 4138 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); 4139 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs; 4140 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen; 4141 } else { 4142 if (c->conf_sigalgs) 4143 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); 4144 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs; 4145 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen; 4146 } 4147 4148 return 1; 4149 4150 err: 4151 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs); 4152 return 0; 4153} 4154 4155static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid) 4156{ 4157 int sig_nid; 4158 size_t i; 4159 if (default_nid == -1) 4160 return 1; 4161 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); 4162 if (default_nid) 4163 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0; 4164 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) 4165 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) 4166 return 1; 4167 return 0; 4168} 4169 4170/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */ 4171static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x) 4172{ 4173 X509_NAME *nm; 4174 int i; 4175 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 4176 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) { 4177 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i))) 4178 return 1; 4179 } 4180 return 0; 4181} 4182 4183/* 4184 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by 4185 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before 4186 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before 4187 * attempting to use them. 4188 */ 4189 4190/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */ 4191 4192# define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \ 4193 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM) 4194/* Strict mode flags */ 4195# define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \ 4196 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \ 4197 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) 4198 4199int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, 4200 int idx) 4201{ 4202 int i; 4203 int rv = 0; 4204 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode; 4205 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL; 4206 CERT *c = s->cert; 4207 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); 4208 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */ 4209 if (idx != -1) { 4210 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */ 4211 if (idx == -2) { 4212 cpk = c->key; 4213 idx = cpk - c->pkeys; 4214 } else 4215 cpk = c->pkeys + idx; 4216 x = cpk->x509; 4217 pk = cpk->privatekey; 4218 chain = cpk->chain; 4219 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT; 4220 /* If no cert or key, forget it */ 4221 if (!x || !pk) 4222 goto end; 4223# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 4224 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */ 4225 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { 4226 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | 4227 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 4228 cpk->valid_flags = rv; 4229 return rv; 4230 } 4231# endif 4232 } else { 4233 if (!x || !pk) 4234 return 0; 4235 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk); 4236 if (idx == -1) 4237 return 0; 4238 cpk = c->pkeys + idx; 4239 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT) 4240 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS; 4241 else 4242 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS; 4243 strict_mode = 1; 4244 } 4245 4246 if (suiteb_flags) { 4247 int ok; 4248 if (check_flags) 4249 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; 4250 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags); 4251 if (ok == X509_V_OK) 4252 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; 4253 else if (!check_flags) 4254 goto end; 4255 } 4256 4257 /* 4258 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature 4259 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode. 4260 */ 4261 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) { 4262 int default_nid; 4263 unsigned char rsign = 0; 4264 if (c->peer_sigalgs) 4265 default_nid = 0; 4266 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */ 4267 else { 4268 switch (idx) { 4269 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC: 4270 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN: 4271 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA: 4272 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa; 4273 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption; 4274 break; 4275 4276 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: 4277 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA: 4278 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa; 4279 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1; 4280 break; 4281 4282 case SSL_PKEY_ECC: 4283 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa; 4284 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1; 4285 break; 4286 4287 default: 4288 default_nid = -1; 4289 break; 4290 } 4291 } 4292 /* 4293 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set 4294 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1. 4295 */ 4296 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) { 4297 size_t j; 4298 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs; 4299 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) { 4300 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign) 4301 break; 4302 } 4303 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) { 4304 if (check_flags) 4305 goto skip_sigs; 4306 else 4307 goto end; 4308 } 4309 } 4310 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */ 4311 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) { 4312 if (!check_flags) 4313 goto end; 4314 } else 4315 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE; 4316 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 4317 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 4318 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) { 4319 if (check_flags) { 4320 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 4321 break; 4322 } else 4323 goto end; 4324 } 4325 } 4326 } 4327 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */ 4328 else if (check_flags) 4329 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 4330 skip_sigs: 4331 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */ 4332 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2)) 4333 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM; 4334 else if (!check_flags) 4335 goto end; 4336 if (!s->server) 4337 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 4338 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */ 4339 else if (strict_mode) { 4340 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 4341 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 4342 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 4343 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) { 4344 if (check_flags) { 4345 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 4346 break; 4347 } else 4348 goto end; 4349 } 4350 } 4351 } 4352 if (!s->server && strict_mode) { 4353 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn; 4354 int check_type = 0; 4355 switch (pk->type) { 4356 case EVP_PKEY_RSA: 4357 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN; 4358 break; 4359 case EVP_PKEY_DSA: 4360 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN; 4361 break; 4362 case EVP_PKEY_EC: 4363 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN; 4364 break; 4365 case EVP_PKEY_DH: 4366 case EVP_PKEY_DHX: 4367 { 4368 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk); 4369 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA) 4370 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH; 4371 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA) 4372 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH; 4373 } 4374 } 4375 if (check_type) { 4376 const unsigned char *ctypes; 4377 int ctypelen; 4378 if (c->ctypes) { 4379 ctypes = c->ctypes; 4380 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num; 4381 } else { 4382 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype; 4383 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num; 4384 } 4385 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) { 4386 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) { 4387 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 4388 break; 4389 } 4390 } 4391 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags) 4392 goto end; 4393 } else 4394 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 4395 4396 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names; 4397 4398 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn)) 4399 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 4400 4401 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { 4402 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x)) 4403 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 4404 } 4405 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { 4406 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 4407 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 4408 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) { 4409 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 4410 break; 4411 } 4412 } 4413 } 4414 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) 4415 goto end; 4416 } else 4417 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 4418 4419 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags) 4420 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID; 4421 4422 end: 4423 4424 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 4425 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN) 4426 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 4427 else if (cpk->digest) 4428 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 4429 } else 4430 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 4431 4432 /* 4433 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the 4434 * chain is invalid. 4435 */ 4436 if (!check_flags) { 4437 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) 4438 cpk->valid_flags = rv; 4439 else { 4440 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */ 4441 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 4442 return 0; 4443 } 4444 } 4445 return rv; 4446} 4447 4448/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */ 4449void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s) 4450{ 4451 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC); 4452 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN); 4453 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN); 4454 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA); 4455 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA); 4456 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC); 4457} 4458 4459/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */ 4460int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 4461{ 4462 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1); 4463} 4464 4465#endif 4466