t1_lib.c revision 291719
1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112#include <stdio.h> 113#include <openssl/objects.h> 114#include <openssl/evp.h> 115#include <openssl/hmac.h> 116#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 117#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 118# include <openssl/ec.h> 119#endif 120#endif 121#include <openssl/ocsp.h> 122#include <openssl/rand.h> 123#include "ssl_locl.h" 124 125const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 126 127#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 128static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 129 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 130 SSL_SESSION **psess); 131static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s); 132int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); 133#endif 134 135SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { 136 tls1_enc, 137 tls1_mac, 138 tls1_setup_key_block, 139 tls1_generate_master_secret, 140 tls1_change_cipher_state, 141 tls1_final_finish_mac, 142 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 143 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 144 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 145 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 146 tls1_alert_code, 147 tls1_export_keying_material, 148 0, 149 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 150 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 151 ssl3_handshake_write 152}; 153 154SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = { 155 tls1_enc, 156 tls1_mac, 157 tls1_setup_key_block, 158 tls1_generate_master_secret, 159 tls1_change_cipher_state, 160 tls1_final_finish_mac, 161 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 162 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 163 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 164 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 165 tls1_alert_code, 166 tls1_export_keying_material, 167 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV, 168 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 169 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 170 ssl3_handshake_write 171}; 172 173SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = { 174 tls1_enc, 175 tls1_mac, 176 tls1_setup_key_block, 177 tls1_generate_master_secret, 178 tls1_change_cipher_state, 179 tls1_final_finish_mac, 180 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 181 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 182 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 183 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 184 tls1_alert_code, 185 tls1_export_keying_material, 186 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF 187 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS, 188 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 189 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 190 ssl3_handshake_write 191}; 192 193long tls1_default_timeout(void) 194{ 195 /* 196 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for 197 * http, the cache would over fill 198 */ 199 return (60 * 60 * 2); 200} 201 202int tls1_new(SSL *s) 203{ 204 if (!ssl3_new(s)) 205 return (0); 206 s->method->ssl_clear(s); 207 return (1); 208} 209 210void tls1_free(SSL *s) 211{ 212#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 213 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) { 214 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); 215 } 216#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ 217 ssl3_free(s); 218} 219 220void tls1_clear(SSL *s) 221{ 222 ssl3_clear(s); 223 s->version = s->method->version; 224} 225 226#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 227 228static int nid_list[] = { 229 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 230 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 231 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 232 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 233 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 234 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 235 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 236 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 237 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 238 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 239 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 240 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 241 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 242 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 243 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 244 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 245 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 246 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 247 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 248 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 249 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 250 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 251 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 252 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 253 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 254 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 255 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 256 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 257}; 258 259static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = { 260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed, 261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime, 262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 263}; 264 265/* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */ 266static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = { 267 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ 268 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 269 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ 270 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 271 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 272 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 273 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 274 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 275 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 276# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 277 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ 278 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 279 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 280 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 281 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 284# endif 285}; 286 287static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = { 288 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ 289 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 290 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ 291 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 292 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 293 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 294 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 295 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 296 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 297# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 298 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ 299 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 300 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 301 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 302 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 303 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 304 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 305# endif 306 /* 307 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set 308 * via an explicit callback or parameters. 309 */ 310 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 311 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 312 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 313 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 314 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 315 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 316 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 317# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 318 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 319 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 320 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 321 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 322 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 323 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 324 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 325 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 326# endif 327}; 328 329static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = { 330 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 331 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384 332}; 333 334# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 335/* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */ 336static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = { 337# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 338 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 339 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 340# endif 341 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 342# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 343 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 344 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 345# endif 346 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 347# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 348 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 349 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 350# endif 351 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 352 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 353# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 354 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 355 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 356 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 357# endif 358 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 359 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 360# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 361 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 362 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 363# endif 364 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 365 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 366# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 367 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 368 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 369 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 370# endif 371 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 372 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 373 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 374}; 375# endif 376 377int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) 378{ 379 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ 380 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > 381 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0]))) 382 return 0; 383 return nid_list[curve_id - 1]; 384} 385 386int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 387{ 388 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ 389 switch (nid) { 390 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 391 return 1; 392 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 393 return 2; 394 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 395 return 3; 396 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 397 return 4; 398 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 399 return 5; 400 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 401 return 6; 402 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 403 return 7; 404 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 405 return 8; 406 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 407 return 9; 408 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 409 return 10; 410 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 411 return 11; 412 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 413 return 12; 414 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 415 return 13; 416 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 417 return 14; 418 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 419 return 15; 420 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 421 return 16; 422 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 423 return 17; 424 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 425 return 18; 426 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 427 return 19; 428 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 429 return 20; 430 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 431 return 21; 432 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 433 return 22; 434 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 435 return 23; 436 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 437 return 24; 438 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 439 return 25; 440 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 441 return 26; 442 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 443 return 27; 444 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 445 return 28; 446 default: 447 return 0; 448 } 449} 450 451/* 452 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise 453 * preferred list. 454 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e., 455 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves. 456 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format. 457 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such 458 * lists in the first place. 459 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly 460 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility 461 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.) 462 */ 463static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, 464 const unsigned char **pcurves, 465 size_t *num_curves) 466{ 467 size_t pcurveslen = 0; 468 if (sess) { 469 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 470 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 471 } else { 472 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */ 473 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 474 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: 475 *pcurves = suiteb_curves; 476 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves); 477 break; 478 479 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: 480 *pcurves = suiteb_curves; 481 pcurveslen = 2; 482 break; 483 484 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: 485 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2; 486 pcurveslen = 2; 487 break; 488 default: 489 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 490 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 491 } 492 if (!*pcurves) { 493# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 494 if (FIPS_mode()) { 495 *pcurves = fips_curves_default; 496 pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default); 497 } else 498# endif 499 { 500 if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { 501 *pcurves = eccurves_auto; 502 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto); 503 } else { 504 *pcurves = eccurves_all; 505 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all); 506 } 507 } 508 } 509 } 510 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */ 511 if (pcurveslen & 1) { 512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 513 *num_curves = 0; 514 return 0; 515 } else { 516 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2; 517 return 1; 518 } 519} 520 521/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */ 522int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) 523{ 524 const unsigned char *curves; 525 size_t num_curves, i; 526 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); 527 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) 528 return 0; 529 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */ 530 if (suiteb_flags) { 531 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; 532 if (p[1]) 533 return 0; 534 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) { 535 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256) 536 return 0; 537 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) { 538 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384) 539 return 0; 540 } else /* Should never happen */ 541 return 0; 542 } 543 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) 544 return 0; 545 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) { 546 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1]) 547 return 1; 548 } 549 return 0; 550} 551 552/*- 553 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match. 554 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches 555 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for 556 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match. 557 */ 558int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) 559{ 560 const unsigned char *pref, *supp; 561 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j; 562 int k; 563 /* Can't do anything on client side */ 564 if (s->server == 0) 565 return -1; 566 if (nmatch == -2) { 567 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 568 /* 569 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know 570 * these are acceptable due to previous checks. 571 */ 572 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; 573 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) 574 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */ 575 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) 576 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */ 577 /* Should never happen */ 578 return NID_undef; 579 } 580 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */ 581 nmatch = 0; 582 } 583 /* 584 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int 585 * but s->options is a long... 586 */ 587 if (!tls1_get_curvelist 588 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp, 589 &num_supp)) 590 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */ 591 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; 592 if (!tls1_get_curvelist 593 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, 594 &num_pref)) 595 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; 596 597 /* 598 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them 599 * are allowed. 600 */ 601 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) { 602 supp = eccurves_all; 603 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; 604 } else if (num_pref == 0 && 605 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) { 606 pref = eccurves_all; 607 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; 608 } 609 610 k = 0; 611 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) { 612 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp; 613 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) { 614 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) { 615 if (nmatch == k) { 616 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1]; 617 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id); 618 } 619 k++; 620 } 621 } 622 } 623 if (nmatch == -1) 624 return k; 625 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */ 626 return NID_undef; 627} 628 629int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, 630 int *curves, size_t ncurves) 631{ 632 unsigned char *clist, *p; 633 size_t i; 634 /* 635 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve 636 * ids < 32 637 */ 638 unsigned long dup_list = 0; 639# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 640 EC_GROUP *curve; 641# endif 642 643 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2); 644 if (!clist) 645 return 0; 646 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) { 647 unsigned long idmask; 648 int id; 649 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]); 650# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 651 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */ 652 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) { 653 OPENSSL_free(clist); 654 return 0; 655 } 656# endif 657# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 658 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]); 659 if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve)) 660 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) { 661 if (curve) 662 EC_GROUP_free(curve); 663 OPENSSL_free(clist); 664 return 0; 665 } else 666 EC_GROUP_free(curve); 667# endif 668 idmask = 1L << id; 669 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) { 670 OPENSSL_free(clist); 671 return 0; 672 } 673 dup_list |= idmask; 674 s2n(id, p); 675 } 676 if (*pext) 677 OPENSSL_free(*pext); 678 *pext = clist; 679 *pextlen = ncurves * 2; 680 return 1; 681} 682 683# define MAX_CURVELIST 28 684 685typedef struct { 686 size_t nidcnt; 687 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST]; 688} nid_cb_st; 689 690static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) 691{ 692 nid_cb_st *narg = arg; 693 size_t i; 694 int nid; 695 char etmp[20]; 696 if (elem == NULL) 697 return 0; 698 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST) 699 return 0; 700 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) 701 return 0; 702 memcpy(etmp, elem, len); 703 etmp[len] = 0; 704 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp); 705 if (nid == NID_undef) 706 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp); 707 if (nid == NID_undef) 708 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp); 709 if (nid == NID_undef) 710 return 0; 711 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++) 712 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid) 713 return 0; 714 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid; 715 return 1; 716} 717 718/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */ 719int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, 720 const char *str) 721{ 722 nid_cb_st ncb; 723 ncb.nidcnt = 0; 724 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb)) 725 return 0; 726 if (pext == NULL) 727 return 1; 728 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt); 729} 730 731/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */ 732static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id, 733 EC_KEY *ec) 734{ 735 int is_prime, id; 736 const EC_GROUP *grp; 737 const EC_METHOD *meth; 738 if (!ec) 739 return 0; 740 /* Determine if it is a prime field */ 741 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); 742 if (!grp) 743 return 0; 744 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp); 745 if (!meth) 746 return 0; 747 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) 748 is_prime = 1; 749 else 750 is_prime = 0; 751 /* Determine curve ID */ 752 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); 753 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id); 754 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */ 755 if (id) { 756 curve_id[0] = 0; 757 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id; 758 } else { 759 curve_id[0] = 0xff; 760 if (is_prime) 761 curve_id[1] = 0x01; 762 else 763 curve_id[1] = 0x02; 764 } 765 if (comp_id) { 766 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) 767 return 0; 768 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { 769 if (is_prime) 770 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 771 else 772 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 773 } else 774 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 775 } 776 return 1; 777} 778 779/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */ 780static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, 781 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id) 782{ 783 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves; 784 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i; 785 int j; 786 /* 787 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is 788 * supported (see RFC4492). 789 */ 790 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 791 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 792 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 793 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) { 794 if (*comp_id == *pformats) 795 break; 796 } 797 if (i == num_formats) 798 return 0; 799 } 800 if (!curve_id) 801 return 1; 802 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */ 803 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) { 804 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves)) 805 return 0; 806 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) { 807 /* 808 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check. 809 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension 810 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve. 811 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves 812 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension. 813 */ 814 break; 815 } 816 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { 817 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1]) 818 break; 819 } 820 if (i == num_curves) 821 return 0; 822 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */ 823 if (!s->server) 824 return 1; 825 } 826 return 1; 827} 828 829static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats, 830 size_t *num_formats) 831{ 832 /* 833 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default 834 */ 835 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 836 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 837 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 838 } else { 839 *pformats = ecformats_default; 840 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */ 841 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) 842 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1; 843 else 844 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default); 845 } 846} 847 848/* 849 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC 850 * certificates have compatible curves and compression. 851 */ 852static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) 853{ 854 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2]; 855 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 856 int rv; 857 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); 858 if (!pkey) 859 return 0; 860 /* If not EC nothing to do */ 861 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) { 862 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 863 return 1; 864 } 865 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec); 866 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 867 if (!rv) 868 return 0; 869 /* 870 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported 871 * curves extension. 872 */ 873 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id); 874 if (!rv) 875 return 0; 876 /* 877 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or 878 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary. 879 */ 880 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) { 881 int check_md; 882 size_t i; 883 CERT *c = s->cert; 884 if (curve_id[0]) 885 return 0; 886 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */ 887 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) 888 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256; 889 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) 890 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384; 891 else 892 return 0; /* Should never happen */ 893 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) 894 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) 895 break; 896 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen) 897 return 0; 898 if (set_ee_md == 2) { 899 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) 900 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256(); 901 else 902 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384(); 903 } 904 } 905 return rv; 906} 907 908# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 909/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */ 910int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) 911{ 912 unsigned char curve_id[2]; 913 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp; 914# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 915 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */ 916 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) 917 return 1; 918# endif 919 /* 920 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other 921 * curves permitted. 922 */ 923 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 924 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */ 925 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) 926 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256; 927 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) 928 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384; 929 else 930 return 0; 931 curve_id[0] = 0; 932 /* Check this curve is acceptable */ 933 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL)) 934 return 0; 935 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */ 936 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) 937 return 1; 938 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */ 939 else { 940 unsigned char curve_tmp[2]; 941 if (!ec) 942 return 0; 943 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec)) 944 return 0; 945 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1]) 946 return 1; 947 return 0; 948 } 949 950 } 951 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { 952 /* Need a shared curve */ 953 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0)) 954 return 1; 955 else 956 return 0; 957 } 958 if (!ec) { 959 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) 960 return 1; 961 else 962 return 0; 963 } 964 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec)) 965 return 0; 966/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */ 967# if 0 968 return 1; 969# else 970 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL); 971# endif 972} 973# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 974 975#else 976 977static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) 978{ 979 return 1; 980} 981 982#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 983 984#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 985 986/* 987 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this 988 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. 989 */ 990 991# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 992# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ 993# else 994# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, 995# endif 996 997# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 998# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ 999# else 1000# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, 1001# endif 1002 1003# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 1004# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 1005 /* */ 1006# else 1007# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, 1008# endif 1009 1010# define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ 1011 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ 1012 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ 1013 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 1014 1015static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { 1016# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 1017 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) 1018 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 1019# endif 1020# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 1021 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 1022 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) 1023# endif 1024# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 1025 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) 1026# endif 1027}; 1028 1029# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 1030static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = { 1031 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 1032 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 1033}; 1034# endif 1035size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs) 1036{ 1037 /* 1038 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other 1039 * preferences. 1040 */ 1041# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1042 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 1043 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: 1044 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; 1045 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs); 1046 1047 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: 1048 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; 1049 return 2; 1050 1051 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: 1052 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2; 1053 return 2; 1054 } 1055# endif 1056 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */ 1057 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) { 1058 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs; 1059 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen; 1060 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) { 1061 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs; 1062 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen; 1063 } else { 1064 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs; 1065 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 1066 } 1067} 1068 1069/* 1070 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature 1071 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest. 1072 */ 1073int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, 1074 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey) 1075{ 1076 const unsigned char *sent_sigs; 1077 size_t sent_sigslen, i; 1078 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 1079 /* Should never happen */ 1080 if (sigalg == -1) 1081 return -1; 1082 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 1083 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) { 1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 1085 return 0; 1086 } 1087# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1088 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 1089 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id; 1090 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */ 1091 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec)) 1092 return 0; 1093 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) { 1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); 1095 return 0; 1096 } 1097 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */ 1098 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 1099 if (curve_id[0]) 1100 return 0; 1101 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) { 1102 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) { 1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, 1104 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); 1105 return 0; 1106 } 1107 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) { 1108 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) { 1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, 1110 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); 1111 return 0; 1112 } 1113 } else 1114 return 0; 1115 } 1116 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) 1117 return 0; 1118# endif 1119 1120 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */ 1121 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs); 1122 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) { 1123 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1]) 1124 break; 1125 } 1126 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */ 1127 if (i == sent_sigslen 1128 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 1129 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { 1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 1131 return 0; 1132 } 1133 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]); 1134 if (*pmd == NULL) { 1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 1136 return 0; 1137 } 1138 /* 1139 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish. 1140 */ 1141 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert) 1142 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd; 1143 return 1; 1144} 1145 1146/* 1147 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't 1148 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike 1149 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global 1150 * settings. 1151 */ 1152void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) 1153{ 1154 CERT *c = s->cert; 1155 const unsigned char *sigalgs; 1156 size_t i, sigalgslen; 1157 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0; 1158 c->mask_a = 0; 1159 c->mask_k = 0; 1160 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */ 1161 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) 1162 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; 1163 else 1164 c->mask_ssl = 0; 1165 /* 1166 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for 1167 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. 1168 */ 1169 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs); 1170 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) { 1171 switch (sigalgs[1]) { 1172# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1173 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 1174 have_rsa = 1; 1175 break; 1176# endif 1177# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 1178 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 1179 have_dsa = 1; 1180 break; 1181# endif 1182# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 1183 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 1184 have_ecdsa = 1; 1185 break; 1186# endif 1187 } 1188 } 1189 /* 1190 * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate 1191 * signature algorithms. 1192 */ 1193 if (!have_rsa) { 1194 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; 1195 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr; 1196 } 1197 if (!have_dsa) { 1198 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS; 1199 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd; 1200 } 1201 if (!have_ecdsa) { 1202 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; 1203 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe; 1204 } 1205# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 1206 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) { 1207 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5; 1208 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5; 1209 } 1210# endif 1211# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1212 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ 1213 if (!s->psk_client_callback) { 1214 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; 1215 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; 1216 } 1217# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1218# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1219 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) { 1220 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; 1221 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; 1222 } 1223# endif 1224 c->valid = 1; 1225} 1226 1227unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, 1228 unsigned char *limit, int *al) 1229{ 1230 int extdatalen = 0; 1231 unsigned char *orig = buf; 1232 unsigned char *ret = buf; 1233# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1234 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ 1235 int using_ecc = 0; 1236 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1237 int i; 1238 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 1239 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 1240 1241 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { 1242 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 1243 1244 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 1245 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 1246 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe) 1247 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { 1248 using_ecc = 1; 1249 break; 1250 } 1251 } 1252 } 1253# endif 1254 1255 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 1256 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 1257 return orig; 1258 1259 ret += 2; 1260 1261 if (ret >= limit) 1262 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 1263 1264 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { 1265 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 1266 unsigned long size_str; 1267 long lenmax; 1268 1269 /*- 1270 * check for enough space. 1271 * 4 for the servername type and entension length 1272 * 2 for servernamelist length 1273 * 1 for the hostname type 1274 * 2 for hostname length 1275 * + hostname length 1276 */ 1277 1278 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 1279 || (size_str = 1280 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 1281 return NULL; 1282 1283 /* extension type and length */ 1284 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); 1285 s2n(size_str + 5, ret); 1286 1287 /* length of servername list */ 1288 s2n(size_str + 3, ret); 1289 1290 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 1291 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 1292 s2n(size_str, ret); 1293 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 1294 ret += size_str; 1295 } 1296 1297 /* Add RI if renegotiating */ 1298 if (s->renegotiate) { 1299 int el; 1300 1301 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { 1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1303 return NULL; 1304 } 1305 1306 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 1307 return NULL; 1308 1309 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); 1310 s2n(el, ret); 1311 1312 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1314 return NULL; 1315 } 1316 1317 ret += el; 1318 } 1319# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1320 /* Add SRP username if there is one */ 1321 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the 1322 * Client Hello message */ 1323 1324 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); 1325 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { 1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1327 return NULL; 1328 } 1329 1330 /*- 1331 * check for enough space. 1332 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length 1333 * 1 for the srp user identity 1334 * + srp user identity length 1335 */ 1336 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) 1337 return NULL; 1338 1339 /* fill in the extension */ 1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); 1341 s2n(login_len + 1, ret); 1342 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len; 1343 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); 1344 ret += login_len; 1345 } 1346# endif 1347 1348# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1349 if (using_ecc) { 1350 /* 1351 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message 1352 */ 1353 long lenmax; 1354 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats; 1355 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len; 1356 1357 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); 1358 1359 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) 1360 return NULL; 1361 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax) 1362 return NULL; 1363 if (num_formats > 255) { 1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1365 return NULL; 1366 } 1367 1368 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); 1369 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */ 1370 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret); 1371 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats; 1372 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats); 1373 ret += num_formats; 1374 1375 /* 1376 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message 1377 */ 1378 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 1379 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) 1380 return NULL; 1381 1382 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) 1383 return NULL; 1384 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2) 1385 return NULL; 1386 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) { 1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1388 return NULL; 1389 } 1390 curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves; 1391 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); 1392 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret); 1393 s2n(curves_list_len, ret); 1394 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len); 1395 ret += curves_list_len; 1396 } 1397# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1398 1399 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { 1400 int ticklen; 1401 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 1402 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 1403 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 1404 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { 1405 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 1406 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 1407 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 1408 return NULL; 1409 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, 1410 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); 1411 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 1412 } else 1413 ticklen = 0; 1414 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 1415 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 1416 goto skip_ext; 1417 /* 1418 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for 1419 * ticket 1420 */ 1421 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) 1422 return NULL; 1423 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); 1424 s2n(ticklen, ret); 1425 if (ticklen) { 1426 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 1427 ret += ticklen; 1428 } 1429 } 1430 skip_ext: 1431 1432 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1433 size_t salglen; 1434 const unsigned char *salg; 1435 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg); 1436 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6) 1437 return NULL; 1438 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); 1439 s2n(salglen + 2, ret); 1440 s2n(salglen, ret); 1441 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen); 1442 ret += salglen; 1443 } 1444# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1445 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1446 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 1447 1448 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) 1449 return NULL; 1450 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 1451 return NULL; 1452 1453 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 1454 s2n(col + 2, ret); 1455 s2n(col, ret); 1456 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); 1457 ret += col; 1458 } 1459# endif 1460 1461 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { 1462 int i; 1463 long extlen, idlen, itmp; 1464 OCSP_RESPID *id; 1465 1466 idlen = 0; 1467 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { 1468 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 1469 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); 1470 if (itmp <= 0) 1471 return NULL; 1472 idlen += itmp + 2; 1473 } 1474 1475 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { 1476 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); 1477 if (extlen < 0) 1478 return NULL; 1479 } else 1480 extlen = 0; 1481 1482 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) 1483 return NULL; 1484 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 1485 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) 1486 return NULL; 1487 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); 1488 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 1489 s2n(idlen, ret); 1490 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { 1491 /* save position of id len */ 1492 unsigned char *q = ret; 1493 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 1494 /* skip over id len */ 1495 ret += 2; 1496 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); 1497 /* write id len */ 1498 s2n(itmp, q); 1499 } 1500 s2n(extlen, ret); 1501 if (extlen > 0) 1502 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); 1503 } 1504# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1505 /* Add Heartbeat extension */ 1506 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) 1507 return NULL; 1508 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); 1509 s2n(1, ret); 1510 /*- 1511 * Set mode: 1512 * 1: peer may send requests 1513 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 1514 */ 1515 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 1516 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1517 else 1518 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1519# endif 1520 1521# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1522 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { 1523 /* 1524 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support 1525 * for Next Protocol Negotiation 1526 */ 1527 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 1528 return NULL; 1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); 1530 s2n(0, ret); 1531 } 1532# endif 1533 1534 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { 1535 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len) 1536 return NULL; 1537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); 1538 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); 1539 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); 1540 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len); 1541 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len; 1542 } 1543# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { 1545 int el; 1546 1547 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 1548 1549 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 1550 return NULL; 1551 1552 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); 1553 s2n(el, ret); 1554 1555 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1557 return NULL; 1558 } 1559 ret += el; 1560 } 1561# endif 1562 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext); 1563 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */ 1564 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al)) 1565 return NULL; 1566 1567 /* 1568 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See 1569 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this 1570 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always 1571 * appear last. 1572 */ 1573 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { 1574 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1575 /* 1576 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the 1577 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c 1578 * does not. 1579 */ 1580 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) 1581 hlen -= 5; 1582 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { 1583 hlen = 0x200 - hlen; 1584 if (hlen >= 4) 1585 hlen -= 4; 1586 else 1587 hlen = 0; 1588 1589 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); 1590 s2n(hlen, ret); 1591 memset(ret, 0, hlen); 1592 ret += hlen; 1593 } 1594 } 1595 1596 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) 1597 return orig; 1598 1599 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 1600 return ret; 1601} 1602 1603unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, 1604 unsigned char *limit, int *al) 1605{ 1606 int extdatalen = 0; 1607 unsigned char *orig = buf; 1608 unsigned char *ret = buf; 1609# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1610 int next_proto_neg_seen; 1611# endif 1612# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1613 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1614 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1615 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) 1616 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 1617 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 1618# endif 1619 /* 1620 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation 1621 */ 1622 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 1623 return orig; 1624 1625 ret += 2; 1626 if (ret >= limit) 1627 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 1628 1629 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 1630 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { 1631 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 1632 return NULL; 1633 1634 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); 1635 s2n(0, ret); 1636 } 1637 1638 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { 1639 int el; 1640 1641 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { 1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1643 return NULL; 1644 } 1645 1646 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 1647 return NULL; 1648 1649 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); 1650 s2n(el, ret); 1651 1652 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1654 return NULL; 1655 } 1656 1657 ret += el; 1658 } 1659# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1660 if (using_ecc) { 1661 const unsigned char *plist; 1662 size_t plistlen; 1663 /* 1664 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message 1665 */ 1666 long lenmax; 1667 1668 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); 1669 1670 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) 1671 return NULL; 1672 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) 1673 return NULL; 1674 if (plistlen > 255) { 1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1676 return NULL; 1677 } 1678 1679 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); 1680 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret); 1681 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen; 1682 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen); 1683 ret += plistlen; 1684 1685 } 1686 /* 1687 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves 1688 * extension 1689 */ 1690# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1691 1692 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { 1693 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 1694 return NULL; 1695 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); 1696 s2n(0, ret); 1697 } 1698 1699 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { 1700 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 1701 return NULL; 1702 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 1703 s2n(0, ret); 1704 } 1705# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1706 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1707 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 1708 1709 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) 1710 return NULL; 1711 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 1712 return NULL; 1713 1714 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 1715 s2n(sol + 2, ret); 1716 s2n(sol, ret); 1717 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); 1718 ret += sol; 1719 } 1720# endif 1721 1722# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1723 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { 1724 int el; 1725 1726 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 1727 1728 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 1729 return NULL; 1730 1731 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); 1732 s2n(el, ret); 1733 1734 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1736 return NULL; 1737 } 1738 ret += el; 1739 } 1740# endif 1741 1742 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 1743 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) 1744 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) { 1745 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 1746 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ 1747 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ 1748 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 1749 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 1750 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 1751 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 1752 }; 1753 if (limit - ret < 36) 1754 return NULL; 1755 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36); 1756 ret += 36; 1757 1758 } 1759# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1760 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ 1761 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) { 1762 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) 1763 return NULL; 1764 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); 1765 s2n(1, ret); 1766 /*- 1767 * Set mode: 1768 * 1: peer may send requests 1769 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 1770 */ 1771 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 1772 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1773 else 1774 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1775 1776 } 1777# endif 1778 1779# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1780 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; 1781 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1782 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { 1783 const unsigned char *npa; 1784 unsigned int npalen; 1785 int r; 1786 1787 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, 1788 s-> 1789 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); 1790 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 1791 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) 1792 return NULL; 1793 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); 1794 s2n(npalen, ret); 1795 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); 1796 ret += npalen; 1797 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1798 } 1799 } 1800# endif 1801 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al)) 1802 return NULL; 1803 1804 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { 1805 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected; 1806 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; 1807 1808 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0) 1809 return NULL; 1810 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); 1811 s2n(3 + len, ret); 1812 s2n(1 + len, ret); 1813 *ret++ = len; 1814 memcpy(ret, selected, len); 1815 ret += len; 1816 } 1817 1818 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) 1819 return orig; 1820 1821 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 1822 return ret; 1823} 1824 1825# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1826/*- 1827 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X 1828 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. 1829 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: 1830 * SNI, 1831 * elliptic_curves 1832 * ec_point_formats 1833 * 1834 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, 1835 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. 1836 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from 1837 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). 1838 */ 1839static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 1840 const unsigned char *limit) 1841{ 1842 unsigned short type, size; 1843 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 1844 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 1845 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 1846 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 1847 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 1848 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 1849 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 1850 1851 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 1852 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 1853 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 1854 0x00, /* uncompressed */ 1855 }; 1856 1857 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 1858 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { 1859 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 1860 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 1861 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 1862 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 1863 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 1864 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 1865 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 1866 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ 1867 }; 1868 1869 if (data >= (limit - 2)) 1870 return; 1871 data += 2; 1872 1873 if (data > (limit - 4)) 1874 return; 1875 n2s(data, type); 1876 n2s(data, size); 1877 1878 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1879 return; 1880 1881 if (data + size > limit) 1882 return; 1883 data += size; 1884 1885 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 1886 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 1887 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); 1888 1889 if (data + len1 + len2 != limit) 1890 return; 1891 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) 1892 return; 1893 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) 1894 return; 1895 } else { 1896 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 1897 1898 if (data + len != limit) 1899 return; 1900 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) 1901 return; 1902 } 1903 1904 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; 1905} 1906# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1907 1908/* 1909 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a 1910 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type 1911 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the 1912 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on 1913 * success. 1914 */ 1915static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 1916 unsigned data_len, int *al) 1917{ 1918 unsigned i; 1919 unsigned proto_len; 1920 const unsigned char *selected; 1921 unsigned char selected_len; 1922 int r; 1923 1924 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL) 1925 return 0; 1926 1927 if (data_len < 2) 1928 goto parse_error; 1929 1930 /* 1931 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit, 1932 * length-prefixed strings. 1933 */ 1934 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]); 1935 data_len -= 2; 1936 data += 2; 1937 if (data_len != i) 1938 goto parse_error; 1939 1940 if (data_len < 2) 1941 goto parse_error; 1942 1943 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) { 1944 proto_len = data[i]; 1945 i++; 1946 1947 if (proto_len == 0) 1948 goto parse_error; 1949 1950 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len) 1951 goto parse_error; 1952 1953 i += proto_len; 1954 } 1955 1956 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len, 1957 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); 1958 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 1959 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) 1960 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 1961 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 1962 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) { 1963 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1964 return -1; 1965 } 1966 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len); 1967 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; 1968 } 1969 return 0; 1970 1971 parse_error: 1972 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1973 return -1; 1974} 1975 1976static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, 1977 unsigned char *limit, int *al) 1978{ 1979 unsigned short type; 1980 unsigned short size; 1981 unsigned short len; 1982 unsigned char *data = *p; 1983 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 1984 1985 s->servername_done = 0; 1986 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 1987# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1988 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1989# endif 1990 1991 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { 1992 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 1993 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; 1994 } 1995# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1996 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 1997 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 1998# endif 1999 2000# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2001 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) 2002 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit); 2003# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2004 2005 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ 2006 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) { 2007 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs); 2008 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL; 2009 } 2010# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2011 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { 2012 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); 2013 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; 2014 } 2015# endif 2016 2017 s->srtp_profile = NULL; 2018 2019 if (data == limit) 2020 goto ri_check; 2021 2022 if (data > (limit - 2)) 2023 goto err; 2024 2025 n2s(data, len); 2026 2027 if (data + len != limit) 2028 goto err; 2029 2030 while (data <= (limit - 4)) { 2031 n2s(data, type); 2032 n2s(data, size); 2033 2034 if (data + size > (limit)) 2035 goto err; 2036# if 0 2037 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); 2038# endif 2039 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 2040 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); 2041/*- 2042 * The servername extension is treated as follows: 2043 * 2044 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 2045 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 2046 * in which case an fatal alert is generated. 2047 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 2048 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 2049 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 2050 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 2051 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 2052 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 2053 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 2054 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 2055 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 2056 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 2057 * the value of the Host: field. 2058 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 2059 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the 2060 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername 2061 * extension. 2062 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 2063 * 2064 */ 2065 2066 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { 2067 unsigned char *sdata; 2068 int servname_type; 2069 int dsize; 2070 2071 if (size < 2) 2072 goto err; 2073 n2s(data, dsize); 2074 size -= 2; 2075 if (dsize > size) 2076 goto err; 2077 2078 sdata = data; 2079 while (dsize > 3) { 2080 servname_type = *(sdata++); 2081 n2s(sdata, len); 2082 dsize -= 3; 2083 2084 if (len > dsize) 2085 goto err; 2086 2087 if (s->servername_done == 0) 2088 switch (servname_type) { 2089 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: 2090 if (!s->hit) { 2091 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) 2092 goto err; 2093 2094 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { 2095 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2096 return 0; 2097 } 2098 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = 2099 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { 2100 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2101 return 0; 2102 } 2103 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); 2104 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; 2105 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { 2106 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); 2107 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 2108 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2109 return 0; 2110 } 2111 s->servername_done = 1; 2112 2113 } else 2114 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname 2115 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 2116 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, 2117 (char *)sdata, len) == 0; 2118 2119 break; 2120 2121 default: 2122 break; 2123 } 2124 2125 dsize -= len; 2126 } 2127 if (dsize != 0) 2128 goto err; 2129 2130 } 2131# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2132 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { 2133 if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) 2134 goto err; 2135 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 2136 goto err; 2137 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) 2138 return -1; 2139 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); 2140 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; 2141 2142 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) 2143 goto err; 2144 } 2145# endif 2146 2147# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2148 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { 2149 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2150 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 2151 2152 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 2153 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) 2154 goto err; 2155 if (!s->hit) { 2156 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 2157 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 2158 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; 2159 } 2160 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 2161 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = 2162 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { 2163 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2164 return 0; 2165 } 2166 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 2167 ecpointformatlist_length; 2168 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, 2169 ecpointformatlist_length); 2170 } 2171# if 0 2172 fprintf(stderr, 2173 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", 2174 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 2175 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 2176 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 2177 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 2178 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 2179# endif 2180 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { 2181 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2182 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); 2183 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); 2184 2185 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || 2186 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 || 2187 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */ 2188 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) 2189 goto err; 2190 2191 if (!s->hit) { 2192 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) 2193 goto err; 2194 2195 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 2196 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = 2197 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { 2198 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2199 return 0; 2200 } 2201 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 2202 ellipticcurvelist_length; 2203 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, 2204 ellipticcurvelist_length); 2205 } 2206# if 0 2207 fprintf(stderr, 2208 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", 2209 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 2210 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 2211 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) 2212 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 2213 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 2214# endif 2215 } 2216# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2217# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2218 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) { 2219 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2220 2221 if (size < 2) { 2222 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2223 return 0; 2224 } 2225 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 2226 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { 2227 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2228 return 0; 2229 } 2230 2231 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2232 /* shouldn't really happen */ 2233 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 2234 } 2235 2236 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2237 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 2238 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 2239 else 2240 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = 2241 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 2242 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2243 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2244 return 0; 2245 } 2246 } 2247# endif 2248 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 2249 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 2250 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, 2251 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 2252 { 2253 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2254 return 0; 2255 } 2256 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { 2257 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2258 return 0; 2259 renegotiate_seen = 1; 2260 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { 2261 int dsize; 2262 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) 2263 goto err; 2264 n2s(data, dsize); 2265 size -= 2; 2266 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) 2267 goto err; 2268 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) 2269 goto err; 2270 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { 2271 2272 if (size < 5) 2273 goto err; 2274 2275 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; 2276 size--; 2277 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { 2278 const unsigned char *sdata; 2279 int dsize; 2280 /* Read in responder_id_list */ 2281 n2s(data, dsize); 2282 size -= 2; 2283 if (dsize > size) 2284 goto err; 2285 while (dsize > 0) { 2286 OCSP_RESPID *id; 2287 int idsize; 2288 if (dsize < 4) 2289 goto err; 2290 n2s(data, idsize); 2291 dsize -= 2 + idsize; 2292 size -= 2 + idsize; 2293 if (dsize < 0) 2294 goto err; 2295 sdata = data; 2296 data += idsize; 2297 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); 2298 if (!id) 2299 goto err; 2300 if (data != sdata) { 2301 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 2302 goto err; 2303 } 2304 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids 2305 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = 2306 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) { 2307 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 2308 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2309 return 0; 2310 } 2311 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { 2312 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 2313 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2314 return 0; 2315 } 2316 } 2317 2318 /* Read in request_extensions */ 2319 if (size < 2) 2320 goto err; 2321 n2s(data, dsize); 2322 size -= 2; 2323 if (dsize != size) 2324 goto err; 2325 sdata = data; 2326 if (dsize > 0) { 2327 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { 2328 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, 2329 X509_EXTENSION_free); 2330 } 2331 2332 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = 2333 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); 2334 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) 2335 goto err; 2336 } 2337 } 2338 /* 2339 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. 2340 */ 2341 else 2342 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 2343 } 2344# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2345 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { 2346 switch (data[0]) { 2347 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ 2348 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2349 break; 2350 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ 2351 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2352 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 2353 break; 2354 default: 2355 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2356 return 0; 2357 } 2358 } 2359# endif 2360# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2361 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 2362 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 && 2363 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { 2364 /*- 2365 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a 2366 * renegotiation. 2367 * 2368 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we 2369 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on 2370 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when 2371 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an 2372 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing 2373 * anything like that, but this might change). 2374 * 2375 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake 2376 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 2377 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen 2378 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new 2379 * Finished message could have been computed.) 2380 */ 2381 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 2382 } 2383# endif 2384 2385 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation && 2386 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 2387 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0) 2388 return 0; 2389# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2390 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ 2391 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 2392# endif 2393 } 2394 2395 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 2396# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 2397 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) 2398 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { 2399 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2400 return 0; 2401 } 2402# endif 2403 2404 data += size; 2405 } 2406 2407 /* Spurious data on the end */ 2408 if (data != limit) 2409 goto err; 2410 2411 *p = data; 2412 2413 ri_check: 2414 2415 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 2416 2417 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && 2418 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 2419 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 2421 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 2422 return 0; 2423 } 2424 2425 return 1; 2426err: 2427 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2428 return 0; 2429} 2430 2431/* 2432 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data 2433 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking. 2434 */ 2435 2436static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, 2437 const unsigned char *data, 2438 const unsigned char *limit, 2439 int *al) 2440{ 2441 unsigned short type, size, len; 2442 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */ 2443 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0) 2444 return 1; 2445 2446 if (data >= limit - 2) 2447 return 1; 2448 n2s(data, len); 2449 2450 if (data > limit - len) 2451 return 1; 2452 2453 while (data <= limit - 4) { 2454 n2s(data, type); 2455 n2s(data, size); 2456 2457 if (data + size > limit) 2458 return 1; 2459 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0) 2460 return 0; 2461 2462 data += size; 2463 } 2464 2465 return 1; 2466} 2467 2468int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, 2469 unsigned char *limit) 2470{ 2471 int al = -1; 2472 unsigned char *ptmp = *p; 2473 /* 2474 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled 2475 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically 2476 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions 2477 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure. 2478 */ 2479 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, limit, &al) <= 0) { 2480 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2481 return 0; 2482 } 2483 2484 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 2486 return 0; 2487 } 2488 2489 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext); 2490 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, limit, &al) <= 0) { 2491 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2492 return 0; 2493 } 2494 2495 return 1; 2496} 2497 2498# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2499/* 2500 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No 2501 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly 2502 * fill the length of the block. 2503 */ 2504static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) 2505{ 2506 unsigned int off = 0; 2507 2508 while (off < len) { 2509 if (d[off] == 0) 2510 return 0; 2511 off += d[off]; 2512 off++; 2513 } 2514 2515 return off == len; 2516} 2517# endif 2518 2519static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, 2520 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 2521{ 2522 unsigned short length; 2523 unsigned short type; 2524 unsigned short size; 2525 unsigned char *data = *p; 2526 int tlsext_servername = 0; 2527 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 2528 2529# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2530 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 2531# endif 2532 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 2533 2534 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { 2535 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2536 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; 2537 } 2538# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2539 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 2540 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 2541# endif 2542 2543 if (data >= (d + n - 2)) 2544 goto ri_check; 2545 2546 n2s(data, length); 2547 if (data + length != d + n) { 2548 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2549 return 0; 2550 } 2551 2552 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { 2553 n2s(data, type); 2554 n2s(data, size); 2555 2556 if (data + size > (d + n)) 2557 goto ri_check; 2558 2559 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 2560 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); 2561 2562 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { 2563 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { 2564 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2565 return 0; 2566 } 2567 tlsext_servername = 1; 2568 } 2569# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2570 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { 2571 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2572 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 2573 2574 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { 2575 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2576 return 0; 2577 } 2578 if (!s->hit) { 2579 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 2580 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 2581 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 2582 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = 2583 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { 2584 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2585 return 0; 2586 } 2587 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 2588 ecpointformatlist_length; 2589 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, 2590 ecpointformatlist_length); 2591 } 2592# if 0 2593 fprintf(stderr, 2594 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); 2595 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 2596 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 2597 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 2598 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 2599# endif 2600 } 2601# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2602 2603 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 2604 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 2605 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, 2606 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 2607 { 2608 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2609 return 0; 2610 } 2611 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 2612 || (size > 0)) { 2613 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2614 return 0; 2615 } 2616 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2617 } 2618# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2619 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) { 2620 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2621 2622 if (size < 2) { 2623 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2624 return 0; 2625 } 2626 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 2627 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { 2628 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2629 return 0; 2630 } 2631 2632 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2633 /* shouldn't really happen */ 2634 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 2635 } 2636 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 2637 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2638 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 2639 } else { 2640 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = 2641 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 2642 } 2643 2644 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2645 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2646 return 0; 2647 } 2648 } 2649# endif 2650 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { 2651 /* 2652 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status 2653 * request message. 2654 */ 2655 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { 2656 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2657 return 0; 2658 } 2659 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ 2660 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 2661 } 2662# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2663 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 2664 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 2665 unsigned char *selected; 2666 unsigned char selected_len; 2667 2668 /* We must have requested it. */ 2669 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { 2670 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2671 return 0; 2672 } 2673 /* The data must be valid */ 2674 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) { 2675 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2676 return 0; 2677 } 2678 if (s-> 2679 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, 2680 size, 2681 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != 2682 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 2683 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2684 return 0; 2685 } 2686 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 2687 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { 2688 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2689 return 0; 2690 } 2691 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); 2692 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; 2693 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 2694 } 2695# endif 2696 2697 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) { 2698 unsigned len; 2699 2700 /* We must have requested it. */ 2701 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) { 2702 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2703 return 0; 2704 } 2705 if (size < 4) { 2706 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2707 return 0; 2708 } 2709 /*- 2710 * The extension data consists of: 2711 * uint16 list_length 2712 * uint8 proto_length; 2713 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; 2714 */ 2715 len = data[0]; 2716 len <<= 8; 2717 len |= data[1]; 2718 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) { 2719 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2720 return 0; 2721 } 2722 len = data[2]; 2723 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) { 2724 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2725 return 0; 2726 } 2727 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) 2728 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2729 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len); 2730 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) { 2731 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2732 return 0; 2733 } 2734 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len); 2735 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; 2736 } 2737 2738 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { 2739 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2740 return 0; 2741 renegotiate_seen = 1; 2742 } 2743# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2744 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { 2745 switch (data[0]) { 2746 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ 2747 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2748 break; 2749 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ 2750 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2751 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 2752 break; 2753 default: 2754 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2755 return 0; 2756 } 2757 } 2758# endif 2759# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 2760 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { 2761 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2762 return 0; 2763 } 2764# endif 2765 /* 2766 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a 2767 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback 2768 */ 2769 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0) 2770 return 0; 2771 2772 data += size; 2773 } 2774 2775 if (data != d + n) { 2776 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2777 return 0; 2778 } 2779 2780 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { 2781 if (s->tlsext_hostname) { 2782 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { 2783 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 2784 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { 2785 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2786 return 0; 2787 } 2788 } else { 2789 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2790 return 0; 2791 } 2792 } 2793 } 2794 2795 *p = data; 2796 2797 ri_check: 2798 2799 /* 2800 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid 2801 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello 2802 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. 2803 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which 2804 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on 2805 * initial connect only. 2806 */ 2807 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) 2808 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 2809 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 2811 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 2812 return 0; 2813 } 2814 2815 return 1; 2816} 2817 2818int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2819{ 2820 2821# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2822 { 2823 int r = 1; 2824 2825 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { 2826 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, 2827 s-> 2828 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 2829 if (!r) 2830 return -1; 2831 } 2832 2833 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2834 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2835 /* shouldn't really happen */ 2836 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 2837 } 2838 2839 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 2840 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2841 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 2842 } else { 2843 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = 2844 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, 2845 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 2846 } 2847 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 2849 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2850 return -1; 2851 } 2852 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = 2853 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 2854 } 2855 2856 if (r == 2) 2857 /* 2858 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate 2859 * server opaque PRF input 2860 */ 2861 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = 2862 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 2863 } 2864# endif 2865 2866 return 1; 2867} 2868 2869int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2870{ 2871 return 1; 2872} 2873 2874static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) 2875{ 2876 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 2877 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2878 2879# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2880 /* 2881 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely 2882 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 2883 */ 2884 /* 2885 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely 2886 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 2887 */ 2888# endif 2889 2890 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2891 ret = 2892 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 2893 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2894 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL 2895 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2896 ret = 2897 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 2898 s-> 2899 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2900 2901# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2902 { 2903 /* 2904 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we 2905 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this 2906 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). 2907 */ 2908 2909 int r = 1; 2910 2911 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { 2912 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, 2913 s-> 2914 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 2915 if (!r) { 2916 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2917 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2918 goto err; 2919 } 2920 } 2921 2922 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2923 /* shouldn't really happen */ 2924 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 2925 } 2926 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; 2927 2928 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2929 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 2930 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 2931 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) { 2932 /* 2933 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF 2934 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! 2935 */ 2936 2937 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 2938 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2939 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 2940 } else { 2941 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = 2942 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, 2943 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 2944 } 2945 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2946 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2947 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2948 goto err; 2949 } 2950 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = 2951 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 2952 } 2953 } 2954 2955 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2956 /* 2957 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we 2958 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the 2959 * handshake. 2960 */ 2961 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2962 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2963 } 2964 } 2965 2966 err: 2967# endif 2968 switch (ret) { 2969 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2970 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2971 return -1; 2972 2973 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2974 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 2975 return 1; 2976 2977 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2978 s->servername_done = 0; 2979 default: 2980 return 1; 2981 } 2982} 2983 2984int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) 2985{ 2986 int al; 2987 size_t i; 2988 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */ 2989 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { 2990 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs); 2991 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL; 2992 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0; 2993 } 2994 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ 2995 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { 2996 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL; 2997 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0; 2998 } 2999 3000 /* If sigalgs received process it. */ 3001 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) { 3002 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { 3003 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3004 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3005 goto err; 3006 } 3007 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */ 3008 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { 3009 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, 3010 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS); 3011 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 3012 goto err; 3013 } 3014 } else 3015 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert); 3016 return 1; 3017 err: 3018 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3019 return 0; 3020} 3021 3022int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) 3023{ 3024 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 3025 int al; 3026 3027 /* 3028 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be 3029 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, 3030 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may 3031 * influence which certificate is sent 3032 */ 3033 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { 3034 int r; 3035 CERT_PKEY *certpkey; 3036 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); 3037 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ 3038 if (certpkey == NULL) { 3039 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 3040 return 1; 3041 } 3042 /* 3043 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate 3044 * et al can pick it up. 3045 */ 3046 s->cert->key = certpkey; 3047 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 3048 switch (r) { 3049 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 3050 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 3051 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 3052 break; 3053 /* status request response should be sent */ 3054 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 3055 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 3056 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 3057 else 3058 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 3059 break; 3060 /* something bad happened */ 3061 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 3062 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3063 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3064 goto err; 3065 } 3066 } else 3067 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 3068 3069 err: 3070 switch (ret) { 3071 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 3072 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3073 return -1; 3074 3075 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 3076 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 3077 return 1; 3078 3079 default: 3080 return 1; 3081 } 3082} 3083 3084int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 3085{ 3086 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 3087 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 3088 3089# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 3090 /* 3091 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 3092 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it 3093 * must contain uncompressed. 3094 */ 3095 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 3096 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 3097 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 3098 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) 3099 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 3100 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) 3101 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) 3102 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { 3103 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 3104 size_t i; 3105 unsigned char *list; 3106 int found_uncompressed = 0; 3107 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 3108 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { 3109 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { 3110 found_uncompressed = 1; 3111 break; 3112 } 3113 } 3114 if (!found_uncompressed) { 3115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 3116 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 3117 return -1; 3118 } 3119 } 3120 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 3121# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 3122 3123 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 3124 ret = 3125 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 3126 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 3127 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL 3128 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 3129 ret = 3130 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 3131 s-> 3132 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 3133 3134# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 3135 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) { 3136 /* 3137 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on 3138 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a 3139 * value from the server too. 3140 */ 3141 3142 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 3143 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3144 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3145 } 3146 3147 /* 3148 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to 3149 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. 3150 */ 3151 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || 3152 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != 3153 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) { 3154 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3155 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 3156 } 3157 } 3158# endif 3159 3160 /* 3161 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the 3162 * callback 3163 */ 3164 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) 3165 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { 3166 int r; 3167 /* 3168 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no 3169 * response. 3170 */ 3171 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) { 3172 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); 3173 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; 3174 } 3175 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; 3176 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 3177 if (r == 0) { 3178 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; 3179 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3180 } 3181 if (r < 0) { 3182 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3183 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3184 } 3185 } 3186 3187 switch (ret) { 3188 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 3189 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3190 return -1; 3191 3192 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 3193 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 3194 return 1; 3195 3196 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 3197 s->servername_done = 0; 3198 default: 3199 return 1; 3200 } 3201} 3202 3203int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, 3204 int n) 3205{ 3206 int al = -1; 3207 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) 3208 return 1; 3209 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) { 3210 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3211 return 0; 3212 } 3213 3214 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { 3215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 3216 return 0; 3217 } 3218 return 1; 3219} 3220 3221/*- 3222 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the 3223 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle 3224 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. 3225 * 3226 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will 3227 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket 3228 * extension, if any. 3229 * len: the length of the session ID. 3230 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. 3231 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 3232 * point to the resulting session. 3233 * 3234 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key 3235 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will 3236 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. 3237 * 3238 * Returns: 3239 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 3240 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). 3241 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports 3242 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. 3243 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but 3244 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. 3245 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. 3246 * 3247 * Side effects: 3248 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue 3249 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support 3250 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have 3251 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if 3252 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. 3253 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. 3254 */ 3255int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, 3256 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) 3257{ 3258 /* Point after session ID in client hello */ 3259 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; 3260 unsigned short i; 3261 3262 *ret = NULL; 3263 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 3264 3265 /* 3266 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful 3267 * resumption. 3268 */ 3269 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 3270 return 0; 3271 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) 3272 return 0; 3273 if (p >= limit) 3274 return -1; 3275 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 3276 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 3277 i = *(p++); 3278 p += i; 3279 if (p >= limit) 3280 return -1; 3281 } 3282 /* Skip past cipher list */ 3283 n2s(p, i); 3284 p += i; 3285 if (p >= limit) 3286 return -1; 3287 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ 3288 i = *(p++); 3289 p += i; 3290 if (p > limit) 3291 return -1; 3292 /* Now at start of extensions */ 3293 if ((p + 2) >= limit) 3294 return 0; 3295 n2s(p, i); 3296 while ((p + 4) <= limit) { 3297 unsigned short type, size; 3298 n2s(p, type); 3299 n2s(p, size); 3300 if (p + size > limit) 3301 return 0; 3302 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 3303 int r; 3304 if (size == 0) { 3305 /* 3306 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have 3307 * one. 3308 */ 3309 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 3310 return 1; 3311 } 3312 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { 3313 /* 3314 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than 3315 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger 3316 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to 3317 * calculate the master secret later. 3318 */ 3319 return 2; 3320 } 3321 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); 3322 switch (r) { 3323 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ 3324 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 3325 return 2; 3326 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ 3327 return r; 3328 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ 3329 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 3330 return 3; 3331 default: /* fatal error */ 3332 return -1; 3333 } 3334 } 3335 p += size; 3336 } 3337 return 0; 3338} 3339 3340/*- 3341 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. 3342 * 3343 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. 3344 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. 3345 * sess_id: points at the session ID. 3346 * sesslen: the length of the session ID. 3347 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 3348 * point to the resulting session. 3349 * 3350 * Returns: 3351 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 3352 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. 3353 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. 3354 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. 3355 */ 3356static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, 3357 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, 3358 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) 3359{ 3360 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3361 unsigned char *sdec; 3362 const unsigned char *p; 3363 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 3364 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 3365 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3366 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3367 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3368 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ 3369 if (eticklen < 48) 3370 return 2; 3371 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 3372 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3373 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3374 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 3375 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 3376 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 3377 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 3378 if (rv < 0) 3379 return -1; 3380 if (rv == 0) 3381 return 2; 3382 if (rv == 2) 3383 renew_ticket = 1; 3384 } else { 3385 /* Check key name matches */ 3386 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 3387 return 2; 3388 if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3389 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0 3390 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3391 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 3392 etick + 16) <= 0) { 3393 goto err; 3394 } 3395 } 3396 /* 3397 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity 3398 * checks on ticket. 3399 */ 3400 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 3401 if (mlen < 0) { 3402 goto err; 3403 } 3404 eticklen -= mlen; 3405 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 3406 if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 3407 || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { 3408 goto err; 3409 } 3410 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3411 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { 3412 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3413 return 2; 3414 } 3415 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 3416 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 3417 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3418 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3419 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 3420 if (!sdec || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { 3421 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3422 return -1; 3423 } 3424 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { 3425 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3426 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 3427 return 2; 3428 } 3429 slen += mlen; 3430 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3431 p = sdec; 3432 3433 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 3434 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 3435 if (sess) { 3436 /* 3437 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect 3438 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session 3439 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by 3440 * standard. 3441 */ 3442 if (sesslen) 3443 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 3444 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 3445 *psess = sess; 3446 if (renew_ticket) 3447 return 4; 3448 else 3449 return 3; 3450 } 3451 ERR_clear_error(); 3452 /* 3453 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. 3454 */ 3455 return 2; 3456err: 3457 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3458 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3459 return -1; 3460} 3461 3462/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ 3463 3464typedef struct { 3465 int nid; 3466 int id; 3467} tls12_lookup; 3468 3469static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { 3470 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, 3471 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, 3472 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, 3473 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, 3474 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, 3475 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} 3476}; 3477 3478static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { 3479 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, 3480 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, 3481 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} 3482}; 3483 3484static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 3485{ 3486 size_t i; 3487 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { 3488 if (table[i].nid == nid) 3489 return table[i].id; 3490 } 3491 return -1; 3492} 3493 3494static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 3495{ 3496 size_t i; 3497 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { 3498 if ((table[i].id) == id) 3499 return table[i].nid; 3500 } 3501 return NID_undef; 3502} 3503 3504int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, 3505 const EVP_MD *md) 3506{ 3507 int sig_id, md_id; 3508 if (!md) 3509 return 0; 3510 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, 3511 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3512 if (md_id == -1) 3513 return 0; 3514 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); 3515 if (sig_id == -1) 3516 return 0; 3517 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; 3518 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; 3519 return 1; 3520} 3521 3522int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) 3523{ 3524 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, 3525 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3526} 3527 3528const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) 3529{ 3530 switch (hash_alg) { 3531# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 3532 case TLSEXT_hash_md5: 3533# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 3534 if (FIPS_mode()) 3535 return NULL; 3536# endif 3537 return EVP_md5(); 3538# endif 3539# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 3540 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: 3541 return EVP_sha1(); 3542# endif 3543# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 3544 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: 3545 return EVP_sha224(); 3546 3547 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: 3548 return EVP_sha256(); 3549# endif 3550# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 3551 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: 3552 return EVP_sha384(); 3553 3554 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: 3555 return EVP_sha512(); 3556# endif 3557 default: 3558 return NULL; 3559 3560 } 3561} 3562 3563static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) 3564{ 3565 switch (sig_alg) { 3566# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3567 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 3568 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; 3569# endif 3570# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3571 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 3572 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; 3573# endif 3574# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3575 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 3576 return SSL_PKEY_ECC; 3577# endif 3578 } 3579 return -1; 3580} 3581 3582/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */ 3583static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, 3584 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data) 3585{ 3586 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0; 3587 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) 3588 return; 3589 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) { 3590 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, 3591 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3592 if (phash_nid) 3593 *phash_nid = hash_nid; 3594 } 3595 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) { 3596 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, 3597 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3598 if (psign_nid) 3599 *psign_nid = sign_nid; 3600 } 3601 if (psignhash_nid) { 3602 if (sign_nid && hash_nid) 3603 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid); 3604 else 3605 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef; 3606 } 3607} 3608 3609/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */ 3610static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig, 3611 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen, 3612 const unsigned char *allow, 3613 size_t allowlen) 3614{ 3615 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp; 3616 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0; 3617 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) { 3618 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */ 3619 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL) 3620 continue; 3621 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1) 3622 continue; 3623 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) { 3624 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) { 3625 nmatch++; 3626 if (shsig) { 3627 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0]; 3628 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1]; 3629 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid, 3630 &shsig->sign_nid, 3631 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp); 3632 shsig++; 3633 } 3634 break; 3635 } 3636 } 3637 } 3638 return nmatch; 3639} 3640 3641/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */ 3642static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) 3643{ 3644 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf; 3645 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen; 3646 size_t nmatch; 3647 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL; 3648 CERT *c = s->cert; 3649 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s); 3650 if (c->shared_sigalgs) { 3651 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); 3652 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL; 3653 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0; 3654 } 3655 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */ 3656 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { 3657 conf = c->client_sigalgs; 3658 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen; 3659 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { 3660 conf = c->conf_sigalgs; 3661 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen; 3662 } else 3663 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf); 3664 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) { 3665 pref = conf; 3666 preflen = conflen; 3667 allow = c->peer_sigalgs; 3668 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen; 3669 } else { 3670 allow = conf; 3671 allowlen = conflen; 3672 pref = c->peer_sigalgs; 3673 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen; 3674 } 3675 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); 3676 if (nmatch) { 3677 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS)); 3678 if (!salgs) 3679 return 0; 3680 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); 3681 } else { 3682 salgs = NULL; 3683 } 3684 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs; 3685 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch; 3686 return 1; 3687} 3688 3689/* Set preferred digest for each key type */ 3690 3691int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) 3692{ 3693 CERT *c = s->cert; 3694 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */ 3695 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 3696 return 1; 3697 /* Should never happen */ 3698 if (!c) 3699 return 0; 3700 3701 if (c->peer_sigalgs) 3702 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs); 3703 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize); 3704 if (!c->peer_sigalgs) 3705 return 0; 3706 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize; 3707 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize); 3708 return 1; 3709} 3710 3711int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) 3712{ 3713 int idx; 3714 size_t i; 3715 const EVP_MD *md; 3716 CERT *c = s->cert; 3717 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr; 3718 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s)) 3719 return 0; 3720 3721# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 3722 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { 3723 /* 3724 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest, 3725 * ignoring any peer preferences. 3726 */ 3727 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL; 3728 if (s->server) 3729 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs; 3730 else 3731 sigs = c->client_sigalgs; 3732 if (sigs) { 3733 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]); 3734 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]); 3735 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 3736 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3737 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { 3738 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = 3739 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3740 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 3741 } 3742 } 3743 } 3744# endif 3745 3746 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs; 3747 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) { 3748 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign); 3749 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) { 3750 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash); 3751 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 3752 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3753 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { 3754 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = 3755 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3756 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 3757 } 3758 } 3759 3760 } 3761 /* 3762 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use 3763 * the certificate for signing. 3764 */ 3765 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { 3766 /* 3767 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not 3768 * supported it stays as NULL. 3769 */ 3770# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3771 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) 3772 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3773# endif 3774# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3775 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) { 3776 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3777 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3778 } 3779# endif 3780# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3781 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) 3782 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3783# endif 3784 } 3785 return 1; 3786} 3787 3788int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, 3789 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, 3790 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) 3791{ 3792 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs; 3793 if (psig == NULL) 3794 return 0; 3795 if (idx >= 0) { 3796 idx <<= 1; 3797 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen) 3798 return 0; 3799 psig += idx; 3800 if (rhash) 3801 *rhash = psig[0]; 3802 if (rsig) 3803 *rsig = psig[1]; 3804 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig); 3805 } 3806 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2; 3807} 3808 3809int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, 3810 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, 3811 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) 3812{ 3813 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs; 3814 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) 3815 return 0; 3816 shsigalgs += idx; 3817 if (phash) 3818 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid; 3819 if (psign) 3820 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid; 3821 if (psignhash) 3822 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid; 3823 if (rsig) 3824 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign; 3825 if (rhash) 3826 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash; 3827 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; 3828} 3829 3830# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 3831int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) 3832{ 3833 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; 3834 unsigned short hbtype; 3835 unsigned int payload; 3836 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 3837 3838 if (s->msg_callback) 3839 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 3840 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, 3841 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 3842 3843 /* Read type and payload length first */ 3844 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 3845 return 0; /* silently discard */ 3846 hbtype = *p++; 3847 n2s(p, payload); 3848 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 3849 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ 3850 pl = p; 3851 3852 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { 3853 unsigned char *buffer, *bp; 3854 int r; 3855 3856 /* 3857 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type, 3858 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding 3859 */ 3860 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 3861 bp = buffer; 3862 3863 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ 3864 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; 3865 s2n(payload, bp); 3866 memcpy(bp, pl, payload); 3867 bp += payload; 3868 /* Random padding */ 3869 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) { 3870 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 3871 return -1; 3872 } 3873 3874 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3875 3 + payload + padding); 3876 3877 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) 3878 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 3879 buffer, 3 + payload + padding, 3880 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 3881 3882 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 3883 3884 if (r < 0) 3885 return r; 3886 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { 3887 unsigned int seq; 3888 3889 /* 3890 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 3891 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number 3892 */ 3893 n2s(pl, seq); 3894 3895 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { 3896 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 3897 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 3898 } 3899 } 3900 3901 return 0; 3902} 3903 3904int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) 3905{ 3906 unsigned char *buf, *p; 3907 int ret = -1; 3908 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ 3909 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 3910 3911 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ 3912 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || 3913 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { 3914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); 3915 return -1; 3916 } 3917 3918 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ 3919 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { 3920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); 3921 return -1; 3922 } 3923 3924 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ 3925 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) { 3926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 3927 return -1; 3928 } 3929 3930 /* 3931 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14 3932 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. 3933 */ 3934 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); 3935 3936 /*- 3937 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number 3938 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add 3939 * some random stuff. 3940 * - Message Type, 1 byte 3941 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) 3942 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) 3943 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) 3944 * - Padding 3945 */ 3946 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 3947 p = buf; 3948 /* Message Type */ 3949 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; 3950 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ 3951 s2n(payload, p); 3952 /* Sequence number */ 3953 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); 3954 /* 16 random bytes */ 3955 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) { 3956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3957 goto err; 3958 } 3959 p += 16; 3960 /* Random padding */ 3961 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) { 3962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3963 goto err; 3964 } 3965 3966 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); 3967 if (ret >= 0) { 3968 if (s->msg_callback) 3969 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 3970 buf, 3 + payload + padding, 3971 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 3972 3973 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; 3974 } 3975 3976err: 3977 OPENSSL_free(buf); 3978 3979 return ret; 3980} 3981# endif 3982 3983# define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2) 3984 3985typedef struct { 3986 size_t sigalgcnt; 3987 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN]; 3988} sig_cb_st; 3989 3990static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) 3991{ 3992 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg; 3993 size_t i; 3994 char etmp[20], *p; 3995 int sig_alg, hash_alg; 3996 if (elem == NULL) 3997 return 0; 3998 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN) 3999 return 0; 4000 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) 4001 return 0; 4002 memcpy(etmp, elem, len); 4003 etmp[len] = 0; 4004 p = strchr(etmp, '+'); 4005 if (!p) 4006 return 0; 4007 *p = 0; 4008 p++; 4009 if (!*p) 4010 return 0; 4011 4012 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA")) 4013 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA; 4014 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA")) 4015 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA; 4016 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA")) 4017 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC; 4018 else 4019 return 0; 4020 4021 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p); 4022 if (hash_alg == NID_undef) 4023 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p); 4024 if (hash_alg == NID_undef) 4025 return 0; 4026 4027 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) { 4028 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg) 4029 return 0; 4030 } 4031 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg; 4032 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg; 4033 return 1; 4034} 4035 4036/* 4037 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the 4038 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 4039 */ 4040int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client) 4041{ 4042 sig_cb_st sig; 4043 sig.sigalgcnt = 0; 4044 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig)) 4045 return 0; 4046 if (c == NULL) 4047 return 1; 4048 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client); 4049} 4050 4051int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, 4052 int client) 4053{ 4054 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr; 4055 int rhash, rsign; 4056 size_t i; 4057 if (salglen & 1) 4058 return 0; 4059 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen); 4060 if (sigalgs == NULL) 4061 return 0; 4062 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) { 4063 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, 4064 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 4065 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, 4066 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 4067 4068 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1) 4069 goto err; 4070 *sptr++ = rhash; 4071 *sptr++ = rsign; 4072 } 4073 4074 if (client) { 4075 if (c->client_sigalgs) 4076 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); 4077 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs; 4078 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen; 4079 } else { 4080 if (c->conf_sigalgs) 4081 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); 4082 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs; 4083 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen; 4084 } 4085 4086 return 1; 4087 4088 err: 4089 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs); 4090 return 0; 4091} 4092 4093static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid) 4094{ 4095 int sig_nid; 4096 size_t i; 4097 if (default_nid == -1) 4098 return 1; 4099 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); 4100 if (default_nid) 4101 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0; 4102 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) 4103 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) 4104 return 1; 4105 return 0; 4106} 4107 4108/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */ 4109static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x) 4110{ 4111 X509_NAME *nm; 4112 int i; 4113 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 4114 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) { 4115 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i))) 4116 return 1; 4117 } 4118 return 0; 4119} 4120 4121/* 4122 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by 4123 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before 4124 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before 4125 * attempting to use them. 4126 */ 4127 4128/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */ 4129 4130# define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \ 4131 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM) 4132/* Strict mode flags */ 4133# define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \ 4134 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \ 4135 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) 4136 4137int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, 4138 int idx) 4139{ 4140 int i; 4141 int rv = 0; 4142 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode; 4143 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL; 4144 CERT *c = s->cert; 4145 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); 4146 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */ 4147 if (idx != -1) { 4148 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */ 4149 if (idx == -2) { 4150 cpk = c->key; 4151 idx = cpk - c->pkeys; 4152 } else 4153 cpk = c->pkeys + idx; 4154 x = cpk->x509; 4155 pk = cpk->privatekey; 4156 chain = cpk->chain; 4157 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT; 4158 /* If no cert or key, forget it */ 4159 if (!x || !pk) 4160 goto end; 4161# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 4162 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */ 4163 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { 4164 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | 4165 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 4166 cpk->valid_flags = rv; 4167 return rv; 4168 } 4169# endif 4170 } else { 4171 if (!x || !pk) 4172 return 0; 4173 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk); 4174 if (idx == -1) 4175 return 0; 4176 cpk = c->pkeys + idx; 4177 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT) 4178 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS; 4179 else 4180 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS; 4181 strict_mode = 1; 4182 } 4183 4184 if (suiteb_flags) { 4185 int ok; 4186 if (check_flags) 4187 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; 4188 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags); 4189 if (ok == X509_V_OK) 4190 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; 4191 else if (!check_flags) 4192 goto end; 4193 } 4194 4195 /* 4196 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature 4197 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode. 4198 */ 4199 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) { 4200 int default_nid; 4201 unsigned char rsign = 0; 4202 if (c->peer_sigalgs) 4203 default_nid = 0; 4204 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */ 4205 else { 4206 switch (idx) { 4207 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC: 4208 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN: 4209 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA: 4210 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa; 4211 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption; 4212 break; 4213 4214 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: 4215 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA: 4216 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa; 4217 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1; 4218 break; 4219 4220 case SSL_PKEY_ECC: 4221 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa; 4222 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1; 4223 break; 4224 4225 default: 4226 default_nid = -1; 4227 break; 4228 } 4229 } 4230 /* 4231 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set 4232 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1. 4233 */ 4234 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) { 4235 size_t j; 4236 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs; 4237 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) { 4238 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign) 4239 break; 4240 } 4241 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) { 4242 if (check_flags) 4243 goto skip_sigs; 4244 else 4245 goto end; 4246 } 4247 } 4248 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */ 4249 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) { 4250 if (!check_flags) 4251 goto end; 4252 } else 4253 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE; 4254 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 4255 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 4256 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) { 4257 if (check_flags) { 4258 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 4259 break; 4260 } else 4261 goto end; 4262 } 4263 } 4264 } 4265 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */ 4266 else if (check_flags) 4267 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 4268 skip_sigs: 4269 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */ 4270 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2)) 4271 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM; 4272 else if (!check_flags) 4273 goto end; 4274 if (!s->server) 4275 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 4276 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */ 4277 else if (strict_mode) { 4278 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 4279 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 4280 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 4281 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) { 4282 if (check_flags) { 4283 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 4284 break; 4285 } else 4286 goto end; 4287 } 4288 } 4289 } 4290 if (!s->server && strict_mode) { 4291 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn; 4292 int check_type = 0; 4293 switch (pk->type) { 4294 case EVP_PKEY_RSA: 4295 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN; 4296 break; 4297 case EVP_PKEY_DSA: 4298 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN; 4299 break; 4300 case EVP_PKEY_EC: 4301 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN; 4302 break; 4303 case EVP_PKEY_DH: 4304 case EVP_PKEY_DHX: 4305 { 4306 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk); 4307 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA) 4308 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH; 4309 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA) 4310 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH; 4311 } 4312 } 4313 if (check_type) { 4314 const unsigned char *ctypes; 4315 int ctypelen; 4316 if (c->ctypes) { 4317 ctypes = c->ctypes; 4318 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num; 4319 } else { 4320 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype; 4321 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num; 4322 } 4323 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) { 4324 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) { 4325 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 4326 break; 4327 } 4328 } 4329 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags) 4330 goto end; 4331 } else 4332 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 4333 4334 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names; 4335 4336 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn)) 4337 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 4338 4339 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { 4340 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x)) 4341 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 4342 } 4343 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { 4344 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 4345 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 4346 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) { 4347 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 4348 break; 4349 } 4350 } 4351 } 4352 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) 4353 goto end; 4354 } else 4355 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 4356 4357 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags) 4358 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID; 4359 4360 end: 4361 4362 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 4363 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN) 4364 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 4365 else if (cpk->digest) 4366 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 4367 } else 4368 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 4369 4370 /* 4371 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the 4372 * chain is invalid. 4373 */ 4374 if (!check_flags) { 4375 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) 4376 cpk->valid_flags = rv; 4377 else { 4378 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */ 4379 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 4380 return 0; 4381 } 4382 } 4383 return rv; 4384} 4385 4386/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */ 4387void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s) 4388{ 4389 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC); 4390 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN); 4391 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN); 4392 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA); 4393 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA); 4394 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC); 4395} 4396 4397/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */ 4398int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 4399{ 4400 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1); 4401} 4402 4403#endif 4404