t1_enc.c revision 238405
155714Skris/* ssl/t1_enc.c */ 255714Skris/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 355714Skris * All rights reserved. 455714Skris * 555714Skris * This package is an SSL implementation written 655714Skris * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 755714Skris * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 855714Skris * 955714Skris * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 1055714Skris * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 1155714Skris * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 1255714Skris * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 1355714Skris * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 1455714Skris * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 1555714Skris * 1655714Skris * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 1755714Skris * the code are not to be removed. 1855714Skris * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 1955714Skris * as the author of the parts of the library used. 2055714Skris * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 2155714Skris * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 2255714Skris * 2355714Skris * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 2455714Skris * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 2555714Skris * are met: 2655714Skris * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 2755714Skris * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 2855714Skris * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 2955714Skris * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 3055714Skris * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 3155714Skris * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 3255714Skris * must display the following acknowledgement: 3355714Skris * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 3455714Skris * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 3555714Skris * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 3655714Skris * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 3755714Skris * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 3855714Skris * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 3955714Skris * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 4055714Skris * 4155714Skris * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 4255714Skris * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 4355714Skris * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 4455714Skris * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 4555714Skris * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 4655714Skris * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 4755714Skris * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 4855714Skris * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 4955714Skris * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 5055714Skris * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 5155714Skris * SUCH DAMAGE. 5255714Skris * 5355714Skris * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 5455714Skris * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 5555714Skris * copied and put under another distribution licence 5655714Skris * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 5755714Skris */ 58100928Snectar/* ==================================================================== 59238405Sjkim * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60100928Snectar * 61100928Snectar * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62100928Snectar * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63100928Snectar * are met: 64100928Snectar * 65100928Snectar * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66100928Snectar * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67100928Snectar * 68100928Snectar * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69100928Snectar * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70100928Snectar * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71100928Snectar * distribution. 72100928Snectar * 73100928Snectar * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74100928Snectar * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75100928Snectar * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76100928Snectar * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77100928Snectar * 78100928Snectar * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79100928Snectar * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80100928Snectar * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81100928Snectar * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82100928Snectar * 83100928Snectar * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84100928Snectar * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85100928Snectar * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86100928Snectar * 87100928Snectar * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88100928Snectar * acknowledgment: 89100928Snectar * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90100928Snectar * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91100928Snectar * 92100928Snectar * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93100928Snectar * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94100928Snectar * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95100928Snectar * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96100928Snectar * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97100928Snectar * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98100928Snectar * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99100928Snectar * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100100928Snectar * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101100928Snectar * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102100928Snectar * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103100928Snectar * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104100928Snectar * ==================================================================== 105100928Snectar * 106100928Snectar * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107100928Snectar * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108100928Snectar * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109100928Snectar * 110100928Snectar */ 111238405Sjkim/* ==================================================================== 112238405Sjkim * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 113238405Sjkim * 114238405Sjkim * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 115238405Sjkim * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 116238405Sjkim * license. 117238405Sjkim * 118238405Sjkim * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 119238405Sjkim * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 120238405Sjkim * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 121238405Sjkim * 122238405Sjkim * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 123238405Sjkim * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 124238405Sjkim * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 125238405Sjkim * 126238405Sjkim * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 127238405Sjkim * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 128238405Sjkim * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 129238405Sjkim * to make use of the Contribution. 130238405Sjkim * 131238405Sjkim * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 132238405Sjkim * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 133238405Sjkim * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 134238405Sjkim * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 135238405Sjkim * OTHERWISE. 136238405Sjkim */ 13755714Skris 13855714Skris#include <stdio.h> 139109998Smarkm#include "ssl_locl.h" 140194206Ssimon#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 14155714Skris#include <openssl/comp.h> 142194206Ssimon#endif 14355714Skris#include <openssl/evp.h> 14455714Skris#include <openssl/hmac.h> 145109998Smarkm#include <openssl/md5.h> 146238405Sjkim#include <openssl/rand.h> 147194206Ssimon#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 148194206Ssimon#include <openssl/des.h> 149194206Ssimon#endif 15055714Skris 151238405Sjkim/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ 152238405Sjkimstatic int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, 153238405Sjkim int sec_len, 154238405Sjkim const void *seed1, int seed1_len, 155238405Sjkim const void *seed2, int seed2_len, 156238405Sjkim const void *seed3, int seed3_len, 157238405Sjkim const void *seed4, int seed4_len, 158238405Sjkim const void *seed5, int seed5_len, 15955714Skris unsigned char *out, int olen) 16055714Skris { 161215697Ssimon int chunk; 162238405Sjkim size_t j; 163238405Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp; 164238405Sjkim EVP_PKEY *mac_key; 165109998Smarkm unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 166238405Sjkim size_t A1_len; 167238405Sjkim int ret = 0; 16855714Skris 16955714Skris chunk=EVP_MD_size(md); 170238405Sjkim OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); 17155714Skris 172238405Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 173238405Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); 174238405Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 175238405Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 176238405Sjkim mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len); 177238405Sjkim if (!mac_key) 178238405Sjkim goto err; 179238405Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key)) 180238405Sjkim goto err; 181238405Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key)) 182238405Sjkim goto err; 183238405Sjkim if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len)) 184238405Sjkim goto err; 185238405Sjkim if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len)) 186238405Sjkim goto err; 187238405Sjkim if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len)) 188238405Sjkim goto err; 189238405Sjkim if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len)) 190238405Sjkim goto err; 191238405Sjkim if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len)) 192238405Sjkim goto err; 193238405Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len)) 194238405Sjkim goto err; 19555714Skris 19655714Skris for (;;) 19755714Skris { 198238405Sjkim /* Reinit mac contexts */ 199238405Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key)) 200238405Sjkim goto err; 201238405Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key)) 202238405Sjkim goto err; 203238405Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len)) 204238405Sjkim goto err; 205238405Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len)) 206238405Sjkim goto err; 207238405Sjkim if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len)) 208238405Sjkim goto err; 209238405Sjkim if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len)) 210238405Sjkim goto err; 211238405Sjkim if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len)) 212238405Sjkim goto err; 213238405Sjkim if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len)) 214238405Sjkim goto err; 215238405Sjkim if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len)) 216238405Sjkim goto err; 21755714Skris 21855714Skris if (olen > chunk) 21955714Skris { 220238405Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j)) 221238405Sjkim goto err; 22255714Skris out+=j; 22355714Skris olen-=j; 224238405Sjkim /* calc the next A1 value */ 225238405Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len)) 226238405Sjkim goto err; 22755714Skris } 22855714Skris else /* last one */ 22955714Skris { 230238405Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len)) 231238405Sjkim goto err; 23255714Skris memcpy(out,A1,olen); 23355714Skris break; 23455714Skris } 23555714Skris } 236238405Sjkim ret = 1; 237238405Sjkimerr: 238238405Sjkim EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 239238405Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 240238405Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp); 241109998Smarkm OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1)); 242238405Sjkim return ret; 24355714Skris } 24455714Skris 245238405Sjkim/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ 246238405Sjkimstatic int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask, 247238405Sjkim const void *seed1, int seed1_len, 248238405Sjkim const void *seed2, int seed2_len, 249238405Sjkim const void *seed3, int seed3_len, 250238405Sjkim const void *seed4, int seed4_len, 251238405Sjkim const void *seed5, int seed5_len, 252238405Sjkim const unsigned char *sec, int slen, 253238405Sjkim unsigned char *out1, 25455714Skris unsigned char *out2, int olen) 25555714Skris { 256238405Sjkim int len,i,idx,count; 257238405Sjkim const unsigned char *S1; 258238405Sjkim long m; 259238405Sjkim const EVP_MD *md; 260238405Sjkim int ret = 0; 26155714Skris 262238405Sjkim /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */ 263238405Sjkim count=0; 264238405Sjkim for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) { 265238405Sjkim if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++; 266238405Sjkim } 267238405Sjkim len=slen/count; 268238405Sjkim if (count == 1) 269238405Sjkim slen = 0; 27055714Skris S1=sec; 271238405Sjkim memset(out1,0,olen); 272238405Sjkim for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) { 273238405Sjkim if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) { 274238405Sjkim if (!md) { 275238405Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, 276238405Sjkim SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE); 277238405Sjkim goto err; 278238405Sjkim } 279238405Sjkim if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1), 280238405Sjkim seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len, 281238405Sjkim out2,olen)) 282238405Sjkim goto err; 283238405Sjkim S1+=len; 284238405Sjkim for (i=0; i<olen; i++) 285238405Sjkim { 286238405Sjkim out1[i]^=out2[i]; 287238405Sjkim } 288238405Sjkim } 28955714Skris } 290238405Sjkim ret = 1; 291238405Sjkimerr: 292238405Sjkim return ret; 293238405Sjkim} 294238405Sjkimstatic int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, 29555714Skris unsigned char *tmp, int num) 29655714Skris { 297238405Sjkim int ret; 298238405Sjkim ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 299238405Sjkim TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, 300238405Sjkim s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 301238405Sjkim s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 302238405Sjkim NULL,0,NULL,0, 30355714Skris s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length, 30455714Skris km,tmp,num); 305109998Smarkm#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 306109998Smarkm printf("tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t", 307109998Smarkm s->session->master_key_length); 308109998Smarkm { 309109998Smarkm int i; 310109998Smarkm for (i=0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++) 311109998Smarkm { 312109998Smarkm printf("%02X", s->session->master_key[i]); 313109998Smarkm } 314109998Smarkm printf("\n"); } 315109998Smarkm#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 316238405Sjkim return ret; 31755714Skris } 31855714Skris 31955714Skrisint tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) 32055714Skris { 32155714Skris static const unsigned char empty[]=""; 322215697Ssimon unsigned char *p,*mac_secret; 323238405Sjkim unsigned char *exp_label; 32455714Skris unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; 32555714Skris unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; 32655714Skris unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2]; 32755714Skris unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2]; 328215697Ssimon unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv; 32955714Skris int client_write; 33055714Skris EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd; 33155714Skris const EVP_CIPHER *c; 332160814Ssimon#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 33355714Skris const SSL_COMP *comp; 334160814Ssimon#endif 33555714Skris const EVP_MD *m; 336238405Sjkim int mac_type; 337238405Sjkim int *mac_secret_size; 338238405Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; 339238405Sjkim EVP_PKEY *mac_key; 340109998Smarkm int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl; 341109998Smarkm int reuse_dd = 0; 34255714Skris 343109998Smarkm is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); 34455714Skris c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; 34555714Skris m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash; 346238405Sjkim mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; 347160814Ssimon#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 34855714Skris comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression; 349160814Ssimon#endif 350215697Ssimon 351215697Ssimon#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 352109998Smarkm printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which); 353238405Sjkim printf("\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n", 354238405Sjkim s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, 355238405Sjkim s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, 356238405Sjkim comp); 357238405Sjkim printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c); 358109998Smarkm printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n", 359109998Smarkm c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len); 360109998Smarkm printf("\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length); 361109998Smarkm { 362238405Sjkim int i; 363238405Sjkim for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++) 364238405Sjkim printf("%02x", key_block[i]); printf("\n"); 365109998Smarkm } 366109998Smarkm#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 367109998Smarkm 36855714Skris if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) 36955714Skris { 370238405Sjkim if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 371238405Sjkim s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 372238405Sjkim else 373238405Sjkim s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 374238405Sjkim 375109998Smarkm if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) 376109998Smarkm reuse_dd = 1; 377109998Smarkm else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL) 37855714Skris goto err; 379167612Ssimon else 380167612Ssimon /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */ 381167612Ssimon EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx); 38255714Skris dd= s->enc_read_ctx; 383238405Sjkim mac_ctx=ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,NULL); 384160814Ssimon#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 38555714Skris if (s->expand != NULL) 38655714Skris { 38755714Skris COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); 38855714Skris s->expand=NULL; 38955714Skris } 39055714Skris if (comp != NULL) 39155714Skris { 39255714Skris s->expand=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); 39355714Skris if (s->expand == NULL) 39455714Skris { 39555714Skris SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); 39655714Skris goto err2; 39755714Skris } 39855714Skris if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL) 39955714Skris s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *) 40068651Skris OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH); 40155714Skris if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL) 40255714Skris goto err; 40355714Skris } 404160814Ssimon#endif 405160814Ssimon /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */ 406160814Ssimon if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 407160814Ssimon memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8); 40855714Skris mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); 409238405Sjkim mac_secret_size=&(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size); 41055714Skris } 41155714Skris else 41255714Skris { 413238405Sjkim if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 414238405Sjkim s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 415238405Sjkim else 416238405Sjkim s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 417109998Smarkm if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) 418109998Smarkm reuse_dd = 1; 419109998Smarkm else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL) 420109998Smarkm goto err; 421167612Ssimon else 422167612Ssimon /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */ 423167612Ssimon EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx); 42455714Skris dd= s->enc_write_ctx; 425238405Sjkim mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL); 426160814Ssimon#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 42755714Skris if (s->compress != NULL) 42855714Skris { 42955714Skris COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); 43055714Skris s->compress=NULL; 43155714Skris } 43255714Skris if (comp != NULL) 43355714Skris { 43455714Skris s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); 43555714Skris if (s->compress == NULL) 43655714Skris { 43755714Skris SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); 43855714Skris goto err2; 43955714Skris } 44055714Skris } 441160814Ssimon#endif 442160814Ssimon /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */ 443160814Ssimon if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 444160814Ssimon memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8); 44555714Skris mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); 446238405Sjkim mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size); 44755714Skris } 44855714Skris 449109998Smarkm if (reuse_dd) 450109998Smarkm EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd); 45155714Skris 45255714Skris p=s->s3->tmp.key_block; 453238405Sjkim i=*mac_secret_size=s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; 454238405Sjkim 45555714Skris cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); 456109998Smarkm j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ? 457109998Smarkm cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl; 45855714Skris /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */ 459238405Sjkim /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */ 460238405Sjkim if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 461238405Sjkim k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; 462238405Sjkim else 463238405Sjkim k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); 46455714Skris if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || 46555714Skris (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) 46655714Skris { 46755714Skris ms= &(p[ 0]); n=i+i; 46855714Skris key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j; 46955714Skris iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k+k; 47055714Skris exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST; 47155714Skris exp_label_len=TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE; 47255714Skris client_write=1; 47355714Skris } 47455714Skris else 47555714Skris { 47655714Skris n=i; 47755714Skris ms= &(p[ n]); n+=i+j; 47855714Skris key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k; 47955714Skris iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k; 48055714Skris exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST; 48155714Skris exp_label_len=TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE; 48255714Skris client_write=0; 48355714Skris } 48455714Skris 48555714Skris if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) 48655714Skris { 487109998Smarkm SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 48855714Skris goto err2; 48955714Skris } 49055714Skris 49155714Skris memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i); 492238405Sjkim 493238405Sjkim if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) 494238405Sjkim { 495238405Sjkim mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, 496238405Sjkim mac_secret,*mac_secret_size); 497238405Sjkim EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key); 498238405Sjkim EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 499238405Sjkim } 50055714Skris#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 50155714Skrisprintf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which); 50255714Skris{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } 50355714Skris#endif 504109998Smarkm if (is_export) 50555714Skris { 50655714Skris /* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the 50755714Skris * same value since only the correct one will be used :-). 50855714Skris */ 509238405Sjkim if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 510238405Sjkim exp_label,exp_label_len, 511238405Sjkim s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 512238405Sjkim s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 513238405Sjkim NULL,0,NULL,0, 514238405Sjkim key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) 515238405Sjkim goto err2; 51655714Skris key=tmp1; 51755714Skris 51855714Skris if (k > 0) 51955714Skris { 520238405Sjkim if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 521238405Sjkim TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE, 522238405Sjkim s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 523238405Sjkim s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 524238405Sjkim NULL,0,NULL,0, 525238405Sjkim empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2)) 526238405Sjkim goto err2; 52755714Skris if (client_write) 52855714Skris iv=iv1; 52955714Skris else 53055714Skris iv= &(iv1[k]); 53155714Skris } 53255714Skris } 53355714Skris 53455714Skris s->session->key_arg_length=0; 535109998Smarkm#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 536109998Smarkm { 537238405Sjkim int i; 538109998Smarkm printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n"); 539238405Sjkim printf("\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) printf("%02x", key[i]); 540109998Smarkm printf("\n"); 541238405Sjkim printf("\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) printf("%02x", iv[i]); 542109998Smarkm printf("\n"); 543109998Smarkm } 544109998Smarkm#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 54555714Skris 546238405Sjkim if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 547238405Sjkim { 548238405Sjkim EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,NULL,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)); 549238405Sjkim EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv); 550238405Sjkim } 551238405Sjkim else 552238405Sjkim EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)); 553238405Sjkim 554238405Sjkim /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */ 555238405Sjkim if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size) 556238405Sjkim EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, 557238405Sjkim *mac_secret_size,mac_secret); 558238405Sjkim 55955714Skris#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 56055714Skrisprintf("which = %04X\nkey=",which); 56155714Skris{ int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } 56255714Skrisprintf("\niv="); 56355714Skris{ int z; for (z=0; z<k; z++) printf("%02X%c",iv[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } 56455714Skrisprintf("\n"); 56555714Skris#endif 56655714Skris 567109998Smarkm OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1,sizeof(tmp1)); 568109998Smarkm OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2,sizeof(tmp1)); 569109998Smarkm OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1,sizeof(iv1)); 570109998Smarkm OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2,sizeof(iv2)); 57155714Skris return(1); 57255714Skriserr: 57355714Skris SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 57455714Skriserr2: 57555714Skris return(0); 57655714Skris } 57755714Skris 57855714Skrisint tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) 57955714Skris { 580238405Sjkim unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL; 58155714Skris const EVP_CIPHER *c; 58255714Skris const EVP_MD *hash; 58355714Skris int num; 58455714Skris SSL_COMP *comp; 585238405Sjkim int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0; 586238405Sjkim int ret=0; 58755714Skris 588109998Smarkm#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 589109998Smarkm printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n"); 590109998Smarkm#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 591109998Smarkm 59255714Skris if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) 59355714Skris return(1); 59455714Skris 595238405Sjkim if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size,&comp)) 59655714Skris { 59755714Skris SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 59855714Skris return(0); 59955714Skris } 60055714Skris 60155714Skris s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c; 60255714Skris s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash; 603238405Sjkim s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; 604238405Sjkim s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 605238405Sjkim num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+mac_secret_size+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); 60655714Skris num*=2; 60755714Skris 60855714Skris ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 60955714Skris 61068651Skris if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) 611238405Sjkim { 612238405Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 61355714Skris goto err; 614238405Sjkim } 61555714Skris 61655714Skris s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num; 61755714Skris s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1; 61855714Skris 619238405Sjkim if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) 620238405Sjkim { 621238405Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 622238405Sjkim goto err; 623238405Sjkim } 62455714Skris 62555714Skris#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 62655714Skrisprintf("client random\n"); 62755714Skris{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->client_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } 62855714Skrisprintf("server random\n"); 62955714Skris{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->server_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } 63055714Skrisprintf("pre-master\n"); 63155714Skris{ int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } 63255714Skris#endif 633238405Sjkim if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num)) 634238405Sjkim goto err; 63555714Skris#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 63655714Skrisprintf("\nkey block\n"); 63755714Skris{ int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } 63855714Skris#endif 63955714Skris 640238405Sjkim if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) 641238405Sjkim && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) 642100936Snectar { 643100936Snectar /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with 644100936Snectar * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 645100936Snectar */ 646100936Snectar s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1; 647100936Snectar 648100936Snectar if (s->session->cipher != NULL) 649100936Snectar { 650238405Sjkim if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) 651100936Snectar s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; 652100936Snectar 653109998Smarkm#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 654238405Sjkim if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) 655100936Snectar s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; 656100928Snectar#endif 657100936Snectar } 658100936Snectar } 659160814Ssimon 660238405Sjkim ret = 1; 66155714Skriserr: 662238405Sjkim if (p2) 663238405Sjkim { 664238405Sjkim OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num); 665238405Sjkim OPENSSL_free(p2); 666238405Sjkim } 667238405Sjkim return(ret); 66855714Skris } 66955714Skris 67055714Skrisint tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) 67155714Skris { 67255714Skris SSL3_RECORD *rec; 67355714Skris EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; 67455714Skris unsigned long l; 675238405Sjkim int bs,i,ii,j,k,pad=0; 67655714Skris const EVP_CIPHER *enc; 67755714Skris 67855714Skris if (send) 67955714Skris { 680238405Sjkim if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) 681238405Sjkim { 682238405Sjkim int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); 683238405Sjkim OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 684238405Sjkim } 68555714Skris ds=s->enc_write_ctx; 68655714Skris rec= &(s->s3->wrec); 68755714Skris if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) 68855714Skris enc=NULL; 68955714Skris else 690238405Sjkim { 691238405Sjkim int ivlen; 69255714Skris enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); 693238405Sjkim /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */ 694238405Sjkim if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION 695238405Sjkim && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 696238405Sjkim ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); 697238405Sjkim else 698238405Sjkim ivlen = 0; 699238405Sjkim if (ivlen > 1) 700238405Sjkim { 701238405Sjkim if ( rec->data != rec->input) 702238405Sjkim /* we can't write into the input stream: 703238405Sjkim * Can this ever happen?? (steve) 704238405Sjkim */ 705238405Sjkim fprintf(stderr, 706238405Sjkim "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n", 707238405Sjkim __FILE__, __LINE__); 708238405Sjkim else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0) 709238405Sjkim return -1; 710238405Sjkim } 711238405Sjkim } 71255714Skris } 71355714Skris else 71455714Skris { 715238405Sjkim if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) 716238405Sjkim { 717238405Sjkim int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 718238405Sjkim OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 719238405Sjkim } 72055714Skris ds=s->enc_read_ctx; 72155714Skris rec= &(s->s3->rrec); 72255714Skris if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) 72355714Skris enc=NULL; 72455714Skris else 72555714Skris enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); 72655714Skris } 72755714Skris 728109998Smarkm#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 729109998Smarkm printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send); 730109998Smarkm#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 731109998Smarkm 73255714Skris if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || 73355714Skris (enc == NULL)) 73455714Skris { 73579998Skris memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length); 73655714Skris rec->input=rec->data; 73755714Skris } 73855714Skris else 73955714Skris { 74055714Skris l=rec->length; 74155714Skris bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); 74255714Skris 743238405Sjkim if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) 74455714Skris { 745238405Sjkim unsigned char buf[13],*seq; 746238405Sjkim 747238405Sjkim seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence; 748238405Sjkim 749238405Sjkim if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 750238405Sjkim { 751238405Sjkim unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq; 752238405Sjkim 753238405Sjkim s2n(send?s->d1->w_epoch:s->d1->r_epoch,p); 754238405Sjkim memcpy(p,&seq[2],6); 755238405Sjkim memcpy(buf,dtlsseq,8); 756238405Sjkim } 757238405Sjkim else 758238405Sjkim { 759238405Sjkim memcpy(buf,seq,8); 760238405Sjkim for (i=7; i>=0; i--) /* increment */ 761238405Sjkim { 762238405Sjkim ++seq[i]; 763238405Sjkim if (seq[i] != 0) break; 764238405Sjkim } 765238405Sjkim } 766238405Sjkim 767238405Sjkim buf[8]=rec->type; 768238405Sjkim buf[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8); 769238405Sjkim buf[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version); 770238405Sjkim buf[11]=rec->length>>8; 771238405Sjkim buf[12]=rec->length&0xff; 772238405Sjkim pad=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,13,buf); 773238405Sjkim if (send) 774238405Sjkim { 775238405Sjkim l+=pad; 776238405Sjkim rec->length+=pad; 777238405Sjkim } 778238405Sjkim } 779238405Sjkim else if ((bs != 1) && send) 780238405Sjkim { 78155714Skris i=bs-((int)l%bs); 78255714Skris 78355714Skris /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ 78455714Skris 78555714Skris /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ 78655714Skris j=i-1; 78755714Skris if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) 78855714Skris { 78955714Skris if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) 79055714Skris j++; 79155714Skris } 79255714Skris for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++) 79355714Skris rec->input[k]=j; 79455714Skris l+=i; 79555714Skris rec->length+=i; 79655714Skris } 79755714Skris 798109998Smarkm#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 799109998Smarkm { 800109998Smarkm unsigned long ui; 801109998Smarkm printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n", 802238405Sjkim ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); 803238405Sjkim printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n", 804109998Smarkm ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, 805238405Sjkim DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, 806109998Smarkm ds->cipher->iv_len); 807109998Smarkm printf("\t\tIV: "); 808109998Smarkm for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]); 809109998Smarkm printf("\n"); 810109998Smarkm printf("\trec->input="); 811109998Smarkm for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]); 812109998Smarkm printf("\n"); 813109998Smarkm } 814109998Smarkm#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 815109998Smarkm 81679998Skris if (!send) 81779998Skris { 81879998Skris if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0) 81979998Skris { 820238405Sjkim if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) 821238405Sjkim return -1; 82279998Skris SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); 82389837Skris ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 82489837Skris return 0; 82579998Skris } 82679998Skris } 82779998Skris 828238405Sjkim i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); 829238405Sjkim if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) 830238405Sjkim ?(i<0) 831238405Sjkim :(i==0)) 832238405Sjkim return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ 833238405Sjkim if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) 834238405Sjkim { 835238405Sjkim rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 836238405Sjkim rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 837238405Sjkim rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 838238405Sjkim } 83955714Skris 840109998Smarkm#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 841109998Smarkm { 842238405Sjkim unsigned long i; 843109998Smarkm printf("\trec->data="); 844238405Sjkim for (i=0; i<l; i++) 845238405Sjkim printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n"); 846109998Smarkm } 847109998Smarkm#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 848109998Smarkm 84955714Skris if ((bs != 1) && !send) 85055714Skris { 85179998Skris ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */ 85255714Skris i++; 853162911Ssimon /* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet 854162911Ssimon * may not be of even length so the padding bug check 855162911Ssimon * cannot be performed. This bug workaround has been 856162911Ssimon * around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either fixed 857162911Ssimon * now or no buggy implementation supports compression 858162911Ssimon * [steve] 859162911Ssimon */ 860162911Ssimon if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) 861162911Ssimon && !s->expand) 86255714Skris { 86355714Skris /* First packet is even in size, so check */ 86455714Skris if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, 86555714Skris "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1)) 86655714Skris s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG; 86755714Skris if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) 86855714Skris i--; 86955714Skris } 87079998Skris /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size. 87179998Skris * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */ 87255714Skris if (i > (int)rec->length) 87355714Skris { 87489837Skris /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done 87589837Skris * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is 87689837Skris * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure 87789837Skris * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ 87889837Skris return -1; 87955714Skris } 88055714Skris for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++) 88155714Skris { 88255714Skris if (rec->data[j] != ii) 88355714Skris { 88489837Skris /* Incorrect padding */ 88589837Skris return -1; 88655714Skris } 88755714Skris } 888238405Sjkim rec->length -=i; 889238405Sjkim if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION 890238405Sjkim && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ds) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 891238405Sjkim { 892238405Sjkim if (bs > (int)rec->length) 893238405Sjkim return -1; 894238405Sjkim rec->data += bs; /* skip the explicit IV */ 895238405Sjkim rec->input += bs; 896238405Sjkim rec->length -= bs; 897238405Sjkim } 89855714Skris } 899238405Sjkim if (pad && !send) 900238405Sjkim rec->length -= pad; 90155714Skris } 90255714Skris return(1); 90355714Skris } 904238405Sjkimint tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out) 90555714Skris { 90655714Skris unsigned int ret; 907238405Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d=NULL; 908238405Sjkim int i; 90955714Skris 910238405Sjkim if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 911238405Sjkim if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 912238405Sjkim return 0; 913238405Sjkim 914238405Sjkim for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++) 915238405Sjkim { 916238405Sjkim if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid) 917238405Sjkim { 918238405Sjkim d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]; 919238405Sjkim break; 920238405Sjkim } 921238405Sjkim } 922238405Sjkim if (!d) { 923238405Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST); 924238405Sjkim return 0; 925238405Sjkim } 926238405Sjkim 927109998Smarkm EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 928238405Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d); 929109998Smarkm EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret); 930109998Smarkm EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 93155714Skris return((int)ret); 93255714Skris } 93355714Skris 934238405Sjkimint tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, 93559191Skris const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out) 93655714Skris { 93755714Skris unsigned int i; 93855714Skris EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 939238405Sjkim unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 94055714Skris unsigned char *q,buf2[12]; 941238405Sjkim int idx; 942238405Sjkim long mask; 943238405Sjkim int err=0; 944238405Sjkim const EVP_MD *md; 94555714Skris 94655714Skris q=buf; 94755714Skris 948238405Sjkim if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 949238405Sjkim if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 950238405Sjkim return 0; 951238405Sjkim 952109998Smarkm EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 95355714Skris 954238405Sjkim for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++) 955238405Sjkim { 956238405Sjkim if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) 957238405Sjkim { 958238405Sjkim int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); 959238405Sjkim if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf))) 960238405Sjkim { 961238405Sjkim /* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */ 962238405Sjkim err = 1; 963238405Sjkim } 964238405Sjkim else 965238405Sjkim { 966238405Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]); 967238405Sjkim EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i); 968238405Sjkim if (i != (unsigned int)hashsize) /* can't really happen */ 969238405Sjkim err = 1; 970238405Sjkim q+=i; 971238405Sjkim } 972238405Sjkim } 973238405Sjkim } 974238405Sjkim 975238405Sjkim if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 976238405Sjkim str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0, 977238405Sjkim s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length, 978238405Sjkim out,buf2,sizeof buf2)) 979238405Sjkim err = 1; 980109998Smarkm EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 98155714Skris 982238405Sjkim if (err) 983238405Sjkim return 0; 984238405Sjkim else 985238405Sjkim return sizeof buf2; 98655714Skris } 98755714Skris 98855714Skrisint tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) 98955714Skris { 99055714Skris SSL3_RECORD *rec; 991238405Sjkim unsigned char *seq; 992238405Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX *hash; 993238405Sjkim size_t md_size; 99455714Skris int i; 995238405Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; 99655714Skris unsigned char buf[5]; 997238405Sjkim int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); 998238405Sjkim int t; 99955714Skris 100055714Skris if (send) 100155714Skris { 100255714Skris rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec); 100355714Skris seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]); 100455714Skris hash=ssl->write_hash; 100555714Skris } 100655714Skris else 100755714Skris { 100855714Skris rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec); 100955714Skris seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]); 101055714Skris hash=ssl->read_hash; 101155714Skris } 101255714Skris 1013238405Sjkim t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); 1014238405Sjkim OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); 1015238405Sjkim md_size=t; 101655714Skris 101755714Skris buf[0]=rec->type; 1018238405Sjkim buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8); 1019238405Sjkim buf[2]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version); 102055714Skris buf[3]=rec->length>>8; 102155714Skris buf[4]=rec->length&0xff; 102255714Skris 102355714Skris /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ 1024238405Sjkim if (stream_mac) 1025238405Sjkim { 1026238405Sjkim mac_ctx = hash; 1027238405Sjkim } 1028238405Sjkim else 1029238405Sjkim { 1030238405Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash); 1031238405Sjkim mac_ctx = &hmac; 1032238405Sjkim } 1033194206Ssimon 1034238405Sjkim if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 1035194206Ssimon { 1036194206Ssimon unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq; 1037238405Sjkim 1038194206Ssimon s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p); 1039194206Ssimon memcpy (p,&seq[2],6); 1040194206Ssimon 1041238405Sjkim EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,dtlsseq,8); 1042194206Ssimon } 1043194206Ssimon else 1044238405Sjkim EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,seq,8); 1045194206Ssimon 1046238405Sjkim EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,buf,5); 1047238405Sjkim EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length); 1048238405Sjkim t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size); 1049238405Sjkim OPENSSL_assert(t > 0); 1050238405Sjkim 1051238405Sjkim if (!stream_mac) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); 105255714Skris#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 105355714Skrisprintf("sec="); 105455714Skris{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); } 105555714Skrisprintf("seq="); 105655714Skris{int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) printf("%02X ",seq[z]); printf("\n"); } 105755714Skrisprintf("buf="); 105855714Skris{int z; for (z=0; z<5; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); } 105955714Skrisprintf("rec="); 106055714Skris{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); } 106155714Skris#endif 106255714Skris 1063238405Sjkim if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 1064194206Ssimon { 1065160814Ssimon for (i=7; i>=0; i--) 1066160814Ssimon { 1067160814Ssimon ++seq[i]; 1068160814Ssimon if (seq[i] != 0) break; 1069160814Ssimon } 107076866Skris } 107155714Skris 107255714Skris#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 107355714Skris{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",md[z]); printf("\n"); } 107455714Skris#endif 107555714Skris return(md_size); 107655714Skris } 107755714Skris 107855714Skrisint tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, 107955714Skris int len) 108055714Skris { 108155714Skris unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 1082238405Sjkim const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL; 1083238405Sjkim int col = 0, sol = 0; 108455714Skris 1085238405Sjkim 1086109998Smarkm#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 1087238405Sjkim printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len); 1088109998Smarkm#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 1089109998Smarkm 1090238405Sjkim#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1091238405Sjkim if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 1092238405Sjkim s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0 && 1093238405Sjkim s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) 1094238405Sjkim { 1095238405Sjkim co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input; 1096238405Sjkim col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 1097238405Sjkim so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input; 1098238405Sjkim sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; /* must be same as col (see draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) */ 1099238405Sjkim } 1100238405Sjkim#endif 1101238405Sjkim 1102238405Sjkim tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 1103238405Sjkim TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, 1104238405Sjkim s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 1105238405Sjkim co, col, 1106238405Sjkim s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 1107238405Sjkim so, sol, 1108238405Sjkim p,len, 1109109998Smarkm s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff); 1110238405Sjkim#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 1111238405Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n"); 1112238405Sjkim BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len); 1113238405Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n"); 1114238405Sjkim BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1115238405Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n"); 1116238405Sjkim BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1117238405Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n"); 1118238405Sjkim BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); 1119238405Sjkim#endif 1120238405Sjkim 1121109998Smarkm#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 1122109998Smarkm printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n"); 1123109998Smarkm#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 112455714Skris return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); 112555714Skris } 112655714Skris 1127238405Sjkimint tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, 1128238405Sjkim const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, 1129238405Sjkim size_t contextlen, int use_context) 1130238405Sjkim { 1131238405Sjkim unsigned char *buff; 1132238405Sjkim unsigned char *val = NULL; 1133238405Sjkim size_t vallen, currentvalpos; 1134238405Sjkim int rv; 1135238405Sjkim 1136238405Sjkim#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 1137238405Sjkim printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen); 1138238405Sjkim#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 1139238405Sjkim 1140238405Sjkim buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen); 1141238405Sjkim if (buff == NULL) goto err2; 1142238405Sjkim 1143238405Sjkim /* construct PRF arguments 1144238405Sjkim * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate 1145238405Sjkim * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values 1146238405Sjkim * does not create a prohibited label. 1147238405Sjkim */ 1148238405Sjkim vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; 1149238405Sjkim if (use_context) 1150238405Sjkim { 1151238405Sjkim vallen += 2 + contextlen; 1152238405Sjkim } 1153238405Sjkim 1154238405Sjkim val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen); 1155238405Sjkim if (val == NULL) goto err2; 1156238405Sjkim currentvalpos = 0; 1157238405Sjkim memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen); 1158238405Sjkim currentvalpos += llen; 1159238405Sjkim memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1160238405Sjkim currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1161238405Sjkim memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1162238405Sjkim currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1163238405Sjkim 1164238405Sjkim if (use_context) 1165238405Sjkim { 1166238405Sjkim val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; 1167238405Sjkim currentvalpos++; 1168238405Sjkim val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; 1169238405Sjkim currentvalpos++; 1170238405Sjkim if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) 1171238405Sjkim { 1172238405Sjkim memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); 1173238405Sjkim } 1174238405Sjkim } 1175238405Sjkim 1176238405Sjkim /* disallow prohibited labels 1177238405Sjkim * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) = 1178238405Sjkim * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the 1179238405Sjkim * comparisons won't have buffer overflow 1180238405Sjkim */ 1181238405Sjkim if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, 1182238405Sjkim TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; 1183238405Sjkim if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, 1184238405Sjkim TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; 1185238405Sjkim if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, 1186238405Sjkim TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; 1187238405Sjkim if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, 1188238405Sjkim TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; 1189238405Sjkim 1190238405Sjkim rv = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2, 1191238405Sjkim val, vallen, 1192238405Sjkim NULL, 0, 1193238405Sjkim NULL, 0, 1194238405Sjkim NULL, 0, 1195238405Sjkim NULL, 0, 1196238405Sjkim s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length, 1197238405Sjkim out,buff,olen); 1198238405Sjkim 1199238405Sjkim#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 1200238405Sjkim printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n"); 1201238405Sjkim#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 1202238405Sjkim goto ret; 1203238405Sjkimerr1: 1204238405Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); 1205238405Sjkim rv = 0; 1206238405Sjkim goto ret; 1207238405Sjkimerr2: 1208238405Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1209238405Sjkim rv = 0; 1210238405Sjkimret: 1211238405Sjkim if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff); 1212238405Sjkim if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val); 1213238405Sjkim return(rv); 1214238405Sjkim } 1215238405Sjkim 121655714Skrisint tls1_alert_code(int code) 121755714Skris { 121855714Skris switch (code) 121955714Skris { 122055714Skris case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); 122155714Skris case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 122255714Skris case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 122355714Skris case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 122455714Skris case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: return(TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); 122555714Skris case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); 122655714Skris case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 122755714Skris case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: return(-1); 122855714Skris case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); 122955714Skris case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); 123055714Skris case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); 123155714Skris case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); 123255714Skris case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); 123355714Skris case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); 123455714Skris case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); 123555714Skris case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: return(TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); 123655714Skris case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 123755714Skris case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); 123859191Skris case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return(TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); 123955714Skris case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return(TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); 124055714Skris case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); 124155714Skris case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); 124259191Skris case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); 124355714Skris case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1244238405Sjkim case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); 1245238405Sjkim case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); 1246238405Sjkim case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: return(TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); 1247238405Sjkim case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); 1248238405Sjkim case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); 1249238405Sjkim case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); 1250238405Sjkim#if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */ 1251160814Ssimon case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return 1252160814Ssimon (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); 1253194206Ssimon#endif 125455714Skris default: return(-1); 125555714Skris } 125655714Skris } 1257