s3_srvr.c revision 325337
1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124/* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 152#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 153 154#include <stdio.h> 155#include "ssl_locl.h" 156#include "kssl_lcl.h" 157#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" 158#include <openssl/buffer.h> 159#include <openssl/rand.h> 160#include <openssl/objects.h> 161#include <openssl/evp.h> 162#include <openssl/hmac.h> 163#include <openssl/x509.h> 164#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 165# include <openssl/dh.h> 166#endif 167#include <openssl/bn.h> 168#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 169# include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 170#endif 171#include <openssl/md5.h> 172 173#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD 174static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 175 176static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 177{ 178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 179 return (SSLv3_server_method()); 180 else 181 return (NULL); 182} 183 184IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 185 ssl3_accept, 186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) 187#endif 188#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 189static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) 190{ 191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; 192 193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 194 195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && 196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { 197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { 198 /* 199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp 200 * login name 201 */ 202 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; 203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 204 } else { 205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); 206 } 207 } 208 return ret; 209} 210#endif 211 212int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 213{ 214 BUF_MEM *buf; 215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); 216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 217 int ret = -1; 218 int new_state, state, skip = 0; 219 220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); 221 ERR_clear_error(); 222 clear_sys_error(); 223 224 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 225 cb = s->info_callback; 226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 228 229 /* init things to blank */ 230 s->in_handshake++; 231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) 232 SSL_clear(s); 233 234 if (s->cert == NULL) { 235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 236 return (-1); 237 } 238#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 239 /* 240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and 241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during 242 * handshakes anyway. 243 */ 244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { 245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 246 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 247 } 248#endif 249 250 for (;;) { 251 state = s->state; 252 253 switch (s->state) { 254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 255 s->renegotiate = 1; 256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 257 258 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 259 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 262 263 s->server = 1; 264 if (cb != NULL) 265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); 266 267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { 268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 270 return -1; 271 } 272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 273 274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) { 275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { 276 ret = -1; 277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 278 goto end; 279 } 280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { 281 BUF_MEM_free(buf); 282 ret = -1; 283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 284 goto end; 285 } 286 s->init_buf = buf; 287 } 288 289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { 290 ret = -1; 291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 292 goto end; 293 } 294 295 s->init_num = 0; 296 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; 297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 298 /* 299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. 300 */ 301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; 302 303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { 304 /* 305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the 306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 307 */ 308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { 309 ret = -1; 310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 311 goto end; 312 } 313 314 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { 315 ret = -1; 316 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 317 goto end; 318 } 319 320 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 321 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 322 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && 323 !(s->options & 324 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 325 /* 326 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't 327 * support secure renegotiation. 328 */ 329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, 330 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 331 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 332 ret = -1; 333 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 334 goto end; 335 } else { 336 /* 337 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a 338 * HelloRequest 339 */ 340 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 341 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 342 } 343 break; 344 345 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 346 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 347 348 s->shutdown = 0; 349 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 350 if (ret <= 0) 351 goto end; 352 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 353 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 354 s->init_num = 0; 355 356 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { 357 ret = -1; 358 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 359 goto end; 360 } 361 break; 362 363 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 364 s->state = SSL_ST_OK; 365 break; 366 367 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 368 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 369 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 370 371 s->shutdown = 0; 372 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 373 if (ret <= 0) 374 goto end; 375#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 376 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D; 377 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D: 378 { 379 int al; 380 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { 381 /* 382 * callback indicates firther work to be done 383 */ 384 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 385 goto end; 386 } 387 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { 388 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 389 /* 390 * This is not really an error but the only means to for 391 * a client to detect whether srp is supported. 392 */ 393 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) 394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 395 ret = -1; 396 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 397 goto end; 398 } 399 } 400#endif 401 402 s->renegotiate = 2; 403 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 404 s->init_num = 0; 405 break; 406 407 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 408 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 409 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 410 if (ret <= 0) 411 goto end; 412#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 413 if (s->hit) { 414 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 415 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 416 else 417 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 418 } 419#else 420 if (s->hit) 421 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 422#endif 423 else 424 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 425 s->init_num = 0; 426 break; 427 428 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 429 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 430 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 431 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ 432 if (! 433 (s->s3->tmp. 434 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 | 435 SSL_aSRP)) 436&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 437 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 438 if (ret <= 0) 439 goto end; 440#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 441 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 442 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 443 else 444 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 445 } else { 446 skip = 1; 447 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 448 } 449#else 450 } else 451 skip = 1; 452 453 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 454#endif 455 s->init_num = 0; 456 break; 457 458 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 459 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 460 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 461 462 /* 463 * clear this, it may get reset by 464 * send_server_key_exchange 465 */ 466 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0; 467 468 /* 469 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a 470 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For 471 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if 472 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, 473 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for 474 * key exchange. 475 */ 476 if (0 477 /* 478 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if 479 * provided 480 */ 481#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 482 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) 483#endif 484#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 485 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ 486 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 487#endif 488 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) 489 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 490 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 491 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 492 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 493 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys 494 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) * 495 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 496 ) 497 ) 498 ) 499 ) { 500 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 501 if (ret <= 0) 502 goto end; 503 } else 504 skip = 1; 505 506 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 507 s->init_num = 0; 508 break; 509 510 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 511 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 512 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 513 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 514 /* 515 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert 516 * during re-negotiation: 517 */ 518 (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0 && 519 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 520 /* 521 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see 522 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in 523 * RFC 2246): 524 */ 525 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && 526 /* 527 * ... except when the application insists on 528 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts 529 * this for SSL 3) 530 */ 531 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 532 /* 533 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites 534 */ 535 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || 536 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ 537 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) 538 /* 539 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests 540 * are omitted 541 */ 542 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 543 /* no cert request */ 544 skip = 1; 545 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; 546 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 547 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 548 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 549 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 550 return -1; 551 } 552 } 553 } else { 554 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; 555 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 556 if (ret <= 0) 557 goto end; 558#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 559 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 560#else 561 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 562 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 563#endif 564 s->init_num = 0; 565 } 566 break; 567 568 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 569 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 570 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); 571 if (ret <= 0) 572 goto end; 573 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 574 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 575 s->init_num = 0; 576 break; 577 578 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 579 580 /* 581 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending 582 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as 583 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely 584 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of 585 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush 586 * unconditionally. 587 */ 588 589 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 590 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { 591 ret = -1; 592 goto end; 593 } 594 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 595 596 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; 597 break; 598 599 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 600 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 601 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 602 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 603 if (ret <= 0) 604 goto end; 605 } 606 s->init_num = 0; 607 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 608 break; 609 610 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 611 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 612 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 613 if (ret <= 0) 614 goto end; 615 if (ret == 2) { 616 /* 617 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH 618 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is 619 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses 620 * its key from the certificate for key exchange. 621 */ 622#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 623 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 624#else 625 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 626 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 627 else 628 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 629#endif 630 s->init_num = 0; 631 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 632 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 633 s->init_num = 0; 634 if (!s->session->peer) 635 break; 636 /* 637 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and 638 * digest cached records. 639 */ 640 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 642 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 643 return -1; 644 } 645 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 646 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 647 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 648 return -1; 649 } 650 } else { 651 int offset = 0; 652 int dgst_num; 653 654 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 655 s->init_num = 0; 656 657 /* 658 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert, 659 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for 660 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next 661 * step 662 */ 663 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 664 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 665 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 666 return -1; 667 } 668 } 669 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++) 670 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { 671 int dgst_size; 672 673 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, 674 EVP_MD_CTX_type 675 (s-> 676 s3->handshake_dgst 677 [dgst_num]), 678 &(s->s3-> 679 tmp.cert_verify_md 680 [offset])); 681 dgst_size = 682 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); 683 if (dgst_size < 0) { 684 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 685 ret = -1; 686 goto end; 687 } 688 offset += dgst_size; 689 } 690 } 691 break; 692 693 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 694 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 695 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 696 if (ret <= 0) 697 goto end; 698 699#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 700 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 701#else 702 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 703 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 704 else 705 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 706#endif 707 s->init_num = 0; 708 break; 709 710#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 711 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: 712 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: 713 /* 714 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 715 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the 716 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be 717 * cautious. 718 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 719 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 720 * the client's Finished message is read. 721 */ 722 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 723 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 724 725 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s); 726 if (ret <= 0) 727 goto end; 728 s->init_num = 0; 729 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 730 break; 731#endif 732 733 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 734 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 735 /* 736 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has 737 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 738 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. 739 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 740 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 741 * the client's Finished message is read. 742 */ 743 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 744 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 745 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 746 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 747 if (ret <= 0) 748 goto end; 749 if (s->hit) 750 s->state = SSL_ST_OK; 751#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 752 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 753 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 754#endif 755 else 756 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 757 s->init_num = 0; 758 break; 759 760#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 761 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 762 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 763 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 764 if (ret <= 0) 765 goto end; 766 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 767 s->init_num = 0; 768 break; 769 770 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 771 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 772 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 773 if (ret <= 0) 774 goto end; 775 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 776 s->init_num = 0; 777 break; 778 779#endif 780 781 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 782 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 783 784 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 785 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { 786 ret = -1; 787 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 788 goto end; 789 } 790 791 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 792 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, 793 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 794 795 if (ret <= 0) 796 goto end; 797 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 798 s->init_num = 0; 799 800 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 801 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 802 { 803 ret = -1; 804 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 805 goto end; 806 } 807 808 break; 809 810 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 811 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 812 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, 813 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, 814 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 815 s->method-> 816 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 817 s->method-> 818 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 819 if (ret <= 0) 820 goto end; 821 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 822 if (s->hit) { 823#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 824 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 825#else 826 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { 827 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 828 } else 829 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 830#endif 831 } else 832 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; 833 s->init_num = 0; 834 break; 835 836 case SSL_ST_OK: 837 /* clean a few things up */ 838 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 839 840 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 841 s->init_buf = NULL; 842 843 /* remove buffering on output */ 844 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 845 846 s->init_num = 0; 847 848 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a 849 * HelloRequest */ 850 s->renegotiate = 0; 851 s->new_session = 0; 852 853 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 854 855 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 856 /* s->server=1; */ 857 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; 858 859 if (cb != NULL) 860 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); 861 } 862 863 ret = 1; 864 goto end; 865 /* break; */ 866 867 case SSL_ST_ERR: 868 default: 869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 870 ret = -1; 871 goto end; 872 /* break; */ 873 } 874 875 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { 876 if (s->debug) { 877 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 878 goto end; 879 } 880 881 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { 882 new_state = s->state; 883 s->state = state; 884 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); 885 s->state = new_state; 886 } 887 } 888 skip = 0; 889 } 890 end: 891 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 892 893 s->in_handshake--; 894 if (cb != NULL) 895 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); 896 return (ret); 897} 898 899int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 900{ 901 902 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { 903 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0); 904 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 905 } 906 907 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 908 return ssl_do_write(s); 909} 910 911int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 912{ 913 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0; 914 unsigned int cookie_len; 915 long n; 916 unsigned long id; 917 unsigned char *p, *d; 918 SSL_CIPHER *c; 919#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 920 unsigned char *q; 921 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; 922#endif 923 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; 924 925 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet) 926 goto retry_cert; 927 928 /* 929 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are 930 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down 931 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we 932 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. 933 */ 934 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { 935 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 936 } 937 s->first_packet = 1; 938 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 939 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 940 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 941 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 942 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 943 944 if (!ok) 945 return ((int)n); 946 s->first_packet = 0; 947 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 948 949 /* 950 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte 951 * for session id length 952 */ 953 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) { 954 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 956 goto f_err; 957 } 958 959 /* 960 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may 961 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) 962 */ 963 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1]; 964 p += 2; 965 966 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version && 967 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) 968 : (s->client_version < s->version)) { 969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 970 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 971 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { 972 /* 973 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version 974 * number 975 */ 976 s->version = s->client_version; 977 } 978 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 979 goto f_err; 980 } 981 982 /* 983 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just 984 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check 985 * cookie length... 986 */ 987 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 988 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; 989 990 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 991 992 if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 993 >= (unsigned int)((d + n) - p)) { 994 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 996 goto f_err; 997 } 998 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); 999 1000 if (cookie_length == 0) 1001 return 1; 1002 } 1003 1004 /* load the client random */ 1005 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1006 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1007 1008 /* get the session-id */ 1009 j = *(p++); 1010 1011 if ((d + n) - p < j) { 1012 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1014 goto f_err; 1015 } 1016 1017 if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) { 1018 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1020 goto f_err; 1021 } 1022 1023 s->hit = 0; 1024 /* 1025 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in 1026 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally 1027 * ignore resumption requests with flag 1028 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather 1029 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this 1030 * for security won't even compile against older library versions). 1031 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to 1032 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains 1033 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the 1034 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored. 1035 */ 1036 if ((s->new_session 1037 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { 1038 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 1039 goto err; 1040 } else { 1041 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 1042 /* 1043 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated 1044 * version. 1045 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption 1046 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but 1047 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. 1048 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and 1049 * will abort the handshake with an error. 1050 */ 1051 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous 1052 * session */ 1053 s->hit = 1; 1054 } else if (i == -1) 1055 goto err; 1056 else { /* i == 0 */ 1057 1058 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 1059 goto err; 1060 } 1061 } 1062 1063 p += j; 1064 1065 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1066 /* cookie stuff */ 1067 if ((d + n) - p < 1) { 1068 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1070 goto f_err; 1071 } 1072 cookie_len = *(p++); 1073 1074 if ((unsigned int)((d + n ) - p) < cookie_len) { 1075 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1077 goto f_err; 1078 } 1079 1080 /* 1081 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 1082 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 1083 * does not cause an overflow. 1084 */ 1085 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) { 1086 /* too much data */ 1087 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1089 goto f_err; 1090 } 1091 1092 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 1093 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) { 1094 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 1095 1096 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { 1097 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 1098 cookie_len) == 0) { 1099 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1101 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1102 goto f_err; 1103 } 1104 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 1105 } 1106 /* default verification */ 1107 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 1108 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { 1109 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1111 goto f_err; 1112 } 1113 cookie_valid = 1; 1114 } 1115 1116 p += cookie_len; 1117 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { 1118 /* Select version to use */ 1119 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION && 1120 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) { 1121 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; 1122 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method(); 1123 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1125 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); 1126 s->version = s->client_version; 1127 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 1128 goto f_err; 1129 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION && 1130 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) { 1131 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; 1132 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method(); 1133 } else { 1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1135 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 1136 s->version = s->client_version; 1137 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 1138 goto f_err; 1139 } 1140 s->session->ssl_version = s->version; 1141 } 1142 } 1143 1144 if ((d + n ) - p < 2) { 1145 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1147 goto f_err; 1148 } 1149 n2s(p, i); 1150 1151 if (i == 0) { 1152 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 1154 goto f_err; 1155 } 1156 1157 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ 1158 if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) { 1159 /* not enough data */ 1160 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1162 goto f_err; 1163 } 1164 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) { 1165 goto err; 1166 } 1167 p += i; 1168 1169 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 1170 if (s->hit) { 1171 j = 0; 1172 id = s->session->cipher->id; 1173 1174#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1175 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", 1176 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); 1177#endif 1178 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 1179 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 1180#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1181 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 1182 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 1183#endif 1184 if (c->id == id) { 1185 j = 1; 1186 break; 1187 } 1188 } 1189 /* 1190 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack: 1191 * CVE-2010-4180. 1192 */ 1193#if 0 1194 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1195 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) { 1196 /* 1197 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used 1198 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead 1199 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't 1200 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the 1201 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though. 1202 */ 1203 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 1204 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { 1205 s->session->cipher = c; 1206 j = 1; 1207 } 1208 } 1209#endif 1210 if (j == 0) { 1211 /* 1212 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked 1213 * to reuse it 1214 */ 1215 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1217 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1218 goto f_err; 1219 } 1220 } 1221 1222 /* compression */ 1223 i = *(p++); 1224 if ((d + n) - p < i) { 1225 /* not enough data */ 1226 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1228 goto f_err; 1229 } 1230#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1231 q = p; 1232#endif 1233 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { 1234 if (p[j] == 0) 1235 break; 1236 } 1237 1238 p += i; 1239 if (j >= i) { 1240 /* no compress */ 1241 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1243 goto f_err; 1244 } 1245#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1246 /* TLS extensions */ 1247 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { 1248 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n)) { 1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1250 goto err; 1251 } 1252 } 1253 1254 /* 1255 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake 1256 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before 1257 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket 1258 * processing to use it in key derivation. 1259 */ 1260 { 1261 unsigned char *pos; 1262 pos = s->s3->server_random; 1263 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { 1264 goto f_err; 1265 } 1266 } 1267 1268 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { 1269 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 1270 1271 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1272 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 1273 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, 1274 &pref_cipher, 1275 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { 1276 s->hit = 1; 1277 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1278 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; 1279 1280 ciphers = NULL; 1281 1282 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1283 pref_cipher = 1284 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, 1285 s-> 1286 session->ciphers, 1287 SSL_get_ciphers 1288 (s)); 1289 if (pref_cipher == NULL) { 1290 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1292 goto f_err; 1293 } 1294 1295 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; 1296 1297 if (s->cipher_list) 1298 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1299 1300 if (s->cipher_list_by_id) 1301 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1302 1303 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1304 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1305 } 1306 } 1307#endif 1308 1309 /* 1310 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1311 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 1312 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. 1313 */ 1314 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; 1315#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1316 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1317 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1318 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1319 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1320 /* Can't disable compression */ 1321 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) { 1322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1323 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1324 goto f_err; 1325 } 1326 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1327 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { 1328 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1329 if (comp_id == comp->id) { 1330 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1331 break; 1332 } 1333 } 1334 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { 1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1336 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1337 goto f_err; 1338 } 1339 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 1340 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) { 1341 if (q[m] == comp_id) 1342 break; 1343 } 1344 if (m >= i) { 1345 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1347 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 1348 goto f_err; 1349 } 1350 } else if (s->hit) 1351 comp = NULL; 1352 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { 1353 /* See if we have a match */ 1354 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0; 1355 1356 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1357 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { 1358 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1359 v = comp->id; 1360 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) { 1361 if (v == q[o]) { 1362 done = 1; 1363 break; 1364 } 1365 } 1366 if (done) 1367 break; 1368 } 1369 if (done) 1370 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1371 else 1372 comp = NULL; 1373 } 1374#else 1375 /* 1376 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 1377 * using compression. 1378 */ 1379 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1381 goto f_err; 1382 } 1383#endif 1384 1385 /* 1386 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher 1387 */ 1388 1389 if (!s->hit) { 1390#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1391 s->session->compress_meth = 0; 1392#else 1393 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; 1394#endif 1395 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1396 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1397 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1398 if (ciphers == NULL) { 1399 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1401 goto f_err; 1402 } 1403 ciphers = NULL; 1404 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { 1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1406 goto err; 1407 } 1408 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ 1409 retry_cert: 1410 if (s->cert->cert_cb) { 1411 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); 1412 if (rv == 0) { 1413 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); 1415 goto f_err; 1416 } 1417 if (rv < 0) { 1418 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 1419 return -1; 1420 } 1421 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1422 } 1423 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1424 1425 if (c == NULL) { 1426 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1428 goto f_err; 1429 } 1430 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; 1431 } else { 1432 /* Session-id reuse */ 1433#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1434 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1435 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL; 1436 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL; 1437 1438 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) { 1439 sk = s->session->ciphers; 1440 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { 1441 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); 1442 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) 1443 nc = c; 1444 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1445 ec = c; 1446 } 1447 if (nc != NULL) 1448 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc; 1449 else if (ec != NULL) 1450 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec; 1451 else 1452 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1453 } else 1454#endif 1455 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1456 } 1457 1458 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { 1459 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 1460 goto f_err; 1461 } 1462 1463 /*- 1464 * we now have the following setup. 1465 * client_random 1466 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1467 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1468 * compression - basically ignored right now 1469 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1470 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1471 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1472 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1473 */ 1474 1475 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1476 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { 1477 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) { 1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1479 goto f_err; 1480 } 1481 } 1482 1483 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1; 1484 if (0) { 1485 f_err: 1486 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1487 err: 1488 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1489 } 1490 1491 if (ciphers != NULL) 1492 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1493 return ret; 1494} 1495 1496int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1497{ 1498 unsigned char *buf; 1499 unsigned char *p, *d; 1500 int i, sl; 1501 int al = 0; 1502 unsigned long l; 1503 1504 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { 1505 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1506#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1507 p = s->s3->server_random; 1508 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { 1509 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1510 return -1; 1511 } 1512#endif 1513 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1514 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 1515 1516 *(p++) = s->version >> 8; 1517 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; 1518 1519 /* Random stuff */ 1520 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1521 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1522 1523 /*- 1524 * There are several cases for the session ID to send 1525 * back in the server hello: 1526 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1527 * we send back the old session ID. 1528 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1529 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1530 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1531 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1532 * session ID. 1533 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1534 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1535 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1536 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1537 * to send back. 1538 */ 1539 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1540 && !s->hit) 1541 s->session->session_id_length = 0; 1542 1543 sl = s->session->session_id_length; 1544 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { 1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1546 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1547 return -1; 1548 } 1549 *(p++) = sl; 1550 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); 1551 p += sl; 1552 1553 /* put the cipher */ 1554 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); 1555 p += i; 1556 1557 /* put the compression method */ 1558#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1559 *(p++) = 0; 1560#else 1561 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1562 *(p++) = 0; 1563 else 1564 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1565#endif 1566#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1567 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { 1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 1569 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1570 return -1; 1571 } 1572 if ((p = 1573 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 1574 &al)) == NULL) { 1575 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1577 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1578 return -1; 1579 } 1580#endif 1581 /* do the header */ 1582 l = (p - d); 1583 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l); 1584 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; 1585 } 1586 1587 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1588 return ssl_do_write(s); 1589} 1590 1591int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1592{ 1593 1594 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { 1595 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0); 1596 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1597 } 1598 1599 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1600 return ssl_do_write(s); 1601} 1602 1603int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1604{ 1605#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1606 unsigned char *q; 1607 int j, num; 1608 RSA *rsa; 1609 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1610 unsigned int u; 1611#endif 1612#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1613# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1614 int j; 1615# endif 1616 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; 1617#endif 1618#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1619 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp; 1620 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1621 int encodedlen = 0; 1622 int curve_id = 0; 1623 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1624#endif 1625 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1626 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1627 unsigned char *p, *d; 1628 int al, i; 1629 unsigned long type; 1630 int n; 1631 CERT *cert; 1632 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1633 int nr[4], kn; 1634 BUF_MEM *buf; 1635 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1636 1637 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1638 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { 1639 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1640 cert = s->cert; 1641 1642 buf = s->init_buf; 1643 1644 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; 1645 n = 0; 1646#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1647 if (type & SSL_kRSA) { 1648 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp; 1649 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { 1650 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1651 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1652 tmp.new_cipher), 1653 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> 1654 tmp.new_cipher)); 1655 if (rsa == NULL) { 1656 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1658 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1659 goto f_err; 1660 } 1661 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1662 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa; 1663 } 1664 if (rsa == NULL) { 1665 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1667 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1668 goto f_err; 1669 } 1670 r[0] = rsa->n; 1671 r[1] = rsa->e; 1672 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1; 1673 } else 1674#endif 1675#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1676 if (type & SSL_kEDH) { 1677 dhp = cert->dh_tmp; 1678 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1679 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1680 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1681 tmp.new_cipher), 1682 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> 1683 tmp.new_cipher)); 1684 if (dhp == NULL) { 1685 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1687 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1688 goto f_err; 1689 } 1690 1691 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { 1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1693 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1694 goto err; 1695 } 1696 1697 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { 1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1699 goto err; 1700 } 1701 1702 s->s3->tmp.dh = dh; 1703 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { 1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1705 goto err; 1706 } 1707 r[0] = dh->p; 1708 r[1] = dh->g; 1709 r[2] = dh->pub_key; 1710 } else 1711#endif 1712#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1713 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { 1714 const EC_GROUP *group; 1715 1716 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { 1717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1718 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1719 goto err; 1720 } 1721 1722 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp; 1723 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { 1724 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ 1725 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2); 1726 if (nid != NID_undef) 1727 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); 1728 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) { 1729 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1730 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1731 tmp.new_cipher), 1732 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s-> 1733 s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1734 } 1735 if (ecdhp == NULL) { 1736 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1738 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1739 goto f_err; 1740 } 1741 1742 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1743 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) 1744 ecdh = ecdhp; 1745 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { 1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1747 goto err; 1748 } 1749 1750 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh; 1751 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1752 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1753 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { 1754 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { 1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1756 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1757 goto err; 1758 } 1759 } 1760 1761 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1762 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1763 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { 1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1765 goto err; 1766 } 1767 1768 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1769 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { 1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1771 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1772 goto err; 1773 } 1774 1775 /* 1776 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named 1777 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is 1778 * non-zero. 1779 */ 1780 if ((curve_id = 1781 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1782 == 0) { 1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1784 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1785 goto err; 1786 } 1787 1788 /* 1789 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and 1790 * allocate memory accordingly. 1791 */ 1792 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1793 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1794 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1795 NULL, 0, NULL); 1796 1797 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1798 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char)); 1799 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1800 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { 1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1802 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1803 goto err; 1804 } 1805 1806 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1807 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1808 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1809 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1810 1811 if (encodedlen == 0) { 1812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1813 goto err; 1814 } 1815 1816 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1817 bn_ctx = NULL; 1818 1819 /* 1820 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in 1821 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four 1822 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1823 * structure. 1824 */ 1825 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1826 1827 /* 1828 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we 1829 * can set these to NULLs 1830 */ 1831 r[0] = NULL; 1832 r[1] = NULL; 1833 r[2] = NULL; 1834 r[3] = NULL; 1835 } else 1836#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1837#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1838 if (type & SSL_kPSK) { 1839 /* 1840 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint 1841 */ 1842 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1843 } else 1844#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1845#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1846 if (type & SSL_kSRP) { 1847 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || 1848 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || 1849 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { 1850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1851 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); 1852 goto err; 1853 } 1854 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; 1855 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; 1856 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; 1857 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; 1858 } else 1859#endif 1860 { 1861 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1863 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1864 goto f_err; 1865 } 1866 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 1867 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1868#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1869 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) 1870 n += 1 + nr[i]; 1871 else 1872#endif 1873#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1874 /* 1875 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS 1876 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length 1877 * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here 1878 */ 1879 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kEDH))) 1880 n += 2 + nr[0]; 1881 else 1882#endif 1883 n += 2 + nr[i]; 1884 } 1885 1886 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) 1887 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 1888 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) 1889 == NULL) { 1890 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1891 goto f_err; 1892 } 1893 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1894 /* Allow space for signature algorithm */ 1895 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 1896 kn += 2; 1897 /* Allow space for signature length */ 1898 kn += 2; 1899 } else { 1900 pkey = NULL; 1901 kn = 0; 1902 } 1903 1904 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) { 1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); 1906 goto err; 1907 } 1908 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 1909 1910 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 1911#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1912 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { 1913 *p = nr[i]; 1914 p++; 1915 } else 1916#endif 1917#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1918 /* 1919 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS 1920 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length 1921 * as the prime 1922 */ 1923 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kEDH))) { 1924 s2n(nr[0], p); 1925 for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) { 1926 *p = 0; 1927 ++p; 1928 } 1929 } else 1930#endif 1931 s2n(nr[i], p); 1932 BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); 1933 p += nr[i]; 1934 } 1935 1936#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1937 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { 1938 /* 1939 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In 1940 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte 1941 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded 1942 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself 1943 */ 1944 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1945 p += 1; 1946 *p = 0; 1947 p += 1; 1948 *p = curve_id; 1949 p += 1; 1950 *p = encodedlen; 1951 p += 1; 1952 memcpy((unsigned char *)p, 1953 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); 1954 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1955 encodedPoint = NULL; 1956 p += encodedlen; 1957 } 1958#endif 1959 1960#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1961 if (type & SSL_kPSK) { 1962 /* copy PSK identity hint */ 1963 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 1964 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, 1965 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); 1966 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1967 } 1968#endif 1969 1970 /* not anonymous */ 1971 if (pkey != NULL) { 1972 /* 1973 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p 1974 * points to the space at the end. 1975 */ 1976#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1977 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1978 q = md_buf; 1979 j = 0; 1980 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { 1981 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, 1982 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 1983 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, 1984 (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 1985 : s->ctx->sha1, 1986 NULL) <= 0 1987 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), 1988 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 1989 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), 1990 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 1991 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 1992 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, 1993 (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) { 1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1995 ERR_LIB_EVP); 1996 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1997 goto f_err; 1998 } 1999 q += i; 2000 j += i; 2001 } 2002 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 2003 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { 2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA); 2005 goto err; 2006 } 2007 s2n(u, p); 2008 n += u + 2; 2009 } else 2010#endif 2011 if (md) { 2012 /* send signature algorithm */ 2013 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2014 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { 2015 /* Should never happen */ 2016 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2018 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2019 goto f_err; 2020 } 2021 p += 2; 2022 } 2023#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 2024 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 2025#endif 2026 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 2027 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), 2028 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 2029 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), 2030 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 2031 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 2032 || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), 2033 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) { 2034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); 2035 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2036 goto f_err; 2037 } 2038 s2n(i, p); 2039 n += i + 2; 2040 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 2041 n += 2; 2042 } else { 2043 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 2044 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2046 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 2047 goto f_err; 2048 } 2049 } 2050 2051 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n); 2052 } 2053 2054 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 2055 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2056 return ssl_do_write(s); 2057 f_err: 2058 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2059 err: 2060#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2061 if (encodedPoint != NULL) 2062 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2063 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2064#endif 2065 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2066 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2067 return (-1); 2068} 2069 2070int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 2071{ 2072 unsigned char *p, *d; 2073 int i, j, nl, off, n; 2074 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; 2075 X509_NAME *name; 2076 BUF_MEM *buf; 2077 2078 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { 2079 buf = s->init_buf; 2080 2081 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 2082 2083 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 2084 p++; 2085 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); 2086 d[0] = n; 2087 p += n; 2088 n++; 2089 2090 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2091 const unsigned char *psigs; 2092 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); 2093 s2n(nl, p); 2094 memcpy(p, psigs, nl); 2095 p += nl; 2096 n += nl + 2; 2097 } 2098 2099 off = n; 2100 p += 2; 2101 n += 2; 2102 2103 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 2104 nl = 0; 2105 if (sk != NULL) { 2106 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { 2107 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); 2108 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); 2109 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean 2110 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) { 2111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2112 ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2113 goto err; 2114 } 2115 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n; 2116 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { 2117 s2n(j, p); 2118 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); 2119 n += 2 + j; 2120 nl += 2 + j; 2121 } else { 2122 d = p; 2123 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); 2124 j -= 2; 2125 s2n(j, d); 2126 j += 2; 2127 n += j; 2128 nl += j; 2129 } 2130 } 2131 } 2132 /* else no CA names */ 2133 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off; 2134 s2n(nl, p); 2135 2136 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n); 2137 2138#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 2139 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 2140 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) { 2141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2142 goto err; 2143 } 2144 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 2145 /* do the header */ 2146 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 2147 *(p++) = 0; 2148 *(p++) = 0; 2149 *(p++) = 0; 2150 s->init_num += 4; 2151 } 2152#endif 2153 2154 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 2155 } 2156 2157 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 2158 return ssl_do_write(s); 2159 err: 2160 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2161 return (-1); 2162} 2163 2164int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2165{ 2166 int i, al, ok; 2167 long n; 2168 unsigned long alg_k; 2169 unsigned char *p; 2170#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2171 RSA *rsa = NULL; 2172 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2173#endif 2174#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2175 BIGNUM *pub = NULL; 2176 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL; 2177#endif 2178#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2179 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 2180#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2181 2182#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2183 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 2184 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 2185 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 2186 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 2187#endif 2188 2189 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2190 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2191 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 2192 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); 2193 2194 if (!ok) 2195 return ((int)n); 2196 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2197 2198 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2199 2200#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2201 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { 2202 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 2203 int decrypt_len; 2204 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; 2205 size_t j, padding_len; 2206 2207 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 2208 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) { 2209 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 2210 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp; 2211 /* 2212 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already 2213 */ 2214 if (rsa == NULL) { 2215 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2217 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 2218 goto f_err; 2219 2220 } 2221 } else { 2222 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 2223 if ((pkey == NULL) || 2224 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { 2225 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2227 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2228 goto f_err; 2229 } 2230 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; 2231 } 2232 2233 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ 2234 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 2235 n2s(p, i); 2236 if (n != i + 2) { 2237 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) { 2238 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2240 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2241 goto f_err; 2242 } else 2243 p -= 2; 2244 } else 2245 n = i; 2246 } 2247 2248 /* 2249 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure 2250 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire 2251 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The 2252 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the 2253 * bound is sufficient to be safe. 2254 */ 2255 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2256 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2258 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2259 goto f_err; 2260 } 2261 2262 /* 2263 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of 2264 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, 2265 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and 2266 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt 2267 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 2268 */ 2269 2270 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, 2271 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) 2272 goto err; 2273 2274 /* 2275 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of 2276 * the timing-sensitive code below. 2277 */ 2278 decrypt_len = 2279 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); 2280 if (decrypt_len < 0) 2281 goto err; 2282 2283 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ 2284 2285 /* 2286 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys 2287 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures 2288 * PS is at least 8 bytes. 2289 */ 2290 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2291 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2293 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2294 goto f_err; 2295 } 2296 2297 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 2298 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(p[0], 0) & 2299 constant_time_eq_int_8(p[1], 2); 2300 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) { 2301 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(p[j]); 2302 } 2303 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(p[padding_len - 1]); 2304 p += padding_len; 2305 2306 /* 2307 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then 2308 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The 2309 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 2310 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number 2311 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in 2312 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. 2313 */ 2314 version_good = 2315 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); 2316 version_good &= 2317 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); 2318 2319 /* 2320 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2321 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2322 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2323 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 2324 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 2325 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such 2326 * clients. 2327 */ 2328 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { 2329 unsigned char workaround_good; 2330 workaround_good = 2331 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); 2332 workaround_good &= 2333 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); 2334 version_good |= workaround_good; 2335 } 2336 2337 /* 2338 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to 2339 * remain non-zero (0xff). 2340 */ 2341 decrypt_good &= version_good; 2342 2343 /* 2344 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using 2345 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not 2346 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees 2347 * it is still sufficiently large to read from. 2348 */ 2349 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { 2350 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j], 2351 rand_premaster_secret[j]); 2352 } 2353 2354 s->session->master_key_length = 2355 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2356 s-> 2357 session->master_key, 2358 p, 2359 sizeof 2360 (rand_premaster_secret)); 2361 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); 2362 } else 2363#endif 2364#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2365 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { 2366 int idx = -1; 2367 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; 2368 if (n > 1) { 2369 n2s(p, i); 2370 } else { 2371 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { 2372 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2374 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2375 goto f_err; 2376 } 2377 i = 0; 2378 } 2379 if (n && n != i + 2) { 2380 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) { 2381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2382 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2383 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2384 goto f_err; 2385 } else { 2386 p -= 2; 2387 i = (int)n; 2388 } 2389 } 2390 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr) 2391 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; 2392 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd) 2393 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; 2394 if (idx >= 0) { 2395 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey; 2396 if ((skey == NULL) || 2397 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) { 2398 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2400 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2401 goto f_err; 2402 } 2403 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh; 2404 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) { 2405 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2407 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2408 goto f_err; 2409 } else 2410 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh; 2411 2412 if (n == 0L) { 2413 /* Get pubkey from cert */ 2414 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2415 if (clkey) { 2416 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1) 2417 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey); 2418 } 2419 if (dh_clnt == NULL) { 2420 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2422 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2423 goto f_err; 2424 } 2425 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey); 2426 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key; 2427 } else 2428 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL); 2429 if (pub == NULL) { 2430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); 2431 goto err; 2432 } 2433 2434 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr); 2435 2436 if (i <= 0) { 2437 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 2439 BN_clear_free(pub); 2440 goto f_err; 2441 } 2442 2443 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 2444 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 2445 if (dh_clnt) 2446 DH_free(dh_clnt); 2447 else 2448 BN_clear_free(pub); 2449 pub = NULL; 2450 s->session->master_key_length = 2451 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2452 s-> 2453 session->master_key, 2454 p, i); 2455 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2456 if (dh_clnt) 2457 return 2; 2458 } else 2459#endif 2460#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2461 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { 2462 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 2463 krb5_data enc_ticket; 2464 krb5_data authenticator; 2465 krb5_data enc_pms; 2466 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 2467 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 2468 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 2469 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2470 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 2471 int padl, outl; 2472 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 2473 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 2474 int kerr = 0; 2475 2476 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 2477 2478 if (!kssl_ctx) 2479 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 2480 2481 n2s(p, i); 2482 enc_ticket.length = i; 2483 2484 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) { 2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2486 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2487 goto err; 2488 } 2489 2490 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 2491 p += enc_ticket.length; 2492 2493 n2s(p, i); 2494 authenticator.length = i; 2495 2496 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) { 2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2498 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2499 goto err; 2500 } 2501 2502 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 2503 p += authenticator.length; 2504 2505 n2s(p, i); 2506 enc_pms.length = i; 2507 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 2508 p += enc_pms.length; 2509 2510 /* 2511 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption 2512 */ 2513 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) { 2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2515 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2516 goto err; 2517 } 2518 2519 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 2520 enc_pms.length + 6)) { 2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2522 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2523 goto err; 2524 } 2525 2526 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2527 &kssl_err)) != 0) { 2528# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2529 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2530 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2531 if (kssl_err.text) 2532 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2533# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); 2535 goto err; 2536 } 2537 2538 /* 2539 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will 2540 * return authtime == 0. 2541 */ 2542 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2543 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) { 2544# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2545 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2546 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2547 if (kssl_err.text) 2548 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2549# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); 2551 goto err; 2552 } 2553 2554 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) { 2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2556 goto err; 2557 } 2558# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2559 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2560# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2561 2562 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2563 if (enc == NULL) 2564 goto err; 2565 2566 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2567 2568 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) { 2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2570 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2571 goto err; 2572 } 2573 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl, 2574 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2575 { 2576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2577 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2578 kerr = 1; 2579 goto kclean; 2580 } 2581 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2582 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2583 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2584 kerr = 1; 2585 goto kclean; 2586 } 2587 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) { 2588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2589 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2590 kerr = 1; 2591 goto kclean; 2592 } 2593 outl += padl; 2594 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2596 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2597 kerr = 1; 2598 goto kclean; 2599 } 2600 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) 2601 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { 2602 /* 2603 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as 2604 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, 2605 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH 2606 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random 2607 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If 2608 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2609 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos 2610 * cipher) 2611 */ 2612 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { 2613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2614 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2615 kerr = 1; 2616 goto kclean; 2617 } 2618 } 2619 2620 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2621 2622 s->session->master_key_length = 2623 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2624 s-> 2625 session->master_key, 2626 pms, outl); 2627 2628 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) { 2629 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2630 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) { 2631 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2632 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ, 2633 len); 2634 } 2635 } 2636 2637 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2638 * but it caused problems for apache. 2639 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2640 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2641 */ 2642 2643 kclean: 2644 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms)); 2645 if (kerr) 2646 goto err; 2647 } else 2648#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2649 2650#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2651 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { 2652 int ret = 1; 2653 int field_size = 0; 2654 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2655 const EC_GROUP *group; 2656 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2657 2658 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2659 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { 2660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2661 goto err; 2662 } 2663 2664 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2665 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { 2666 /* use the certificate */ 2667 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2668 } else { 2669 /* 2670 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the 2671 * ServerKeyExchange msg. 2672 */ 2673 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2674 } 2675 2676 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2677 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2678 2679 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2680 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { 2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2682 goto err; 2683 } 2684 2685 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2686 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { 2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2688 goto err; 2689 } 2690 2691 if (n == 0L) { 2692 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2693 2694 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { 2695 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2697 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2698 goto f_err; 2699 } 2700 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2701 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { 2702 /* 2703 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication 2704 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the 2705 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we 2706 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is 2707 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly 2708 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group. 2709 */ 2710 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2712 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2713 goto f_err; 2714 } 2715 2716 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2717 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey-> 2718 pkey.ec)) == 0) { 2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2720 goto err; 2721 } 2722 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2723 } else { 2724 /* 2725 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the 2726 * ClientKeyExchange message. 2727 */ 2728 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { 2729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2730 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2731 goto err; 2732 } 2733 2734 /* Get encoded point length */ 2735 i = *p; 2736 p += 1; 2737 if (n != 1 + i) { 2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2739 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2740 goto f_err; 2741 } 2742 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { 2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2744 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2745 goto f_err; 2746 } 2747 /* 2748 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it 2749 * to the start 2750 */ 2751 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2752 } 2753 2754 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2755 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2756 if (field_size <= 0) { 2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2758 goto err; 2759 } 2760 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, 2761 NULL); 2762 if (i <= 0) { 2763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2764 goto err; 2765 } 2766 2767 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2768 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2769 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2770 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2771 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 2772 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 2773 2774 /* Compute the master secret */ 2775 s->session->master_key_length = 2776 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2777 s-> 2778 session->master_key, 2779 p, i); 2780 2781 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2782 return (ret); 2783 } else 2784#endif 2785#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2786 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { 2787 unsigned char *t = NULL; 2788 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4]; 2789 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; 2790 int psk_err = 1; 2791 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; 2792 2793 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2794 2795 n2s(p, i); 2796 if (n != i + 2) { 2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2798 goto psk_err; 2799 } 2800 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 2801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2802 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2803 goto psk_err; 2804 } 2805 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { 2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2807 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2808 goto psk_err; 2809 } 2810 2811 /* 2812 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback 2813 */ 2814 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); 2815 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i); 2816 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, 2817 psk_or_pre_ms, 2818 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2819 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1); 2820 2821 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { 2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2823 goto psk_err; 2824 } else if (psk_len == 0) { 2825 /* 2826 * PSK related to the given identity not found 2827 */ 2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2829 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2830 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 2831 goto psk_err; 2832 } 2833 2834 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ 2835 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len; 2836 t = psk_or_pre_ms; 2837 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); 2838 s2n(psk_len, t); 2839 memset(t, 0, psk_len); 2840 t += psk_len; 2841 s2n(psk_len, t); 2842 2843 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) 2844 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); 2845 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i); 2846 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { 2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2848 goto psk_err; 2849 } 2850 2851 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) 2852 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); 2853 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 2854 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && 2855 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { 2856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2857 goto psk_err; 2858 } 2859 2860 s->session->master_key_length = 2861 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2862 s-> 2863 session->master_key, 2864 psk_or_pre_ms, 2865 pre_ms_len); 2866 psk_err = 0; 2867 psk_err: 2868 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2869 if (psk_err != 0) 2870 goto f_err; 2871 } else 2872#endif 2873#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2874 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { 2875 int param_len; 2876 2877 n2s(p, i); 2878 param_len = i + 2; 2879 if (param_len > n) { 2880 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2882 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); 2883 goto f_err; 2884 } 2885 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { 2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2887 goto err; 2888 } 2889 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 2890 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { 2891 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2893 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); 2894 goto f_err; 2895 } 2896 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) 2897 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 2898 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 2899 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { 2900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2901 goto err; 2902 } 2903 2904 if ((s->session->master_key_length = 2905 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s, 2906 s->session->master_key)) < 0) { 2907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2908 goto err; 2909 } 2910 2911 p += i; 2912 } else 2913#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ 2914 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 2915 int ret = 0; 2916 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 2917 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 2918 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; 2919 size_t outlen = 32, inlen; 2920 unsigned long alg_a; 2921 int Ttag, Tclass; 2922 long Tlen; 2923 2924 /* Get our certificate private key */ 2925 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2926 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 2927 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; 2928 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 2929 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 2930 2931 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); 2932 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { 2933 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2935 goto f_err; 2936 } 2937 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { 2938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2939 goto gerr; 2940 } 2941 /* 2942 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 2943 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 2944 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a 2945 * client certificate for authorization only. 2946 */ 2947 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2948 if (client_pub_pkey) { 2949 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2950 ERR_clear_error(); 2951 } 2952 /* Decrypt session key */ 2953 if (ASN1_get_object 2954 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, 2955 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE 2956 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { 2957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2958 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2959 goto gerr; 2960 } 2961 start = p; 2962 inlen = Tlen; 2963 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt 2964 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { 2965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2966 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2967 goto gerr; 2968 } 2969 /* Generate master secret */ 2970 s->session->master_key_length = 2971 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2972 s-> 2973 session->master_key, 2974 premaster_secret, 32); 2975 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret)); 2976 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2977 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl 2978 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2979 ret = 2; 2980 else 2981 ret = 1; 2982 gerr: 2983 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2984 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2985 if (ret) 2986 return ret; 2987 else 2988 goto err; 2989 } else { 2990 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2992 goto f_err; 2993 } 2994 2995 return (1); 2996 f_err: 2997 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2998#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) 2999 err: 3000#endif 3001#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 3002 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 3003 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 3004 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 3005 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 3006 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 3007#endif 3008 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3009 return (-1); 3010} 3011 3012int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 3013{ 3014 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 3015 unsigned char *p; 3016 int al, ok, ret = 0; 3017 long n; 3018 int type = 0, i, j; 3019 X509 *peer; 3020 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 3021 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 3022 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 3023 3024 /* 3025 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received 3026 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non 3027 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even 3028 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static 3029 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the 3030 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here. 3031 */ 3032 if (s->session->peer == NULL) { 3033 ret = 1; 3034 goto end; 3035 } 3036 3037 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3038 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 3039 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 3040 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, 3041 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 3042 3043 if (!ok) 3044 return ((int)n); 3045 3046 peer = s->session->peer; 3047 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); 3048 if (pkey == NULL) { 3049 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3050 goto f_err; 3051 } 3052 3053 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); 3054 3055 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { 3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3057 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 3058 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 3059 goto f_err; 3060 } 3061 3062 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 3063 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3064 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ 3065 /* 3066 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without 3067 * length field 3068 */ 3069 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 3070 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) { 3071 i = 64; 3072 } else { 3073 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 3074 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey); 3075 if (rv == -1) { 3076 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3077 goto f_err; 3078 } else if (rv == 0) { 3079 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3080 goto f_err; 3081 } 3082#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3083 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 3084#endif 3085 p += 2; 3086 n -= 2; 3087 } 3088 n2s(p, i); 3089 n -= 2; 3090 if (i > n) { 3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3092 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3093 goto f_err; 3094 } 3095 } 3096 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 3097 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { 3098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 3099 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3100 goto f_err; 3101 } 3102 3103 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 3104 long hdatalen = 0; 3105 void *hdata; 3106 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 3107 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 3108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3109 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3110 goto f_err; 3111 } 3112#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3113 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", 3114 EVP_MD_name(md)); 3115#endif 3116 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) 3117 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { 3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3119 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3120 goto f_err; 3121 } 3122 3123 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) { 3124 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 3126 goto f_err; 3127 } 3128 } else 3129#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3130 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { 3131 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3132 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 3133 pkey->pkey.rsa); 3134 if (i < 0) { 3135 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 3137 goto f_err; 3138 } 3139 if (i == 0) { 3140 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 3142 goto f_err; 3143 } 3144 } else 3145#endif 3146#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3147 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { 3148 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3149 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3150 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa); 3151 if (j <= 0) { 3152 /* bad signature */ 3153 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 3155 goto f_err; 3156 } 3157 } else 3158#endif 3159#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3160 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 3161 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3162 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3163 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec); 3164 if (j <= 0) { 3165 /* bad signature */ 3166 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3168 goto f_err; 3169 } 3170 } else 3171#endif 3172 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 3173 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { 3174 unsigned char signature[64]; 3175 int idx; 3176 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); 3177 if (pctx == NULL) { 3178 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3180 goto f_err; 3181 } 3182 if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) { 3183 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3184 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3186 goto f_err; 3187 } 3188 if (i != 64) { 3189#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3190 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i); 3191#endif 3192 } 3193 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) { 3194 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx]; 3195 } 3196 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3197 32); 3198 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3199 if (j <= 0) { 3200 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3202 goto f_err; 3203 } 3204 } else { 3205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3206 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 3207 goto f_err; 3208 } 3209 3210 ret = 1; 3211 if (0) { 3212 f_err: 3213 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3214 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3215 } 3216 end: 3217 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 3218 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); 3219 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; 3220 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 3221 } 3222 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 3223 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 3224 return (ret); 3225} 3226 3227int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 3228{ 3229 int i, ok, al, ret = -1; 3230 X509 *x = NULL; 3231 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n; 3232 const unsigned char *p, *q; 3233 unsigned char *d; 3234 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 3235 3236 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3237 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 3238 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 3239 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); 3240 3241 if (!ok) 3242 return ((int)n); 3243 3244 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 3245 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3246 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3248 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3249 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3250 goto f_err; 3251 } 3252 /* 3253 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list 3254 */ 3255 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 3256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3257 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 3258 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3259 goto f_err; 3260 } 3261 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 3262 return (1); 3263 } 3264 3265 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 3266 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 3268 goto f_err; 3269 } 3270 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3271 3272 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 3273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3274 goto err; 3275 } 3276 3277 n2l3(p, llen); 3278 if (llen + 3 != n) { 3279 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3281 goto f_err; 3282 } 3283 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) { 3284 if (nc + 3 > llen) { 3285 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3287 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3288 goto f_err; 3289 } 3290 n2l3(p, l); 3291 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) { 3292 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3294 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3295 goto f_err; 3296 } 3297 3298 q = p; 3299 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l); 3300 if (x == NULL) { 3301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 3302 goto err; 3303 } 3304 if (p != (q + l)) { 3305 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3307 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3308 goto f_err; 3309 } 3310 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 3311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3312 goto err; 3313 } 3314 x = NULL; 3315 nc += l + 3; 3316 } 3317 3318 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { 3319 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 3320 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 3321 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3323 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 3324 goto f_err; 3325 } 3326 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 3327 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3328 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3330 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3331 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3332 goto f_err; 3333 } 3334 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 3335 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 3336 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3337 goto f_err; 3338 } 3339 } else { 3340 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 3341 if (i <= 0) { 3342 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 3343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3344 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); 3345 goto f_err; 3346 } 3347 } 3348 3349 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 3350 X509_free(s->session->peer); 3351 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); 3352 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 3353 3354 /* 3355 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we 3356 * arrive here. 3357 */ 3358 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { 3359 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 3360 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { 3361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3362 goto err; 3363 } 3364 } 3365 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 3366 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 3367 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; 3368 /* 3369 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own 3370 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c 3371 */ 3372 3373 sk = NULL; 3374 3375 ret = 1; 3376 if (0) { 3377 f_err: 3378 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3379 err: 3380 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3381 } 3382 3383 if (x != NULL) 3384 X509_free(x); 3385 if (sk != NULL) 3386 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 3387 return (ret); 3388} 3389 3390int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 3391{ 3392 CERT_PKEY *cpk; 3393 3394 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { 3395 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); 3396 if (cpk == NULL) { 3397 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 3398 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || 3399 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) { 3400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 3401 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3402 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3403 return (0); 3404 } 3405 } 3406 3407 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) { 3408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3409 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3410 return (0); 3411 } 3412 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 3413 } 3414 3415 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 3416 return ssl_do_write(s); 3417} 3418 3419#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 3420/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 3421int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 3422{ 3423 unsigned char *senc = NULL; 3424 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3425 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3426 3427 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { 3428 unsigned char *p, *macstart; 3429 const unsigned char *const_p; 3430 int len, slen_full, slen; 3431 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3432 unsigned int hlen; 3433 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3434 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3435 unsigned char key_name[16]; 3436 3437 /* get session encoding length */ 3438 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3439 /* 3440 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too 3441 * long 3442 */ 3443 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { 3444 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3445 return -1; 3446 } 3447 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); 3448 if (!senc) { 3449 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3450 return -1; 3451 } 3452 3453 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3454 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3455 3456 p = senc; 3457 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) 3458 goto err; 3459 3460 /* 3461 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up 3462 */ 3463 const_p = senc; 3464 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 3465 if (sess == NULL) 3466 goto err; 3467 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ 3468 3469 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 3470 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ 3471 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3472 goto err; 3473 } 3474 p = senc; 3475 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { 3476 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3477 goto err; 3478 } 3479 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3480 3481 /*- 3482 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3483 * follows handshake_header_length + 3484 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 3485 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 3486 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 3487 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 3488 */ 3489 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 3490 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + 3491 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 3492 goto err; 3493 3494 p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 3495 /* 3496 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does 3497 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. 3498 */ 3499 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 3500 /* if 0 is returned, write en empty ticket */ 3501 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 3502 &hctx, 1); 3503 3504 if (ret == 0) { 3505 l2n(0, p); /* timeout */ 3506 s2n(0, p); /* length */ 3507 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 3508 p - ssl_handshake_start(s)); 3509 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 3510 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3511 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3512 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3513 return ssl_do_write(s); 3514 } 3515 if (ret < 0) 3516 goto err; 3517 } else { 3518 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0) 3519 goto err; 3520 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3521 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) 3522 goto err; 3523 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3524 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL)) 3525 goto err; 3526 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 3527 } 3528 3529 /* 3530 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified 3531 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for 3532 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. 3533 */ 3534 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); 3535 3536 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 3537 p += 2; 3538 /* Output key name */ 3539 macstart = p; 3540 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 3541 p += 16; 3542 /* output IV */ 3543 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 3544 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3545 /* Encrypt session data */ 3546 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) 3547 goto err; 3548 p += len; 3549 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len)) 3550 goto err; 3551 p += len; 3552 3553 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) 3554 goto err; 3555 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) 3556 goto err; 3557 3558 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3559 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3560 3561 p += hlen; 3562 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 3563 /* Total length */ 3564 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s); 3565 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */ 3566 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4; 3567 s2n(len - 6, p); 3568 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len); 3569 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 3570 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3571 } 3572 3573 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 3574 return ssl_do_write(s); 3575 err: 3576 if (senc) 3577 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3578 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3579 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3580 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3581 return -1; 3582} 3583 3584int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 3585{ 3586 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { 3587 unsigned char *p; 3588 size_t msglen; 3589 3590 /*- 3591 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3592 * follows handshake_header_length + 3593 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 3594 * + (ocsp response) 3595 */ 3596 msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 3597 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen)) { 3598 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3599 return -1; 3600 } 3601 3602 p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 3603 3604 /* status type */ 3605 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; 3606 /* length of OCSP response */ 3607 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 3608 /* actual response */ 3609 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 3610 3611 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen); 3612 } 3613 3614 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 3615 return (ssl_do_write(s)); 3616} 3617 3618# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 3619/* 3620 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. 3621 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found 3622 */ 3623int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) 3624{ 3625 int ok; 3626 int proto_len, padding_len; 3627 long n; 3628 const unsigned char *p; 3629 3630 /* 3631 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the 3632 * extension in their ClientHello 3633 */ 3634 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { 3635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, 3636 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); 3637 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3638 return -1; 3639 } 3640 3641 /* See the payload format below */ 3642 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3643 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, 3644 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, 3645 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok); 3646 3647 if (!ok) 3648 return ((int)n); 3649 3650 /* 3651 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in 3652 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by 3653 * ssl3_get_finished). 3654 */ 3655 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { 3656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); 3657 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3658 return -1; 3659 } 3660 3661 if (n < 2) { 3662 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3663 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ 3664 } 3665 3666 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3667 3668 /*- 3669 * The payload looks like: 3670 * uint8 proto_len; 3671 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 3672 * uint8 padding_len; 3673 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 3674 */ 3675 proto_len = p[0]; 3676 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) { 3677 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3678 return 0; 3679 } 3680 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; 3681 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) { 3682 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3683 return 0; 3684 } 3685 3686 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); 3687 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { 3688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3689 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3690 return 0; 3691 } 3692 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); 3693 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; 3694 3695 return 1; 3696} 3697# endif 3698 3699#endif 3700