s3_srvr.c revision 312826
1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124/* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 152#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 153 154#include <stdio.h> 155#include "ssl_locl.h" 156#include "kssl_lcl.h" 157#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" 158#include <openssl/buffer.h> 159#include <openssl/rand.h> 160#include <openssl/objects.h> 161#include <openssl/evp.h> 162#include <openssl/hmac.h> 163#include <openssl/x509.h> 164#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 165# include <openssl/dh.h> 166#endif 167#include <openssl/bn.h> 168#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 169# include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 170#endif 171#include <openssl/md5.h> 172 173#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD 174static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 175 176static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 177{ 178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 179 return (SSLv3_server_method()); 180 else 181 return (NULL); 182} 183 184IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 185 ssl3_accept, 186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) 187#endif 188#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 189static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) 190{ 191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; 192 193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 194 195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && 196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { 197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { 198 /* 199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp 200 * login name 201 */ 202 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; 203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 204 } else { 205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); 206 } 207 } 208 return ret; 209} 210#endif 211 212int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 213{ 214 BUF_MEM *buf; 215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); 216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 217 int ret = -1; 218 int new_state, state, skip = 0; 219 220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); 221 ERR_clear_error(); 222 clear_sys_error(); 223 224 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 225 cb = s->info_callback; 226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 228 229 /* init things to blank */ 230 s->in_handshake++; 231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) 232 SSL_clear(s); 233 234 if (s->cert == NULL) { 235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 236 return (-1); 237 } 238#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 239 /* 240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and 241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during 242 * handshakes anyway. 243 */ 244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { 245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 246 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 247 } 248#endif 249 250 for (;;) { 251 state = s->state; 252 253 switch (s->state) { 254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 255 s->renegotiate = 1; 256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 257 258 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 259 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 262 263 s->server = 1; 264 if (cb != NULL) 265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); 266 267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { 268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 270 return -1; 271 } 272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 273 274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) { 275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { 276 ret = -1; 277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 278 goto end; 279 } 280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { 281 BUF_MEM_free(buf); 282 ret = -1; 283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 284 goto end; 285 } 286 s->init_buf = buf; 287 } 288 289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { 290 ret = -1; 291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 292 goto end; 293 } 294 295 s->init_num = 0; 296 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; 297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 298 /* 299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. 300 */ 301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; 302 303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { 304 /* 305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the 306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 307 */ 308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { 309 ret = -1; 310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 311 goto end; 312 } 313 314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 315 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 317 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && 318 !(s->options & 319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 320 /* 321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't 322 * support secure renegotiation. 323 */ 324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, 325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 327 ret = -1; 328 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 329 goto end; 330 } else { 331 /* 332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a 333 * HelloRequest 334 */ 335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 337 } 338 break; 339 340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 342 343 s->shutdown = 0; 344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 345 if (ret <= 0) 346 goto end; 347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 349 s->init_num = 0; 350 351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 352 break; 353 354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK; 356 break; 357 358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 361 362 s->shutdown = 0; 363 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 364 if (ret <= 0) 365 goto end; 366#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 367 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D; 368 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D: 369 { 370 int al; 371 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { 372 /* 373 * callback indicates firther work to be done 374 */ 375 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 376 goto end; 377 } 378 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { 379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 380 /* 381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for 382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported. 383 */ 384 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) 385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 386 ret = -1; 387 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 388 goto end; 389 } 390 } 391#endif 392 393 s->renegotiate = 2; 394 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 395 s->init_num = 0; 396 break; 397 398 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 400 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 401 if (ret <= 0) 402 goto end; 403#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 404 if (s->hit) { 405 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 407 else 408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 409 } 410#else 411 if (s->hit) 412 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 413#endif 414 else 415 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 416 s->init_num = 0; 417 break; 418 419 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 421 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 422 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ 423 if (! 424 (s->s3->tmp. 425 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 | 426 SSL_aSRP)) 427&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 428 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 429 if (ret <= 0) 430 goto end; 431#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 432 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 433 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 434 else 435 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 436 } else { 437 skip = 1; 438 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 439 } 440#else 441 } else 442 skip = 1; 443 444 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 445#endif 446 s->init_num = 0; 447 break; 448 449 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 451 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 452 453 /* 454 * clear this, it may get reset by 455 * send_server_key_exchange 456 */ 457 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0; 458 459 /* 460 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a 461 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For 462 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if 463 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, 464 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for 465 * key exchange. 466 */ 467 if (0 468 /* 469 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if 470 * provided 471 */ 472#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 473 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) 474#endif 475#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 476 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ 477 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 478#endif 479 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) 480 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 481 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 482 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 483 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 484 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys 485 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) * 486 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 487 ) 488 ) 489 ) 490 ) { 491 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 492 if (ret <= 0) 493 goto end; 494 } else 495 skip = 1; 496 497 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 498 s->init_num = 0; 499 break; 500 501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 503 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 504 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 505 /* 506 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert 507 * during re-negotiation: 508 */ 509 (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0 && 510 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 511 /* 512 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see 513 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in 514 * RFC 2246): 515 */ 516 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && 517 /* 518 * ... except when the application insists on 519 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts 520 * this for SSL 3) 521 */ 522 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 523 /* 524 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites 525 */ 526 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || 527 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ 528 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) 529 /* 530 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests 531 * are omitted 532 */ 533 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 534 /* no cert request */ 535 skip = 1; 536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; 537 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 538 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 539 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 540 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 541 return -1; 542 } 543 } 544 } else { 545 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; 546 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 547 if (ret <= 0) 548 goto end; 549#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 550 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 551#else 552 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 553 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 554#endif 555 s->init_num = 0; 556 } 557 break; 558 559 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 561 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); 562 if (ret <= 0) 563 goto end; 564 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 565 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 566 s->init_num = 0; 567 break; 568 569 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 570 571 /* 572 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending 573 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as 574 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely 575 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of 576 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush 577 * unconditionally. 578 */ 579 580 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 581 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { 582 ret = -1; 583 goto end; 584 } 585 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 586 587 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; 588 break; 589 590 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 592 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 593 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 594 if (ret <= 0) 595 goto end; 596 } 597 s->init_num = 0; 598 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 599 break; 600 601 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 602 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 603 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 604 if (ret <= 0) 605 goto end; 606 if (ret == 2) { 607 /* 608 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH 609 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is 610 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses 611 * its key from the certificate for key exchange. 612 */ 613#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 614 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 615#else 616 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 617 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 618 else 619 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 620#endif 621 s->init_num = 0; 622 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 623 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 624 s->init_num = 0; 625 if (!s->session->peer) 626 break; 627 /* 628 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and 629 * digest cached records. 630 */ 631 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 633 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 634 return -1; 635 } 636 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 637 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 638 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 639 return -1; 640 } 641 } else { 642 int offset = 0; 643 int dgst_num; 644 645 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 646 s->init_num = 0; 647 648 /* 649 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert, 650 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for 651 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next 652 * step 653 */ 654 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 655 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 656 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 657 return -1; 658 } 659 } 660 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++) 661 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { 662 int dgst_size; 663 664 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, 665 EVP_MD_CTX_type 666 (s-> 667 s3->handshake_dgst 668 [dgst_num]), 669 &(s->s3-> 670 tmp.cert_verify_md 671 [offset])); 672 dgst_size = 673 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); 674 if (dgst_size < 0) { 675 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 676 ret = -1; 677 goto end; 678 } 679 offset += dgst_size; 680 } 681 } 682 break; 683 684 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 685 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 686 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 687 if (ret <= 0) 688 goto end; 689 690#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 691 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 692#else 693 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 694 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 695 else 696 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 697#endif 698 s->init_num = 0; 699 break; 700 701#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 702 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: 703 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: 704 /* 705 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 706 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the 707 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be 708 * cautious. 709 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 710 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 711 * the client's Finished message is read. 712 */ 713 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 714 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 715 716 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s); 717 if (ret <= 0) 718 goto end; 719 s->init_num = 0; 720 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 721 break; 722#endif 723 724 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 725 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 726 /* 727 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has 728 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 729 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. 730 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 731 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 732 * the client's Finished message is read. 733 */ 734 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 735 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 736 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 737 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 738 if (ret <= 0) 739 goto end; 740 if (s->hit) 741 s->state = SSL_ST_OK; 742#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 743 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 744 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 745#endif 746 else 747 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 748 s->init_num = 0; 749 break; 750 751#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 752 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 753 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 754 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 755 if (ret <= 0) 756 goto end; 757 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 758 s->init_num = 0; 759 break; 760 761 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 762 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 763 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 764 if (ret <= 0) 765 goto end; 766 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 767 s->init_num = 0; 768 break; 769 770#endif 771 772 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 773 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 774 775 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 776 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { 777 ret = -1; 778 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 779 goto end; 780 } 781 782 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 783 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, 784 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 785 786 if (ret <= 0) 787 goto end; 788 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 789 s->init_num = 0; 790 791 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 792 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 793 { 794 ret = -1; 795 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 796 goto end; 797 } 798 799 break; 800 801 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 802 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 803 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, 804 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, 805 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 806 s->method-> 807 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 808 s->method-> 809 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 810 if (ret <= 0) 811 goto end; 812 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 813 if (s->hit) { 814#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 815 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 816#else 817 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { 818 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 819 } else 820 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 821#endif 822 } else 823 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; 824 s->init_num = 0; 825 break; 826 827 case SSL_ST_OK: 828 /* clean a few things up */ 829 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 830 831 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 832 s->init_buf = NULL; 833 834 /* remove buffering on output */ 835 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 836 837 s->init_num = 0; 838 839 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a 840 * HelloRequest */ 841 s->renegotiate = 0; 842 s->new_session = 0; 843 844 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 845 846 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 847 /* s->server=1; */ 848 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; 849 850 if (cb != NULL) 851 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); 852 } 853 854 ret = 1; 855 goto end; 856 /* break; */ 857 858 case SSL_ST_ERR: 859 default: 860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 861 ret = -1; 862 goto end; 863 /* break; */ 864 } 865 866 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { 867 if (s->debug) { 868 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 869 goto end; 870 } 871 872 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { 873 new_state = s->state; 874 s->state = state; 875 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); 876 s->state = new_state; 877 } 878 } 879 skip = 0; 880 } 881 end: 882 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 883 884 s->in_handshake--; 885 if (cb != NULL) 886 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); 887 return (ret); 888} 889 890int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 891{ 892 893 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { 894 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0); 895 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 896 } 897 898 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 899 return ssl_do_write(s); 900} 901 902int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 903{ 904 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0; 905 unsigned int cookie_len; 906 long n; 907 unsigned long id; 908 unsigned char *p, *d; 909 SSL_CIPHER *c; 910#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 911 unsigned char *q; 912 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; 913#endif 914 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; 915 916 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet) 917 goto retry_cert; 918 919 /* 920 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are 921 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down 922 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we 923 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. 924 */ 925 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { 926 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 927 } 928 s->first_packet = 1; 929 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 930 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 931 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 932 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 933 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 934 935 if (!ok) 936 return ((int)n); 937 s->first_packet = 0; 938 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 939 940 /* 941 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte 942 * for session id length 943 */ 944 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) { 945 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 947 goto f_err; 948 } 949 950 /* 951 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may 952 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) 953 */ 954 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1]; 955 p += 2; 956 957 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version && 958 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) 959 : (s->client_version < s->version)) { 960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 961 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 962 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { 963 /* 964 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version 965 * number 966 */ 967 s->version = s->client_version; 968 } 969 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 970 goto f_err; 971 } 972 973 /* 974 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just 975 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check 976 * cookie length... 977 */ 978 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 979 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; 980 981 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 982 983 if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 984 >= (unsigned int)((d + n) - p)) { 985 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 987 goto f_err; 988 } 989 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); 990 991 if (cookie_length == 0) 992 return 1; 993 } 994 995 /* load the client random */ 996 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 997 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 998 999 /* get the session-id */ 1000 j = *(p++); 1001 1002 if ((d + n) - p < j) { 1003 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1005 goto f_err; 1006 } 1007 1008 if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) { 1009 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1011 goto f_err; 1012 } 1013 1014 s->hit = 0; 1015 /* 1016 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in 1017 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally 1018 * ignore resumption requests with flag 1019 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather 1020 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this 1021 * for security won't even compile against older library versions). 1022 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to 1023 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains 1024 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the 1025 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored. 1026 */ 1027 if ((s->new_session 1028 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { 1029 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 1030 goto err; 1031 } else { 1032 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 1033 /* 1034 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated 1035 * version. 1036 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption 1037 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but 1038 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. 1039 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and 1040 * will abort the handshake with an error. 1041 */ 1042 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous 1043 * session */ 1044 s->hit = 1; 1045 } else if (i == -1) 1046 goto err; 1047 else { /* i == 0 */ 1048 1049 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 1050 goto err; 1051 } 1052 } 1053 1054 p += j; 1055 1056 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1057 /* cookie stuff */ 1058 if ((d + n) - p < 1) { 1059 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1061 goto f_err; 1062 } 1063 cookie_len = *(p++); 1064 1065 if ((unsigned int)((d + n ) - p) < cookie_len) { 1066 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1068 goto f_err; 1069 } 1070 1071 /* 1072 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 1073 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 1074 * does not cause an overflow. 1075 */ 1076 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) { 1077 /* too much data */ 1078 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1080 goto f_err; 1081 } 1082 1083 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 1084 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) { 1085 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 1086 1087 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { 1088 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 1089 cookie_len) == 0) { 1090 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1092 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1093 goto f_err; 1094 } 1095 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 1096 } 1097 /* default verification */ 1098 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 1099 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { 1100 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1102 goto f_err; 1103 } 1104 cookie_valid = 1; 1105 } 1106 1107 p += cookie_len; 1108 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { 1109 /* Select version to use */ 1110 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION && 1111 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) { 1112 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; 1113 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method(); 1114 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1116 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); 1117 s->version = s->client_version; 1118 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 1119 goto f_err; 1120 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION && 1121 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) { 1122 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; 1123 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method(); 1124 } else { 1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1126 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 1127 s->version = s->client_version; 1128 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 1129 goto f_err; 1130 } 1131 s->session->ssl_version = s->version; 1132 } 1133 } 1134 1135 if ((d + n ) - p < 2) { 1136 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1138 goto f_err; 1139 } 1140 n2s(p, i); 1141 1142 if (i == 0) { 1143 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 1145 goto f_err; 1146 } 1147 1148 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ 1149 if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) { 1150 /* not enough data */ 1151 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1153 goto f_err; 1154 } 1155 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) { 1156 goto err; 1157 } 1158 p += i; 1159 1160 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 1161 if (s->hit) { 1162 j = 0; 1163 id = s->session->cipher->id; 1164 1165#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1166 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", 1167 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); 1168#endif 1169 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 1170 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 1171#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1172 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 1173 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 1174#endif 1175 if (c->id == id) { 1176 j = 1; 1177 break; 1178 } 1179 } 1180 /* 1181 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack: 1182 * CVE-2010-4180. 1183 */ 1184#if 0 1185 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1186 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) { 1187 /* 1188 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used 1189 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead 1190 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't 1191 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the 1192 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though. 1193 */ 1194 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 1195 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { 1196 s->session->cipher = c; 1197 j = 1; 1198 } 1199 } 1200#endif 1201 if (j == 0) { 1202 /* 1203 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked 1204 * to reuse it 1205 */ 1206 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1208 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1209 goto f_err; 1210 } 1211 } 1212 1213 /* compression */ 1214 i = *(p++); 1215 if ((d + n) - p < i) { 1216 /* not enough data */ 1217 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1219 goto f_err; 1220 } 1221#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1222 q = p; 1223#endif 1224 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { 1225 if (p[j] == 0) 1226 break; 1227 } 1228 1229 p += i; 1230 if (j >= i) { 1231 /* no compress */ 1232 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1234 goto f_err; 1235 } 1236#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1237 /* TLS extensions */ 1238 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { 1239 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n)) { 1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1241 goto err; 1242 } 1243 } 1244 1245 /* 1246 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake 1247 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before 1248 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket 1249 * processing to use it in key derivation. 1250 */ 1251 { 1252 unsigned char *pos; 1253 pos = s->s3->server_random; 1254 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { 1255 goto f_err; 1256 } 1257 } 1258 1259 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { 1260 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 1261 1262 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1263 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 1264 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, 1265 &pref_cipher, 1266 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { 1267 s->hit = 1; 1268 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1269 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; 1270 1271 ciphers = NULL; 1272 1273 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1274 pref_cipher = 1275 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, 1276 s-> 1277 session->ciphers, 1278 SSL_get_ciphers 1279 (s)); 1280 if (pref_cipher == NULL) { 1281 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1283 goto f_err; 1284 } 1285 1286 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; 1287 1288 if (s->cipher_list) 1289 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1290 1291 if (s->cipher_list_by_id) 1292 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1293 1294 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1295 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1296 } 1297 } 1298#endif 1299 1300 /* 1301 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1302 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 1303 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. 1304 */ 1305 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; 1306#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1307 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1308 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1309 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1310 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1311 /* Can't disable compression */ 1312 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) { 1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1314 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1315 goto f_err; 1316 } 1317 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1318 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { 1319 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1320 if (comp_id == comp->id) { 1321 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1322 break; 1323 } 1324 } 1325 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { 1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1327 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1328 goto f_err; 1329 } 1330 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 1331 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) { 1332 if (q[m] == comp_id) 1333 break; 1334 } 1335 if (m >= i) { 1336 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1338 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 1339 goto f_err; 1340 } 1341 } else if (s->hit) 1342 comp = NULL; 1343 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { 1344 /* See if we have a match */ 1345 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0; 1346 1347 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1348 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { 1349 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1350 v = comp->id; 1351 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) { 1352 if (v == q[o]) { 1353 done = 1; 1354 break; 1355 } 1356 } 1357 if (done) 1358 break; 1359 } 1360 if (done) 1361 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1362 else 1363 comp = NULL; 1364 } 1365#else 1366 /* 1367 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 1368 * using compression. 1369 */ 1370 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1372 goto f_err; 1373 } 1374#endif 1375 1376 /* 1377 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher 1378 */ 1379 1380 if (!s->hit) { 1381#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1382 s->session->compress_meth = 0; 1383#else 1384 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; 1385#endif 1386 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1387 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1388 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1389 if (ciphers == NULL) { 1390 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1392 goto f_err; 1393 } 1394 ciphers = NULL; 1395 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { 1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1397 goto err; 1398 } 1399 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ 1400 retry_cert: 1401 if (s->cert->cert_cb) { 1402 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); 1403 if (rv == 0) { 1404 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); 1406 goto f_err; 1407 } 1408 if (rv < 0) { 1409 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 1410 return -1; 1411 } 1412 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1413 } 1414 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1415 1416 if (c == NULL) { 1417 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1419 goto f_err; 1420 } 1421 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; 1422 } else { 1423 /* Session-id reuse */ 1424#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1425 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1426 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL; 1427 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL; 1428 1429 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) { 1430 sk = s->session->ciphers; 1431 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { 1432 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); 1433 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) 1434 nc = c; 1435 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1436 ec = c; 1437 } 1438 if (nc != NULL) 1439 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc; 1440 else if (ec != NULL) 1441 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec; 1442 else 1443 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1444 } else 1445#endif 1446 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1447 } 1448 1449 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { 1450 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 1451 goto f_err; 1452 } 1453 1454 /*- 1455 * we now have the following setup. 1456 * client_random 1457 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1458 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1459 * compression - basically ignored right now 1460 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1461 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1462 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1463 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1464 */ 1465 1466 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1467 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { 1468 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) { 1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1470 goto f_err; 1471 } 1472 } 1473 1474 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1; 1475 if (0) { 1476 f_err: 1477 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1478 err: 1479 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1480 } 1481 1482 if (ciphers != NULL) 1483 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1484 return ret; 1485} 1486 1487int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1488{ 1489 unsigned char *buf; 1490 unsigned char *p, *d; 1491 int i, sl; 1492 int al = 0; 1493 unsigned long l; 1494 1495 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { 1496 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1497#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1498 p = s->s3->server_random; 1499 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { 1500 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1501 return -1; 1502 } 1503#endif 1504 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1505 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 1506 1507 *(p++) = s->version >> 8; 1508 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; 1509 1510 /* Random stuff */ 1511 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1512 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1513 1514 /*- 1515 * There are several cases for the session ID to send 1516 * back in the server hello: 1517 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1518 * we send back the old session ID. 1519 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1520 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1521 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1522 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1523 * session ID. 1524 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1525 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1526 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1527 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1528 * to send back. 1529 */ 1530 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1531 && !s->hit) 1532 s->session->session_id_length = 0; 1533 1534 sl = s->session->session_id_length; 1535 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { 1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1537 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1538 return -1; 1539 } 1540 *(p++) = sl; 1541 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); 1542 p += sl; 1543 1544 /* put the cipher */ 1545 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); 1546 p += i; 1547 1548 /* put the compression method */ 1549#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1550 *(p++) = 0; 1551#else 1552 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1553 *(p++) = 0; 1554 else 1555 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1556#endif 1557#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1558 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { 1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 1560 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1561 return -1; 1562 } 1563 if ((p = 1564 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 1565 &al)) == NULL) { 1566 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1568 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1569 return -1; 1570 } 1571#endif 1572 /* do the header */ 1573 l = (p - d); 1574 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l); 1575 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; 1576 } 1577 1578 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1579 return ssl_do_write(s); 1580} 1581 1582int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1583{ 1584 1585 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { 1586 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0); 1587 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1588 } 1589 1590 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1591 return ssl_do_write(s); 1592} 1593 1594int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1595{ 1596#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1597 unsigned char *q; 1598 int j, num; 1599 RSA *rsa; 1600 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1601 unsigned int u; 1602#endif 1603#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1604# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1605 int j; 1606# endif 1607 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; 1608#endif 1609#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1610 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp; 1611 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1612 int encodedlen = 0; 1613 int curve_id = 0; 1614 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1615#endif 1616 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1617 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1618 unsigned char *p, *d; 1619 int al, i; 1620 unsigned long type; 1621 int n; 1622 CERT *cert; 1623 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1624 int nr[4], kn; 1625 BUF_MEM *buf; 1626 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1627 1628 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1629 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { 1630 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1631 cert = s->cert; 1632 1633 buf = s->init_buf; 1634 1635 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; 1636 n = 0; 1637#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1638 if (type & SSL_kRSA) { 1639 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp; 1640 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { 1641 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1642 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1643 tmp.new_cipher), 1644 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> 1645 tmp.new_cipher)); 1646 if (rsa == NULL) { 1647 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1649 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1650 goto f_err; 1651 } 1652 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1653 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa; 1654 } 1655 if (rsa == NULL) { 1656 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1658 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1659 goto f_err; 1660 } 1661 r[0] = rsa->n; 1662 r[1] = rsa->e; 1663 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1; 1664 } else 1665#endif 1666#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1667 if (type & SSL_kEDH) { 1668 dhp = cert->dh_tmp; 1669 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1670 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1671 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1672 tmp.new_cipher), 1673 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> 1674 tmp.new_cipher)); 1675 if (dhp == NULL) { 1676 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1678 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1679 goto f_err; 1680 } 1681 1682 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { 1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1684 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1685 goto err; 1686 } 1687 1688 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { 1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1690 goto err; 1691 } 1692 1693 s->s3->tmp.dh = dh; 1694 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { 1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1696 goto err; 1697 } 1698 r[0] = dh->p; 1699 r[1] = dh->g; 1700 r[2] = dh->pub_key; 1701 } else 1702#endif 1703#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1704 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { 1705 const EC_GROUP *group; 1706 1707 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp; 1708 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { 1709 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ 1710 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2); 1711 if (nid != NID_undef) 1712 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); 1713 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) { 1714 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1715 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1716 tmp.new_cipher), 1717 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s-> 1718 s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1719 } 1720 if (ecdhp == NULL) { 1721 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1723 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1724 goto f_err; 1725 } 1726 1727 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { 1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1729 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1730 goto err; 1731 } 1732 1733 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1734 if (ecdhp == NULL) { 1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1736 goto err; 1737 } 1738 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) 1739 ecdh = ecdhp; 1740 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { 1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1742 goto err; 1743 } 1744 1745 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh; 1746 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1747 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1748 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { 1749 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { 1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1751 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1752 goto err; 1753 } 1754 } 1755 1756 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1757 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1758 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { 1759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1760 goto err; 1761 } 1762 1763 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1764 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { 1765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1766 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1767 goto err; 1768 } 1769 1770 /* 1771 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named 1772 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is 1773 * non-zero. 1774 */ 1775 if ((curve_id = 1776 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1777 == 0) { 1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1779 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1780 goto err; 1781 } 1782 1783 /* 1784 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and 1785 * allocate memory accordingly. 1786 */ 1787 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1788 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1789 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1790 NULL, 0, NULL); 1791 1792 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1793 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char)); 1794 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1795 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { 1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1797 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1798 goto err; 1799 } 1800 1801 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1802 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1803 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1804 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1805 1806 if (encodedlen == 0) { 1807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1808 goto err; 1809 } 1810 1811 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1812 bn_ctx = NULL; 1813 1814 /* 1815 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in 1816 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four 1817 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1818 * structure. 1819 */ 1820 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1821 1822 /* 1823 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we 1824 * can set these to NULLs 1825 */ 1826 r[0] = NULL; 1827 r[1] = NULL; 1828 r[2] = NULL; 1829 r[3] = NULL; 1830 } else 1831#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1832#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1833 if (type & SSL_kPSK) { 1834 /* 1835 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint 1836 */ 1837 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1838 } else 1839#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1840#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1841 if (type & SSL_kSRP) { 1842 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || 1843 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || 1844 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { 1845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1846 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); 1847 goto err; 1848 } 1849 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; 1850 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; 1851 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; 1852 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; 1853 } else 1854#endif 1855 { 1856 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1858 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1859 goto f_err; 1860 } 1861 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 1862 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1863#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1864 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) 1865 n += 1 + nr[i]; 1866 else 1867#endif 1868#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1869 /* 1870 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS 1871 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length 1872 * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here 1873 */ 1874 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kEDH))) 1875 n += 2 + nr[0]; 1876 else 1877#endif 1878 n += 2 + nr[i]; 1879 } 1880 1881 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) 1882 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 1883 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) 1884 == NULL) { 1885 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1886 goto f_err; 1887 } 1888 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1889 /* Allow space for signature algorithm */ 1890 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 1891 kn += 2; 1892 /* Allow space for signature length */ 1893 kn += 2; 1894 } else { 1895 pkey = NULL; 1896 kn = 0; 1897 } 1898 1899 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) { 1900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); 1901 goto err; 1902 } 1903 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 1904 1905 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 1906#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1907 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { 1908 *p = nr[i]; 1909 p++; 1910 } else 1911#endif 1912#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1913 /* 1914 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS 1915 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length 1916 * as the prime 1917 */ 1918 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kEDH))) { 1919 s2n(nr[0], p); 1920 for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) { 1921 *p = 0; 1922 ++p; 1923 } 1924 } else 1925#endif 1926 s2n(nr[i], p); 1927 BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); 1928 p += nr[i]; 1929 } 1930 1931#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1932 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { 1933 /* 1934 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In 1935 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte 1936 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded 1937 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself 1938 */ 1939 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1940 p += 1; 1941 *p = 0; 1942 p += 1; 1943 *p = curve_id; 1944 p += 1; 1945 *p = encodedlen; 1946 p += 1; 1947 memcpy((unsigned char *)p, 1948 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); 1949 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1950 encodedPoint = NULL; 1951 p += encodedlen; 1952 } 1953#endif 1954 1955#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1956 if (type & SSL_kPSK) { 1957 /* copy PSK identity hint */ 1958 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 1959 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, 1960 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); 1961 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1962 } 1963#endif 1964 1965 /* not anonymous */ 1966 if (pkey != NULL) { 1967 /* 1968 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p 1969 * points to the space at the end. 1970 */ 1971#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1972 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1973 q = md_buf; 1974 j = 0; 1975 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { 1976 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, 1977 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 1978 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, 1979 (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 1980 : s->ctx->sha1, 1981 NULL) <= 0 1982 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), 1983 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 1984 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), 1985 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 1986 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 1987 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, 1988 (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) { 1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1990 ERR_LIB_EVP); 1991 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1992 goto f_err; 1993 } 1994 q += i; 1995 j += i; 1996 } 1997 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 1998 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { 1999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA); 2000 goto err; 2001 } 2002 s2n(u, p); 2003 n += u + 2; 2004 } else 2005#endif 2006 if (md) { 2007 /* send signature algorithm */ 2008 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2009 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { 2010 /* Should never happen */ 2011 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2013 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2014 goto f_err; 2015 } 2016 p += 2; 2017 } 2018#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 2019 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 2020#endif 2021 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 2022 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), 2023 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 2024 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), 2025 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 2026 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 2027 || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), 2028 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) { 2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); 2030 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2031 goto f_err; 2032 } 2033 s2n(i, p); 2034 n += i + 2; 2035 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 2036 n += 2; 2037 } else { 2038 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 2039 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2041 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 2042 goto f_err; 2043 } 2044 } 2045 2046 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n); 2047 } 2048 2049 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 2050 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2051 return ssl_do_write(s); 2052 f_err: 2053 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2054 err: 2055#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2056 if (encodedPoint != NULL) 2057 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2058 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2059#endif 2060 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2061 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2062 return (-1); 2063} 2064 2065int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 2066{ 2067 unsigned char *p, *d; 2068 int i, j, nl, off, n; 2069 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; 2070 X509_NAME *name; 2071 BUF_MEM *buf; 2072 2073 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { 2074 buf = s->init_buf; 2075 2076 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 2077 2078 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 2079 p++; 2080 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); 2081 d[0] = n; 2082 p += n; 2083 n++; 2084 2085 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2086 const unsigned char *psigs; 2087 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs); 2088 s2n(nl, p); 2089 memcpy(p, psigs, nl); 2090 p += nl; 2091 n += nl + 2; 2092 } 2093 2094 off = n; 2095 p += 2; 2096 n += 2; 2097 2098 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 2099 nl = 0; 2100 if (sk != NULL) { 2101 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { 2102 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); 2103 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); 2104 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean 2105 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) { 2106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2107 ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2108 goto err; 2109 } 2110 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n; 2111 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { 2112 s2n(j, p); 2113 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); 2114 n += 2 + j; 2115 nl += 2 + j; 2116 } else { 2117 d = p; 2118 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); 2119 j -= 2; 2120 s2n(j, d); 2121 j += 2; 2122 n += j; 2123 nl += j; 2124 } 2125 } 2126 } 2127 /* else no CA names */ 2128 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off; 2129 s2n(nl, p); 2130 2131 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n); 2132 2133#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 2134 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 2135 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) { 2136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2137 goto err; 2138 } 2139 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 2140 /* do the header */ 2141 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 2142 *(p++) = 0; 2143 *(p++) = 0; 2144 *(p++) = 0; 2145 s->init_num += 4; 2146 } 2147#endif 2148 2149 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 2150 } 2151 2152 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 2153 return ssl_do_write(s); 2154 err: 2155 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2156 return (-1); 2157} 2158 2159int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2160{ 2161 int i, al, ok; 2162 long n; 2163 unsigned long alg_k; 2164 unsigned char *p; 2165#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2166 RSA *rsa = NULL; 2167 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2168#endif 2169#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2170 BIGNUM *pub = NULL; 2171 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL; 2172#endif 2173#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2174 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 2175#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2176 2177#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2178 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 2179 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 2180 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 2181 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 2182#endif 2183 2184 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2185 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2186 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 2187 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); 2188 2189 if (!ok) 2190 return ((int)n); 2191 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2192 2193 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2194 2195#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2196 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { 2197 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 2198 int decrypt_len; 2199 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; 2200 size_t j; 2201 2202 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 2203 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) { 2204 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 2205 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp; 2206 /* 2207 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already 2208 */ 2209 if (rsa == NULL) { 2210 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2212 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 2213 goto f_err; 2214 2215 } 2216 } else { 2217 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 2218 if ((pkey == NULL) || 2219 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { 2220 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2222 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2223 goto f_err; 2224 } 2225 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; 2226 } 2227 2228 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ 2229 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 2230 n2s(p, i); 2231 if (n != i + 2) { 2232 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) { 2233 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2235 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2236 goto f_err; 2237 } else 2238 p -= 2; 2239 } else 2240 n = i; 2241 } 2242 2243 /* 2244 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure 2245 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire 2246 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The 2247 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the 2248 * bound is sufficient to be safe. 2249 */ 2250 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2251 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2253 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2254 goto f_err; 2255 } 2256 2257 /* 2258 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of 2259 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, 2260 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and 2261 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt 2262 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 2263 */ 2264 2265 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, 2266 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) 2267 goto err; 2268 decrypt_len = 2269 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 2270 ERR_clear_error(); 2271 2272 /* 2273 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will 2274 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. 2275 */ 2276 decrypt_good = 2277 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 2278 2279 /* 2280 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then 2281 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The 2282 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 2283 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number 2284 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in 2285 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. 2286 */ 2287 version_good = 2288 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); 2289 version_good &= 2290 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); 2291 2292 /* 2293 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2294 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2295 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2296 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 2297 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 2298 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such 2299 * clients. 2300 */ 2301 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { 2302 unsigned char workaround_good; 2303 workaround_good = 2304 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); 2305 workaround_good &= 2306 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); 2307 version_good |= workaround_good; 2308 } 2309 2310 /* 2311 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to 2312 * remain non-zero (0xff). 2313 */ 2314 decrypt_good &= version_good; 2315 2316 /* 2317 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using 2318 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not 2319 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees 2320 * it is still sufficiently large to read from. 2321 */ 2322 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { 2323 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j], 2324 rand_premaster_secret[j]); 2325 } 2326 2327 s->session->master_key_length = 2328 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2329 s-> 2330 session->master_key, 2331 p, 2332 sizeof 2333 (rand_premaster_secret)); 2334 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); 2335 } else 2336#endif 2337#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2338 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { 2339 int idx = -1; 2340 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; 2341 if (n > 1) { 2342 n2s(p, i); 2343 } else { 2344 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { 2345 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2347 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2348 goto f_err; 2349 } 2350 i = 0; 2351 } 2352 if (n && n != i + 2) { 2353 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) { 2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2355 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2356 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2357 goto f_err; 2358 } else { 2359 p -= 2; 2360 i = (int)n; 2361 } 2362 } 2363 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr) 2364 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; 2365 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd) 2366 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; 2367 if (idx >= 0) { 2368 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey; 2369 if ((skey == NULL) || 2370 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) { 2371 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2373 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2374 goto f_err; 2375 } 2376 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh; 2377 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) { 2378 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2380 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2381 goto f_err; 2382 } else 2383 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh; 2384 2385 if (n == 0L) { 2386 /* Get pubkey from cert */ 2387 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2388 if (clkey) { 2389 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1) 2390 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey); 2391 } 2392 if (dh_clnt == NULL) { 2393 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2395 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2396 goto f_err; 2397 } 2398 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey); 2399 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key; 2400 } else 2401 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL); 2402 if (pub == NULL) { 2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); 2404 goto err; 2405 } 2406 2407 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr); 2408 2409 if (i <= 0) { 2410 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 2412 BN_clear_free(pub); 2413 goto f_err; 2414 } 2415 2416 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 2417 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 2418 if (dh_clnt) 2419 DH_free(dh_clnt); 2420 else 2421 BN_clear_free(pub); 2422 pub = NULL; 2423 s->session->master_key_length = 2424 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2425 s-> 2426 session->master_key, 2427 p, i); 2428 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2429 if (dh_clnt) 2430 return 2; 2431 } else 2432#endif 2433#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2434 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { 2435 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 2436 krb5_data enc_ticket; 2437 krb5_data authenticator; 2438 krb5_data enc_pms; 2439 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 2440 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 2441 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 2442 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2443 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 2444 int padl, outl; 2445 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 2446 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 2447 int kerr = 0; 2448 2449 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 2450 2451 if (!kssl_ctx) 2452 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 2453 2454 n2s(p, i); 2455 enc_ticket.length = i; 2456 2457 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) { 2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2459 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2460 goto err; 2461 } 2462 2463 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 2464 p += enc_ticket.length; 2465 2466 n2s(p, i); 2467 authenticator.length = i; 2468 2469 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) { 2470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2471 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2472 goto err; 2473 } 2474 2475 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 2476 p += authenticator.length; 2477 2478 n2s(p, i); 2479 enc_pms.length = i; 2480 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 2481 p += enc_pms.length; 2482 2483 /* 2484 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption 2485 */ 2486 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) { 2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2488 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2489 goto err; 2490 } 2491 2492 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 2493 enc_pms.length + 6)) { 2494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2495 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2496 goto err; 2497 } 2498 2499 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2500 &kssl_err)) != 0) { 2501# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2502 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2503 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2504 if (kssl_err.text) 2505 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2506# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); 2508 goto err; 2509 } 2510 2511 /* 2512 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will 2513 * return authtime == 0. 2514 */ 2515 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2516 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) { 2517# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2518 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2519 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2520 if (kssl_err.text) 2521 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2522# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); 2524 goto err; 2525 } 2526 2527 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) { 2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2529 goto err; 2530 } 2531# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2532 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2533# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2534 2535 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2536 if (enc == NULL) 2537 goto err; 2538 2539 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2540 2541 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) { 2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2543 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2544 goto err; 2545 } 2546 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl, 2547 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2548 { 2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2550 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2551 kerr = 1; 2552 goto kclean; 2553 } 2554 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2556 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2557 kerr = 1; 2558 goto kclean; 2559 } 2560 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) { 2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2562 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2563 kerr = 1; 2564 goto kclean; 2565 } 2566 outl += padl; 2567 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2569 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2570 kerr = 1; 2571 goto kclean; 2572 } 2573 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) 2574 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { 2575 /* 2576 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as 2577 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, 2578 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH 2579 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random 2580 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If 2581 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2582 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos 2583 * cipher) 2584 */ 2585 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { 2586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2587 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2588 kerr = 1; 2589 goto kclean; 2590 } 2591 } 2592 2593 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2594 2595 s->session->master_key_length = 2596 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2597 s-> 2598 session->master_key, 2599 pms, outl); 2600 2601 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) { 2602 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2603 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) { 2604 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2605 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ, 2606 len); 2607 } 2608 } 2609 2610 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2611 * but it caused problems for apache. 2612 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2613 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2614 */ 2615 2616 kclean: 2617 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms)); 2618 if (kerr) 2619 goto err; 2620 } else 2621#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2622 2623#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2624 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { 2625 int ret = 1; 2626 int field_size = 0; 2627 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2628 const EC_GROUP *group; 2629 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2630 2631 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2632 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { 2633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2634 goto err; 2635 } 2636 2637 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2638 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { 2639 /* use the certificate */ 2640 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2641 } else { 2642 /* 2643 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the 2644 * ServerKeyExchange msg. 2645 */ 2646 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2647 } 2648 2649 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2650 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2651 2652 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2653 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { 2654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2655 goto err; 2656 } 2657 2658 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2659 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { 2660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2661 goto err; 2662 } 2663 2664 if (n == 0L) { 2665 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2666 2667 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { 2668 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2670 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2671 goto f_err; 2672 } 2673 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2674 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { 2675 /* 2676 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication 2677 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the 2678 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we 2679 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is 2680 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly 2681 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group. 2682 */ 2683 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2685 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2686 goto f_err; 2687 } 2688 2689 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2690 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey-> 2691 pkey.ec)) == 0) { 2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2693 goto err; 2694 } 2695 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2696 } else { 2697 /* 2698 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the 2699 * ClientKeyExchange message. 2700 */ 2701 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { 2702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2703 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2704 goto err; 2705 } 2706 2707 /* Get encoded point length */ 2708 i = *p; 2709 p += 1; 2710 if (n != 1 + i) { 2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2712 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2713 goto f_err; 2714 } 2715 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { 2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2717 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2718 goto f_err; 2719 } 2720 /* 2721 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it 2722 * to the start 2723 */ 2724 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2725 } 2726 2727 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2728 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2729 if (field_size <= 0) { 2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2731 goto err; 2732 } 2733 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, 2734 NULL); 2735 if (i <= 0) { 2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2737 goto err; 2738 } 2739 2740 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2741 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2742 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2743 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2744 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 2745 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 2746 2747 /* Compute the master secret */ 2748 s->session->master_key_length = 2749 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2750 s-> 2751 session->master_key, 2752 p, i); 2753 2754 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2755 return (ret); 2756 } else 2757#endif 2758#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2759 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { 2760 unsigned char *t = NULL; 2761 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4]; 2762 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; 2763 int psk_err = 1; 2764 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; 2765 2766 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2767 2768 n2s(p, i); 2769 if (n != i + 2) { 2770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2771 goto psk_err; 2772 } 2773 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 2774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2775 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2776 goto psk_err; 2777 } 2778 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { 2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2780 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2781 goto psk_err; 2782 } 2783 2784 /* 2785 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback 2786 */ 2787 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); 2788 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i); 2789 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, 2790 psk_or_pre_ms, 2791 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2792 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1); 2793 2794 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { 2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2796 goto psk_err; 2797 } else if (psk_len == 0) { 2798 /* 2799 * PSK related to the given identity not found 2800 */ 2801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2802 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2803 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 2804 goto psk_err; 2805 } 2806 2807 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ 2808 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len; 2809 t = psk_or_pre_ms; 2810 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); 2811 s2n(psk_len, t); 2812 memset(t, 0, psk_len); 2813 t += psk_len; 2814 s2n(psk_len, t); 2815 2816 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) 2817 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); 2818 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i); 2819 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { 2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2821 goto psk_err; 2822 } 2823 2824 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) 2825 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); 2826 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 2827 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && 2828 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { 2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2830 goto psk_err; 2831 } 2832 2833 s->session->master_key_length = 2834 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2835 s-> 2836 session->master_key, 2837 psk_or_pre_ms, 2838 pre_ms_len); 2839 psk_err = 0; 2840 psk_err: 2841 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2842 if (psk_err != 0) 2843 goto f_err; 2844 } else 2845#endif 2846#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2847 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { 2848 int param_len; 2849 2850 n2s(p, i); 2851 param_len = i + 2; 2852 if (param_len > n) { 2853 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2855 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); 2856 goto f_err; 2857 } 2858 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { 2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2860 goto err; 2861 } 2862 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 2863 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { 2864 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2866 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); 2867 goto f_err; 2868 } 2869 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) 2870 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 2871 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 2872 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { 2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2874 goto err; 2875 } 2876 2877 if ((s->session->master_key_length = 2878 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s, 2879 s->session->master_key)) < 0) { 2880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2881 goto err; 2882 } 2883 2884 p += i; 2885 } else 2886#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ 2887 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 2888 int ret = 0; 2889 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 2890 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 2891 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; 2892 size_t outlen = 32, inlen; 2893 unsigned long alg_a; 2894 int Ttag, Tclass; 2895 long Tlen; 2896 2897 /* Get our certificate private key */ 2898 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2899 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 2900 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; 2901 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 2902 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 2903 2904 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); 2905 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { 2906 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2908 goto f_err; 2909 } 2910 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { 2911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2912 goto gerr; 2913 } 2914 /* 2915 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 2916 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 2917 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a 2918 * client certificate for authorization only. 2919 */ 2920 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2921 if (client_pub_pkey) { 2922 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2923 ERR_clear_error(); 2924 } 2925 /* Decrypt session key */ 2926 if (ASN1_get_object 2927 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, 2928 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE 2929 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { 2930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2931 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2932 goto gerr; 2933 } 2934 start = p; 2935 inlen = Tlen; 2936 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt 2937 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { 2938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2939 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2940 goto gerr; 2941 } 2942 /* Generate master secret */ 2943 s->session->master_key_length = 2944 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2945 s-> 2946 session->master_key, 2947 premaster_secret, 32); 2948 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret)); 2949 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2950 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl 2951 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2952 ret = 2; 2953 else 2954 ret = 1; 2955 gerr: 2956 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2957 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2958 if (ret) 2959 return ret; 2960 else 2961 goto err; 2962 } else { 2963 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2965 goto f_err; 2966 } 2967 2968 return (1); 2969 f_err: 2970 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2971#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) 2972 err: 2973#endif 2974#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2975 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2976 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2977 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2978 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2979 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2980#endif 2981 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2982 return (-1); 2983} 2984 2985int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2986{ 2987 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2988 unsigned char *p; 2989 int al, ok, ret = 0; 2990 long n; 2991 int type = 0, i, j; 2992 X509 *peer; 2993 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2994 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 2995 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 2996 2997 /* 2998 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received 2999 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non 3000 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even 3001 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static 3002 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the 3003 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here. 3004 */ 3005 if (s->session->peer == NULL) { 3006 ret = 1; 3007 goto end; 3008 } 3009 3010 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3011 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 3012 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 3013 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, 3014 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 3015 3016 if (!ok) 3017 return ((int)n); 3018 3019 peer = s->session->peer; 3020 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); 3021 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); 3022 3023 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { 3024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3025 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 3026 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 3027 goto f_err; 3028 } 3029 3030 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 3031 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3032 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ 3033 /* 3034 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without 3035 * length field 3036 */ 3037 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 3038 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) { 3039 i = 64; 3040 } else { 3041 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 3042 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey); 3043 if (rv == -1) { 3044 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3045 goto f_err; 3046 } else if (rv == 0) { 3047 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3048 goto f_err; 3049 } 3050#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3051 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 3052#endif 3053 p += 2; 3054 n -= 2; 3055 } 3056 n2s(p, i); 3057 n -= 2; 3058 if (i > n) { 3059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3060 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3061 goto f_err; 3062 } 3063 } 3064 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 3065 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { 3066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 3067 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3068 goto f_err; 3069 } 3070 3071 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 3072 long hdatalen = 0; 3073 void *hdata; 3074 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 3075 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3077 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3078 goto f_err; 3079 } 3080#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3081 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", 3082 EVP_MD_name(md)); 3083#endif 3084 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) 3085 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { 3086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3087 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3088 goto f_err; 3089 } 3090 3091 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) { 3092 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 3094 goto f_err; 3095 } 3096 } else 3097#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3098 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { 3099 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3100 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 3101 pkey->pkey.rsa); 3102 if (i < 0) { 3103 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 3105 goto f_err; 3106 } 3107 if (i == 0) { 3108 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 3110 goto f_err; 3111 } 3112 } else 3113#endif 3114#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3115 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { 3116 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3117 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3118 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa); 3119 if (j <= 0) { 3120 /* bad signature */ 3121 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 3123 goto f_err; 3124 } 3125 } else 3126#endif 3127#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3128 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 3129 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3130 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3131 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec); 3132 if (j <= 0) { 3133 /* bad signature */ 3134 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3136 goto f_err; 3137 } 3138 } else 3139#endif 3140 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 3141 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { 3142 unsigned char signature[64]; 3143 int idx; 3144 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); 3145 if (pctx == NULL) { 3146 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3148 goto f_err; 3149 } 3150 if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) { 3151 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3152 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3154 goto f_err; 3155 } 3156 if (i != 64) { 3157 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i); 3158 } 3159 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) { 3160 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx]; 3161 } 3162 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3163 32); 3164 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3165 if (j <= 0) { 3166 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3168 goto f_err; 3169 } 3170 } else { 3171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3172 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 3173 goto f_err; 3174 } 3175 3176 ret = 1; 3177 if (0) { 3178 f_err: 3179 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3180 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3181 } 3182 end: 3183 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 3184 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); 3185 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; 3186 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 3187 } 3188 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 3189 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 3190 return (ret); 3191} 3192 3193int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 3194{ 3195 int i, ok, al, ret = -1; 3196 X509 *x = NULL; 3197 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n; 3198 const unsigned char *p, *q; 3199 unsigned char *d; 3200 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 3201 3202 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3203 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 3204 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 3205 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); 3206 3207 if (!ok) 3208 return ((int)n); 3209 3210 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 3211 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3212 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3214 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3215 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3216 goto f_err; 3217 } 3218 /* 3219 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list 3220 */ 3221 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 3222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3223 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 3224 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3225 goto f_err; 3226 } 3227 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 3228 return (1); 3229 } 3230 3231 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 3232 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 3234 goto f_err; 3235 } 3236 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3237 3238 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3240 goto err; 3241 } 3242 3243 n2l3(p, llen); 3244 if (llen + 3 != n) { 3245 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3247 goto f_err; 3248 } 3249 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) { 3250 if (nc + 3 > llen) { 3251 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3253 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3254 goto f_err; 3255 } 3256 n2l3(p, l); 3257 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) { 3258 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3260 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3261 goto f_err; 3262 } 3263 3264 q = p; 3265 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l); 3266 if (x == NULL) { 3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 3268 goto err; 3269 } 3270 if (p != (q + l)) { 3271 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3273 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3274 goto f_err; 3275 } 3276 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3278 goto err; 3279 } 3280 x = NULL; 3281 nc += l + 3; 3282 } 3283 3284 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { 3285 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 3286 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 3287 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3289 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 3290 goto f_err; 3291 } 3292 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 3293 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3294 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3296 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3297 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3298 goto f_err; 3299 } 3300 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 3301 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 3302 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3303 goto f_err; 3304 } 3305 } else { 3306 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 3307 if (i <= 0) { 3308 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 3309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3310 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); 3311 goto f_err; 3312 } 3313 } 3314 3315 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 3316 X509_free(s->session->peer); 3317 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); 3318 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 3319 3320 /* 3321 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we 3322 * arrive here. 3323 */ 3324 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { 3325 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 3326 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { 3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3328 goto err; 3329 } 3330 } 3331 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 3332 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 3333 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; 3334 /* 3335 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own 3336 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c 3337 */ 3338 3339 sk = NULL; 3340 3341 ret = 1; 3342 if (0) { 3343 f_err: 3344 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3345 err: 3346 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3347 } 3348 3349 if (x != NULL) 3350 X509_free(x); 3351 if (sk != NULL) 3352 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 3353 return (ret); 3354} 3355 3356int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 3357{ 3358 CERT_PKEY *cpk; 3359 3360 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { 3361 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); 3362 if (cpk == NULL) { 3363 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 3364 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || 3365 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) { 3366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 3367 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3368 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3369 return (0); 3370 } 3371 } 3372 3373 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) { 3374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3375 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3376 return (0); 3377 } 3378 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 3379 } 3380 3381 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 3382 return ssl_do_write(s); 3383} 3384 3385#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 3386/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 3387int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 3388{ 3389 unsigned char *senc = NULL; 3390 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3391 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3392 3393 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { 3394 unsigned char *p, *macstart; 3395 const unsigned char *const_p; 3396 int len, slen_full, slen; 3397 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3398 unsigned int hlen; 3399 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3400 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3401 unsigned char key_name[16]; 3402 3403 /* get session encoding length */ 3404 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3405 /* 3406 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too 3407 * long 3408 */ 3409 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { 3410 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3411 return -1; 3412 } 3413 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); 3414 if (!senc) { 3415 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3416 return -1; 3417 } 3418 3419 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3420 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3421 3422 p = senc; 3423 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) 3424 goto err; 3425 3426 /* 3427 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up 3428 */ 3429 const_p = senc; 3430 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 3431 if (sess == NULL) 3432 goto err; 3433 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ 3434 3435 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 3436 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ 3437 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3438 goto err; 3439 } 3440 p = senc; 3441 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { 3442 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3443 goto err; 3444 } 3445 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3446 3447 /*- 3448 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3449 * follows handshake_header_length + 3450 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 3451 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 3452 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 3453 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 3454 */ 3455 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 3456 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + 3457 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 3458 goto err; 3459 3460 p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 3461 /* 3462 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does 3463 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. 3464 */ 3465 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 3466 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 3467 &hctx, 1) < 0) 3468 goto err; 3469 } else { 3470 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0) 3471 goto err; 3472 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3473 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) 3474 goto err; 3475 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3476 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL)) 3477 goto err; 3478 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 3479 } 3480 3481 /* 3482 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified 3483 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for 3484 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. 3485 */ 3486 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); 3487 3488 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 3489 p += 2; 3490 /* Output key name */ 3491 macstart = p; 3492 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 3493 p += 16; 3494 /* output IV */ 3495 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 3496 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3497 /* Encrypt session data */ 3498 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) 3499 goto err; 3500 p += len; 3501 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len)) 3502 goto err; 3503 p += len; 3504 3505 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) 3506 goto err; 3507 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) 3508 goto err; 3509 3510 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3511 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3512 3513 p += hlen; 3514 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 3515 /* Total length */ 3516 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s); 3517 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */ 3518 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4; 3519 s2n(len - 6, p); 3520 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len); 3521 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 3522 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3523 } 3524 3525 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 3526 return ssl_do_write(s); 3527 err: 3528 if (senc) 3529 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3530 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3531 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3532 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3533 return -1; 3534} 3535 3536int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 3537{ 3538 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { 3539 unsigned char *p; 3540 size_t msglen; 3541 3542 /*- 3543 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3544 * follows handshake_header_length + 3545 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 3546 * + (ocsp response) 3547 */ 3548 msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 3549 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen)) { 3550 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3551 return -1; 3552 } 3553 3554 p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 3555 3556 /* status type */ 3557 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; 3558 /* length of OCSP response */ 3559 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 3560 /* actual response */ 3561 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 3562 3563 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen); 3564 } 3565 3566 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 3567 return (ssl_do_write(s)); 3568} 3569 3570# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 3571/* 3572 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. 3573 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found 3574 */ 3575int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) 3576{ 3577 int ok; 3578 int proto_len, padding_len; 3579 long n; 3580 const unsigned char *p; 3581 3582 /* 3583 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the 3584 * extension in their ClientHello 3585 */ 3586 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { 3587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, 3588 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); 3589 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3590 return -1; 3591 } 3592 3593 /* See the payload format below */ 3594 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3595 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, 3596 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, 3597 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok); 3598 3599 if (!ok) 3600 return ((int)n); 3601 3602 /* 3603 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in 3604 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by 3605 * ssl3_get_finished). 3606 */ 3607 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { 3608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); 3609 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3610 return -1; 3611 } 3612 3613 if (n < 2) { 3614 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3615 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ 3616 } 3617 3618 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3619 3620 /*- 3621 * The payload looks like: 3622 * uint8 proto_len; 3623 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 3624 * uint8 padding_len; 3625 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 3626 */ 3627 proto_len = p[0]; 3628 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) { 3629 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3630 return 0; 3631 } 3632 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; 3633 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) { 3634 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3635 return 0; 3636 } 3637 3638 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); 3639 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { 3640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3641 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3642 return 0; 3643 } 3644 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); 3645 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; 3646 3647 return 1; 3648} 3649# endif 3650 3651#endif 3652