s3_pkt.c revision 306195
1/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112#include <stdio.h> 113#include <limits.h> 114#include <errno.h> 115#define USE_SOCKETS 116#include "ssl_locl.h" 117#include <openssl/evp.h> 118#include <openssl/buffer.h> 119#include <openssl/rand.h> 120 121#ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 122# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 123#endif 124 125#if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \ 126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \ 127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ 128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \ 129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \ 130 ) 131# undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 132# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 133#endif 134 135static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 136 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); 137static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); 138 139int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) 140{ 141 /* 142 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase 143 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of 144 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If 145 * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus 146 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) 147 */ 148 int i, len, left; 149 long align = 0; 150 unsigned char *pkt; 151 SSL3_BUFFER *rb; 152 153 if (n <= 0) 154 return n; 155 156 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf); 157 if (rb->buf == NULL) 158 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) 159 return -1; 160 161 left = rb->left; 162#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 163 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 164 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); 165#endif 166 167 if (!extend) { 168 /* start with empty packet ... */ 169 if (left == 0) 170 rb->offset = align; 171 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { 172 /* 173 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload 174 * alignment... 175 */ 176 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; 177 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA 178 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) { 179 /* 180 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field 181 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about 182 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no 183 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer 184 * overrun can be triggered. 185 */ 186 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); 187 rb->offset = align; 188 } 189 } 190 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; 191 s->packet_length = 0; 192 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ 193 } 194 195 /* 196 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read 197 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into 198 * the buffer). 199 */ 200 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 201 if (left == 0 && extend) 202 return 0; 203 if (left > 0 && n > left) 204 n = left; 205 } 206 207 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ 208 if (left >= n) { 209 s->packet_length += n; 210 rb->left = left - n; 211 rb->offset += n; 212 return (n); 213 } 214 215 /* else we need to read more data */ 216 217 len = s->packet_length; 218 pkt = rb->buf + align; 219 /* 220 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already 221 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end 222 */ 223 if (s->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */ 224 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left); 225 s->packet = pkt; 226 rb->offset = len + align; 227 } 228 229 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */ 230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 231 return -1; 232 } 233 234 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */ 235 if (!s->read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 236 /* ignore max parameter */ 237 max = n; 238 else { 239 if (max < n) 240 max = n; 241 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) 242 max = rb->len - rb->offset; 243 } 244 245 while (left < n) { 246 /* 247 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and 248 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if 249 * possible) 250 */ 251 252 clear_sys_error(); 253 if (s->rbio != NULL) { 254 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 255 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); 256 } else { 257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); 258 i = -1; 259 } 260 261 if (i <= 0) { 262 rb->left = left; 263 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 264 if (len + left == 0) 265 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 266 return (i); 267 } 268 left += i; 269 /* 270 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the 271 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to 272 * byte oriented as in the TLS case. 273 */ 274 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 275 if (n > left) 276 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ 277 } 278 } 279 280 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ 281 rb->offset += n; 282 rb->left = left - n; 283 s->packet_length += n; 284 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 285 return (n); 286} 287 288/* 289 * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that 290 * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an 291 * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and 292 * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever. 293 */ 294#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 295 296/*- 297 * Call this to get a new input record. 298 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error 299 * or non-blocking IO. 300 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in 301 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record 302 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data 303 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes 304 */ 305/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ 306static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) 307{ 308 int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al; 309 int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1; 310 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 311 SSL_SESSION *sess; 312 unsigned char *p; 313 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 314 short version; 315 unsigned mac_size, orig_len; 316 size_t extra; 317 unsigned empty_record_count = 0; 318 319 rr = &(s->s3->rrec); 320 sess = s->session; 321 322 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) 323 extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; 324 else 325 extra = 0; 326 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) { 327 /* 328 * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after 329 * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done 330 */ 331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 332 return -1; 333 } 334 335 again: 336 /* check if we have the header */ 337 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || 338 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { 339 n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); 340 if (n <= 0) 341 return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ 342 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; 343 344 p = s->packet; 345 if (s->msg_callback) 346 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, 347 s->msg_callback_arg); 348 349 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ 350 rr->type = *(p++); 351 ssl_major = *(p++); 352 ssl_minor = *(p++); 353 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; 354 n2s(p, rr->length); 355#if 0 356 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); 357#endif 358 359 /* Lets check version */ 360 if (!s->first_packet) { 361 if (version != s->version) { 362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 363 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) 364 && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { 365 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { 366 /* 367 * The record is using an incorrect version number, but 368 * what we've got appears to be an alert. We haven't 369 * read the body yet to check whether its a fatal or 370 * not - but chances are it is. We probably shouldn't 371 * send a fatal alert back. We'll just end. 372 */ 373 goto err; 374 } 375 /* 376 * Send back error using their minor version number :-) 377 */ 378 s->version = (unsigned short)version; 379 } 380 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 381 goto f_err; 382 } 383 } 384 385 if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { 386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 387 goto err; 388 } 389 390 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { 391 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 393 goto f_err; 394 } 395 396 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ 397 } 398 399 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ 400 401 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { 402 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ 403 i = rr->length; 404 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1); 405 if (n <= 0) 406 return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */ 407 /* 408 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 409 * + rr->length 410 */ 411 } 412 413 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ 414 415 /* 416 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, 417 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet 418 */ 419 rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); 420 421 /* 422 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points 423 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either 424 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into 425 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer 426 */ 427 428 /* 429 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length 430 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. 431 */ 432 433 /* check is not needed I believe */ 434 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) { 435 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 437 goto f_err; 438 } 439 440 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ 441 rr->data = rr->input; 442 443 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); 444 /*- 445 * enc_err is: 446 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. 447 * 1: if the padding is valid 448 * -1: if the padding is invalid 449 */ 450 if (enc_err == 0) { 451 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; 452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); 453 goto f_err; 454 } 455#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 456 printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); 457 { 458 unsigned int z; 459 for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) 460 printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); 461 } 462 printf("\n"); 463#endif 464 465 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ 466 if ((sess != NULL) && 467 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { 468 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ 469 unsigned char *mac = NULL; 470 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 471 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 472 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); 473 474 /* 475 * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type 476 */ 477 orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8); 478 479 /* 480 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was 481 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, 482 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount 483 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. 484 */ 485 if (orig_len < mac_size || 486 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ 487 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && 488 orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { 489 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 491 goto f_err; 492 } 493 494 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { 495 /* 496 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be 497 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in 498 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the 499 * contents of the padding bytes. 500 */ 501 mac = mac_tmp; 502 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); 503 rr->length -= mac_size; 504 } else { 505 /* 506 * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals 507 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for 508 * |mac_size| above. 509 */ 510 rr->length -= mac_size; 511 mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; 512 } 513 514 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); 515 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL 516 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) 517 enc_err = -1; 518 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size) 519 enc_err = -1; 520 } 521 522 if (enc_err < 0) { 523 /* 524 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, 525 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption 526 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should 527 * not reveal which kind of error occured -- this might become 528 * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) 529 */ 530 al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; 531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, 532 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 533 goto f_err; 534 } 535 536 /* r->length is now just compressed */ 537 if (s->expand != NULL) { 538 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) { 539 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 541 goto f_err; 542 } 543 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { 544 al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; 545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); 546 goto f_err; 547 } 548 } 549 550 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) { 551 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 553 goto f_err; 554 } 555 556 rr->off = 0; 557 /*- 558 * So at this point the following is true 559 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record 560 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record 561 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte 562 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment 563 * after use :-). 564 */ 565 566 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ 567 s->packet_length = 0; 568 569 /* just read a 0 length packet */ 570 if (rr->length == 0) { 571 empty_record_count++; 572 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { 573 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); 575 goto f_err; 576 } 577 goto again; 578 } 579#if 0 580 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, 581 rr->length); 582#endif 583 584 return (1); 585 586 f_err: 587 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 588 err: 589 return (ret); 590} 591 592int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) 593{ 594#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 595 int i; 596 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 597 598 rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec); 599 i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, 600 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, 601 (int)rr->length); 602 if (i < 0) 603 return (0); 604 else 605 rr->length = i; 606 rr->data = rr->comp; 607#endif 608 return (1); 609} 610 611int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) 612{ 613#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 614 int i; 615 SSL3_RECORD *wr; 616 617 wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec); 618 i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, 619 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, 620 wr->input, (int)wr->length); 621 if (i < 0) 622 return (0); 623 else 624 wr->length = i; 625 626 wr->input = wr->data; 627#endif 628 return (1); 629} 630 631/* 632 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if 633 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. 634 */ 635int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) 636{ 637 const unsigned char *buf = buf_; 638 int tot; 639 unsigned int n, nw; 640#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 641 unsigned int max_send_fragment; 642#endif 643 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); 644 int i; 645 646 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 647 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); 648 tot = s->s3->wnum; 649 s->s3->wnum = 0; 650 651 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) { 652 i = s->handshake_func(s); 653 if (i < 0) 654 return (i); 655 if (i == 0) { 656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 657 return -1; 658 } 659 } 660 661 /* 662 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out 663 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for 664 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for 665 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be 666 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then 667 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and 668 * report the error in a way the user will notice 669 */ 670 if (len < tot) { 671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 672 return (-1); 673 } 674 675 /* 676 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This 677 * will happen with non blocking IO 678 */ 679 if (wb->left != 0) { 680 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->s3->wpend_tot); 681 if (i <= 0) { 682 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ 683 s->s3->wnum = tot; 684 return i; 685 } 686 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */ 687 } 688#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 689 /* 690 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times* 691 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate 692 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the 693 * compromise is considered worthy. 694 */ 695 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 696 len >= 4 * (int)(max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) && 697 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL && 698 SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && 699 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & 700 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) { 701 unsigned char aad[13]; 702 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; 703 int packlen; 704 705 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */ 706 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0) 707 max_send_fragment -= 512; 708 709 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */ 710 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 711 712 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 713 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE, 714 max_send_fragment, NULL); 715 716 if (len >= 8 * (int)max_send_fragment) 717 packlen *= 8; 718 else 719 packlen *= 4; 720 721 wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen); 722 if (!wb->buf) { 723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 724 return -1; 725 } 726 wb->len = packlen; 727 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */ 728 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ 729 wb->buf = NULL; 730 return tot; 731 } 732 733 n = (len - tot); 734 for (;;) { 735 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) { 736 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ 737 wb->buf = NULL; 738 break; 739 } 740 741 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { 742 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 743 if (i <= 0) { 744 s->s3->wnum = tot; 745 return i; 746 } 747 } 748 749 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment) 750 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8); 751 else 752 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4); 753 754 memcpy(aad, s->s3->write_sequence, 8); 755 aad[8] = type; 756 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 757 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 758 aad[11] = 0; 759 aad[12] = 0; 760 mb_param.out = NULL; 761 mb_param.inp = aad; 762 mb_param.len = nw; 763 764 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 765 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, 766 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); 767 768 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */ 769 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ 770 wb->buf = NULL; 771 break; 772 } 773 774 mb_param.out = wb->buf; 775 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot]; 776 mb_param.len = nw; 777 778 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 779 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, 780 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0) 781 return -1; 782 783 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave; 784 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) { 785 int j = 6; 786 while (j >= 0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ; 787 } 788 789 wb->offset = 0; 790 wb->left = packlen; 791 792 s->s3->wpend_tot = nw; 793 s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot]; 794 s->s3->wpend_type = type; 795 s->s3->wpend_ret = nw; 796 797 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw); 798 if (i <= 0) { 799 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) { 800 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); 801 wb->buf = NULL; 802 } 803 s->s3->wnum = tot; 804 return i; 805 } 806 if (i == (int)n) { 807 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ 808 wb->buf = NULL; 809 return tot + i; 810 } 811 n -= i; 812 tot += i; 813 } 814 } else 815#endif 816 if (tot == len) { /* done? */ 817 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 818 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 819 820 return tot; 821 } 822 823 n = (len - tot); 824 for (;;) { 825 if (n > s->max_send_fragment) 826 nw = s->max_send_fragment; 827 else 828 nw = n; 829 830 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); 831 if (i <= 0) { 832 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ 833 s->s3->wnum = tot; 834 return i; 835 } 836 837 if ((i == (int)n) || 838 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 839 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { 840 /* 841 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment 842 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: 843 */ 844 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; 845 846 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && 847 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 848 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 849 850 return tot + i; 851 } 852 853 n -= i; 854 tot += i; 855 } 856} 857 858static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 859 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) 860{ 861 unsigned char *p, *plen; 862 int i, mac_size, clear = 0; 863 int prefix_len = 0; 864 int eivlen; 865 long align = 0; 866 SSL3_RECORD *wr; 867 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); 868 SSL_SESSION *sess; 869 870 /* 871 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This 872 * will happen with non blocking IO 873 */ 874 if (wb->left != 0) 875 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); 876 877 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ 878 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { 879 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 880 if (i <= 0) 881 return (i); 882 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ 883 } 884 885 if (wb->buf == NULL) 886 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) 887 return -1; 888 889 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) 890 return 0; 891 892 wr = &(s->s3->wrec); 893 sess = s->session; 894 895 if ((sess == NULL) || 896 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || 897 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { 898#if 1 899 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ 900#else 901 clear = 1; 902#endif 903 mac_size = 0; 904 } else { 905 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); 906 if (mac_size < 0) 907 goto err; 908 } 909 910 /* 911 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself 912 */ 913 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { 914 /* 915 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see 916 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 917 */ 918 919 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { 920 /* 921 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this 922 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these 923 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual 924 * payload) 925 */ 926 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); 927 if (prefix_len <= 0) 928 goto err; 929 930 if (prefix_len > 931 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) 932 { 933 /* insufficient space */ 934 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 935 goto err; 936 } 937 } 938 939 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; 940 } 941 942 if (create_empty_fragment) { 943#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 944 /* 945 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be 946 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real 947 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers. 948 */ 949 align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 950 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); 951#endif 952 p = wb->buf + align; 953 wb->offset = align; 954 } else if (prefix_len) { 955 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len; 956 } else { 957#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 958 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 959 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); 960#endif 961 p = wb->buf + align; 962 wb->offset = align; 963 } 964 965 /* write the header */ 966 967 *(p++) = type & 0xff; 968 wr->type = type; 969 970 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8); 971 /* 972 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes 973 * and record version number > TLS 1.0 974 */ 975 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B 976 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) 977 *(p++) = 0x1; 978 else 979 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; 980 981 /* field where we are to write out packet length */ 982 plen = p; 983 p += 2; 984 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ 985 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { 986 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); 987 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { 988 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); 989 if (eivlen <= 1) 990 eivlen = 0; 991 } 992 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ 993 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 994 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 995 else 996 eivlen = 0; 997 } else 998 eivlen = 0; 999 1000 /* lets setup the record stuff. */ 1001 wr->data = p + eivlen; 1002 wr->length = (int)len; 1003 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf; 1004 1005 /* 1006 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data 1007 */ 1008 1009 /* first we compress */ 1010 if (s->compress != NULL) { 1011 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) { 1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); 1013 goto err; 1014 } 1015 } else { 1016 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length); 1017 wr->input = wr->data; 1018 } 1019 1020 /* 1021 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from 1022 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the 1023 * wb->buf 1024 */ 1025 1026 if (mac_size != 0) { 1027 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0) 1028 goto err; 1029 wr->length += mac_size; 1030 } 1031 1032 wr->input = p; 1033 wr->data = p; 1034 1035 if (eivlen) { 1036 /* 1037 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err; 1038 */ 1039 wr->length += eivlen; 1040 } 1041 1042 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1) 1043 goto err; 1044 1045 /* record length after mac and block padding */ 1046 s2n(wr->length, plen); 1047 1048 if (s->msg_callback) 1049 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, 1050 s->msg_callback_arg); 1051 1052 /* 1053 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is 1054 * wr->length long 1055 */ 1056 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ 1057 wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 1058 1059 if (create_empty_fragment) { 1060 /* 1061 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write 1062 * out anything here 1063 */ 1064 return wr->length; 1065 } 1066 1067 /* now let's set up wb */ 1068 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; 1069 1070 /* 1071 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write 1072 * retries later 1073 */ 1074 s->s3->wpend_tot = len; 1075 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf; 1076 s->s3->wpend_type = type; 1077 s->s3->wpend_ret = len; 1078 1079 /* we now just need to write the buffer */ 1080 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); 1081 err: 1082 return -1; 1083} 1084 1085/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ 1086int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 1087 unsigned int len) 1088{ 1089 int i; 1090 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); 1091 1092/* XXXX */ 1093 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) 1094 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && 1095 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) 1096 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) { 1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); 1098 return (-1); 1099 } 1100 1101 for (;;) { 1102 clear_sys_error(); 1103 if (s->wbio != NULL) { 1104 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 1105 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, 1106 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), 1107 (unsigned int)wb->left); 1108 } else { 1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); 1110 i = -1; 1111 } 1112 if (i == wb->left) { 1113 wb->left = 0; 1114 wb->offset += i; 1115 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1116 return (s->s3->wpend_ret); 1117 } else if (i <= 0) { 1118 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1119 /* 1120 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in 1121 * using a datagram service 1122 */ 1123 wb->left = 0; 1124 } 1125 return (i); 1126 } 1127 wb->offset += i; 1128 wb->left -= i; 1129 } 1130} 1131 1132/*- 1133 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. 1134 * 'type' is one of the following: 1135 * 1136 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) 1137 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) 1138 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) 1139 * 1140 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first 1141 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). 1142 * 1143 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as 1144 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really 1145 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. 1146 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store 1147 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol 1148 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): 1149 * Change cipher spec protocol 1150 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored 1151 * Alert protocol 1152 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) 1153 * Handshake protocol 1154 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have 1155 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages 1156 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers 1157 * Application data protocol 1158 * none of our business 1159 */ 1160int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) 1161{ 1162 int al, i, j, ret; 1163 unsigned int n; 1164 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 1165 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; 1166 1167 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ 1168 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) 1169 return (-1); 1170 1171 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 1172 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek 1173 && (type != 1174 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { 1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1176 return -1; 1177 } 1178 1179 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 1180 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ 1181 { 1182 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; 1183 unsigned char *dst = buf; 1184 unsigned int k; 1185 1186 /* peek == 0 */ 1187 n = 0; 1188 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { 1189 *dst++ = *src++; 1190 len--; 1191 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; 1192 n++; 1193 } 1194 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ 1195 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) 1196 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; 1197 return n; 1198 } 1199 1200 /* 1201 * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. 1202 */ 1203 1204 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { 1205 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ 1206 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1207 if (i < 0) 1208 return (i); 1209 if (i == 0) { 1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1211 return (-1); 1212 } 1213 } 1214 start: 1215 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1216 1217 /*- 1218 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record 1219 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data 1220 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read 1221 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. 1222 */ 1223 rr = &(s->s3->rrec); 1224 1225 /* get new packet if necessary */ 1226 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { 1227 ret = ssl3_get_record(s); 1228 if (ret <= 0) 1229 return (ret); 1230 } 1231 1232 /* 1233 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty 1234 * record that isn't an alert. 1235 */ 1236 if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0) 1237 s->cert->alert_count = 0; 1238 1239 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ 1240 1241 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, 1242 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ 1243 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { 1244 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); 1246 goto f_err; 1247 } 1248 1249 /* 1250 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in 1251 * 'peek' mode) 1252 */ 1253 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { 1254 rr->length = 0; 1255 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1256 return (0); 1257 } 1258 1259 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or 1260 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ 1261 /* 1262 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are 1263 * doing a handshake for the first time 1264 */ 1265 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && 1266 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { 1267 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); 1269 goto f_err; 1270 } 1271 1272 if (len <= 0) 1273 return (len); 1274 1275 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) 1276 n = rr->length; 1277 else 1278 n = (unsigned int)len; 1279 1280 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); 1281 if (!peek) { 1282 rr->length -= n; 1283 rr->off += n; 1284 if (rr->length == 0) { 1285 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 1286 rr->off = 0; 1287 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 1288 && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) 1289 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 1290 } 1291 } 1292 return (n); 1293 } 1294 1295 /* 1296 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, 1297 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). 1298 */ 1299 1300 /* 1301 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill 1302 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. 1303 */ 1304 { 1305 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; 1306 unsigned char *dest = NULL; 1307 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; 1308 1309 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 1310 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; 1311 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; 1312 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; 1313 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { 1314 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; 1315 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; 1316 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; 1317 } 1318#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1319 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) { 1320 tls1_process_heartbeat(s); 1321 1322 /* Exit and notify application to read again */ 1323 rr->length = 0; 1324 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1325 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); 1326 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); 1327 return (-1); 1328 } 1329#endif 1330 1331 if (dest_maxlen > 0) { 1332 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ 1333 if (rr->length < n) 1334 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ 1335 1336 /* now move 'n' bytes: */ 1337 while (n-- > 0) { 1338 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; 1339 rr->length--; 1340 } 1341 1342 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) 1343 goto start; /* fragment was too small */ 1344 } 1345 } 1346 1347 /*- 1348 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1349 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. 1350 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) 1351 */ 1352 1353 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ 1354 if ((!s->server) && 1355 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && 1356 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && 1357 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { 1358 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; 1359 1360 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || 1361 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || 1362 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { 1363 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); 1365 goto f_err; 1366 } 1367 1368 if (s->msg_callback) 1369 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 1370 s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, 1371 s->msg_callback_arg); 1372 1373 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && 1374 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && 1375 !s->s3->renegotiate) { 1376 ssl3_renegotiate(s); 1377 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { 1378 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1379 if (i < 0) 1380 return (i); 1381 if (i == 0) { 1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1383 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1384 return (-1); 1385 } 1386 1387 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { 1388 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ 1389 BIO *bio; 1390 /* 1391 * In the case where we try to read application data, 1392 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with 1393 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may 1394 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world 1395 */ 1396 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1397 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1398 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1399 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1400 return (-1); 1401 } 1402 } 1403 } 1404 } 1405 /* 1406 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try 1407 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for 1408 */ 1409 goto start; 1410 } 1411 /* 1412 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't 1413 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING: 1414 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) 1415 */ 1416 if (s->server && 1417 SSL_is_init_finished(s) && 1418 !s->s3->send_connection_binding && 1419 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && 1420 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && 1421 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && 1422 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && 1423 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 1424 /* 1425 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; 1426 */ 1427 rr->length = 0; 1428 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1429 goto start; 1430 } 1431 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) { 1432 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; 1433 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; 1434 1435 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; 1436 1437 if (s->msg_callback) 1438 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, 1439 s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1440 1441 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1442 cb = s->info_callback; 1443 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1444 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 1445 1446 if (cb != NULL) { 1447 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; 1448 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); 1449 } 1450 1451 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { 1452 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; 1453 1454 s->cert->alert_count++; 1455 if (s->cert->alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { 1456 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); 1458 goto f_err; 1459 } 1460 1461 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { 1462 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1463 return (0); 1464 } 1465 /* 1466 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested 1467 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal 1468 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it 1469 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In 1470 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if 1471 * the peer refused it where we carry on. 1472 */ 1473 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { 1474 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1476 goto f_err; 1477 } 1478#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME 1479 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) 1480 return (0); 1481#endif 1482 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { 1483 char tmp[16]; 1484 1485 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1486 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; 1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); 1488 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); 1489 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); 1490 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1491 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); 1492 return (0); 1493 } else { 1494 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); 1496 goto f_err; 1497 } 1498 1499 goto start; 1500 } 1501 1502 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a 1503 * shutdown */ 1504 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1505 rr->length = 0; 1506 return (0); 1507 } 1508 1509 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 1510 /* 1511 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly 1512 * what the record payload has to look like 1513 */ 1514 if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || 1515 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { 1516 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); 1518 goto f_err; 1519 } 1520 1521 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ 1522 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { 1523 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1525 goto f_err; 1526 } 1527 1528 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) { 1529 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1531 goto f_err; 1532 } 1533 1534 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 1535 1536 rr->length = 0; 1537 1538 if (s->msg_callback) 1539 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 1540 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1541 1542 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; 1543 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) 1544 goto err; 1545 else 1546 goto start; 1547 } 1548 1549 /* 1550 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) 1551 */ 1552 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) { 1553 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && 1554 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { 1555#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences 1556 * are not as expected (and because this is 1557 * not really needed for clients except for 1558 * detecting protocol violations): */ 1559 s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server) 1560 ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; 1561#else 1562 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; 1563#endif 1564 s->renegotiate = 1; 1565 s->new_session = 1; 1566 } 1567 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1568 if (i < 0) 1569 return (i); 1570 if (i == 0) { 1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1572 return (-1); 1573 } 1574 1575 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { 1576 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ 1577 BIO *bio; 1578 /* 1579 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we 1580 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry 1581 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty 1582 * problems in the blocking world 1583 */ 1584 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1585 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1586 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1587 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1588 return (-1); 1589 } 1590 } 1591 goto start; 1592 } 1593 1594 switch (rr->type) { 1595 default: 1596#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS 1597 /* 1598 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give 1599 * an unexpected message alert. 1600 */ 1601 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) { 1602 rr->length = 0; 1603 goto start; 1604 } 1605#endif 1606 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1608 goto f_err; 1609 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: 1610 case SSL3_RT_ALERT: 1611 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: 1612 /* 1613 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of 1614 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not 1615 * happen when type != rr->type 1616 */ 1617 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1619 goto f_err; 1620 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: 1621 /* 1622 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have 1623 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() 1624 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read 1625 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet 1626 * started), we will indulge it. 1627 */ 1628 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && 1629 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && 1630 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && 1631 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && 1632 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1633 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && 1634 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && 1635 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) 1636 ) 1637 )) { 1638 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; 1639 return (-1); 1640 } else { 1641 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1643 goto f_err; 1644 } 1645 } 1646 /* not reached */ 1647 1648 f_err: 1649 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1650 err: 1651 return (-1); 1652} 1653 1654int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) 1655{ 1656 int i; 1657 const char *sender; 1658 int slen; 1659 1660 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) 1661 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; 1662 else 1663 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; 1664 1665 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) { 1666 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { 1667 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ 1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 1669 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1670 return (0); 1671 } 1672 1673 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 1674 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) 1675 return (0); 1676 } 1677 1678 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i)) 1679 return (0); 1680 1681 /* 1682 * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it 1683 * before we read the finished message 1684 */ 1685 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { 1686 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; 1687 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; 1688 } else { 1689 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; 1690 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; 1691 } 1692 1693 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, 1694 sender, slen, 1695 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); 1696 if (i == 0) { 1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1698 return 0; 1699 } 1700 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i; 1701 1702 return (1); 1703} 1704 1705int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) 1706{ 1707 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ 1708 desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); 1709 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) 1710 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have 1711 * protocol_version alerts */ 1712 if (desc < 0) 1713 return -1; 1714 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ 1715 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) 1716 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); 1717 1718 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; 1719 s->s3->send_alert[0] = level; 1720 s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc; 1721 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ 1722 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 1723 /* 1724 * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in 1725 * the future 1726 */ 1727 return -1; 1728} 1729 1730int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) 1731{ 1732 int i, j; 1733 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 1734 1735 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; 1736 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); 1737 if (i <= 0) { 1738 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; 1739 } else { 1740 /* 1741 * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the 1742 * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not 1743 * worry too much. 1744 */ 1745 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) 1746 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); 1747 1748 if (s->msg_callback) 1749 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 1750 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1751 1752 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1753 cb = s->info_callback; 1754 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1755 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 1756 1757 if (cb != NULL) { 1758 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; 1759 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); 1760 } 1761 } 1762 return (i); 1763} 1764