x509_cmp.c revision 369300 
1/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
33 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59#include <stdio.h>
60#include <ctype.h>
61#include "cryptlib.h"
62#include <openssl/asn1.h>
63#include <openssl/objects.h>
64#include <openssl/x509.h>
65#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
66
67int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
68{
69    int i;
70    X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
71
72    ai = a->cert_info;
73    bi = b->cert_info;
74    i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
75    if (i)
76        return (i);
77    return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
78}
79
80#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
81unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
82{
83    unsigned long ret = 0;
84    EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
85    unsigned char md[16];
86    char *f;
87
88    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
89    f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
90    if (f == NULL)
91        goto err;
92    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
93        goto err;
94    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
95        goto err;
96    OPENSSL_free(f);
97    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
98        (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
99         (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
100        goto err;
101    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
102        goto err;
103    ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
104           ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
105        ) & 0xffffffffL;
106 err:
107    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
108    return (ret);
109}
110#endif
111
112int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
113{
114    return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
115}
116
117int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
118{
119    return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
120}
121
122int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
123{
124    return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
125}
126
127#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
128int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
129{
130    return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
131}
132#endif
133
134X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
135{
136    return (a->cert_info->issuer);
137}
138
139unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
140{
141    return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
142}
143
144#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
145unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
146{
147    return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
148}
149#endif
150
151X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
152{
153    return (a->cert_info->subject);
154}
155
156ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
157{
158    return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
159}
160
161unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
162{
163    return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
164}
165
166#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
167unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
168{
169    return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
170}
171#endif
172
173#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
174/*
175 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
176 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
177 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
178 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
179 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
180 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
181 */
182int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
183{
184    int rv;
185    /* ensure hash is valid */
186    X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
187    X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
188
189    rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
190    if (rv)
191        return rv;
192    /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
193    if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) {
194        rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
195        if (rv)
196            return rv;
197        return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
198                      a->cert_info->enc.len);
199    }
200    return rv;
201}
202#endif
203
204int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
205{
206    int ret;
207
208    /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
209
210    if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
211        ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
212        if (ret < 0)
213            return -2;
214    }
215
216    if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
217        ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
218        if (ret < 0)
219            return -2;
220    }
221
222    ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
223
224    if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0)
225        return ret;
226
227    return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
228
229}
230
231unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
232{
233    unsigned long ret = 0;
234    unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
235
236    /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
237    i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
238    if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
239                    NULL))
240        return 0;
241
242    ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
243           ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
244        ) & 0xffffffffL;
245    return (ret);
246}
247
248#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
249/*
250 * I now DER encode the name and hash it.  Since I cache the DER encoding,
251 * this is reasonably efficient.
252 */
253
254unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
255{
256    EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
257    unsigned long ret = 0;
258    unsigned char md[16];
259
260    /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
261    i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
262    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
263    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
264    if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
265        && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
266        && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
267        ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
268               ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
269            ) & 0xffffffffL;
270    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
271
272    return (ret);
273}
274#endif
275
276/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
277X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
278                                     ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
279{
280    int i;
281    X509_CINF cinf;
282    X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
283
284    if (!sk)
285        return NULL;
286
287    x.cert_info = &cinf;
288    cinf.serialNumber = serial;
289    cinf.issuer = name;
290
291    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
292        x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
293        if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
294            return (x509);
295    }
296    return (NULL);
297}
298
299X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
300{
301    X509 *x509;
302    int i;
303
304    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
305        x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
306        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
307            return (x509);
308    }
309    return (NULL);
310}
311
312EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
313{
314    if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
315        return (NULL);
316    return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
317}
318
319ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
320{
321    if (!x)
322        return NULL;
323    return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
324}
325
326int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
327{
328    EVP_PKEY *xk;
329    int ret;
330
331    xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
332
333    if (xk)
334        ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
335    else
336        ret = -2;
337
338    switch (ret) {
339    case 1:
340        break;
341    case 0:
342        X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
343        break;
344    case -1:
345        X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
346        break;
347    case -2:
348        X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
349    }
350    if (xk)
351        EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
352    if (ret > 0)
353        return 1;
354    return 0;
355}
356
357/*
358 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
359 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
360 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
361 */
362
363#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
364
365static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
366{
367    const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
368    int curve_nid;
369    if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
370        grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
371    if (!grp)
372        return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
373    curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
374    /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
375    if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
376        /*
377         * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
378         */
379        if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
380            return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
381        if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
382            return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
383        /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
384        *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
385    } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
386        if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
387            return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
388        if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
389            return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
390    } else
391        return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
392
393    return X509_V_OK;
394}
395
396int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
397                            unsigned long flags)
398{
399    int rv, i, sign_nid;
400    EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
401    unsigned long tflags;
402    if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
403        return X509_V_OK;
404    tflags = flags;
405    /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
406    if (x == NULL) {
407        x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
408        i = 1;
409    } else
410        i = 0;
411
412    if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
413        rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
414        /* Correct error depth */
415        i = 0;
416        goto end;
417    }
418
419    pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
420    /* Check EE key only */
421    rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
422    if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
423        /* Correct error depth */
424        i = 0;
425        goto end;
426    }
427    for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
428        sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
429        x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
430        if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
431            rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
432            goto end;
433        }
434        EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
435        pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
436        rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
437        if (rv != X509_V_OK)
438            goto end;
439    }
440
441    /* Final check: root CA signature */
442    rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
443 end:
444    if (pk)
445        EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
446    if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
447        /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
448        if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
449             || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
450            i--;
451        /*
452         * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
453         * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
454         */
455        if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
456            rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
457        if (perror_depth)
458            *perror_depth = i;
459    }
460    return rv;
461}
462
463int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
464{
465    int sign_nid;
466    if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
467        return X509_V_OK;
468    sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
469    return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
470}
471
472#else
473int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
474                            unsigned long flags)
475{
476    return 0;
477}
478
479int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
480{
481    return 0;
482}
483
484#endif
485/*
486 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
487 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
488 * each X509 structure.
489 */
490STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
491{
492    STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
493    int i;
494    ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
495    if (ret == NULL)
496        return NULL;
497    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
498        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
499        CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
500    }
501    return ret;
502}
503