x509_cmp.c revision 352193 
1/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
33 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59#include <stdio.h>
60#include <ctype.h>
61#include "cryptlib.h"
62#include <openssl/asn1.h>
63#include <openssl/objects.h>
64#include <openssl/x509.h>
65#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
66
67int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
68{
69    int i;
70    X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
71
72    ai = a->cert_info;
73    bi = b->cert_info;
74    i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
75    if (i)
76        return (i);
77    return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
78}
79
80#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
81unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
82{
83    unsigned long ret = 0;
84    EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
85    unsigned char md[16];
86    char *f;
87
88    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
89    f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
90    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
91        goto err;
92    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
93        goto err;
94    OPENSSL_free(f);
95    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
96        (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
97         (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
98        goto err;
99    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
100        goto err;
101    ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
102           ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
103        ) & 0xffffffffL;
104 err:
105    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
106    return (ret);
107}
108#endif
109
110int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
111{
112    return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
113}
114
115int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
116{
117    return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
118}
119
120int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
121{
122    return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
123}
124
125#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
126int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
127{
128    return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
129}
130#endif
131
132X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
133{
134    return (a->cert_info->issuer);
135}
136
137unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
138{
139    return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
140}
141
142#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
143unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
144{
145    return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
146}
147#endif
148
149X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
150{
151    return (a->cert_info->subject);
152}
153
154ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
155{
156    return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
157}
158
159unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
160{
161    return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
162}
163
164#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
165unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
166{
167    return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
168}
169#endif
170
171#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
172/*
173 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
174 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
175 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
176 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
177 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
178 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
179 */
180int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
181{
182    int rv;
183    /* ensure hash is valid */
184    X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
185    X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
186
187    rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
188    if (rv)
189        return rv;
190    /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
191    if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) {
192        rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
193        if (rv)
194            return rv;
195        return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
196                      a->cert_info->enc.len);
197    }
198    return rv;
199}
200#endif
201
202int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
203{
204    int ret;
205
206    /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
207
208    if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
209        ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
210        if (ret < 0)
211            return -2;
212    }
213
214    if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
215        ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
216        if (ret < 0)
217            return -2;
218    }
219
220    ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
221
222    if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0)
223        return ret;
224
225    return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
226
227}
228
229unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
230{
231    unsigned long ret = 0;
232    unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
233
234    /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
235    i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
236    if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
237                    NULL))
238        return 0;
239
240    ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
241           ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
242        ) & 0xffffffffL;
243    return (ret);
244}
245
246#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
247/*
248 * I now DER encode the name and hash it.  Since I cache the DER encoding,
249 * this is reasonably efficient.
250 */
251
252unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
253{
254    EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
255    unsigned long ret = 0;
256    unsigned char md[16];
257
258    /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
259    i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
260    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
261    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
262    if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
263        && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
264        && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
265        ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
266               ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
267            ) & 0xffffffffL;
268    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
269
270    return (ret);
271}
272#endif
273
274/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
275X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
276                                     ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
277{
278    int i;
279    X509_CINF cinf;
280    X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
281
282    if (!sk)
283        return NULL;
284
285    x.cert_info = &cinf;
286    cinf.serialNumber = serial;
287    cinf.issuer = name;
288
289    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
290        x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
291        if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
292            return (x509);
293    }
294    return (NULL);
295}
296
297X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
298{
299    X509 *x509;
300    int i;
301
302    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
303        x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
304        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
305            return (x509);
306    }
307    return (NULL);
308}
309
310EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
311{
312    if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
313        return (NULL);
314    return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
315}
316
317ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
318{
319    if (!x)
320        return NULL;
321    return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
322}
323
324int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
325{
326    EVP_PKEY *xk;
327    int ret;
328
329    xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
330
331    if (xk)
332        ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
333    else
334        ret = -2;
335
336    switch (ret) {
337    case 1:
338        break;
339    case 0:
340        X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
341        break;
342    case -1:
343        X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
344        break;
345    case -2:
346        X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
347    }
348    if (xk)
349        EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
350    if (ret > 0)
351        return 1;
352    return 0;
353}
354
355/*
356 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
357 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
358 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
359 */
360
361#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
362
363static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
364{
365    const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
366    int curve_nid;
367    if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
368        grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
369    if (!grp)
370        return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
371    curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
372    /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
373    if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
374        /*
375         * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
376         */
377        if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
378            return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
379        if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
380            return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
381        /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
382        *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
383    } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
384        if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
385            return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
386        if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
387            return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
388    } else
389        return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
390
391    return X509_V_OK;
392}
393
394int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
395                            unsigned long flags)
396{
397    int rv, i, sign_nid;
398    EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
399    unsigned long tflags;
400    if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
401        return X509_V_OK;
402    tflags = flags;
403    /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
404    if (x == NULL) {
405        x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
406        i = 1;
407    } else
408        i = 0;
409
410    if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
411        rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
412        /* Correct error depth */
413        i = 0;
414        goto end;
415    }
416
417    pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
418    /* Check EE key only */
419    rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
420    if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
421        /* Correct error depth */
422        i = 0;
423        goto end;
424    }
425    for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
426        sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
427        x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
428        if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
429            rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
430            goto end;
431        }
432        EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
433        pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
434        rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
435        if (rv != X509_V_OK)
436            goto end;
437    }
438
439    /* Final check: root CA signature */
440    rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
441 end:
442    if (pk)
443        EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
444    if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
445        /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
446        if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
447             || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
448            i--;
449        /*
450         * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
451         * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
452         */
453        if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
454            rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
455        if (perror_depth)
456            *perror_depth = i;
457    }
458    return rv;
459}
460
461int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
462{
463    int sign_nid;
464    if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
465        return X509_V_OK;
466    sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
467    return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
468}
469
470#else
471int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
472                            unsigned long flags)
473{
474    return 0;
475}
476
477int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
478{
479    return 0;
480}
481
482#endif
483/*
484 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
485 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
486 * each X509 structure.
487 */
488STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
489{
490    STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
491    int i;
492    ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
493    if (ret == NULL)
494        return NULL;
495    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
496        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
497        CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
498    }
499    return ret;
500}
501