auth.c revision 314072
1/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.113 2015/08/21 03:42:19 djm Exp $ */ 2/* 3 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 6 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 7 * are met: 8 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 9 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 10 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 12 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 13 * 14 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR 15 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES 16 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. 17 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, 18 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 19 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, 20 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY 21 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT 22 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF 23 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 24 */ 25 26#include "includes.h" 27__RCSID("$FreeBSD: stable/11/crypto/openssh/auth.c 314072 2017-02-22 04:15:39Z lidl $"); 28 29#include <sys/types.h> 30#include <sys/stat.h> 31 32#include <netinet/in.h> 33 34#include <errno.h> 35#include <fcntl.h> 36#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H 37# include <paths.h> 38#endif 39#include <pwd.h> 40#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H 41#include <login.h> 42#endif 43#ifdef USE_SHADOW 44#include <shadow.h> 45#endif 46#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H 47#include <libgen.h> 48#endif 49#include <stdarg.h> 50#include <stdio.h> 51#include <string.h> 52#include <unistd.h> 53#include <limits.h> 54 55#include "xmalloc.h" 56#include "match.h" 57#include "groupaccess.h" 58#include "log.h" 59#include "buffer.h" 60#include "misc.h" 61#include "servconf.h" 62#include "key.h" 63#include "hostfile.h" 64#include "auth.h" 65#include "auth-options.h" 66#include "canohost.h" 67#include "uidswap.h" 68#include "packet.h" 69#include "loginrec.h" 70#ifdef GSSAPI 71#include "ssh-gss.h" 72#endif 73#include "authfile.h" 74#include "monitor_wrap.h" 75#include "authfile.h" 76#include "ssherr.h" 77#include "compat.h" 78#include "blacklist_client.h" 79 80/* import */ 81extern ServerOptions options; 82extern int use_privsep; 83extern Buffer loginmsg; 84extern struct passwd *privsep_pw; 85 86/* Debugging messages */ 87Buffer auth_debug; 88int auth_debug_init; 89 90/* 91 * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed 92 * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false 93 * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed 94 * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't 95 * listed there, false will be returned. 96 * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned. 97 * Otherwise true is returned. 98 */ 99int 100allowed_user(struct passwd * pw) 101{ 102 struct stat st; 103 const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL; 104 u_int i; 105#ifdef USE_SHADOW 106 struct spwd *spw = NULL; 107#endif 108 109 /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */ 110 if (!pw || !pw->pw_name) 111 return 0; 112 113#ifdef USE_SHADOW 114 if (!options.use_pam) 115 spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name); 116#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE 117 if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw)) 118 return 0; 119#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */ 120#endif /* USE_SHADOW */ 121 122 /* grab passwd field for locked account check */ 123 passwd = pw->pw_passwd; 124#ifdef USE_SHADOW 125 if (spw != NULL) 126#ifdef USE_LIBIAF 127 passwd = get_iaf_password(pw); 128#else 129 passwd = spw->sp_pwdp; 130#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ 131#endif 132 133 /* check for locked account */ 134 if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) { 135 int locked = 0; 136 137#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING 138 if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0) 139 locked = 1; 140#endif 141#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX 142 if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX, 143 strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0) 144 locked = 1; 145#endif 146#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR 147 if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR)) 148 locked = 1; 149#endif 150#ifdef USE_LIBIAF 151 free((void *) passwd); 152#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ 153 if (locked) { 154 logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked", 155 pw->pw_name); 156 return 0; 157 } 158 } 159 160 /* 161 * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we 162 * are chrooting. 163 */ 164 if (options.chroot_directory == NULL || 165 strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) { 166 char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? 167 _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */ 168 169 if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) { 170 logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s " 171 "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell); 172 free(shell); 173 return 0; 174 } 175 if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 || 176 (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) { 177 logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s " 178 "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell); 179 free(shell); 180 return 0; 181 } 182 free(shell); 183 } 184 185 if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 || 186 options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { 187 hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns); 188 ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr(); 189 } 190 191 /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */ 192 if (options.num_deny_users > 0) { 193 for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) 194 if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, 195 options.deny_users[i])) { 196 logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " 197 "because listed in DenyUsers", 198 pw->pw_name, hostname); 199 return 0; 200 } 201 } 202 /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */ 203 if (options.num_allow_users > 0) { 204 for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) 205 if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, 206 options.allow_users[i])) 207 break; 208 /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */ 209 if (i >= options.num_allow_users) { 210 logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " 211 "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname); 212 return 0; 213 } 214 } 215 if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { 216 /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */ 217 if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { 218 logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " 219 "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname); 220 return 0; 221 } 222 223 /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */ 224 if (options.num_deny_groups > 0) 225 if (ga_match(options.deny_groups, 226 options.num_deny_groups)) { 227 ga_free(); 228 logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " 229 "because a group is listed in DenyGroups", 230 pw->pw_name, hostname); 231 return 0; 232 } 233 /* 234 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups 235 * isn't listed there 236 */ 237 if (options.num_allow_groups > 0) 238 if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups, 239 options.num_allow_groups)) { 240 ga_free(); 241 logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " 242 "because none of user's groups are listed " 243 "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname); 244 return 0; 245 } 246 ga_free(); 247 } 248 249#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER 250 if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg)) 251 return 0; 252#endif 253 254 /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */ 255 return 1; 256} 257 258void 259auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...) 260{ 261 va_list ap; 262 int i; 263 264 free(authctxt->info); 265 authctxt->info = NULL; 266 267 va_start(ap, fmt); 268 i = vasprintf(&authctxt->info, fmt, ap); 269 va_end(ap); 270 271 if (i < 0 || authctxt->info == NULL) 272 fatal("vasprintf failed"); 273} 274 275void 276auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial, 277 const char *method, const char *submethod) 278{ 279 void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose; 280 char *authmsg; 281 282 if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed) 283 return; 284 285 /* Raise logging level */ 286 if (authenticated == 1 || 287 !authctxt->valid || 288 authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 || 289 strcmp(method, "password") == 0) 290 authlog = logit; 291 292 if (authctxt->postponed) 293 authmsg = "Postponed"; 294 else if (partial) 295 authmsg = "Partial"; 296 else { 297 authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed"; 298 if (authenticated) 299 BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_AUTH_OK); 300 } 301 302 authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s%s%s", 303 authmsg, 304 method, 305 submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod, 306 authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", 307 authctxt->user, 308 get_remote_ipaddr(), 309 get_remote_port(), 310 compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1", 311 authctxt->info != NULL ? ": " : "", 312 authctxt->info != NULL ? authctxt->info : ""); 313 free(authctxt->info); 314 authctxt->info = NULL; 315 316#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 317 if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed && 318 (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 || 319 strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 || 320 strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)) 321 record_failed_login(authctxt->user, 322 get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh"); 323# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE 324 if (authenticated) 325 sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user, 326 get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg); 327# endif 328#endif 329#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS 330 if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) 331 audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method)); 332#endif 333} 334 335 336void 337auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *authctxt) 338{ 339 error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for " 340 "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s", 341 authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", 342 authctxt->user, 343 get_remote_ipaddr(), 344 get_remote_port(), 345 compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1"); 346 packet_disconnect("Too many authentication failures"); 347 /* NOTREACHED */ 348} 349 350/* 351 * Check whether root logins are disallowed. 352 */ 353int 354auth_root_allowed(const char *method) 355{ 356 switch (options.permit_root_login) { 357 case PERMIT_YES: 358 return 1; 359 case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: 360 if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || 361 strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || 362 strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0) 363 return 1; 364 break; 365 case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: 366 if (forced_command) { 367 logit("Root login accepted for forced command."); 368 return 1; 369 } 370 break; 371 } 372 logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr()); 373 return 0; 374} 375 376 377/* 378 * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename 379 * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%', 380 * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username. 381 * 382 * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc. 383 */ 384char * 385expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw) 386{ 387 char *file, ret[PATH_MAX]; 388 int i; 389 390 file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir, 391 "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); 392 393 /* 394 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward 395 * compatible and prepend the '%h/' 396 */ 397 if (*file == '/') 398 return (file); 399 400 i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file); 401 if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret)) 402 fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long"); 403 free(file); 404 return (xstrdup(ret)); 405} 406 407char * 408authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw) 409{ 410 if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL) 411 return NULL; 412 return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw); 413} 414 415/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */ 416HostStatus 417check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host, 418 const char *sysfile, const char *userfile) 419{ 420 char *user_hostfile; 421 struct stat st; 422 HostStatus host_status; 423 struct hostkeys *hostkeys; 424 const struct hostkey_entry *found; 425 426 hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); 427 load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile); 428 if (userfile != NULL) { 429 user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid); 430 if (options.strict_modes && 431 (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) && 432 ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || 433 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { 434 logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: " 435 "bad owner or modes for %.200s", 436 pw->pw_name, user_hostfile); 437 auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes", 438 user_hostfile); 439 } else { 440 temporarily_use_uid(pw); 441 load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile); 442 restore_uid(); 443 } 444 free(user_hostfile); 445 } 446 host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found); 447 if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED) 448 error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication", 449 found->host); 450 else if (host_status == HOST_OK) 451 debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__, 452 found->host, found->file, found->line); 453 else 454 debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host); 455 456 free_hostkeys(hostkeys); 457 458 return host_status; 459} 460 461/* 462 * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components 463 * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of 464 * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable. 465 * 466 * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ? 467 * 468 * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to 469 * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an 470 * error buffer plus max size as arguments. 471 * 472 * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure 473 */ 474int 475auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir, 476 uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen) 477{ 478 char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX]; 479 char *cp; 480 int comparehome = 0; 481 struct stat st; 482 483 if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) { 484 snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name, 485 strerror(errno)); 486 return -1; 487 } 488 if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) 489 comparehome = 1; 490 491 if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) { 492 snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf); 493 return -1; 494 } 495 if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) || 496 (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) { 497 snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", 498 buf); 499 return -1; 500 } 501 502 /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */ 503 for (;;) { 504 if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) { 505 snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); 506 return -1; 507 } 508 strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); 509 510 if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || 511 (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) || 512 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { 513 snprintf(err, errlen, 514 "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); 515 return -1; 516 } 517 518 /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */ 519 if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) 520 break; 521 522 /* 523 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, 524 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too 525 */ 526 if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0)) 527 break; 528 } 529 return 0; 530} 531 532/* 533 * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to 534 * avoid races. 535 * 536 * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure 537 */ 538static int 539secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, 540 char *err, size_t errlen) 541{ 542 struct stat st; 543 544 /* check the open file to avoid races */ 545 if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) { 546 snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s", 547 file, strerror(errno)); 548 return -1; 549 } 550 return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen); 551} 552 553static FILE * 554auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes, 555 int log_missing, char *file_type) 556{ 557 char line[1024]; 558 struct stat st; 559 int fd; 560 FILE *f; 561 562 if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) { 563 if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT) 564 debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file, 565 strerror(errno)); 566 return NULL; 567 } 568 569 if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { 570 close(fd); 571 return NULL; 572 } 573 if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { 574 logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file", 575 pw->pw_name, file_type, file); 576 close(fd); 577 return NULL; 578 } 579 unset_nonblock(fd); 580 if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) { 581 close(fd); 582 return NULL; 583 } 584 if (strict_modes && 585 secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) { 586 fclose(f); 587 logit("Authentication refused: %s", line); 588 auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line); 589 return NULL; 590 } 591 592 return f; 593} 594 595 596FILE * 597auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes) 598{ 599 return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys"); 600} 601 602FILE * 603auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes) 604{ 605 return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0, 606 "authorized principals"); 607} 608 609struct passwd * 610getpwnamallow(const char *user) 611{ 612#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP 613 extern login_cap_t *lc; 614#ifdef BSD_AUTH 615 auth_session_t *as; 616#endif 617#endif 618 struct passwd *pw; 619 struct connection_info *ci = get_connection_info(1, options.use_dns); 620 621 ci->user = user; 622 parse_server_match_config(&options, ci); 623 624#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) 625 aix_setauthdb(user); 626#endif 627 628 pw = getpwnam(user); 629 630#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) 631 aix_restoreauthdb(); 632#endif 633#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN 634 /* 635 * Windows usernames are case-insensitive. To avoid later problems 636 * when trying to match the username, the user is only allowed to 637 * login if the username is given in the same case as stored in the 638 * user database. 639 */ 640 if (pw != NULL && strcmp(user, pw->pw_name) != 0) { 641 logit("Login name %.100s does not match stored username %.100s", 642 user, pw->pw_name); 643 pw = NULL; 644 } 645#endif 646 if (pw == NULL) { 647 BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL); 648 logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s", 649 user, get_remote_ipaddr()); 650#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 651 record_failed_login(user, 652 get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh"); 653#endif 654#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS 655 audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER); 656#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ 657 return (NULL); 658 } 659 if (!allowed_user(pw)) 660 return (NULL); 661#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP 662 if ((lc = login_getpwclass(pw)) == NULL) { 663 debug("unable to get login class: %s", user); 664 return (NULL); 665 } 666#ifdef BSD_AUTH 667 if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 || 668 auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) { 669 debug("Approval failure for %s", user); 670 pw = NULL; 671 } 672 if (as != NULL) 673 auth_close(as); 674#endif 675#endif 676 if (pw != NULL) 677 return (pwcopy(pw)); 678 return (NULL); 679} 680 681/* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */ 682int 683auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key) 684{ 685 char *fp = NULL; 686 int r; 687 688 if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL) 689 return 0; 690 if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, 691 SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { 692 r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; 693 error("%s: fingerprint key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); 694 goto out; 695 } 696 697 r = sshkey_check_revoked(key, options.revoked_keys_file); 698 switch (r) { 699 case 0: 700 break; /* not revoked */ 701 case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED: 702 error("Authentication key %s %s revoked by file %s", 703 sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file); 704 goto out; 705 default: 706 error("Error checking authentication key %s %s in " 707 "revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(key), fp, 708 options.revoked_keys_file, ssh_err(r)); 709 goto out; 710 } 711 712 /* Success */ 713 r = 0; 714 715 out: 716 free(fp); 717 return r == 0 ? 0 : 1; 718} 719 720void 721auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) 722{ 723 char buf[1024]; 724 va_list args; 725 726 if (!auth_debug_init) 727 return; 728 729 va_start(args, fmt); 730 vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); 731 va_end(args); 732 buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf); 733} 734 735void 736auth_debug_send(void) 737{ 738 char *msg; 739 740 if (!auth_debug_init) 741 return; 742 while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) { 743 msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL); 744 packet_send_debug("%s", msg); 745 free(msg); 746 } 747} 748 749void 750auth_debug_reset(void) 751{ 752 if (auth_debug_init) 753 buffer_clear(&auth_debug); 754 else { 755 buffer_init(&auth_debug); 756 auth_debug_init = 1; 757 } 758} 759 760struct passwd * 761fakepw(void) 762{ 763 static struct passwd fake; 764 765 memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake)); 766 fake.pw_name = "NOUSER"; 767 fake.pw_passwd = 768 "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK"; 769#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS 770 fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER"; 771#endif 772 fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid; 773 fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid; 774#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS 775 fake.pw_class = ""; 776#endif 777 fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist"; 778 fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist"; 779 780 return (&fake); 781} 782