s3_srvr.c revision 194206
1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124 125#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 126#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 127 128#include <stdio.h> 129#include "ssl_locl.h" 130#include "kssl_lcl.h" 131#include <openssl/buffer.h> 132#include <openssl/rand.h> 133#include <openssl/objects.h> 134#include <openssl/evp.h> 135#include <openssl/hmac.h> 136#include <openssl/x509.h> 137#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 138#include <openssl/dh.h> 139#endif 140#include <openssl/bn.h> 141#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 142#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 143#endif 144#include <openssl/md5.h> 145 146static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 147#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 148static int nid2curve_id(int nid); 149#endif 150 151static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 152 { 153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 154 return(SSLv3_server_method()); 155 else 156 return(NULL); 157 } 158 159IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 160 ssl3_accept, 161 ssl_undefined_function, 162 ssl3_get_server_method) 163 164int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 165 { 166 BUF_MEM *buf; 167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); 168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; 169 long num1; 170 int ret= -1; 171 int new_state,state,skip=0; 172 173 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); 174 ERR_clear_error(); 175 clear_sys_error(); 176 177 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 178 cb=s->info_callback; 179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 181 182 /* init things to blank */ 183 s->in_handshake++; 184 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 185 186 if (s->cert == NULL) 187 { 188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 189 return(-1); 190 } 191 192 for (;;) 193 { 194 state=s->state; 195 196 switch (s->state) 197 { 198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 199 s->new_session=1; 200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 201 202 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 203 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 205 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 206 207 s->server=1; 208 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); 209 210 if ((s->version>>8) != 3) 211 { 212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 213 return -1; 214 } 215 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 216 217 if (s->init_buf == NULL) 218 { 219 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) 220 { 221 ret= -1; 222 goto end; 223 } 224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) 225 { 226 ret= -1; 227 goto end; 228 } 229 s->init_buf=buf; 230 } 231 232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) 233 { 234 ret= -1; 235 goto end; 236 } 237 238 s->init_num=0; 239 240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) 241 { 242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that 243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 244 */ 245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } 246 247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 250 } 251 else 252 { 253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, 254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */ 255 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 256 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 257 } 258 break; 259 260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 262 263 s->shutdown=0; 264 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 265 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 266 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 267 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 268 s->init_num=0; 269 270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 271 break; 272 273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 274 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 275 break; 276 277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 280 281 s->shutdown=0; 282 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 283 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 284 s->new_session = 2; 285 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 286 s->init_num=0; 287 break; 288 289 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 290 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 291 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 292 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 293#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 294 if (s->hit) 295 { 296 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 298 else 299 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 300 } 301#else 302 if (s->hit) 303 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 304#endif 305 else 306 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 307 s->init_num=0; 308 break; 309 310 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 311 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 312 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */ 313 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) 314 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5)) 315 { 316 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 317 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 318#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 319 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 320 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 321 else 322 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 323 } 324 else 325 { 326 skip = 1; 327 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 328 } 329#else 330 } 331 else 332 skip=1; 333 334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 335#endif 336 s->init_num=0; 337 break; 338 339 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 340 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 341 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; 342 343 /* clear this, it may get reset by 344 * send_server_key_exchange */ 345 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) 346#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 347 && !(l & SSL_KRB5) 348#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 349 ) 350 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key 351 * even when forbidden by protocol specs 352 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to 353 * be able to handle this) */ 354 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 355 else 356 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; 357 358 359 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or 360 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate 361 * 362 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange 363 * message only if the cipher suite is either 364 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the 365 * server certificate contains the server's 366 * public key for key exchange. 367 */ 368 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp 369 || (l & SSL_kECDHE) 370 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA)) 371 || ((l & SSL_kRSA) 372 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 373 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 374 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 375 ) 376 ) 377 ) 378 ) 379 { 380 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 381 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 382 } 383 else 384 skip=1; 385 386 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 387 s->init_num=0; 388 break; 389 390 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 391 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 392 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 393 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 394 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, 395 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ 396 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 397 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 398 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites 399 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts 400 * and in RFC 2246): */ 401 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) && 402 /* ... except when the application insists on verification 403 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ 404 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 405 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ 406 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5)) 407 { 408 /* no cert request */ 409 skip=1; 410 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; 411 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 412 } 413 else 414 { 415 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; 416 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 417 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 418#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 419 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 420#else 421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 422 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 423#endif 424 s->init_num=0; 425 } 426 break; 427 428 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 429 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 430 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); 431 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 432 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 434 s->init_num=0; 435 break; 436 437 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 438 /* number of bytes to be flushed */ 439 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL); 440 if (num1 > 0) 441 { 442 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; 443 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio); 444 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; } 445 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 446 } 447 448 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; 449 break; 450 451 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 452 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 453 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ 454 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); 455 if (ret <= 0) 456 goto end; 457 if (ret == 2) 458 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; 459 else { 460 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 461 { 462 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 463 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 464 } 465 s->init_num=0; 466 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 467 } 468 break; 469 470 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 471 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 472 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 473 if (ret <= 0) 474 goto end; 475 if (ret == 2) 476 { 477 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when 478 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in 479 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify 480 * message is not sent. 481 */ 482 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 483 s->init_num = 0; 484 } 485 else 486 { 487 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 488 s->init_num=0; 489 490 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is 491 * a client cert, it can be verified 492 */ 493 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, 494 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1), 495 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0])); 496 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, 497 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2), 498 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); 499 } 500 break; 501 502 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 503 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 504 505 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ 506 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 507 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 508 509 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 510 s->init_num=0; 511 break; 512 513 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 514 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 515 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 516 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 517 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 518 if (s->hit) 519 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 520#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 521 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 522 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 523#endif 524 else 525 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 526 s->init_num=0; 527 break; 528 529#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 530 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 531 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 532 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 533 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 534 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 535 s->init_num=0; 536 break; 537 538 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 539 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 540 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 541 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 543 s->init_num=0; 544 break; 545 546#endif 547 548 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 549 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 550 551 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 552 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) 553 { ret= -1; goto end; } 554 555 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 556 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 557 558 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 559 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 560 s->init_num=0; 561 562 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 563 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 564 { 565 ret= -1; 566 goto end; 567 } 568 569 break; 570 571 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 572 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 573 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, 574 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 575 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 576 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 577 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 578 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 579 if (s->hit) 580 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 581 else 582 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; 583 s->init_num=0; 584 break; 585 586 case SSL_ST_OK: 587 /* clean a few things up */ 588 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 589 590 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 591 s->init_buf=NULL; 592 593 /* remove buffering on output */ 594 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 595 596 s->init_num=0; 597 598 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ 599 { 600 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless 601 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */ 602 603 s->new_session=0; 604 605 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 606 607 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 608 /* s->server=1; */ 609 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; 610 611 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); 612 } 613 614 ret = 1; 615 goto end; 616 /* break; */ 617 618 default: 619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 620 ret= -1; 621 goto end; 622 /* break; */ 623 } 624 625 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) 626 { 627 if (s->debug) 628 { 629 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 630 goto end; 631 } 632 633 634 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) 635 { 636 new_state=s->state; 637 s->state=state; 638 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); 639 s->state=new_state; 640 } 641 } 642 skip=0; 643 } 644end: 645 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 646 647 s->in_handshake--; 648 if (cb != NULL) 649 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); 650 return(ret); 651 } 652 653int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 654 { 655 unsigned char *p; 656 657 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) 658 { 659 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 660 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 661 *(p++)=0; 662 *(p++)=0; 663 *(p++)=0; 664 665 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 666 /* number of bytes to write */ 667 s->init_num=4; 668 s->init_off=0; 669 } 670 671 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 672 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 673 } 674 675int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) 676 { 677 int ok; 678 long n; 679 680 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, 681 * so permit appropriate message length */ 682 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 683 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 684 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 685 -1, 686 s->max_cert_list, 687 &ok); 688 if (!ok) return((int)n); 689 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 690 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) 691 { 692 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, 693 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) 694 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared 695 * when a handshake is not completed ... */ 696#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 697 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 698 { 699 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 700 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 701 } 702#endif 703 return 2; 704 } 705 return 1; 706} 707 708int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 709 { 710 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; 711 unsigned int cookie_len; 712 long n; 713 unsigned long id; 714 unsigned char *p,*d,*q; 715 SSL_CIPHER *c; 716#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 717 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; 718#endif 719 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; 720 721 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. 722 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, 723 * This down switching should be handled by a different method. 724 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with 725 * TLSv1. 726 */ 727 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) 728 { 729 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 730 } 731 s->first_packet=1; 732 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 733 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 734 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 735 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 736 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 737 &ok); 738 739 if (!ok) return((int)n); 740 s->first_packet=0; 741 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 742 743 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header 744 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ 745 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; 746 p+=2; 747 748 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || 749 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) 750 { 751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 752 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) 753 { 754 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ 755 s->version = s->client_version; 756 } 757 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 758 goto f_err; 759 } 760 761 /* load the client random */ 762 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 763 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 764 765 /* get the session-id */ 766 j= *(p++); 767 768 s->hit=0; 769 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation 770 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option 771 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7. 772 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default, 773 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications 774 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with 775 * an earlier library version) 776 */ 777 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) 778 { 779 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 780 goto err; 781 } 782 else 783 { 784 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 785 if (i == 1) 786 { /* previous session */ 787 s->hit=1; 788 } 789 else if (i == -1) 790 goto err; 791 else /* i == 0 */ 792 { 793 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 794 goto err; 795 } 796 } 797 798 p+=j; 799 800 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) 801 { 802 /* cookie stuff */ 803 cookie_len = *(p++); 804 805 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 806 s->d1->send_cookie == 0) 807 { 808 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */ 809 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len) 810 { 811 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 813 goto f_err; 814 } 815 } 816 817 /* 818 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 819 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 820 * does not cause an overflow. 821 */ 822 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) 823 { 824 /* too much data */ 825 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 827 goto f_err; 828 } 829 830 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 831 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 832 cookie_len > 0) 833 { 834 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 835 836 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) 837 { 838 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 839 cookie_len) == 0) 840 { 841 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 843 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 844 goto f_err; 845 } 846 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 847 } 848 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 849 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ 850 { 851 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 853 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 854 goto f_err; 855 } 856 } 857 858 p += cookie_len; 859 } 860 861 n2s(p,i); 862 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) 863 { 864 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ 865 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 867 goto f_err; 868 } 869 if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) 870 { 871 /* not enough data */ 872 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 874 goto f_err; 875 } 876 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) 877 == NULL)) 878 { 879 goto err; 880 } 881 p+=i; 882 883 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 884 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) 885 { 886 j=0; 887 id=s->session->cipher->id; 888 889#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 890 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers)); 891#endif 892 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) 893 { 894 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i); 895#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 896 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 897 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 898#endif 899 if (c->id == id) 900 { 901 j=1; 902 break; 903 } 904 } 905 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) 906 { 907 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may 908 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to 909 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server 910 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not 911 * enabled, though. */ 912 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 913 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) 914 { 915 s->session->cipher = c; 916 j = 1; 917 } 918 } 919 if (j == 0) 920 { 921 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher 922 * list if we are asked to reuse it */ 923 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 925 goto f_err; 926 } 927 } 928 929 /* compression */ 930 i= *(p++); 931 if ((p+i) > (d+n)) 932 { 933 /* not enough data */ 934 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 936 goto f_err; 937 } 938 q=p; 939 for (j=0; j<i; j++) 940 { 941 if (p[j] == 0) break; 942 } 943 944 p+=i; 945 if (j >= i) 946 { 947 /* no compress */ 948 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 950 goto f_err; 951 } 952 953#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 954 /* TLS extensions*/ 955 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) 956 { 957 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) 958 { 959 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ 960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 961 goto f_err; 962 } 963 } 964 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { 965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 966 goto err; 967 } 968#endif 969 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 970 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 971 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ 972 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; 973#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 974 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL) 975 { /* See if we have a match */ 976 int m,nn,o,v,done=0; 977 978 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 979 for (m=0; m<nn; m++) 980 { 981 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 982 v=comp->id; 983 for (o=0; o<i; o++) 984 { 985 if (v == q[o]) 986 { 987 done=1; 988 break; 989 } 990 } 991 if (done) break; 992 } 993 if (done) 994 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 995 else 996 comp=NULL; 997 } 998#endif 999 1000 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */ 1001#if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test 1002 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b, 1003 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */ 1004 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) 1005 { 1006 if (p < (d+n)) 1007 { 1008 /* wrong number of bytes, 1009 * there could be more to follow */ 1010 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1012 goto f_err; 1013 } 1014 } 1015#endif 1016 1017 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must 1018 * pick a cipher */ 1019 1020 if (!s->hit) 1021 { 1022#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1023 s->session->compress_meth=0; 1024#else 1025 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; 1026#endif 1027 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1028 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1029 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 1030 if (ciphers == NULL) 1031 { 1032 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); 1034 goto f_err; 1035 } 1036 ciphers=NULL; 1037 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, 1038 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1039 1040 if (c == NULL) 1041 { 1042 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1044 goto f_err; 1045 } 1046 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; 1047 } 1048 else 1049 { 1050 /* Session-id reuse */ 1051#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1052 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1053 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; 1054 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; 1055 1056 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1057 { 1058 sk=s->session->ciphers; 1059 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) 1060 { 1061 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); 1062 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL) 1063 nc=c; 1064 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1065 ec=c; 1066 } 1067 if (nc != NULL) 1068 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; 1069 else if (ec != NULL) 1070 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; 1071 else 1072 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1073 } 1074 else 1075#endif 1076 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1077 } 1078 1079 /* we now have the following setup. 1080 * client_random 1081 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1082 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1083 * compression - basically ignored right now 1084 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1085 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1086 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1087 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1088 */ 1089 1090 ret=1; 1091 if (0) 1092 { 1093f_err: 1094 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1095 } 1096err: 1097 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1098 return(ret); 1099 } 1100 1101int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1102 { 1103 unsigned char *buf; 1104 unsigned char *p,*d; 1105 int i,sl; 1106 unsigned long l,Time; 1107 1108 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1109 { 1110 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1111 p=s->s3->server_random; 1112 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ 1113 l2n(Time,p); 1114 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) 1115 return -1; 1116 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1117 d=p= &(buf[4]); 1118 1119 *(p++)=s->version>>8; 1120 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; 1121 1122 /* Random stuff */ 1123 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1124 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1125 1126 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the 1127 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the 1128 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send 1129 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length 1130 * session-id if we want it to be single use. 1131 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id 1132 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff. 1133 * 1134 * We also have an additional case where stateless session 1135 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old 1136 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can 1137 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful 1138 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality 1139 * is unaffected. 1140 */ 1141 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1142 && !s->hit) 1143 s->session->session_id_length=0; 1144 1145 sl=s->session->session_id_length; 1146 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) 1147 { 1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1149 return -1; 1150 } 1151 *(p++)=sl; 1152 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); 1153 p+=sl; 1154 1155 /* put the cipher */ 1156 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); 1157 p+=i; 1158 1159 /* put the compression method */ 1160#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1161 *(p++)=0; 1162#else 1163 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1164 *(p++)=0; 1165 else 1166 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1167#endif 1168#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1169 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1170 { 1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1172 return -1; 1173 } 1174#endif 1175 /* do the header */ 1176 l=(p-d); 1177 d=buf; 1178 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1179 l2n3(l,d); 1180 1181 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; 1182 /* number of bytes to write */ 1183 s->init_num=p-buf; 1184 s->init_off=0; 1185 } 1186 1187 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1188 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1189 } 1190 1191int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1192 { 1193 unsigned char *p; 1194 1195 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) 1196 { 1197 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1198 1199 /* do the header */ 1200 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1201 *(p++)=0; 1202 *(p++)=0; 1203 *(p++)=0; 1204 1205 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1206 /* number of bytes to write */ 1207 s->init_num=4; 1208 s->init_off=0; 1209 } 1210 1211 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1212 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1213 } 1214 1215int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1216 { 1217#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1218 unsigned char *q; 1219 int j,num; 1220 RSA *rsa; 1221 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1222 unsigned int u; 1223#endif 1224#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1225 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; 1226#endif 1227#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1228 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; 1229 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1230 int encodedlen = 0; 1231 int curve_id = 0; 1232 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1233#endif 1234 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1235 unsigned char *p,*d; 1236 int al,i; 1237 unsigned long type; 1238 int n; 1239 CERT *cert; 1240 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1241 int nr[4],kn; 1242 BUF_MEM *buf; 1243 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1244 1245 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1246 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) 1247 { 1248 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK; 1249 cert=s->cert; 1250 1251 buf=s->init_buf; 1252 1253 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; 1254 n=0; 1255#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1256 if (type & SSL_kRSA) 1257 { 1258 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; 1259 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1260 { 1261 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1262 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1263 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1264 if(rsa == NULL) 1265 { 1266 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1268 goto f_err; 1269 } 1270 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1271 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; 1272 } 1273 if (rsa == NULL) 1274 { 1275 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1277 goto f_err; 1278 } 1279 r[0]=rsa->n; 1280 r[1]=rsa->e; 1281 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 1282 } 1283 else 1284#endif 1285#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1286 if (type & SSL_kEDH) 1287 { 1288 dhp=cert->dh_tmp; 1289 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1290 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1291 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1292 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1293 if (dhp == NULL) 1294 { 1295 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1297 goto f_err; 1298 } 1299 1300 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 1301 { 1302 DH_free(dh); 1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1304 goto err; 1305 } 1306 1307 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) 1308 { 1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1310 goto err; 1311 } 1312 1313 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; 1314 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || 1315 dhp->priv_key == NULL || 1316 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) 1317 { 1318 if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) 1319 { 1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1321 ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1322 goto err; 1323 } 1324 } 1325 else 1326 { 1327 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); 1328 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); 1329 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || 1330 (dh->priv_key == NULL)) 1331 { 1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1333 goto err; 1334 } 1335 } 1336 r[0]=dh->p; 1337 r[1]=dh->g; 1338 r[2]=dh->pub_key; 1339 } 1340 else 1341#endif 1342#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1343 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) 1344 { 1345 const EC_GROUP *group; 1346 1347 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; 1348 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1349 { 1350 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1351 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1352 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1353 } 1354 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1355 { 1356 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1358 goto f_err; 1359 } 1360 1361 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) 1362 { 1363 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1365 goto err; 1366 } 1367 1368 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1369 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1370 { 1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1372 goto err; 1373 } 1374 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp)) 1375 { 1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1377 goto err; 1378 } 1379 ecdh = ecdhp; 1380 1381 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; 1382 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1383 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1384 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) 1385 { 1386 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) 1387 { 1388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1389 goto err; 1390 } 1391 } 1392 1393 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1394 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1395 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) 1396 { 1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1398 goto err; 1399 } 1400 1401 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1402 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 1403 { 1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1405 goto err; 1406 } 1407 1408 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH 1409 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 1410 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. 1411 */ 1412 if ((curve_id = 1413 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1414 == 0) 1415 { 1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1417 goto err; 1418 } 1419 1420 /* Encode the public key. 1421 * First check the size of encoding and 1422 * allocate memory accordingly. 1423 */ 1424 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1425 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1426 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1427 NULL, 0, NULL); 1428 1429 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1430 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 1431 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1432 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) 1433 { 1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1435 goto err; 1436 } 1437 1438 1439 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1440 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1441 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1442 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1443 1444 if (encodedlen == 0) 1445 { 1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1447 goto err; 1448 } 1449 1450 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; 1451 1452 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 1453 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1454 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes 1455 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1456 * structure. 1457 */ 1458 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1459 1460 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message 1461 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs 1462 */ 1463 r[0]=NULL; 1464 r[1]=NULL; 1465 r[2]=NULL; 1466 r[3]=NULL; 1467 } 1468 else 1469#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1470 { 1471 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1473 goto f_err; 1474 } 1475 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) 1476 { 1477 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1478 n+=2+nr[i]; 1479 } 1480 1481 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)) 1482 { 1483 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) 1484 == NULL) 1485 { 1486 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1487 goto f_err; 1488 } 1489 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1490 } 1491 else 1492 { 1493 pkey=NULL; 1494 kn=0; 1495 } 1496 1497 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) 1498 { 1499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); 1500 goto err; 1501 } 1502 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1503 p= &(d[4]); 1504 1505 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) 1506 { 1507 s2n(nr[i],p); 1508 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); 1509 p+=nr[i]; 1510 } 1511 1512#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1513 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) 1514 { 1515 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. 1516 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: 1517 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 1518 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by 1519 * the actual encoded point itself 1520 */ 1521 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1522 p += 1; 1523 *p = 0; 1524 p += 1; 1525 *p = curve_id; 1526 p += 1; 1527 *p = encodedlen; 1528 p += 1; 1529 memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 1530 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 1531 encodedlen); 1532 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1533 p += encodedlen; 1534 } 1535#endif 1536 1537 /* not anonymous */ 1538 if (pkey != NULL) 1539 { 1540 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) 1541 * and p points to the space at the end. */ 1542#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1543 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) 1544 { 1545 q=md_buf; 1546 j=0; 1547 for (num=2; num > 0; num--) 1548 { 1549 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, 1550 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 1551 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) 1552 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); 1553 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1554 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1555 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1556 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, 1557 (unsigned int *)&i); 1558 q+=i; 1559 j+=i; 1560 } 1561 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 1562 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) 1563 { 1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); 1565 goto err; 1566 } 1567 s2n(u,p); 1568 n+=u+2; 1569 } 1570 else 1571#endif 1572#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) 1573 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) 1574 { 1575 /* lets do DSS */ 1576 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL); 1577 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1578 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1579 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1580 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), 1581 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) 1582 { 1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA); 1584 goto err; 1585 } 1586 s2n(i,p); 1587 n+=i+2; 1588 } 1589 else 1590#endif 1591#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA) 1592 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 1593 { 1594 /* let's do ECDSA */ 1595 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL); 1596 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1597 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1598 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1599 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), 1600 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) 1601 { 1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA); 1603 goto err; 1604 } 1605 s2n(i,p); 1606 n+=i+2; 1607 } 1608 else 1609#endif 1610 { 1611 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 1612 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 1614 goto f_err; 1615 } 1616 } 1617 1618 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 1619 l2n3(n,d); 1620 1621 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 1622 * it off */ 1623 s->init_num=n+4; 1624 s->init_off=0; 1625 } 1626 1627 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 1628 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1629 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1630f_err: 1631 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1632err: 1633#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1634 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1635 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1636#endif 1637 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1638 return(-1); 1639 } 1640 1641int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 1642 { 1643 unsigned char *p,*d; 1644 int i,j,nl,off,n; 1645 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; 1646 X509_NAME *name; 1647 BUF_MEM *buf; 1648 1649 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) 1650 { 1651 buf=s->init_buf; 1652 1653 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); 1654 1655 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 1656 p++; 1657 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); 1658 d[0]=n; 1659 p+=n; 1660 n++; 1661 1662 off=n; 1663 p+=2; 1664 n+=2; 1665 1666 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 1667 nl=0; 1668 if (sk != NULL) 1669 { 1670 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) 1671 { 1672 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); 1673 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL); 1674 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2)) 1675 { 1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 1677 goto err; 1678 } 1679 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]); 1680 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) 1681 { 1682 s2n(j,p); 1683 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 1684 n+=2+j; 1685 nl+=2+j; 1686 } 1687 else 1688 { 1689 d=p; 1690 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 1691 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; 1692 n+=j; 1693 nl+=j; 1694 } 1695 } 1696 } 1697 /* else no CA names */ 1698 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]); 1699 s2n(nl,p); 1700 1701 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; 1702 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 1703 l2n3(n,d); 1704 1705 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 1706 * it off */ 1707 1708 s->init_num=n+4; 1709 s->init_off=0; 1710#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 1711 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 1712 1713 /* do the header */ 1714 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1715 *(p++)=0; 1716 *(p++)=0; 1717 *(p++)=0; 1718 s->init_num += 4; 1719#endif 1720 1721 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 1722 } 1723 1724 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 1725 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1726err: 1727 return(-1); 1728 } 1729 1730int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1731 { 1732 int i,al,ok; 1733 long n; 1734 unsigned long l; 1735 unsigned char *p; 1736#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1737 RSA *rsa=NULL; 1738 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 1739#endif 1740#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1741 BIGNUM *pub=NULL; 1742 DH *dh_srvr; 1743#endif 1744#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 1745 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 1746#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 1747 1748#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1749 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 1750 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 1751 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 1752 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1753#endif 1754 1755 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 1756 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 1757 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 1758 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1759 2048, /* ??? */ 1760 &ok); 1761 1762 if (!ok) return((int)n); 1763 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 1764 1765 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; 1766 1767#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1768 if (l & SSL_kRSA) 1769 { 1770 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 1771 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) 1772 { 1773 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 1774 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; 1775 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should 1776 * be sent already */ 1777 if (rsa == NULL) 1778 { 1779 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 1781 goto f_err; 1782 1783 } 1784 } 1785 else 1786 { 1787 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 1788 if ( (pkey == NULL) || 1789 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || 1790 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) 1791 { 1792 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 1794 goto f_err; 1795 } 1796 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; 1797 } 1798 1799 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */ 1800 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && 1801 s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 1802 { 1803 n2s(p,i); 1804 if (n != i+2) 1805 { 1806 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) 1807 { 1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 1809 goto err; 1810 } 1811 else 1812 p-=2; 1813 } 1814 else 1815 n=i; 1816 } 1817 1818 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 1819 1820 al = -1; 1821 1822 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 1823 { 1824 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1825 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ 1826 } 1827 1828 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 1829 { 1830 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 1831 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 1832 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 1833 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 1834 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 1835 * protocol version. 1836 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ 1837 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) && 1838 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) 1839 { 1840 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1841 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ 1842 1843 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 1844 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version 1845 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would 1846 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext 1847 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except 1848 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, 1849 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */ 1850 } 1851 } 1852 1853 if (al != -1) 1854 { 1855 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure 1856 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding 1857 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */ 1858 ERR_clear_error(); 1859 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 1860 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8; 1861 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; 1862 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ 1863 goto err; 1864 } 1865 1866 s->session->master_key_length= 1867 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 1868 s->session->master_key, 1869 p,i); 1870 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 1871 } 1872 else 1873#endif 1874#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1875 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) 1876 { 1877 n2s(p,i); 1878 if (n != i+2) 1879 { 1880 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) 1881 { 1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 1883 goto err; 1884 } 1885 else 1886 { 1887 p-=2; 1888 i=(int)n; 1889 } 1890 } 1891 1892 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */ 1893 { 1894 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); 1896 goto f_err; 1897 } 1898 else 1899 { 1900 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) 1901 { 1902 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1904 goto f_err; 1905 } 1906 else 1907 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; 1908 } 1909 1910 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); 1911 if (pub == NULL) 1912 { 1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB); 1914 goto err; 1915 } 1916 1917 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); 1918 1919 if (i <= 0) 1920 { 1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1922 goto err; 1923 } 1924 1925 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 1926 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; 1927 1928 BN_clear_free(pub); 1929 pub=NULL; 1930 s->session->master_key_length= 1931 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 1932 s->session->master_key,p,i); 1933 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 1934 } 1935 else 1936#endif 1937#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 1938 if (l & SSL_kKRB5) 1939 { 1940 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 1941 krb5_data enc_ticket; 1942 krb5_data authenticator; 1943 krb5_data enc_pms; 1944 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 1945 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 1946 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 1947 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 1948 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 1949 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 1950 int padl, outl; 1951 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 1952 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 1953 1954 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 1955 1956 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 1957 1958 n2s(p,i); 1959 enc_ticket.length = i; 1960 1961 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6) 1962 { 1963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1964 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 1965 goto err; 1966 } 1967 1968 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 1969 p+=enc_ticket.length; 1970 1971 n2s(p,i); 1972 authenticator.length = i; 1973 1974 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6) 1975 { 1976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1977 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 1978 goto err; 1979 } 1980 1981 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 1982 p+=authenticator.length; 1983 1984 n2s(p,i); 1985 enc_pms.length = i; 1986 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 1987 p+=enc_pms.length; 1988 1989 /* Note that the length is checked again below, 1990 ** after decryption 1991 */ 1992 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) 1993 { 1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1995 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 1996 goto err; 1997 } 1998 1999 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 2000 enc_pms.length + 6)) 2001 { 2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2003 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2004 goto err; 2005 } 2006 2007 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2008 &kssl_err)) != 0) 2009 { 2010#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2011 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2012 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2013 if (kssl_err.text) 2014 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2015#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2017 kssl_err.reason); 2018 goto err; 2019 } 2020 2021 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, 2022 ** but will return authtime == 0. 2023 */ 2024 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2025 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) 2026 { 2027#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2028 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2029 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2030 if (kssl_err.text) 2031 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2032#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2034 kssl_err.reason); 2035 goto err; 2036 } 2037 2038 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) 2039 { 2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2041 goto err; 2042 } 2043 2044#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2045 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2046#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2047 2048 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2049 if (enc == NULL) 2050 goto err; 2051 2052 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2053 2054 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) 2055 { 2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2057 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2058 goto err; 2059 } 2060 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, 2061 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2062 { 2063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2064 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2065 goto err; 2066 } 2067 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2068 { 2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2070 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2071 goto err; 2072 } 2073 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl)) 2074 { 2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2076 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2077 goto err; 2078 } 2079 outl += padl; 2080 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2081 { 2082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2083 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2084 goto err; 2085 } 2086 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 2087 { 2088 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2089 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2090 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2091 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of 2092 * the protocol version. 2093 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2094 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) 2095 */ 2096 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) 2097 { 2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2099 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2100 goto err; 2101 } 2102 } 2103 2104 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2105 2106 s->session->master_key_length= 2107 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2108 s->session->master_key, pms, outl); 2109 2110 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) 2111 { 2112 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2113 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 2114 { 2115 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2116 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len); 2117 } 2118 } 2119 2120 2121 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2122 ** but it caused problems for apache. 2123 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2124 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2125 */ 2126 } 2127 else 2128#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2129 2130#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2131 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE)) 2132 { 2133 int ret = 1; 2134 int field_size = 0; 2135 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2136 const EC_GROUP *group; 2137 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2138 2139 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2140 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 2141 { 2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2143 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2144 goto err; 2145 } 2146 2147 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2148 if (l & SSL_kECDH) 2149 { 2150 /* use the certificate */ 2151 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2152 } 2153 else 2154 { 2155 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when 2156 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. 2157 */ 2158 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2159 } 2160 2161 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2162 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2163 2164 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2165 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) 2166 { 2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2168 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2169 goto err; 2170 } 2171 2172 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2173 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) 2174 { 2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2176 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2177 goto err; 2178 } 2179 2180 if (n == 0L) 2181 { 2182 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2183 2184 if (l & SSL_kECDHE) 2185 { 2186 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2188 goto f_err; 2189 } 2190 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2191 == NULL) || 2192 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) 2193 { 2194 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client 2195 * authentication using ECDH certificates 2196 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is 2197 * never executed. When that support is 2198 * added, we ought to ensure the key 2199 * received in the certificate is 2200 * authorized for key agreement. 2201 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that 2202 * the two ECDH shares are for the same 2203 * group. 2204 */ 2205 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2207 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2208 goto f_err; 2209 } 2210 2211 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2212 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) 2213 { 2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2215 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2216 goto err; 2217 } 2218 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2219 } 2220 else 2221 { 2222 /* Get client's public key from encoded point 2223 * in the ClientKeyExchange message. 2224 */ 2225 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) 2226 { 2227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2228 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2229 goto err; 2230 } 2231 2232 /* Get encoded point length */ 2233 i = *p; 2234 p += 1; 2235 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 2236 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) 2237 { 2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2239 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2240 goto err; 2241 } 2242 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer 2243 * currently, so set it to the start 2244 */ 2245 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2246 } 2247 2248 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2249 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2250 if (field_size <= 0) 2251 { 2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2253 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2254 goto err; 2255 } 2256 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); 2257 if (i <= 0) 2258 { 2259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2260 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2261 goto err; 2262 } 2263 2264 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2265 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2266 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2267 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2268 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2269 2270 /* Compute the master secret */ 2271 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ 2272 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); 2273 2274 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2275 return (ret); 2276 } 2277 else 2278#endif 2279 { 2280 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2282 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2283 goto f_err; 2284 } 2285 2286 return(1); 2287f_err: 2288 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2289#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) 2290err: 2291#endif 2292#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2293 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2294 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2295 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2296 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2297 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2298#endif 2299 return(-1); 2300 } 2301 2302int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2303 { 2304 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 2305 unsigned char *p; 2306 int al,ok,ret=0; 2307 long n; 2308 int type=0,i,j; 2309 X509 *peer; 2310 2311 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2312 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2313 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 2314 -1, 2315 514, /* 514? */ 2316 &ok); 2317 2318 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2319 2320 if (s->session->peer != NULL) 2321 { 2322 peer=s->session->peer; 2323 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2324 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); 2325 } 2326 else 2327 { 2328 peer=NULL; 2329 pkey=NULL; 2330 } 2331 2332 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) 2333 { 2334 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 2335 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 2336 { 2337 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); 2339 goto f_err; 2340 } 2341 ret=1; 2342 goto end; 2343 } 2344 2345 if (peer == NULL) 2346 { 2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); 2348 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2349 goto f_err; 2350 } 2351 2352 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 2353 { 2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 2355 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2356 goto f_err; 2357 } 2358 2359 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 2360 { 2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 2362 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2363 goto f_err; 2364 } 2365 2366 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 2367 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2368 n2s(p,i); 2369 n-=2; 2370 if (i > n) 2371 { 2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2373 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2374 goto f_err; 2375 } 2376 2377 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 2378 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) 2379 { 2380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 2381 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2382 goto f_err; 2383 } 2384 2385#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2386 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) 2387 { 2388 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 2389 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 2390 pkey->pkey.rsa); 2391 if (i < 0) 2392 { 2393 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 2395 goto f_err; 2396 } 2397 if (i == 0) 2398 { 2399 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 2401 goto f_err; 2402 } 2403 } 2404 else 2405#endif 2406#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2407 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) 2408 { 2409 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2410 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2411 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); 2412 if (j <= 0) 2413 { 2414 /* bad signature */ 2415 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 2417 goto f_err; 2418 } 2419 } 2420 else 2421#endif 2422#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2423 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 2424 { 2425 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2426 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2427 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); 2428 if (j <= 0) 2429 { 2430 /* bad signature */ 2431 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 2433 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 2434 goto f_err; 2435 } 2436 } 2437 else 2438#endif 2439 { 2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2441 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 2442 goto f_err; 2443 } 2444 2445 2446 ret=1; 2447 if (0) 2448 { 2449f_err: 2450 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2451 } 2452end: 2453 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 2454 return(ret); 2455 } 2456 2457int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 2458 { 2459 int i,ok,al,ret= -1; 2460 X509 *x=NULL; 2461 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; 2462 const unsigned char *p,*q; 2463 unsigned char *d; 2464 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; 2465 2466 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2467 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 2468 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 2469 -1, 2470 s->max_cert_list, 2471 &ok); 2472 2473 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2474 2475 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) 2476 { 2477 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2478 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 2479 { 2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2481 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2482 goto f_err; 2483 } 2484 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ 2485 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 2486 { 2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 2488 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2489 goto f_err; 2490 } 2491 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 2492 return(1); 2493 } 2494 2495 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) 2496 { 2497 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 2499 goto f_err; 2500 } 2501 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2502 2503 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) 2504 { 2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2506 goto err; 2507 } 2508 2509 n2l3(p,llen); 2510 if (llen+3 != n) 2511 { 2512 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2514 goto f_err; 2515 } 2516 for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) 2517 { 2518 n2l3(p,l); 2519 if ((l+nc+3) > llen) 2520 { 2521 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2523 goto f_err; 2524 } 2525 2526 q=p; 2527 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); 2528 if (x == NULL) 2529 { 2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 2531 goto err; 2532 } 2533 if (p != (q+l)) 2534 { 2535 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2537 goto f_err; 2538 } 2539 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) 2540 { 2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2542 goto err; 2543 } 2544 x=NULL; 2545 nc+=l+3; 2546 } 2547 2548 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) 2549 { 2550 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 2551 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) 2552 { 2553 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 2555 goto f_err; 2556 } 2557 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 2558 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2559 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 2560 { 2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2562 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2563 goto f_err; 2564 } 2565 } 2566 else 2567 { 2568 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); 2569 if (i <= 0) 2570 { 2571 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 2573 goto f_err; 2574 } 2575 } 2576 2577 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 2578 X509_free(s->session->peer); 2579 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); 2580 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 2581 2582 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL 2583 * when we arrive here. */ 2584 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 2585 { 2586 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 2587 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 2588 { 2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2590 goto err; 2591 } 2592 } 2593 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 2594 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 2595 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; 2596 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the 2597 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ 2598 2599 sk=NULL; 2600 2601 ret=1; 2602 if (0) 2603 { 2604f_err: 2605 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2606 } 2607err: 2608 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); 2609 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); 2610 return(ret); 2611 } 2612 2613int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 2614 { 2615 unsigned long l; 2616 X509 *x; 2617 2618 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) 2619 { 2620 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); 2621 if (x == NULL && 2622 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 2623 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms 2624 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK)) 2625 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)) 2626 { 2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2628 return(0); 2629 } 2630 2631 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x); 2632 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 2633 s->init_num=(int)l; 2634 s->init_off=0; 2635 } 2636 2637 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 2638 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2639 } 2640 2641 2642#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2643/* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */ 2644static int nid2curve_id(int nid) 2645{ 2646 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) 2647 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */ 2648 switch (nid) { 2649 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 2650 return 1; 2651 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 2652 return 2; 2653 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 2654 return 3; 2655 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 2656 return 4; 2657 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 2658 return 5; 2659 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 2660 return 6; 2661 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 2662 return 7; 2663 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 2664 return 8; 2665 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 2666 return 9; 2667 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 2668 return 10; 2669 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 2670 return 11; 2671 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 2672 return 12; 2673 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 2674 return 13; 2675 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 2676 return 14; 2677 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 2678 return 15; 2679 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 2680 return 16; 2681 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 2682 return 17; 2683 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 2684 return 18; 2685 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 2686 return 19; 2687 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 2688 return 20; 2689 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 2690 return 21; 2691 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 2692 return 22; 2693 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 2694 return 23; 2695 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 2696 return 24; 2697 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 2698 return 25; 2699 default: 2700 return 0; 2701 } 2702} 2703#endif 2704#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 2705int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 2706 { 2707 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) 2708 { 2709 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; 2710 int len, slen; 2711 unsigned int hlen; 2712 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2713 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2714 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2715 unsigned char key_name[16]; 2716 2717 /* get session encoding length */ 2718 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 2719 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is 2720 * too long 2721 */ 2722 if (slen > 0xFF00) 2723 return -1; 2724 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 2725 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length 2726 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 2727 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 2728 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 2729 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 2730 */ 2731 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 2732 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + 2733 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 2734 return -1; 2735 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen); 2736 if (!senc) 2737 return -1; 2738 p = senc; 2739 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); 2740 2741 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2742 /* do the header */ 2743 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 2744 /* Skip message length for now */ 2745 p += 3; 2746 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2747 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2748 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present 2749 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values 2750 * from parent ctx. 2751 */ 2752 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 2753 { 2754 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 2755 &hctx, 1) < 0) 2756 { 2757 OPENSSL_free(senc); 2758 return -1; 2759 } 2760 } 2761 else 2762 { 2763 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); 2764 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2765 s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); 2766 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 2767 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 2768 memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 2769 } 2770 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p); 2771 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 2772 p += 2; 2773 /* Output key name */ 2774 macstart = p; 2775 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 2776 p += 16; 2777 /* output IV */ 2778 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 2779 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2780 /* Encrypt session data */ 2781 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); 2782 p += len; 2783 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); 2784 p += len; 2785 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2786 2787 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); 2788 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); 2789 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2790 2791 p += hlen; 2792 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 2793 /* Total length */ 2794 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2795 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; 2796 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ 2797 p += 4; 2798 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ 2799 2800 /* number of bytes to write */ 2801 s->init_num= len; 2802 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 2803 s->init_off=0; 2804 OPENSSL_free(senc); 2805 } 2806 2807 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 2808 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2809 } 2810 2811int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 2812 { 2813 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) 2814 { 2815 unsigned char *p; 2816 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 2817 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + 2818 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 2819 * + (ocsp response) 2820 */ 2821 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) 2822 return -1; 2823 2824 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2825 2826 /* do the header */ 2827 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 2828 /* message length */ 2829 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); 2830 /* status type */ 2831 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; 2832 /* length of OCSP response */ 2833 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 2834 /* actual response */ 2835 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 2836 /* number of bytes to write */ 2837 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 2838 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 2839 s->init_off = 0; 2840 } 2841 2842 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 2843 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2844 } 2845#endif 2846