s3_srvr.c revision 186872
1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124 125#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 126#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 127 128#include <stdio.h> 129#include "ssl_locl.h" 130#include "kssl_lcl.h" 131#include <openssl/buffer.h> 132#include <openssl/rand.h> 133#include <openssl/objects.h> 134#include <openssl/evp.h> 135#include <openssl/x509.h> 136#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 137#include <openssl/dh.h> 138#endif 139#include <openssl/bn.h> 140#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 141#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 142#endif 143#include <openssl/md5.h> 144 145static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 146 147#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 148static int nid2curve_id(int nid); 149#endif 150 151static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 152 { 153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 154 return(SSLv3_server_method()); 155 else 156 return(NULL); 157 } 158 159IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 160 ssl3_accept, 161 ssl_undefined_function, 162 ssl3_get_server_method) 163 164int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 165 { 166 BUF_MEM *buf; 167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); 168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; 169 long num1; 170 int ret= -1; 171 int new_state,state,skip=0; 172 173 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); 174 ERR_clear_error(); 175 clear_sys_error(); 176 177 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 178 cb=s->info_callback; 179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 181 182 /* init things to blank */ 183 s->in_handshake++; 184 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 185 186 if (s->cert == NULL) 187 { 188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 189 return(-1); 190 } 191 192 for (;;) 193 { 194 state=s->state; 195 196 switch (s->state) 197 { 198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 199 s->new_session=1; 200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 201 202 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 203 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 205 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 206 207 s->server=1; 208 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); 209 210 if ((s->version>>8) != 3) 211 { 212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 213 return -1; 214 } 215 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 216 217 if (s->init_buf == NULL) 218 { 219 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) 220 { 221 ret= -1; 222 goto end; 223 } 224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) 225 { 226 ret= -1; 227 goto end; 228 } 229 s->init_buf=buf; 230 } 231 232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) 233 { 234 ret= -1; 235 goto end; 236 } 237 238 s->init_num=0; 239 240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) 241 { 242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that 243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 244 */ 245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } 246 247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 250 } 251 else 252 { 253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, 254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */ 255 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 256 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 257 } 258 break; 259 260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 262 263 s->shutdown=0; 264 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 265 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 266 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 267 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 268 s->init_num=0; 269 270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 271 break; 272 273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 274 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 275 break; 276 277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 280 281 s->shutdown=0; 282 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 283 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 284 s->new_session = 2; 285 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 286 s->init_num=0; 287 break; 288 289 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 290 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 291 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 292 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 293 294 if (s->hit) 295 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 296 else 297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 298 s->init_num=0; 299 break; 300 301 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 302 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 303 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */ 304 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) 305 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5)) 306 { 307 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 308 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 309 } 310 else 311 skip=1; 312 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 313 s->init_num=0; 314 break; 315 316 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 317 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 318 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; 319 320 /* clear this, it may get reset by 321 * send_server_key_exchange */ 322 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) 323#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 324 && !(l & SSL_KRB5) 325#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 326 ) 327 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key 328 * even when forbidden by protocol specs 329 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to 330 * be able to handle this) */ 331 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 332 else 333 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; 334 335 336 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or 337 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate 338 * 339 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange 340 * message only if the cipher suite is either 341 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the 342 * server certificate contains the server's 343 * public key for key exchange. 344 */ 345 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp 346 || (l & SSL_kECDHE) 347 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA)) 348 || ((l & SSL_kRSA) 349 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 350 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 351 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 352 ) 353 ) 354 ) 355 ) 356 { 357 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 358 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 359 } 360 else 361 skip=1; 362 363 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 364 s->init_num=0; 365 break; 366 367 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 368 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 369 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 370 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 371 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, 372 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ 373 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 374 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 375 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites 376 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts 377 * and in RFC 2246): */ 378 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) && 379 /* ... except when the application insists on verification 380 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ 381 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 382 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ 383 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5)) 384 { 385 /* no cert request */ 386 skip=1; 387 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; 388 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 389 } 390 else 391 { 392 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; 393 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 394 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 395#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 397#else 398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 399 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 400#endif 401 s->init_num=0; 402 } 403 break; 404 405 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 406 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 407 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); 408 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 409 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 410 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 411 s->init_num=0; 412 break; 413 414 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 415 /* number of bytes to be flushed */ 416 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL); 417 if (num1 > 0) 418 { 419 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; 420 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio); 421 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; } 422 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 423 } 424 425 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; 426 break; 427 428 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 429 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 430 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ 431 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); 432 if (ret <= 0) 433 goto end; 434 if (ret == 2) 435 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; 436 else { 437 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 438 { 439 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 440 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 441 } 442 s->init_num=0; 443 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 444 } 445 break; 446 447 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 448 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 449 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 450 if (ret <= 0) 451 goto end; 452 if (ret == 2) 453 { 454 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when 455 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in 456 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify 457 * message is not sent. 458 */ 459 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 460 s->init_num = 0; 461 } 462 else 463 { 464 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 465 s->init_num=0; 466 467 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is 468 * a client cert, it can be verified 469 */ 470 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, 471 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1), 472 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0])); 473 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, 474 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2), 475 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); 476 } 477 break; 478 479 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 480 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 481 482 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ 483 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 484 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 485 486 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 487 s->init_num=0; 488 break; 489 490 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 491 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 492 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 493 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 494 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 495 if (s->hit) 496 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 497 else 498 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 499 s->init_num=0; 500 break; 501 502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 504 505 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 506 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) 507 { ret= -1; goto end; } 508 509 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 510 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 511 512 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 513 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 514 s->init_num=0; 515 516 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 517 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 518 { 519 ret= -1; 520 goto end; 521 } 522 523 break; 524 525 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 526 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 527 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, 528 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 529 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 530 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 531 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 532 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 533 if (s->hit) 534 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 535 else 536 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; 537 s->init_num=0; 538 break; 539 540 case SSL_ST_OK: 541 /* clean a few things up */ 542 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 543 544 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 545 s->init_buf=NULL; 546 547 /* remove buffering on output */ 548 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 549 550 s->init_num=0; 551 552 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ 553 { 554 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless 555 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */ 556 557 s->new_session=0; 558 559 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 560 561 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 562 /* s->server=1; */ 563 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; 564 565 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); 566 } 567 568 ret = 1; 569 goto end; 570 /* break; */ 571 572 default: 573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 574 ret= -1; 575 goto end; 576 /* break; */ 577 } 578 579 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) 580 { 581 if (s->debug) 582 { 583 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 584 goto end; 585 } 586 587 588 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) 589 { 590 new_state=s->state; 591 s->state=state; 592 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); 593 s->state=new_state; 594 } 595 } 596 skip=0; 597 } 598end: 599 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 600 601 s->in_handshake--; 602 if (cb != NULL) 603 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); 604 return(ret); 605 } 606 607int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 608 { 609 unsigned char *p; 610 611 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) 612 { 613 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 614 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 615 *(p++)=0; 616 *(p++)=0; 617 *(p++)=0; 618 619 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 620 /* number of bytes to write */ 621 s->init_num=4; 622 s->init_off=0; 623 } 624 625 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 626 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 627 } 628 629int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) 630 { 631 int ok; 632 long n; 633 634 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, 635 * so permit appropriate message length */ 636 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 637 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 638 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 639 -1, 640 s->max_cert_list, 641 &ok); 642 if (!ok) return((int)n); 643 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 644 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) 645 { 646 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, 647 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) 648 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared 649 * when a handshake is not completed ... */ 650#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 651 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 652 { 653 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 654 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 655 } 656#endif 657 return 2; 658 } 659 return 1; 660} 661 662int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 663 { 664 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; 665 unsigned int cookie_len; 666 long n; 667 unsigned long id; 668 unsigned char *p,*d,*q; 669 SSL_CIPHER *c; 670#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 671 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; 672#endif 673 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; 674 675 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. 676 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, 677 * This down switching should be handled by a different method. 678 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with 679 * TLSv1. 680 */ 681 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) 682 { 683 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 684 } 685 s->first_packet=1; 686 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 687 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 688 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 689 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 690 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 691 &ok); 692 693 if (!ok) return((int)n); 694 s->first_packet=0; 695 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 696 697 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header 698 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ 699 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; 700 p+=2; 701 702 if (s->client_version < s->version) 703 { 704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 705 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) 706 { 707 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ 708 s->version = s->client_version; 709 } 710 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 711 goto f_err; 712 } 713 714 /* load the client random */ 715 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 716 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 717 718 /* get the session-id */ 719 j= *(p++); 720 721 s->hit=0; 722 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation 723 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option 724 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7. 725 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default, 726 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications 727 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with 728 * an earlier library version) 729 */ 730 if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) 731 { 732 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 733 goto err; 734 } 735 else 736 { 737 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j); 738 if (i == 1) 739 { /* previous session */ 740 s->hit=1; 741 } 742 else if (i == -1) 743 goto err; 744 else /* i == 0 */ 745 { 746 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 747 goto err; 748 } 749 } 750 751 p+=j; 752 753 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) 754 { 755 /* cookie stuff */ 756 cookie_len = *(p++); 757 758 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 759 s->d1->send_cookie == 0) 760 { 761 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */ 762 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len) 763 { 764 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 766 goto f_err; 767 } 768 } 769 770 /* 771 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 772 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 773 * does not cause an overflow. 774 */ 775 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) 776 { 777 /* too much data */ 778 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 780 goto f_err; 781 } 782 783 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 784 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 785 cookie_len > 0) 786 { 787 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 788 789 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) 790 { 791 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 792 cookie_len) == 0) 793 { 794 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 796 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 797 goto f_err; 798 } 799 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 800 } 801 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 802 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ 803 { 804 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 806 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 807 goto f_err; 808 } 809 } 810 811 p += cookie_len; 812 } 813 814 n2s(p,i); 815 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) 816 { 817 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ 818 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 820 goto f_err; 821 } 822 if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) 823 { 824 /* not enough data */ 825 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 827 goto f_err; 828 } 829 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) 830 == NULL)) 831 { 832 goto err; 833 } 834 p+=i; 835 836 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 837 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) 838 { 839 j=0; 840 id=s->session->cipher->id; 841 842#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 843 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers)); 844#endif 845 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) 846 { 847 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i); 848#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 849 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 850 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 851#endif 852 if (c->id == id) 853 { 854 j=1; 855 break; 856 } 857 } 858 if (j == 0) 859 { 860 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) 861 { 862 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */ 863 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 864 } 865 else 866 { 867 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher 868 * list if we are asked to reuse it */ 869 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 871 goto f_err; 872 } 873 } 874 } 875 876 /* compression */ 877 i= *(p++); 878 if ((p+i) > (d+n)) 879 { 880 /* not enough data */ 881 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 883 goto f_err; 884 } 885 q=p; 886 for (j=0; j<i; j++) 887 { 888 if (p[j] == 0) break; 889 } 890 891 p+=i; 892 if (j >= i) 893 { 894 /* no compress */ 895 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 897 goto f_err; 898 } 899 900 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 901 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 902 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ 903 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; 904#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 905 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL) 906 { /* See if we have a match */ 907 int m,nn,o,v,done=0; 908 909 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 910 for (m=0; m<nn; m++) 911 { 912 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 913 v=comp->id; 914 for (o=0; o<i; o++) 915 { 916 if (v == q[o]) 917 { 918 done=1; 919 break; 920 } 921 } 922 if (done) break; 923 } 924 if (done) 925 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 926 else 927 comp=NULL; 928 } 929#endif 930 931 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */ 932#if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test 933 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b, 934 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */ 935 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) 936 { 937 if (p < (d+n)) 938 { 939 /* wrong number of bytes, 940 * there could be more to follow */ 941 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 943 goto f_err; 944 } 945 } 946#endif 947 948 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must 949 * pick a cipher */ 950 951 if (!s->hit) 952 { 953#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 954 s->session->compress_meth=0; 955#else 956 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; 957#endif 958 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 959 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 960 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 961 if (ciphers == NULL) 962 { 963 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); 965 goto f_err; 966 } 967 ciphers=NULL; 968 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, 969 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 970 971 if (c == NULL) 972 { 973 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 975 goto f_err; 976 } 977 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; 978 } 979 else 980 { 981 /* Session-id reuse */ 982#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 983 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 984 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; 985 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; 986 987 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 988 { 989 sk=s->session->ciphers; 990 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) 991 { 992 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); 993 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL) 994 nc=c; 995 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 996 ec=c; 997 } 998 if (nc != NULL) 999 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; 1000 else if (ec != NULL) 1001 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; 1002 else 1003 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1004 } 1005 else 1006#endif 1007 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1008 } 1009 1010 /* we now have the following setup. 1011 * client_random 1012 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1013 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1014 * compression - basically ignored right now 1015 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1016 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1017 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1018 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1019 */ 1020 1021 ret=1; 1022 if (0) 1023 { 1024f_err: 1025 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1026 } 1027err: 1028 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1029 return(ret); 1030 } 1031 1032int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1033 { 1034 unsigned char *buf; 1035 unsigned char *p,*d; 1036 int i,sl; 1037 unsigned long l,Time; 1038 1039 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1040 { 1041 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1042 p=s->s3->server_random; 1043 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ 1044 l2n(Time,p); 1045 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) 1046 return -1; 1047 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1048 d=p= &(buf[4]); 1049 1050 *(p++)=s->version>>8; 1051 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; 1052 1053 /* Random stuff */ 1054 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1055 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1056 1057 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the 1058 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the 1059 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send 1060 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length 1061 * session-id if we want it to be single use. 1062 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id 1063 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff. 1064 */ 1065 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)) 1066 s->session->session_id_length=0; 1067 1068 sl=s->session->session_id_length; 1069 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) 1070 { 1071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1072 return -1; 1073 } 1074 *(p++)=sl; 1075 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); 1076 p+=sl; 1077 1078 /* put the cipher */ 1079 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); 1080 p+=i; 1081 1082 /* put the compression method */ 1083#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1084 *(p++)=0; 1085#else 1086 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1087 *(p++)=0; 1088 else 1089 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1090#endif 1091 1092 /* do the header */ 1093 l=(p-d); 1094 d=buf; 1095 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1096 l2n3(l,d); 1097 1098 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; 1099 /* number of bytes to write */ 1100 s->init_num=p-buf; 1101 s->init_off=0; 1102 } 1103 1104 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ 1105 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1106 } 1107 1108int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1109 { 1110 unsigned char *p; 1111 1112 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) 1113 { 1114 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1115 1116 /* do the header */ 1117 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1118 *(p++)=0; 1119 *(p++)=0; 1120 *(p++)=0; 1121 1122 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1123 /* number of bytes to write */ 1124 s->init_num=4; 1125 s->init_off=0; 1126 } 1127 1128 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ 1129 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1130 } 1131 1132int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1133 { 1134#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1135 unsigned char *q; 1136 int j,num; 1137 RSA *rsa; 1138 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1139 unsigned int u; 1140#endif 1141#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1142 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; 1143#endif 1144#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1145 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; 1146 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1147 int encodedlen = 0; 1148 int curve_id = 0; 1149 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1150#endif 1151 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1152 unsigned char *p,*d; 1153 int al,i; 1154 unsigned long type; 1155 int n; 1156 CERT *cert; 1157 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1158 int nr[4],kn; 1159 BUF_MEM *buf; 1160 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1161 1162 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1163 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) 1164 { 1165 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK; 1166 cert=s->cert; 1167 1168 buf=s->init_buf; 1169 1170 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; 1171 n=0; 1172#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1173 if (type & SSL_kRSA) 1174 { 1175 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; 1176 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1177 { 1178 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1179 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1180 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1181 if(rsa == NULL) 1182 { 1183 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1185 goto f_err; 1186 } 1187 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1188 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; 1189 } 1190 if (rsa == NULL) 1191 { 1192 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1194 goto f_err; 1195 } 1196 r[0]=rsa->n; 1197 r[1]=rsa->e; 1198 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 1199 } 1200 else 1201#endif 1202#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1203 if (type & SSL_kEDH) 1204 { 1205 dhp=cert->dh_tmp; 1206 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1207 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1208 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1209 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1210 if (dhp == NULL) 1211 { 1212 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1214 goto f_err; 1215 } 1216 1217 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 1218 { 1219 DH_free(dh); 1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1221 goto err; 1222 } 1223 1224 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) 1225 { 1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1227 goto err; 1228 } 1229 1230 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; 1231 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || 1232 dhp->priv_key == NULL || 1233 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) 1234 { 1235 if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) 1236 { 1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1238 ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1239 goto err; 1240 } 1241 } 1242 else 1243 { 1244 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); 1245 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); 1246 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || 1247 (dh->priv_key == NULL)) 1248 { 1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1250 goto err; 1251 } 1252 } 1253 r[0]=dh->p; 1254 r[1]=dh->g; 1255 r[2]=dh->pub_key; 1256 } 1257 else 1258#endif 1259#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1260 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) 1261 { 1262 const EC_GROUP *group; 1263 1264 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; 1265 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1266 { 1267 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1268 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1269 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1270 } 1271 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1272 { 1273 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1275 goto f_err; 1276 } 1277 1278 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) 1279 { 1280 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1282 goto err; 1283 } 1284 1285 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1286 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1287 { 1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1289 goto err; 1290 } 1291 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp)) 1292 { 1293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1294 goto err; 1295 } 1296 ecdh = ecdhp; 1297 1298 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; 1299 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1300 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1301 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) 1302 { 1303 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) 1304 { 1305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1306 goto err; 1307 } 1308 } 1309 1310 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1311 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1312 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) 1313 { 1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1315 goto err; 1316 } 1317 1318 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1319 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 1320 { 1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1322 goto err; 1323 } 1324 1325 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH 1326 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 1327 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. 1328 */ 1329 if ((curve_id = 1330 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1331 == 0) 1332 { 1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1334 goto err; 1335 } 1336 1337 /* Encode the public key. 1338 * First check the size of encoding and 1339 * allocate memory accordingly. 1340 */ 1341 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1342 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1343 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1344 NULL, 0, NULL); 1345 1346 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1347 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 1348 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1349 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) 1350 { 1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1352 goto err; 1353 } 1354 1355 1356 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1357 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1358 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1359 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1360 1361 if (encodedlen == 0) 1362 { 1363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1364 goto err; 1365 } 1366 1367 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; 1368 1369 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 1370 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1371 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes 1372 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1373 * structure. 1374 */ 1375 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1376 1377 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message 1378 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs 1379 */ 1380 r[0]=NULL; 1381 r[1]=NULL; 1382 r[2]=NULL; 1383 r[3]=NULL; 1384 } 1385 else 1386#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1387 { 1388 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1390 goto f_err; 1391 } 1392 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) 1393 { 1394 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1395 n+=2+nr[i]; 1396 } 1397 1398 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)) 1399 { 1400 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) 1401 == NULL) 1402 { 1403 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1404 goto f_err; 1405 } 1406 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1407 } 1408 else 1409 { 1410 pkey=NULL; 1411 kn=0; 1412 } 1413 1414 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) 1415 { 1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); 1417 goto err; 1418 } 1419 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1420 p= &(d[4]); 1421 1422 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) 1423 { 1424 s2n(nr[i],p); 1425 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); 1426 p+=nr[i]; 1427 } 1428 1429#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1430 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) 1431 { 1432 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. 1433 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: 1434 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 1435 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by 1436 * the actual encoded point itself 1437 */ 1438 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1439 p += 1; 1440 *p = 0; 1441 p += 1; 1442 *p = curve_id; 1443 p += 1; 1444 *p = encodedlen; 1445 p += 1; 1446 memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 1447 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 1448 encodedlen); 1449 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1450 p += encodedlen; 1451 } 1452#endif 1453 1454 /* not anonymous */ 1455 if (pkey != NULL) 1456 { 1457 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) 1458 * and p points to the space at the end. */ 1459#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1460 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) 1461 { 1462 q=md_buf; 1463 j=0; 1464 for (num=2; num > 0; num--) 1465 { 1466 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) 1467 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); 1468 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1469 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1470 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1471 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, 1472 (unsigned int *)&i); 1473 q+=i; 1474 j+=i; 1475 } 1476 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 1477 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) 1478 { 1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); 1480 goto err; 1481 } 1482 s2n(u,p); 1483 n+=u+2; 1484 } 1485 else 1486#endif 1487#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) 1488 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) 1489 { 1490 /* lets do DSS */ 1491 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL); 1492 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1493 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1494 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1495 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), 1496 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) 1497 { 1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA); 1499 goto err; 1500 } 1501 s2n(i,p); 1502 n+=i+2; 1503 } 1504 else 1505#endif 1506#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA) 1507 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 1508 { 1509 /* let's do ECDSA */ 1510 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL); 1511 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1512 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1513 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1514 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), 1515 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) 1516 { 1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA); 1518 goto err; 1519 } 1520 s2n(i,p); 1521 n+=i+2; 1522 } 1523 else 1524#endif 1525 { 1526 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 1527 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 1529 goto f_err; 1530 } 1531 } 1532 1533 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 1534 l2n3(n,d); 1535 1536 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 1537 * it off */ 1538 s->init_num=n+4; 1539 s->init_off=0; 1540 } 1541 1542 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 1543 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1544 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1545f_err: 1546 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1547err: 1548#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1549 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1550 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1551#endif 1552 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1553 return(-1); 1554 } 1555 1556int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 1557 { 1558 unsigned char *p,*d; 1559 int i,j,nl,off,n; 1560 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; 1561 X509_NAME *name; 1562 BUF_MEM *buf; 1563 1564 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) 1565 { 1566 buf=s->init_buf; 1567 1568 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); 1569 1570 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 1571 p++; 1572 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); 1573 d[0]=n; 1574 p+=n; 1575 n++; 1576 1577 off=n; 1578 p+=2; 1579 n+=2; 1580 1581 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 1582 nl=0; 1583 if (sk != NULL) 1584 { 1585 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) 1586 { 1587 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); 1588 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL); 1589 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2)) 1590 { 1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 1592 goto err; 1593 } 1594 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]); 1595 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) 1596 { 1597 s2n(j,p); 1598 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 1599 n+=2+j; 1600 nl+=2+j; 1601 } 1602 else 1603 { 1604 d=p; 1605 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 1606 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; 1607 n+=j; 1608 nl+=j; 1609 } 1610 } 1611 } 1612 /* else no CA names */ 1613 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]); 1614 s2n(nl,p); 1615 1616 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; 1617 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 1618 l2n3(n,d); 1619 1620 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 1621 * it off */ 1622 1623 s->init_num=n+4; 1624 s->init_off=0; 1625#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 1626 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 1627 1628 /* do the header */ 1629 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1630 *(p++)=0; 1631 *(p++)=0; 1632 *(p++)=0; 1633 s->init_num += 4; 1634#endif 1635 1636 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 1637 } 1638 1639 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 1640 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1641err: 1642 return(-1); 1643 } 1644 1645int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1646 { 1647 int i,al,ok; 1648 long n; 1649 unsigned long l; 1650 unsigned char *p; 1651#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1652 RSA *rsa=NULL; 1653 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 1654#endif 1655#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1656 BIGNUM *pub=NULL; 1657 DH *dh_srvr; 1658#endif 1659#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 1660 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 1661#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 1662 1663#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1664 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 1665 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 1666 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 1667 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1668#endif 1669 1670 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 1671 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 1672 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 1673 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1674 2048, /* ??? */ 1675 &ok); 1676 1677 if (!ok) return((int)n); 1678 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 1679 1680 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; 1681 1682#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1683 if (l & SSL_kRSA) 1684 { 1685 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 1686 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) 1687 { 1688 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 1689 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; 1690 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should 1691 * be sent already */ 1692 if (rsa == NULL) 1693 { 1694 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 1696 goto f_err; 1697 1698 } 1699 } 1700 else 1701 { 1702 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 1703 if ( (pkey == NULL) || 1704 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || 1705 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) 1706 { 1707 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 1709 goto f_err; 1710 } 1711 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; 1712 } 1713 1714 /* TLS */ 1715 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) 1716 { 1717 n2s(p,i); 1718 if (n != i+2) 1719 { 1720 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) 1721 { 1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 1723 goto err; 1724 } 1725 else 1726 p-=2; 1727 } 1728 else 1729 n=i; 1730 } 1731 1732 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 1733 1734 al = -1; 1735 1736 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 1737 { 1738 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1739 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ 1740 } 1741 1742 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 1743 { 1744 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 1745 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 1746 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 1747 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 1748 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 1749 * protocol version. 1750 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ 1751 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) && 1752 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) 1753 { 1754 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1755 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ 1756 1757 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 1758 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version 1759 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would 1760 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext 1761 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except 1762 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, 1763 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */ 1764 } 1765 } 1766 1767 if (al != -1) 1768 { 1769 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure 1770 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding 1771 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */ 1772 ERR_clear_error(); 1773 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 1774 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8; 1775 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; 1776 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ 1777 goto err; 1778 } 1779 1780 s->session->master_key_length= 1781 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 1782 s->session->master_key, 1783 p,i); 1784 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 1785 } 1786 else 1787#endif 1788#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1789 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) 1790 { 1791 n2s(p,i); 1792 if (n != i+2) 1793 { 1794 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) 1795 { 1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 1797 goto err; 1798 } 1799 else 1800 { 1801 p-=2; 1802 i=(int)n; 1803 } 1804 } 1805 1806 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */ 1807 { 1808 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); 1810 goto f_err; 1811 } 1812 else 1813 { 1814 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) 1815 { 1816 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1818 goto f_err; 1819 } 1820 else 1821 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; 1822 } 1823 1824 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); 1825 if (pub == NULL) 1826 { 1827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB); 1828 goto err; 1829 } 1830 1831 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); 1832 1833 if (i <= 0) 1834 { 1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1836 goto err; 1837 } 1838 1839 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 1840 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; 1841 1842 BN_clear_free(pub); 1843 pub=NULL; 1844 s->session->master_key_length= 1845 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 1846 s->session->master_key,p,i); 1847 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 1848 } 1849 else 1850#endif 1851#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 1852 if (l & SSL_kKRB5) 1853 { 1854 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 1855 krb5_data enc_ticket; 1856 krb5_data authenticator; 1857 krb5_data enc_pms; 1858 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 1859 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 1860 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 1861 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 1862 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 1863 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 1864 int padl, outl; 1865 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 1866 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 1867 1868 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 1869 1870 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 1871 1872 n2s(p,i); 1873 enc_ticket.length = i; 1874 1875 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6) 1876 { 1877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1878 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 1879 goto err; 1880 } 1881 1882 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 1883 p+=enc_ticket.length; 1884 1885 n2s(p,i); 1886 authenticator.length = i; 1887 1888 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6) 1889 { 1890 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1891 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 1892 goto err; 1893 } 1894 1895 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 1896 p+=authenticator.length; 1897 1898 n2s(p,i); 1899 enc_pms.length = i; 1900 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 1901 p+=enc_pms.length; 1902 1903 /* Note that the length is checked again below, 1904 ** after decryption 1905 */ 1906 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) 1907 { 1908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1909 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 1910 goto err; 1911 } 1912 1913 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 1914 enc_pms.length + 6)) 1915 { 1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1917 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 1918 goto err; 1919 } 1920 1921 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 1922 &kssl_err)) != 0) 1923 { 1924#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 1925 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 1926 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 1927 if (kssl_err.text) 1928 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 1929#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 1930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1931 kssl_err.reason); 1932 goto err; 1933 } 1934 1935 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, 1936 ** but will return authtime == 0. 1937 */ 1938 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 1939 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) 1940 { 1941#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 1942 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 1943 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 1944 if (kssl_err.text) 1945 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 1946#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 1947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1948 kssl_err.reason); 1949 goto err; 1950 } 1951 1952 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) 1953 { 1954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 1955 goto err; 1956 } 1957 1958#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 1959 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 1960#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 1961 1962 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 1963 if (enc == NULL) 1964 goto err; 1965 1966 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 1967 1968 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) 1969 { 1970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1971 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 1972 goto err; 1973 } 1974 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, 1975 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 1976 { 1977 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1978 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 1979 goto err; 1980 } 1981 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 1982 { 1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1984 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 1985 goto err; 1986 } 1987 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl)) 1988 { 1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1990 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 1991 goto err; 1992 } 1993 outl += padl; 1994 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 1995 { 1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1997 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 1998 goto err; 1999 } 2000 if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 2001 { 2002 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2003 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2004 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2005 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of 2006 * the protocol version. 2007 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2008 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) 2009 */ 2010 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) && 2011 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) 2012 { 2013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2014 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2015 goto err; 2016 } 2017 } 2018 2019 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2020 2021 s->session->master_key_length= 2022 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2023 s->session->master_key, pms, outl); 2024 2025 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) 2026 { 2027 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2028 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 2029 { 2030 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2031 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len); 2032 } 2033 } 2034 2035 2036 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2037 ** but it caused problems for apache. 2038 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2039 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2040 */ 2041 } 2042 else 2043#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2044 2045#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2046 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE)) 2047 { 2048 int ret = 1; 2049 int field_size = 0; 2050 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2051 const EC_GROUP *group; 2052 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2053 2054 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2055 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 2056 { 2057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2058 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2059 goto err; 2060 } 2061 2062 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2063 if (l & SSL_kECDH) 2064 { 2065 /* use the certificate */ 2066 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2067 } 2068 else 2069 { 2070 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when 2071 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. 2072 */ 2073 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2074 } 2075 2076 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2077 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2078 2079 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2080 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) 2081 { 2082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2083 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2084 goto err; 2085 } 2086 2087 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2088 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) 2089 { 2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2091 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2092 goto err; 2093 } 2094 2095 if (n == 0L) 2096 { 2097 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2098 2099 if (l & SSL_kECDHE) 2100 { 2101 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2103 goto f_err; 2104 } 2105 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2106 == NULL) || 2107 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) 2108 { 2109 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client 2110 * authentication using ECDH certificates 2111 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is 2112 * never executed. When that support is 2113 * added, we ought to ensure the key 2114 * received in the certificate is 2115 * authorized for key agreement. 2116 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that 2117 * the two ECDH shares are for the same 2118 * group. 2119 */ 2120 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2122 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2123 goto f_err; 2124 } 2125 2126 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2127 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) 2128 { 2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2130 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2131 goto err; 2132 } 2133 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2134 } 2135 else 2136 { 2137 /* Get client's public key from encoded point 2138 * in the ClientKeyExchange message. 2139 */ 2140 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) 2141 { 2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2143 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2144 goto err; 2145 } 2146 2147 /* Get encoded point length */ 2148 i = *p; 2149 p += 1; 2150 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 2151 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) 2152 { 2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2154 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2155 goto err; 2156 } 2157 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer 2158 * currently, so set it to the start 2159 */ 2160 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2161 } 2162 2163 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2164 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2165 if (field_size <= 0) 2166 { 2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2168 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2169 goto err; 2170 } 2171 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); 2172 if (i <= 0) 2173 { 2174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2175 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2176 goto err; 2177 } 2178 2179 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2180 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2181 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2182 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2183 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2184 2185 /* Compute the master secret */ 2186 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ 2187 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); 2188 2189 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2190 return (ret); 2191 } 2192 else 2193#endif 2194 { 2195 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2197 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2198 goto f_err; 2199 } 2200 2201 return(1); 2202f_err: 2203 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2204#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) 2205err: 2206#endif 2207#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2208 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2209 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2210 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2211 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2212 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2213#endif 2214 return(-1); 2215 } 2216 2217int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2218 { 2219 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 2220 unsigned char *p; 2221 int al,ok,ret=0; 2222 long n; 2223 int type=0,i,j; 2224 X509 *peer; 2225 2226 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2227 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2228 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 2229 -1, 2230 514, /* 514? */ 2231 &ok); 2232 2233 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2234 2235 if (s->session->peer != NULL) 2236 { 2237 peer=s->session->peer; 2238 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2239 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); 2240 } 2241 else 2242 { 2243 peer=NULL; 2244 pkey=NULL; 2245 } 2246 2247 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) 2248 { 2249 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 2250 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 2251 { 2252 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); 2254 goto f_err; 2255 } 2256 ret=1; 2257 goto end; 2258 } 2259 2260 if (peer == NULL) 2261 { 2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); 2263 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2264 goto f_err; 2265 } 2266 2267 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 2268 { 2269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 2270 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2271 goto f_err; 2272 } 2273 2274 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 2275 { 2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 2277 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2278 goto f_err; 2279 } 2280 2281 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 2282 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2283 n2s(p,i); 2284 n-=2; 2285 if (i > n) 2286 { 2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2288 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2289 goto f_err; 2290 } 2291 2292 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 2293 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) 2294 { 2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 2296 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2297 goto f_err; 2298 } 2299 2300#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2301 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) 2302 { 2303 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 2304 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 2305 pkey->pkey.rsa); 2306 if (i < 0) 2307 { 2308 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 2310 goto f_err; 2311 } 2312 if (i == 0) 2313 { 2314 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 2316 goto f_err; 2317 } 2318 } 2319 else 2320#endif 2321#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2322 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) 2323 { 2324 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2325 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2326 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); 2327 if (j <= 0) 2328 { 2329 /* bad signature */ 2330 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 2332 goto f_err; 2333 } 2334 } 2335 else 2336#endif 2337#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2338 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 2339 { 2340 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2341 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2342 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); 2343 if (j <= 0) 2344 { 2345 /* bad signature */ 2346 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 2348 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 2349 goto f_err; 2350 } 2351 } 2352 else 2353#endif 2354 { 2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2356 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 2357 goto f_err; 2358 } 2359 2360 2361 ret=1; 2362 if (0) 2363 { 2364f_err: 2365 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2366 } 2367end: 2368 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 2369 return(ret); 2370 } 2371 2372int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 2373 { 2374 int i,ok,al,ret= -1; 2375 X509 *x=NULL; 2376 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; 2377 const unsigned char *p,*q; 2378 unsigned char *d; 2379 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; 2380 2381 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2382 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 2383 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 2384 -1, 2385 s->max_cert_list, 2386 &ok); 2387 2388 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2389 2390 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) 2391 { 2392 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2393 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 2394 { 2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2396 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2397 goto f_err; 2398 } 2399 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ 2400 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 2401 { 2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 2403 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2404 goto f_err; 2405 } 2406 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 2407 return(1); 2408 } 2409 2410 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) 2411 { 2412 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 2414 goto f_err; 2415 } 2416 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2417 2418 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) 2419 { 2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2421 goto err; 2422 } 2423 2424 n2l3(p,llen); 2425 if (llen+3 != n) 2426 { 2427 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2429 goto f_err; 2430 } 2431 for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) 2432 { 2433 n2l3(p,l); 2434 if ((l+nc+3) > llen) 2435 { 2436 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2438 goto f_err; 2439 } 2440 2441 q=p; 2442 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); 2443 if (x == NULL) 2444 { 2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 2446 goto err; 2447 } 2448 if (p != (q+l)) 2449 { 2450 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2452 goto f_err; 2453 } 2454 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) 2455 { 2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2457 goto err; 2458 } 2459 x=NULL; 2460 nc+=l+3; 2461 } 2462 2463 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) 2464 { 2465 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 2466 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) 2467 { 2468 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 2470 goto f_err; 2471 } 2472 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 2473 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2474 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 2475 { 2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2477 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2478 goto f_err; 2479 } 2480 } 2481 else 2482 { 2483 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); 2484 if (i <= 0) 2485 { 2486 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 2488 goto f_err; 2489 } 2490 } 2491 2492 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 2493 X509_free(s->session->peer); 2494 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); 2495 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 2496 2497 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL 2498 * when we arrive here. */ 2499 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 2500 { 2501 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 2502 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 2503 { 2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2505 goto err; 2506 } 2507 } 2508 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 2509 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 2510 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; 2511 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the 2512 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ 2513 2514 sk=NULL; 2515 2516 ret=1; 2517 if (0) 2518 { 2519f_err: 2520 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2521 } 2522err: 2523 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); 2524 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); 2525 return(ret); 2526 } 2527 2528int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 2529 { 2530 unsigned long l; 2531 X509 *x; 2532 2533 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) 2534 { 2535 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); 2536 if (x == NULL && 2537 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 2538 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms 2539 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK)) 2540 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)) 2541 { 2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2543 return(0); 2544 } 2545 2546 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x); 2547 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 2548 s->init_num=(int)l; 2549 s->init_off=0; 2550 } 2551 2552 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 2553 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2554 } 2555 2556 2557#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2558/* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */ 2559static int nid2curve_id(int nid) 2560{ 2561 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) 2562 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */ 2563 switch (nid) { 2564 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 2565 return 1; 2566 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 2567 return 2; 2568 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 2569 return 3; 2570 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 2571 return 4; 2572 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 2573 return 5; 2574 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 2575 return 6; 2576 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 2577 return 7; 2578 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 2579 return 8; 2580 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 2581 return 9; 2582 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 2583 return 10; 2584 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 2585 return 11; 2586 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 2587 return 12; 2588 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 2589 return 13; 2590 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 2591 return 14; 2592 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 2593 return 15; 2594 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 2595 return 16; 2596 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 2597 return 17; 2598 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 2599 return 18; 2600 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 2601 return 19; 2602 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 2603 return 20; 2604 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 2605 return 21; 2606 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 2607 return 22; 2608 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 2609 return 23; 2610 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 2611 return 24; 2612 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 2613 return 25; 2614 default: 2615 return 0; 2616 } 2617} 2618#endif 2619