authreadkeys.c revision 298770
1/*
2 * authreadkeys.c - routines to support the reading of the key file
3 */
4#include <config.h>
5#include <stdio.h>
6#include <ctype.h>
7
8#include "ntpd.h"	/* Only for DPRINTF */
9#include "ntp_fp.h"
10#include "ntp.h"
11#include "ntp_syslog.h"
12#include "ntp_stdlib.h"
13#include "ntp_keyacc.h"
14
15#ifdef OPENSSL
16#include "openssl/objects.h"
17#include "openssl/evp.h"
18#endif	/* OPENSSL */
19
20/* Forwards */
21static char *nexttok (char **);
22
23/*
24 * nexttok - basic internal tokenizing routine
25 */
26static char *
27nexttok(
28	char	**str
29	)
30{
31	register char *cp;
32	char *starttok;
33
34	cp = *str;
35
36	/*
37	 * Space past white space
38	 */
39	while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
40		cp++;
41
42	/*
43	 * Save this and space to end of token
44	 */
45	starttok = cp;
46	while (*cp != '\0' && *cp != '\n' && *cp != ' '
47	       && *cp != '\t' && *cp != '#')
48		cp++;
49
50	/*
51	 * If token length is zero return an error, else set end of
52	 * token to zero and return start.
53	 */
54	if (starttok == cp)
55		return NULL;
56
57	if (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
58		*cp++ = '\0';
59	else
60		*cp = '\0';
61
62	*str = cp;
63	return starttok;
64}
65
66
67/* TALOS-CAN-0055: possibly DoS attack by setting the key file to the
68 * log file. This is hard to prevent (it would need to check two files
69 * to be the same on the inode level, which will not work so easily with
70 * Windows or VMS) but we can avoid the self-amplification loop: We only
71 * log the first 5 errors, silently ignore the next 10 errors, and give
72 * up when when we have found more than 15 errors.
73 *
74 * This avoids the endless file iteration we will end up with otherwise,
75 * and also avoids overflowing the log file.
76 *
77 * Nevertheless, once this happens, the keys are gone since this would
78 * require a save/swap strategy that is not easy to apply due to the
79 * data on global/static level.
80 */
81
82static const u_int nerr_loglimit = 5u;
83static const u_int nerr_maxlimit = 15;
84
85static void log_maybe(u_int*, const char*, ...) NTP_PRINTF(2, 3);
86
87typedef struct keydata KeyDataT;
88struct keydata {
89	KeyDataT *next;		/* queue/stack link		*/
90	KeyAccT  *keyacclist;	/* key access list		*/
91	keyid_t   keyid;	/* stored key ID		*/
92	u_short   keytype;	/* stored key type		*/
93	u_short   seclen;	/* length of secret		*/
94	u_char    secbuf[1];	/* begin of secret (formal only)*/
95};
96
97static void
98log_maybe(
99	u_int      *pnerr,
100	const char *fmt  ,
101	...)
102{
103	va_list ap;
104	if ((NULL == pnerr) || (++(*pnerr) <= nerr_loglimit)) {
105		va_start(ap, fmt);
106		mvsyslog(LOG_ERR, fmt, ap);
107		va_end(ap);
108	}
109}
110
111static void
112free_keydata(
113	KeyDataT *node
114	)
115{
116	KeyAccT *kap;
117
118	if (node) {
119		while (node->keyacclist) {
120			kap = node->keyacclist;
121			node->keyacclist = kap->next;
122			free(kap);
123		}
124
125		/* purge secrets from memory before free()ing it */
126		memset(node, 0, sizeof(*node) + node->seclen);
127		free(node);
128	}
129}
130
131/*
132 * authreadkeys - (re)read keys from a file.
133 */
134int
135authreadkeys(
136	const char *file
137	)
138{
139	FILE	*fp;
140	char	*line;
141	char	*token;
142	keyid_t	keyno;
143	int	keytype;
144	char	buf[512];		/* lots of room for line */
145	u_char	keystr[32];		/* Bug 2537 */
146	size_t	len;
147	size_t	j;
148	u_int   nerr;
149	KeyDataT *list = NULL;
150	KeyDataT *next = NULL;
151	/*
152	 * Open file.  Complain and return if it can't be opened.
153	 */
154	fp = fopen(file, "r");
155	if (fp == NULL) {
156		msyslog(LOG_ERR, "authreadkeys: file '%s': %m",
157		    file);
158		goto onerror;
159	}
160	INIT_SSL();
161
162	/*
163	 * Now read lines from the file, looking for key entries. Put
164	 * the data into temporary store for later propagation to avoid
165	 * two-pass processing.
166	 */
167	nerr = 0;
168	while ((line = fgets(buf, sizeof buf, fp)) != NULL) {
169		if (nerr > nerr_maxlimit)
170			break;
171		token = nexttok(&line);
172		if (token == NULL)
173			continue;
174
175		/*
176		 * First is key number.  See if it is okay.
177		 */
178		keyno = atoi(token);
179		if (keyno < 1) {
180			log_maybe(&nerr,
181				  "authreadkeys: cannot change key %s",
182				  token);
183			continue;
184		}
185
186		if (keyno > NTP_MAXKEY) {
187			log_maybe(&nerr,
188				  "authreadkeys: key %s > %d reserved for Autokey",
189				  token, NTP_MAXKEY);
190			continue;
191		}
192
193		/*
194		 * Next is keytype. See if that is all right.
195		 */
196		token = nexttok(&line);
197		if (token == NULL) {
198			log_maybe(&nerr,
199				  "authreadkeys: no key type for key %d",
200				  keyno);
201			continue;
202		}
203
204		/* We want to silently ignore keys where we do not
205		 * support the requested digest type. OTOH, we want to
206		 * make sure the file is well-formed.  That means we
207		 * have to process the line completely and have to
208		 * finally throw away the result... This is a bit more
209		 * work, but it also results in better error detection.
210		 */
211#ifdef OPENSSL
212		/*
213		 * The key type is the NID used by the message digest
214		 * algorithm. There are a number of inconsistencies in
215		 * the OpenSSL database. We attempt to discover them
216		 * here and prevent use of inconsistent data later.
217		 */
218		keytype = keytype_from_text(token, NULL);
219		if (keytype == 0) {
220			log_maybe(NULL,
221				  "authreadkeys: invalid type for key %d",
222				  keyno);
223		} else if (EVP_get_digestbynid(keytype) == NULL) {
224			log_maybe(NULL,
225				  "authreadkeys: no algorithm for key %d",
226				  keyno);
227			keytype = 0;
228		}
229#else	/* !OPENSSL follows */
230		/*
231		 * The key type is unused, but is required to be 'M' or
232		 * 'm' for compatibility.
233		 */
234		if (!(*token == 'M' || *token == 'm')) {
235			log_maybe(NULL,
236				  "authreadkeys: invalid type for key %d",
237				  keyno);
238			keytype = 0;
239		} else {
240			keytype = KEY_TYPE_MD5;
241		}
242#endif	/* !OPENSSL */
243
244		/*
245		 * Finally, get key and insert it. If it is longer than 20
246		 * characters, it is a binary string encoded in hex;
247		 * otherwise, it is a text string of printable ASCII
248		 * characters.
249		 */
250		token = nexttok(&line);
251		if (token == NULL) {
252			log_maybe(&nerr,
253				  "authreadkeys: no key for key %d", keyno);
254			continue;
255		}
256		next = NULL;
257		len = strlen(token);
258		if (len <= 20) {	/* Bug 2537 */
259			next = emalloc(sizeof(KeyDataT) + len);
260			next->keyacclist = NULL;
261			next->keyid   = keyno;
262			next->keytype = keytype;
263			next->seclen  = len;
264			memcpy(next->secbuf, token, len);
265		} else {
266			static const char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef";
267			u_char	temp;
268			char	*ptr;
269			size_t	jlim;
270
271			jlim = min(len, 2 * sizeof(keystr));
272			for (j = 0; j < jlim; j++) {
273				ptr = strchr(hex, tolower((unsigned char)token[j]));
274				if (ptr == NULL)
275					break;	/* abort decoding */
276				temp = (u_char)(ptr - hex);
277				if (j & 1)
278					keystr[j / 2] |= temp;
279				else
280					keystr[j / 2] = temp << 4;
281			}
282			if (j < jlim) {
283				log_maybe(&nerr,
284					  "authreadkeys: invalid hex digit for key %d",
285					  keyno);
286				continue;
287			}
288			len = jlim/2; /* hmmmm.... what about odd length?!? */
289			next = emalloc(sizeof(KeyDataT) + len);
290			next->keyacclist = NULL;
291			next->keyid   = keyno;
292			next->keytype = keytype;
293			next->seclen  = len;
294			memcpy(next->secbuf, keystr, len);
295		}
296
297		token = nexttok(&line);
298		DPRINTF(0, ("authreadkeys: full access list <%s>\n", (token) ? token : "NULL"));
299		if (token != NULL) {	/* A comma-separated IP access list */
300			char *tp = token;
301
302			while (tp) {
303				char *i;
304				sockaddr_u addr;
305
306				i = strchr(tp, (int)',');
307				if (i)
308					*i = '\0';
309				DPRINTF(0, ("authreadkeys: access list:  <%s>\n", tp));
310
311				if (is_ip_address(tp, AF_UNSPEC, &addr)) {
312					next->keyacclist = keyacc_new_push(
313						next->keyacclist, &addr);
314				} else {
315					log_maybe(&nerr,
316						  "authreadkeys: invalid IP address <%s> for key %d",
317						  tp, keyno);
318				}
319
320				if (i) {
321					tp = i + 1;
322				} else {
323					tp = 0;
324				}
325			}
326		}
327
328		/* check if this has to be weeded out... */
329		if (0 == keytype) {
330			free_keydata(next);
331			next = NULL;
332			continue;
333		}
334
335		INSIST(NULL != next);
336		next->next = list;
337		list = next;
338	}
339	fclose(fp);
340	if (nerr > 0) {
341		const char * why = "";
342		if (nerr > nerr_maxlimit)
343			why = " (emergency break)";
344		msyslog(LOG_ERR,
345			"authreadkeys: rejecting file '%s' after %u error(s)%s",
346			file, nerr, why);
347		goto onerror;
348	}
349
350	/* first remove old file-based keys */
351	auth_delkeys();
352	/* insert the new key material */
353	while (NULL != (next = list)) {
354		list = next->next;
355		MD5auth_setkey(next->keyid, next->keytype,
356			       next->secbuf, next->seclen, next->keyacclist);
357		next->keyacclist = NULL; /* consumed by MD5auth_setkey */
358		free_keydata(next);
359	}
360	return (1);
361
362  onerror:
363	/* Mop up temporary storage before bailing out. */
364	while (NULL != (next = list)) {
365		list = next->next;
366		free_keydata(next);
367	}
368	return (0);
369}
370