155714Skris/* ssl/t1_enc.c */ 255714Skris/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 355714Skris * All rights reserved. 455714Skris * 555714Skris * This package is an SSL implementation written 655714Skris * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 755714Skris * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8280304Sjkim * 955714Skris * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 1055714Skris * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 1155714Skris * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 1255714Skris * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 1355714Skris * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 1455714Skris * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15280304Sjkim * 1655714Skris * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 1755714Skris * the code are not to be removed. 1855714Skris * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 1955714Skris * as the author of the parts of the library used. 2055714Skris * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 2155714Skris * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22280304Sjkim * 2355714Skris * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 2455714Skris * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 2555714Skris * are met: 2655714Skris * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 2755714Skris * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 2855714Skris * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 2955714Skris * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 3055714Skris * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 3155714Skris * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 3255714Skris * must display the following acknowledgement: 3355714Skris * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 3455714Skris * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 3555714Skris * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 3655714Skris * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37280304Sjkim * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 3855714Skris * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 3955714Skris * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40280304Sjkim * 4155714Skris * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 4255714Skris * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 4355714Skris * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 4455714Skris * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 4555714Skris * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 4655714Skris * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 4755714Skris * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 4855714Skris * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 4955714Skris * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 5055714Skris * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 5155714Skris * SUCH DAMAGE. 52280304Sjkim * 5355714Skris * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 5455714Skris * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 5555714Skris * copied and put under another distribution licence 5655714Skris * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 5755714Skris */ 58100928Snectar/* ==================================================================== 59238405Sjkim * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60100928Snectar * 61100928Snectar * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62100928Snectar * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63100928Snectar * are met: 64100928Snectar * 65100928Snectar * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66280304Sjkim * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67100928Snectar * 68100928Snectar * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69100928Snectar * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70100928Snectar * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71100928Snectar * distribution. 72100928Snectar * 73100928Snectar * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74100928Snectar * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75100928Snectar * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76100928Snectar * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77100928Snectar * 78100928Snectar * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79100928Snectar * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80100928Snectar * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81100928Snectar * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82100928Snectar * 83100928Snectar * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84100928Snectar * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85100928Snectar * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86100928Snectar * 87100928Snectar * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88100928Snectar * acknowledgment: 89100928Snectar * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90100928Snectar * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91100928Snectar * 92100928Snectar * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93100928Snectar * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94100928Snectar * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95100928Snectar * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96100928Snectar * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97100928Snectar * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98100928Snectar * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99100928Snectar * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100100928Snectar * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101100928Snectar * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102100928Snectar * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103100928Snectar * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104100928Snectar * ==================================================================== 105100928Snectar * 106100928Snectar * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107100928Snectar * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108100928Snectar * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109100928Snectar * 110100928Snectar */ 111238405Sjkim/* ==================================================================== 112238405Sjkim * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 113238405Sjkim * 114238405Sjkim * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 115238405Sjkim * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 116238405Sjkim * license. 117238405Sjkim * 118238405Sjkim * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 119238405Sjkim * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 120238405Sjkim * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 121238405Sjkim * 122238405Sjkim * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 123238405Sjkim * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 124238405Sjkim * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 125238405Sjkim * 126238405Sjkim * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 127238405Sjkim * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 128238405Sjkim * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 129238405Sjkim * to make use of the Contribution. 130238405Sjkim * 131238405Sjkim * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 132238405Sjkim * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 133238405Sjkim * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 134238405Sjkim * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 135238405Sjkim * OTHERWISE. 136238405Sjkim */ 13755714Skris 13855714Skris#include <stdio.h> 139109998Smarkm#include "ssl_locl.h" 140194206Ssimon#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 141280304Sjkim# include <openssl/comp.h> 142194206Ssimon#endif 14355714Skris#include <openssl/evp.h> 14455714Skris#include <openssl/hmac.h> 145109998Smarkm#include <openssl/md5.h> 146238405Sjkim#include <openssl/rand.h> 147194206Ssimon#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 148280304Sjkim# include <openssl/des.h> 149194206Ssimon#endif 15055714Skris 151238405Sjkim/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ 152238405Sjkimstatic int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, 153280304Sjkim int sec_len, 154280304Sjkim const void *seed1, int seed1_len, 155280304Sjkim const void *seed2, int seed2_len, 156280304Sjkim const void *seed3, int seed3_len, 157280304Sjkim const void *seed4, int seed4_len, 158280304Sjkim const void *seed5, int seed5_len, 159280304Sjkim unsigned char *out, int olen) 160280304Sjkim{ 161280304Sjkim int chunk; 162280304Sjkim size_t j; 163280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp; 164280304Sjkim EVP_PKEY *mac_key; 165280304Sjkim unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 166280304Sjkim size_t A1_len; 167280304Sjkim int ret = 0; 16855714Skris 169280304Sjkim chunk = EVP_MD_size(md); 170280304Sjkim OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); 17155714Skris 172280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 173280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); 174280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 175280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 176280304Sjkim mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len); 177280304Sjkim if (!mac_key) 178280304Sjkim goto err; 179280304Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 180280304Sjkim goto err; 181280304Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 182280304Sjkim goto err; 183280304Sjkim if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 184280304Sjkim goto err; 185280304Sjkim if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 186280304Sjkim goto err; 187280304Sjkim if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 188280304Sjkim goto err; 189280304Sjkim if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 190280304Sjkim goto err; 191280304Sjkim if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 192280304Sjkim goto err; 193280304Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 194280304Sjkim goto err; 19555714Skris 196280304Sjkim for (;;) { 197280304Sjkim /* Reinit mac contexts */ 198280304Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 199280304Sjkim goto err; 200280304Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 201280304Sjkim goto err; 202280304Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) 203280304Sjkim goto err; 204280304Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp, A1, A1_len)) 205280304Sjkim goto err; 206280304Sjkim if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 207280304Sjkim goto err; 208280304Sjkim if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 209280304Sjkim goto err; 210280304Sjkim if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 211280304Sjkim goto err; 212280304Sjkim if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 213280304Sjkim goto err; 214280304Sjkim if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 215280304Sjkim goto err; 21655714Skris 217280304Sjkim if (olen > chunk) { 218280304Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j)) 219280304Sjkim goto err; 220280304Sjkim out += j; 221280304Sjkim olen -= j; 222280304Sjkim /* calc the next A1 value */ 223280304Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len)) 224280304Sjkim goto err; 225280304Sjkim } else { /* last one */ 226280304Sjkim 227280304Sjkim if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 228280304Sjkim goto err; 229280304Sjkim memcpy(out, A1, olen); 230280304Sjkim break; 231280304Sjkim } 232280304Sjkim } 233280304Sjkim ret = 1; 234280304Sjkim err: 235280304Sjkim EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 236280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 237280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp); 238280304Sjkim OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1)); 239280304Sjkim return ret; 240280304Sjkim} 241280304Sjkim 242238405Sjkim/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ 243238405Sjkimstatic int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask, 244280304Sjkim const void *seed1, int seed1_len, 245280304Sjkim const void *seed2, int seed2_len, 246280304Sjkim const void *seed3, int seed3_len, 247280304Sjkim const void *seed4, int seed4_len, 248280304Sjkim const void *seed5, int seed5_len, 249280304Sjkim const unsigned char *sec, int slen, 250280304Sjkim unsigned char *out1, unsigned char *out2, int olen) 251280304Sjkim{ 252280304Sjkim int len, i, idx, count; 253280304Sjkim const unsigned char *S1; 254280304Sjkim long m; 255280304Sjkim const EVP_MD *md; 256280304Sjkim int ret = 0; 25755714Skris 258280304Sjkim /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */ 259280304Sjkim count = 0; 260280304Sjkim for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) { 261280304Sjkim if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) 262280304Sjkim count++; 263280304Sjkim } 264284285Sjkim if (!count) { 265280304Sjkim /* Should never happen */ 266280304Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 267280304Sjkim goto err; 268280304Sjkim } 269280304Sjkim len = slen / count; 270280304Sjkim if (count == 1) 271280304Sjkim slen = 0; 272280304Sjkim S1 = sec; 273280304Sjkim memset(out1, 0, olen); 274280304Sjkim for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) { 275280304Sjkim if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) { 276280304Sjkim if (!md) { 277280304Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE); 278280304Sjkim goto err; 279280304Sjkim } 280280304Sjkim if (!tls1_P_hash(md, S1, len + (slen & 1), 281280304Sjkim seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3, 282280304Sjkim seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, seed5, seed5_len, 283280304Sjkim out2, olen)) 284280304Sjkim goto err; 285280304Sjkim S1 += len; 286280304Sjkim for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) { 287280304Sjkim out1[i] ^= out2[i]; 288280304Sjkim } 289280304Sjkim } 290280304Sjkim } 291280304Sjkim ret = 1; 292280304Sjkim err: 293280304Sjkim return ret; 294238405Sjkim} 295280304Sjkim 296238405Sjkimstatic int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, 297280304Sjkim unsigned char *tmp, int num) 298280304Sjkim{ 299280304Sjkim int ret; 300280304Sjkim ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 301280304Sjkim TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, 302280304Sjkim TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, 303280304Sjkim SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 304280304Sjkim NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key, 305280304Sjkim s->session->master_key_length, km, tmp, num); 306109998Smarkm#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 307280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t", 308280304Sjkim s->session->master_key_length); 309280304Sjkim { 310109998Smarkm int i; 311280304Sjkim for (i = 0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++) { 312280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "%02X", s->session->master_key[i]); 313280304Sjkim } 314280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 315280304Sjkim } 316280304Sjkim#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 317280304Sjkim return ret; 318280304Sjkim} 31955714Skris 32055714Skrisint tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) 321280304Sjkim{ 322280304Sjkim static const unsigned char empty[] = ""; 323280304Sjkim unsigned char *p, *mac_secret; 324280304Sjkim unsigned char *exp_label; 325280304Sjkim unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; 326280304Sjkim unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; 327280304Sjkim unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2]; 328280304Sjkim unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2]; 329280304Sjkim unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv; 330280304Sjkim int client_write; 331280304Sjkim EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd; 332280304Sjkim const EVP_CIPHER *c; 333160814Ssimon#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 334280304Sjkim const SSL_COMP *comp; 335160814Ssimon#endif 336280304Sjkim const EVP_MD *m; 337280304Sjkim int mac_type; 338280304Sjkim int *mac_secret_size; 339280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; 340280304Sjkim EVP_PKEY *mac_key; 341280304Sjkim int is_export, n, i, j, k, exp_label_len, cl; 342280304Sjkim int reuse_dd = 0; 34355714Skris 344280304Sjkim is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); 345280304Sjkim c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; 346280304Sjkim m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash; 347280304Sjkim mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; 348160814Ssimon#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 349280304Sjkim comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression; 350160814Ssimon#endif 351215697Ssimon 352215697Ssimon#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 353280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which); 354280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n", 355280304Sjkim s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, 356280304Sjkim s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, comp); 357280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c); 358280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n", 359280304Sjkim c->nid, c->block_size, c->key_len, c->iv_len); 360280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", 361280304Sjkim s->s3->tmp.key_block_length); 362280304Sjkim { 363238405Sjkim int i; 364280304Sjkim for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++) 365280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]); 366280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 367280304Sjkim } 368280304Sjkim#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 369109998Smarkm 370280304Sjkim if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) { 371280304Sjkim if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 372280304Sjkim s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 373280304Sjkim else 374280304Sjkim s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 375238405Sjkim 376280304Sjkim if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) 377280304Sjkim reuse_dd = 1; 378280304Sjkim else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = 379280304Sjkim OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL) 380280304Sjkim goto err; 381280304Sjkim else 382280304Sjkim /* 383280304Sjkim * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error 384280304Sjkim */ 385280304Sjkim EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx); 386280304Sjkim dd = s->enc_read_ctx; 387280304Sjkim mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL); 388160814Ssimon#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 389280304Sjkim if (s->expand != NULL) { 390280304Sjkim COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); 391280304Sjkim s->expand = NULL; 392280304Sjkim } 393280304Sjkim if (comp != NULL) { 394280304Sjkim s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); 395280304Sjkim if (s->expand == NULL) { 396280304Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, 397280304Sjkim SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); 398280304Sjkim goto err2; 399280304Sjkim } 400280304Sjkim if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL) 401280304Sjkim s->s3->rrec.comp = (unsigned char *) 402280304Sjkim OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH); 403280304Sjkim if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL) 404280304Sjkim goto err; 405280304Sjkim } 406160814Ssimon#endif 407280304Sjkim /* 408280304Sjkim * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION 409280304Sjkim */ 410280304Sjkim if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 411280304Sjkim memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]), 0, 8); 412280304Sjkim mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); 413280304Sjkim mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size); 414280304Sjkim } else { 415280304Sjkim if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 416280304Sjkim s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 417280304Sjkim else 418280304Sjkim s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 419280304Sjkim if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 420280304Sjkim reuse_dd = 1; 421280304Sjkim else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 422280304Sjkim goto err; 423280304Sjkim dd = s->enc_write_ctx; 424280304Sjkim if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 425280304Sjkim mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); 426280304Sjkim if (!mac_ctx) 427280304Sjkim goto err; 428280304Sjkim s->write_hash = mac_ctx; 429280304Sjkim } else 430280304Sjkim mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL); 431160814Ssimon#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 432280304Sjkim if (s->compress != NULL) { 433280304Sjkim COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); 434280304Sjkim s->compress = NULL; 435280304Sjkim } 436280304Sjkim if (comp != NULL) { 437280304Sjkim s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); 438280304Sjkim if (s->compress == NULL) { 439280304Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, 440280304Sjkim SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); 441280304Sjkim goto err2; 442280304Sjkim } 443280304Sjkim } 444160814Ssimon#endif 445280304Sjkim /* 446280304Sjkim * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION 447280304Sjkim */ 448280304Sjkim if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 449280304Sjkim memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]), 0, 8); 450280304Sjkim mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); 451280304Sjkim mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size); 452280304Sjkim } 45355714Skris 454280304Sjkim if (reuse_dd) 455280304Sjkim EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd); 45655714Skris 457280304Sjkim p = s->s3->tmp.key_block; 458280304Sjkim i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; 459238405Sjkim 460280304Sjkim cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); 461280304Sjkim j = is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ? 462280304Sjkim cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl; 463280304Sjkim /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */ 464280304Sjkim /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */ 465280304Sjkim if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 466280304Sjkim k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; 467280304Sjkim else 468280304Sjkim k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); 469280304Sjkim if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || 470280304Sjkim (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { 471280304Sjkim ms = &(p[0]); 472280304Sjkim n = i + i; 473280304Sjkim key = &(p[n]); 474280304Sjkim n += j + j; 475280304Sjkim iv = &(p[n]); 476280304Sjkim n += k + k; 477280304Sjkim exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST; 478280304Sjkim exp_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE; 479280304Sjkim client_write = 1; 480280304Sjkim } else { 481280304Sjkim n = i; 482280304Sjkim ms = &(p[n]); 483280304Sjkim n += i + j; 484280304Sjkim key = &(p[n]); 485280304Sjkim n += j + k; 486280304Sjkim iv = &(p[n]); 487280304Sjkim n += k; 488280304Sjkim exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST; 489280304Sjkim exp_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE; 490280304Sjkim client_write = 0; 491280304Sjkim } 49255714Skris 493280304Sjkim if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) { 494280304Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 495280304Sjkim goto err2; 496280304Sjkim } 49755714Skris 498280304Sjkim memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i); 499238405Sjkim 500280304Sjkim if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) { 501280304Sjkim mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, 502280304Sjkim mac_secret, *mac_secret_size); 503280304Sjkim EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key); 504280304Sjkim EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 505280304Sjkim } 50655714Skris#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 507280304Sjkim printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which); 508280304Sjkim { 509280304Sjkim int z; 510280304Sjkim for (z = 0; z < i; z++) 511280304Sjkim printf("%02X%c", ms[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); 512280304Sjkim } 51355714Skris#endif 514280304Sjkim if (is_export) { 515280304Sjkim /* 516280304Sjkim * In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the same value 517280304Sjkim * since only the correct one will be used :-). 518280304Sjkim */ 519280304Sjkim if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 520280304Sjkim exp_label, exp_label_len, 521280304Sjkim s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 522280304Sjkim s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 523280304Sjkim NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 524280304Sjkim key, j, tmp1, tmp2, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) 525280304Sjkim goto err2; 526280304Sjkim key = tmp1; 52755714Skris 528280304Sjkim if (k > 0) { 529280304Sjkim if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 530280304Sjkim TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST, TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE, 531280304Sjkim s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 532280304Sjkim s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 533280304Sjkim NULL, 0, NULL, 0, empty, 0, iv1, iv2, k * 2)) 534280304Sjkim goto err2; 535280304Sjkim if (client_write) 536280304Sjkim iv = iv1; 537280304Sjkim else 538280304Sjkim iv = &(iv1[k]); 539280304Sjkim } 540280304Sjkim } 54155714Skris 542280304Sjkim s->session->key_arg_length = 0; 543109998Smarkm#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 544280304Sjkim { 545238405Sjkim int i; 546280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n"); 547280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\tkey= "); 548280304Sjkim for (i = 0; i < c->key_len; i++) 549280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "%02x", key[i]); 550280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 551280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\t iv= "); 552280304Sjkim for (i = 0; i < c->iv_len; i++) 553280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "%02x", iv[i]); 554280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 555280304Sjkim } 556280304Sjkim#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 55755714Skris 558280304Sjkim if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { 559280304Sjkim if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) 560280304Sjkim || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)) { 561280304Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 562280304Sjkim goto err2; 563280304Sjkim } 564280304Sjkim } else { 565280304Sjkim if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) { 566280304Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 567280304Sjkim goto err2; 568280304Sjkim } 569280304Sjkim } 570280304Sjkim /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */ 571280304Sjkim if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size 572280304Sjkim && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, 573280304Sjkim *mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) { 574280304Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 575280304Sjkim goto err2; 576280304Sjkim } 577238405Sjkim 57855714Skris#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 579280304Sjkim printf("which = %04X\nkey=", which); 580280304Sjkim { 581280304Sjkim int z; 582280304Sjkim for (z = 0; z < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) 583280304Sjkim printf("%02X%c", key[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); 584280304Sjkim } 585280304Sjkim printf("\niv="); 586280304Sjkim { 587280304Sjkim int z; 588280304Sjkim for (z = 0; z < k; z++) 589280304Sjkim printf("%02X%c", iv[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); 590280304Sjkim } 591280304Sjkim printf("\n"); 59255714Skris#endif 59355714Skris 594280304Sjkim OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1, sizeof(tmp1)); 595280304Sjkim OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, sizeof(tmp1)); 596280304Sjkim OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1, sizeof(iv1)); 597280304Sjkim OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2, sizeof(iv2)); 598280304Sjkim return (1); 599280304Sjkim err: 600280304Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 601280304Sjkim err2: 602280304Sjkim return (0); 603280304Sjkim} 60455714Skris 60555714Skrisint tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) 606280304Sjkim{ 607280304Sjkim unsigned char *p1, *p2 = NULL; 608280304Sjkim const EVP_CIPHER *c; 609280304Sjkim const EVP_MD *hash; 610280304Sjkim int num; 611280304Sjkim SSL_COMP *comp; 612280304Sjkim int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0; 613280304Sjkim int ret = 0; 61455714Skris 615109998Smarkm#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 616280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "tls1_setup_key_block()\n"); 617280304Sjkim#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 618109998Smarkm 619280304Sjkim if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) 620280304Sjkim return (1); 62155714Skris 622280304Sjkim if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp 623280304Sjkim (s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp)) { 624280304Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 625280304Sjkim return (0); 626280304Sjkim } 62755714Skris 628280304Sjkim s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c; 629280304Sjkim s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash; 630280304Sjkim s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; 631280304Sjkim s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 632280304Sjkim num = 633280304Sjkim EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); 634280304Sjkim num *= 2; 63555714Skris 636280304Sjkim ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 63755714Skris 638280304Sjkim if ((p1 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) { 639280304Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 640280304Sjkim goto err; 641280304Sjkim } 64255714Skris 643280304Sjkim s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num; 644280304Sjkim s->s3->tmp.key_block = p1; 64555714Skris 646280304Sjkim if ((p2 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) { 647280304Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 648280304Sjkim OPENSSL_free(p1); 649280304Sjkim goto err; 650280304Sjkim } 65155714Skris#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 652280304Sjkim printf("client random\n"); 653280304Sjkim { 654280304Sjkim int z; 655280304Sjkim for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) 656280304Sjkim printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z], 657280304Sjkim ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); 658280304Sjkim } 659280304Sjkim printf("server random\n"); 660280304Sjkim { 661280304Sjkim int z; 662280304Sjkim for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) 663280304Sjkim printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z], 664280304Sjkim ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); 665280304Sjkim } 666280304Sjkim printf("pre-master\n"); 667280304Sjkim { 668280304Sjkim int z; 669280304Sjkim for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++) 670280304Sjkim printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z], 671280304Sjkim ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); 672280304Sjkim } 67355714Skris#endif 674280304Sjkim if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p1, p2, num)) 675280304Sjkim goto err; 67655714Skris#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 677280304Sjkim printf("\nkey block\n"); 678280304Sjkim { 679280304Sjkim int z; 680280304Sjkim for (z = 0; z < num; z++) 681280304Sjkim printf("%02X%c", p1[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); 682280304Sjkim } 68355714Skris#endif 68455714Skris 685280304Sjkim if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) 686280304Sjkim && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) { 687280304Sjkim /* 688280304Sjkim * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV 689280304Sjkim * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 690280304Sjkim */ 691280304Sjkim s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1; 692100936Snectar 693280304Sjkim if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { 694280304Sjkim if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) 695280304Sjkim s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; 696280304Sjkim 697109998Smarkm#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 698280304Sjkim if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) 699280304Sjkim s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; 700100928Snectar#endif 701280304Sjkim } 702280304Sjkim } 70355714Skris 704280304Sjkim ret = 1; 705280304Sjkim err: 706280304Sjkim if (p2) { 707280304Sjkim OPENSSL_cleanse(p2, num); 708280304Sjkim OPENSSL_free(p2); 709280304Sjkim } 710280304Sjkim return (ret); 711280304Sjkim} 712280304Sjkim 713280304Sjkim/*- 714280304Sjkim * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. 715246772Sjkim * 716246772Sjkim * Returns: 717246772Sjkim * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too 718246772Sjkim * short etc). 719246772Sjkim * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. 720246772Sjkim * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, 721246772Sjkim * an internal error occured. 722246772Sjkim */ 72355714Skrisint tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) 724280304Sjkim{ 725280304Sjkim SSL3_RECORD *rec; 726280304Sjkim EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; 727280304Sjkim unsigned long l; 728280304Sjkim int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0; 729280304Sjkim const EVP_CIPHER *enc; 73055714Skris 731280304Sjkim if (send) { 732280304Sjkim if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) { 733280304Sjkim int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); 734280304Sjkim OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 735280304Sjkim } 736280304Sjkim ds = s->enc_write_ctx; 737280304Sjkim rec = &(s->s3->wrec); 738280304Sjkim if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) 739280304Sjkim enc = NULL; 740280304Sjkim else { 741280304Sjkim int ivlen; 742280304Sjkim enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); 743280304Sjkim /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */ 744280304Sjkim if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION 745280304Sjkim && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 746280304Sjkim ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); 747280304Sjkim else 748280304Sjkim ivlen = 0; 749280304Sjkim if (ivlen > 1) { 750280304Sjkim if (rec->data != rec->input) 751280304Sjkim /* 752280304Sjkim * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever 753280304Sjkim * happen?? (steve) 754280304Sjkim */ 755280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, 756280304Sjkim "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n", 757280304Sjkim __FILE__, __LINE__); 758280304Sjkim else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0) 759280304Sjkim return -1; 760280304Sjkim } 761280304Sjkim } 762280304Sjkim } else { 763280304Sjkim if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { 764280304Sjkim int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 765280304Sjkim OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 766280304Sjkim } 767280304Sjkim ds = s->enc_read_ctx; 768280304Sjkim rec = &(s->s3->rrec); 769280304Sjkim if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) 770280304Sjkim enc = NULL; 771280304Sjkim else 772280304Sjkim enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); 773280304Sjkim } 77455714Skris 775109998Smarkm#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 776280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "tls1_enc(%d)\n", send); 777280304Sjkim#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 778109998Smarkm 779280304Sjkim if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { 780280304Sjkim memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); 781280304Sjkim rec->input = rec->data; 782280304Sjkim ret = 1; 783280304Sjkim } else { 784280304Sjkim l = rec->length; 785280304Sjkim bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); 78655714Skris 787280304Sjkim if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { 788284285Sjkim unsigned char buf[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN], *seq; 789238405Sjkim 790280304Sjkim seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence; 791238405Sjkim 792280304Sjkim if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 793280304Sjkim unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq; 794238405Sjkim 795280304Sjkim s2n(send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch, p); 796280304Sjkim memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); 797280304Sjkim memcpy(buf, dtlsseq, 8); 798280304Sjkim } else { 799280304Sjkim memcpy(buf, seq, 8); 800280304Sjkim for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */ 801280304Sjkim ++seq[i]; 802280304Sjkim if (seq[i] != 0) 803280304Sjkim break; 804280304Sjkim } 805280304Sjkim } 806238405Sjkim 807280304Sjkim buf[8] = rec->type; 808280304Sjkim buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 809280304Sjkim buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 810280304Sjkim buf[11] = rec->length >> 8; 811280304Sjkim buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff; 812284285Sjkim pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 813284285Sjkim EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf); 814284285Sjkim if (pad <= 0) 815284285Sjkim return -1; 816280304Sjkim if (send) { 817280304Sjkim l += pad; 818280304Sjkim rec->length += pad; 819280304Sjkim } 820280304Sjkim } else if ((bs != 1) && send) { 821280304Sjkim i = bs - ((int)l % bs); 82255714Skris 823280304Sjkim /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ 82455714Skris 825280304Sjkim /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ 826280304Sjkim j = i - 1; 827280304Sjkim if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) { 828280304Sjkim if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) 829280304Sjkim j++; 830280304Sjkim } 831280304Sjkim for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++) 832280304Sjkim rec->input[k] = j; 833280304Sjkim l += i; 834280304Sjkim rec->length += i; 835280304Sjkim } 836109998Smarkm#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 837280304Sjkim { 838280304Sjkim unsigned long ui; 839280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, 840280304Sjkim "EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n", 841280304Sjkim ds, rec->data, rec->input, l); 842280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, 843280304Sjkim "\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%lu %lu], %d iv_len\n", 844280304Sjkim ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, DES_KEY_SZ, 845280304Sjkim DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, ds->cipher->iv_len); 846280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\t\tIV: "); 847280304Sjkim for (i = 0; i < ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) 848280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "%02X", ds->iv[i]); 849280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 850280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\trec->input="); 851280304Sjkim for (ui = 0; ui < l; ui++) 852280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->input[ui]); 853280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 854280304Sjkim } 855280304Sjkim#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 856109998Smarkm 857280304Sjkim if (!send) { 858280304Sjkim if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) 859280304Sjkim return 0; 860280304Sjkim } 86155714Skris 862280304Sjkim i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l); 863280304Sjkim if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) 864280304Sjkim ? (i < 0) 865280304Sjkim : (i == 0)) 866280304Sjkim return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ 867280304Sjkim if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) { 868280304Sjkim rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 869280304Sjkim rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 870280304Sjkim rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 871280304Sjkim } 872109998Smarkm#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 873280304Sjkim { 874280304Sjkim unsigned long i; 875280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\trec->data="); 876280304Sjkim for (i = 0; i < l; i++) 877280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->data[i]); 878280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 879280304Sjkim } 880280304Sjkim#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 881109998Smarkm 882280304Sjkim ret = 1; 883280304Sjkim if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) 884280304Sjkim mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 885280304Sjkim if ((bs != 1) && !send) 886280304Sjkim ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); 887280304Sjkim if (pad && !send) 888280304Sjkim rec->length -= pad; 889280304Sjkim } 890280304Sjkim return ret; 891280304Sjkim} 892246772Sjkim 893238405Sjkimint tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out) 894280304Sjkim{ 895280304Sjkim unsigned int ret; 896280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL; 897280304Sjkim int i; 89855714Skris 899280304Sjkim if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 900280304Sjkim if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 901280304Sjkim return 0; 902238405Sjkim 903280304Sjkim for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) { 904280304Sjkim if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] 905280304Sjkim && EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) { 906280304Sjkim d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]; 907280304Sjkim break; 908280304Sjkim } 909280304Sjkim } 910280304Sjkim if (!d) { 911280304Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST); 912280304Sjkim return 0; 913280304Sjkim } 914238405Sjkim 915280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 916280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d); 917280304Sjkim EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret); 918280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 919280304Sjkim return ((int)ret); 920280304Sjkim} 92155714Skris 922238405Sjkimint tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, 923280304Sjkim const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out) 924280304Sjkim{ 925280304Sjkim unsigned int i; 926280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 927280304Sjkim unsigned char buf[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 928280304Sjkim unsigned char *q, buf2[12]; 929280304Sjkim int idx; 930280304Sjkim long mask; 931280304Sjkim int err = 0; 932280304Sjkim const EVP_MD *md; 93355714Skris 934280304Sjkim q = buf; 93555714Skris 936280304Sjkim if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 937280304Sjkim if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 938280304Sjkim return 0; 939238405Sjkim 940280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 94155714Skris 942280304Sjkim for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &mask, &md); idx++) { 943280304Sjkim if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) { 944280304Sjkim int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); 945280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]; 946280304Sjkim if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 947280304Sjkim || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q - buf))) { 948280304Sjkim /* 949280304Sjkim * internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! 950280304Sjkim */ 951280304Sjkim err = 1; 952280304Sjkim } else { 953280304Sjkim if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) || 954280304Sjkim !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, q, &i) || 955280304Sjkim (i != (unsigned int)hashsize)) 956280304Sjkim err = 1; 957280304Sjkim q += hashsize; 958280304Sjkim } 959280304Sjkim } 960280304Sjkim } 96155714Skris 962280304Sjkim if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 963280304Sjkim str, slen, buf, (int)(q - buf), NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 964280304Sjkim s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 965280304Sjkim out, buf2, sizeof buf2)) 966280304Sjkim err = 1; 967280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 96855714Skris 969280304Sjkim OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (int)(q - buf)); 970280304Sjkim OPENSSL_cleanse(buf2, sizeof(buf2)); 971280304Sjkim if (err) 972280304Sjkim return 0; 973280304Sjkim else 974280304Sjkim return sizeof buf2; 975280304Sjkim} 976280304Sjkim 97755714Skrisint tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) 978280304Sjkim{ 979280304Sjkim SSL3_RECORD *rec; 980280304Sjkim unsigned char *seq; 981280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX *hash; 982280304Sjkim size_t md_size, orig_len; 983280304Sjkim int i; 984280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; 985280304Sjkim unsigned char header[13]; 986280304Sjkim int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) 987280304Sjkim : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); 988280304Sjkim int t; 98955714Skris 990280304Sjkim if (send) { 991280304Sjkim rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec); 992280304Sjkim seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]); 993280304Sjkim hash = ssl->write_hash; 994280304Sjkim } else { 995280304Sjkim rec = &(ssl->s3->rrec); 996280304Sjkim seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]); 997280304Sjkim hash = ssl->read_hash; 998280304Sjkim } 99955714Skris 1000280304Sjkim t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); 1001280304Sjkim OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); 1002280304Sjkim md_size = t; 100355714Skris 1004280304Sjkim /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ 1005280304Sjkim if (stream_mac) { 1006280304Sjkim mac_ctx = hash; 1007280304Sjkim } else { 1008280304Sjkim if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash)) 1009280304Sjkim return -1; 1010280304Sjkim mac_ctx = &hmac; 1011280304Sjkim } 1012194206Ssimon 1013280304Sjkim if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 1014280304Sjkim unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; 1015238405Sjkim 1016280304Sjkim s2n(send ? ssl->d1->w_epoch : ssl->d1->r_epoch, p); 1017280304Sjkim memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); 1018194206Ssimon 1019280304Sjkim memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8); 1020280304Sjkim } else 1021280304Sjkim memcpy(header, seq, 8); 1022194206Ssimon 1023280304Sjkim /* 1024280304Sjkim * kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type 1025280304Sjkim */ 1026280304Sjkim orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8); 1027280304Sjkim rec->type &= 0xff; 1028246772Sjkim 1029280304Sjkim header[8] = rec->type; 1030280304Sjkim header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); 1031280304Sjkim header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); 1032280304Sjkim header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; 1033280304Sjkim header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; 1034246772Sjkim 1035280304Sjkim if (!send && 1036280304Sjkim EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && 1037280304Sjkim ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { 1038280304Sjkim /* 1039280304Sjkim * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any 1040280304Sjkim * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we 1041280304Sjkim * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. 1042280304Sjkim */ 1043280304Sjkim /* Final param == not SSLv3 */ 1044280304Sjkim ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, 1045280304Sjkim md, &md_size, 1046280304Sjkim header, rec->input, 1047280304Sjkim rec->length + md_size, orig_len, 1048280304Sjkim ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, 1049280304Sjkim ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0); 1050280304Sjkim } else { 1051280304Sjkim EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)); 1052280304Sjkim EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length); 1053280304Sjkim t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size); 1054280304Sjkim OPENSSL_assert(t > 0); 1055246772Sjkim#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 1056280304Sjkim if (!send && FIPS_mode()) 1057280304Sjkim tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx, 1058280304Sjkim mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length, orig_len); 1059246772Sjkim#endif 1060280304Sjkim } 1061280304Sjkim 1062280304Sjkim if (!stream_mac) 1063280304Sjkim EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); 106455714Skris#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 1065280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "seq="); 1066280304Sjkim { 1067280304Sjkim int z; 1068280304Sjkim for (z = 0; z < 8; z++) 1069280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]); 1070280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 1071280304Sjkim } 1072280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "rec="); 1073280304Sjkim { 1074280304Sjkim unsigned int z; 1075280304Sjkim for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++) 1076280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]); 1077280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 1078280304Sjkim } 107955714Skris#endif 108055714Skris 1081280304Sjkim if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 1082280304Sjkim for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { 1083280304Sjkim ++seq[i]; 1084280304Sjkim if (seq[i] != 0) 1085280304Sjkim break; 1086280304Sjkim } 1087280304Sjkim } 108855714Skris#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 1089280304Sjkim { 1090280304Sjkim unsigned int z; 1091280304Sjkim for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++) 1092280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]); 1093280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 1094280304Sjkim } 109555714Skris#endif 1096280304Sjkim return (md_size); 1097280304Sjkim} 109855714Skris 109955714Skrisint tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, 1100280304Sjkim int len) 1101280304Sjkim{ 1102280304Sjkim unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 1103280304Sjkim const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL; 1104280304Sjkim int col = 0, sol = 0; 110555714Skris 1106109998Smarkm#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 1107280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s, out, p, 1108280304Sjkim len); 1109280304Sjkim#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 1110109998Smarkm 1111238405Sjkim#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1112280304Sjkim if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL 1113280304Sjkim && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL 1114280304Sjkim && s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0 1115280304Sjkim && s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 1116280304Sjkim s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) { 1117280304Sjkim co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input; 1118280304Sjkim col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 1119280304Sjkim so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input; 1120280304Sjkim /* 1121280304Sjkim * must be same as col (see 1122280304Sjkim * draft-resc-00.txts-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) 1123280304Sjkim */ 1124280304Sjkim sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 1125280304Sjkim } 1126238405Sjkim#endif 1127238405Sjkim 1128280304Sjkim tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 1129280304Sjkim TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, 1130280304Sjkim s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 1131280304Sjkim co, col, 1132280304Sjkim s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 1133280304Sjkim so, sol, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff); 1134280304Sjkim OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, sizeof buff); 1135238405Sjkim#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 1136280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n"); 1137280304Sjkim BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len); 1138280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n"); 1139280304Sjkim BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1140280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n"); 1141280304Sjkim BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1142280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n"); 1143280304Sjkim BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, 1144280304Sjkim SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); 1145238405Sjkim#endif 1146238405Sjkim 1147109998Smarkm#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 1148280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n"); 1149280304Sjkim#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 1150280304Sjkim return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); 1151280304Sjkim} 115255714Skris 1153238405Sjkimint tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, 1154280304Sjkim const char *label, size_t llen, 1155280304Sjkim const unsigned char *context, 1156280304Sjkim size_t contextlen, int use_context) 1157280304Sjkim{ 1158280304Sjkim unsigned char *buff; 1159280304Sjkim unsigned char *val = NULL; 1160280304Sjkim size_t vallen, currentvalpos; 1161280304Sjkim int rv; 1162238405Sjkim 1163238405Sjkim#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 1164280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%lu,%s,%lu,%p,%lu)\n", 1165280304Sjkim s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen); 1166280304Sjkim#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 1167238405Sjkim 1168280304Sjkim buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen); 1169280304Sjkim if (buff == NULL) 1170280304Sjkim goto err2; 1171238405Sjkim 1172280304Sjkim /* 1173280304Sjkim * construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather 1174280304Sjkim * than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the 1175280304Sjkim * concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label. 1176280304Sjkim */ 1177280304Sjkim vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; 1178280304Sjkim if (use_context) { 1179280304Sjkim vallen += 2 + contextlen; 1180280304Sjkim } 1181238405Sjkim 1182280304Sjkim val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen); 1183280304Sjkim if (val == NULL) 1184280304Sjkim goto err2; 1185280304Sjkim currentvalpos = 0; 1186280304Sjkim memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen); 1187280304Sjkim currentvalpos += llen; 1188280304Sjkim memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1189280304Sjkim currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1190280304Sjkim memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1191280304Sjkim currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1192238405Sjkim 1193280304Sjkim if (use_context) { 1194280304Sjkim val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; 1195280304Sjkim currentvalpos++; 1196280304Sjkim val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; 1197280304Sjkim currentvalpos++; 1198280304Sjkim if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) { 1199280304Sjkim memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); 1200280304Sjkim } 1201280304Sjkim } 1202238405Sjkim 1203280304Sjkim /* 1204280304Sjkim * disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited 1205280304Sjkim * label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and 1206280304Sjkim * the comparisons won't have buffer overflow 1207280304Sjkim */ 1208280304Sjkim if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, 1209280304Sjkim TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1210280304Sjkim goto err1; 1211280304Sjkim if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, 1212280304Sjkim TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1213280304Sjkim goto err1; 1214280304Sjkim if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, 1215280304Sjkim TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1216280304Sjkim goto err1; 1217280304Sjkim if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, 1218280304Sjkim TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1219280304Sjkim goto err1; 1220238405Sjkim 1221280304Sjkim rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 1222280304Sjkim val, vallen, 1223280304Sjkim NULL, 0, 1224280304Sjkim NULL, 0, 1225280304Sjkim NULL, 0, 1226280304Sjkim NULL, 0, 1227280304Sjkim s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 1228280304Sjkim out, buff, olen); 1229280304Sjkim OPENSSL_cleanse(val, vallen); 1230280304Sjkim OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, olen); 1231238405Sjkim 1232238405Sjkim#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 1233280304Sjkim fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n"); 1234280304Sjkim#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 1235280304Sjkim goto ret; 1236280304Sjkim err1: 1237280304Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, 1238280304Sjkim SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); 1239280304Sjkim rv = 0; 1240280304Sjkim goto ret; 1241280304Sjkim err2: 1242280304Sjkim SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1243280304Sjkim rv = 0; 1244280304Sjkim ret: 1245280304Sjkim if (buff != NULL) 1246280304Sjkim OPENSSL_free(buff); 1247280304Sjkim if (val != NULL) 1248280304Sjkim OPENSSL_free(val); 1249280304Sjkim return (rv); 1250280304Sjkim} 1251238405Sjkim 125255714Skrisint tls1_alert_code(int code) 1253280304Sjkim{ 1254280304Sjkim switch (code) { 1255280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: 1256280304Sjkim return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); 1257280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: 1258280304Sjkim return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1259280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: 1260280304Sjkim return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 1261280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: 1262280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 1263280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: 1264280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); 1265280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: 1266280304Sjkim return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); 1267280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: 1268280304Sjkim return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1269280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: 1270280304Sjkim return (-1); 1271280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: 1272280304Sjkim return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); 1273280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: 1274280304Sjkim return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); 1275280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: 1276280304Sjkim return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); 1277280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: 1278280304Sjkim return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); 1279280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: 1280280304Sjkim return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); 1281280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: 1282280304Sjkim return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); 1283280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: 1284280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); 1285280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: 1286280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); 1287280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: 1288280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 1289280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: 1290280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); 1291280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: 1292280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); 1293280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: 1294280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); 1295280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: 1296280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); 1297280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: 1298280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1299280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: 1300280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); 1301280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: 1302280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1303280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: 1304280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); 1305280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: 1306280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); 1307280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: 1308280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); 1309280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: 1310280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); 1311280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: 1312280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); 1313280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: 1314280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); 1315280304Sjkim case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: 1316280304Sjkim return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); 1317280304Sjkim#if 0 1318280304Sjkim /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */ 1319280304Sjkim case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: 1320280304Sjkim return (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); 1321194206Ssimon#endif 1322280304Sjkim default: 1323280304Sjkim return (-1); 1324280304Sjkim } 1325280304Sjkim} 1326