mac_cred.c revision 175202
1100894Srwatson/*- 2126097Srwatson * Copyright (c) 1999-2002 Robert N. M. Watson 3100894Srwatson * Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin 4126097Srwatson * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. 5145147Srwatson * Copyright (c) 2005 Samy Al Bahra 6172930Srwatson * Copyright (c) 2006 SPARTA, Inc. 7100894Srwatson * All rights reserved. 8100894Srwatson * 9100894Srwatson * This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the 10100894Srwatson * TrustedBSD Project. 11100894Srwatson * 12106392Srwatson * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network 13106392Srwatson * Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network 14106392Srwatson * Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), 15106392Srwatson * as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. 16100894Srwatson * 17172930Srwatson * This software was enhanced by SPARTA ISSO under SPAWAR contract 18172930Srwatson * N66001-04-C-6019 ("SEFOS"). 19172930Srwatson * 20100894Srwatson * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 21100894Srwatson * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 22100894Srwatson * are met: 23100894Srwatson * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 24100894Srwatson * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 25100894Srwatson * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 26100894Srwatson * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 27100894Srwatson * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 28100894Srwatson * 29100894Srwatson * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND 30100894Srwatson * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 31100894Srwatson * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 32100894Srwatson * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 33100894Srwatson * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 34100894Srwatson * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 35100894Srwatson * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 36100894Srwatson * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 37100894Srwatson * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 38100894Srwatson * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 39100894Srwatson * SUCH DAMAGE. 40100894Srwatson */ 41116182Sobrien 42116182Sobrien#include <sys/cdefs.h> 43116182Sobrien__FBSDID("$FreeBSD: head/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c 175202 2008-01-10 01:10:58Z attilio $"); 44116182Sobrien 45100894Srwatson#include "opt_mac.h" 46101173Srwatson 47100894Srwatson#include <sys/param.h> 48106856Srwatson#include <sys/condvar.h> 49106468Srwatson#include <sys/imgact.h> 50100979Srwatson#include <sys/kernel.h> 51100979Srwatson#include <sys/lock.h> 52102949Sbde#include <sys/malloc.h> 53100979Srwatson#include <sys/mutex.h> 54100979Srwatson#include <sys/mac.h> 55100979Srwatson#include <sys/proc.h> 56116701Srwatson#include <sys/sbuf.h> 57100979Srwatson#include <sys/systm.h> 58100979Srwatson#include <sys/vnode.h> 59100979Srwatson#include <sys/mount.h> 60100979Srwatson#include <sys/file.h> 61100979Srwatson#include <sys/namei.h> 62100979Srwatson#include <sys/sysctl.h> 63100894Srwatson 64100979Srwatson#include <vm/vm.h> 65100979Srwatson#include <vm/pmap.h> 66100979Srwatson#include <vm/vm_map.h> 67100979Srwatson#include <vm/vm_object.h> 68100979Srwatson 69163606Srwatson#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h> 70121361Srwatson#include <security/mac/mac_internal.h> 71165469Srwatson#include <security/mac/mac_policy.h> 72100979Srwatson 73103136Srwatsonstatic int mac_mmap_revocation = 1; 74103136SrwatsonSYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation, CTLFLAG_RW, 75103136Srwatson &mac_mmap_revocation, 0, "Revoke mmap access to files on subject " 76103136Srwatson "relabel"); 77121361Srwatson 78101892Srwatsonstatic int mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow = 0; 79100979SrwatsonSYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation_via_cow, CTLFLAG_RW, 80100979Srwatson &mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow, 0, "Revoke mmap access to files via " 81100979Srwatson "copy-on-write semantics, or by removing all write access"); 82100979Srwatson 83100979Srwatsonstatic void mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(struct thread *td, 84100979Srwatson struct ucred *cred, struct vm_map *map); 85100979Srwatson 86122524Srwatsonstruct label * 87122524Srwatsonmac_cred_label_alloc(void) 88104521Srwatson{ 89122524Srwatson struct label *label; 90104521Srwatson 91122524Srwatson label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK); 92172930Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(cred_init_label, label); 93122524Srwatson return (label); 94104521Srwatson} 95104521Srwatson 96104521Srwatsonvoid 97172930Srwatsonmac_cred_init(struct ucred *cred) 98105694Srwatson{ 99105694Srwatson 100122524Srwatson cred->cr_label = mac_cred_label_alloc(); 101105694Srwatson} 102105694Srwatson 103122524Srwatsonstatic struct label * 104122524Srwatsonmac_proc_label_alloc(void) 105122524Srwatson{ 106122524Srwatson struct label *label; 107122524Srwatson 108122524Srwatson label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK); 109172930Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(proc_init_label, label); 110122524Srwatson return (label); 111122524Srwatson} 112122524Srwatson 113105694Srwatsonvoid 114172930Srwatsonmac_proc_init(struct proc *p) 115107105Srwatson{ 116107105Srwatson 117122524Srwatson p->p_label = mac_proc_label_alloc(); 118107105Srwatson} 119107105Srwatson 120105988Srwatsonvoid 121122524Srwatsonmac_cred_label_free(struct label *label) 122104521Srwatson{ 123104521Srwatson 124172930Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(cred_destroy_label, label); 125122524Srwatson mac_labelzone_free(label); 126104521Srwatson} 127104521Srwatson 128104521Srwatsonvoid 129172930Srwatsonmac_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred) 130105694Srwatson{ 131105694Srwatson 132122524Srwatson mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label); 133122524Srwatson cred->cr_label = NULL; 134105694Srwatson} 135105694Srwatson 136122524Srwatsonstatic void 137122524Srwatsonmac_proc_label_free(struct label *label) 138122524Srwatson{ 139122524Srwatson 140172930Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(proc_destroy_label, label); 141122524Srwatson mac_labelzone_free(label); 142122524Srwatson} 143122524Srwatson 144105694Srwatsonvoid 145172930Srwatsonmac_proc_destroy(struct proc *p) 146107105Srwatson{ 147107105Srwatson 148122524Srwatson mac_proc_label_free(p->p_label); 149122524Srwatson p->p_label = NULL; 150107105Srwatson} 151107105Srwatson 152121361Srwatsonint 153172930Srwatsonmac_cred_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *elements, 154122159Srwatson char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen) 155105694Srwatson{ 156104522Srwatson int error; 157104522Srwatson 158121507Srwatson MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen); 159104522Srwatson 160104522Srwatson return (error); 161104522Srwatson} 162104522Srwatson 163121361Srwatsonint 164172930Srwatsonmac_cred_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *string) 165105694Srwatson{ 166105694Srwatson int error; 167105694Srwatson 168121507Srwatson MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string); 169105694Srwatson 170105694Srwatson return (error); 171105694Srwatson} 172105694Srwatson 173104522Srwatson/* 174165425Srwatson * Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other kernel 175165425Srwatson * processes and threads are spawned. 176104522Srwatson */ 177104521Srwatsonvoid 178172930Srwatsonmac_proc_create_swapper(struct ucred *cred) 179104522Srwatson{ 180104522Srwatson 181172930Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(proc_create_swapper, cred); 182104522Srwatson} 183104522Srwatson 184104522Srwatson/* 185104522Srwatson * Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other 186104522Srwatson * userland processes and threads are spawned. 187104522Srwatson */ 188104522Srwatsonvoid 189172930Srwatsonmac_proc_create_init(struct ucred *cred) 190104522Srwatson{ 191104522Srwatson 192172930Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(proc_create_init, cred); 193104522Srwatson} 194104522Srwatson 195172957Srwatson/* 196172957Srwatson * When a thread becomes an NFS server daemon, its credential may need to be 197172957Srwatson * updated to reflect this so that policies can recognize when file system 198172957Srwatson * operations originate from the network. 199172957Srwatson * 200172957Srwatson * At some point, it would be desirable if the credential used for each NFS 201172957Srwatson * RPC could be set based on the RPC context (i.e., source system, etc) to 202172957Srwatson * provide more fine-grained access control. 203172957Srwatson */ 204104522Srwatsonvoid 205172957Srwatsonmac_proc_associate_nfsd(struct ucred *cred) 206172957Srwatson{ 207172957Srwatson 208172957Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(proc_associate_nfsd, cred); 209172957Srwatson} 210172957Srwatson 211172957Srwatsonvoid 212104522Srwatsonmac_thread_userret(struct thread *td) 213104522Srwatson{ 214104522Srwatson 215104522Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(thread_userret, td); 216104522Srwatson} 217104522Srwatson 218104522Srwatson/* 219104522Srwatson * When a new process is created, its label must be initialized. Generally, 220165425Srwatson * this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible deltas. 221165425Srwatson * This function allows that processing to take place. 222104522Srwatson */ 223104522Srwatsonvoid 224172930Srwatsonmac_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest) 225104522Srwatson{ 226104522Srwatson 227172930Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(cred_copy_label, src->cr_label, dest->cr_label); 228104522Srwatson} 229104522Srwatson 230105988Srwatsonint 231122524Srwatsonmac_execve_enter(struct image_params *imgp, struct mac *mac_p) 232106468Srwatson{ 233122524Srwatson struct label *label; 234106468Srwatson struct mac mac; 235106468Srwatson char *buffer; 236106468Srwatson int error; 237106468Srwatson 238106468Srwatson if (mac_p == NULL) 239106468Srwatson return (0); 240106468Srwatson 241106468Srwatson error = copyin(mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac)); 242106468Srwatson if (error) 243106468Srwatson return (error); 244106468Srwatson 245106468Srwatson error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac); 246106468Srwatson if (error) 247106468Srwatson return (error); 248106468Srwatson 249111119Simp buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); 250106468Srwatson error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, buffer, mac.m_buflen, NULL); 251106468Srwatson if (error) { 252106468Srwatson free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); 253106468Srwatson return (error); 254106468Srwatson } 255106468Srwatson 256122524Srwatson label = mac_cred_label_alloc(); 257172930Srwatson error = mac_cred_internalize_label(label, buffer); 258106468Srwatson free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); 259106468Srwatson if (error) { 260122524Srwatson mac_cred_label_free(label); 261106468Srwatson return (error); 262106468Srwatson } 263122524Srwatson imgp->execlabel = label; 264106468Srwatson return (0); 265106468Srwatson} 266106468Srwatson 267100979Srwatsonvoid 268106468Srwatsonmac_execve_exit(struct image_params *imgp) 269100979Srwatson{ 270122524Srwatson if (imgp->execlabel != NULL) { 271122524Srwatson mac_cred_label_free(imgp->execlabel); 272122524Srwatson imgp->execlabel = NULL; 273122524Srwatson } 274106468Srwatson} 275100979Srwatson 276100979Srwatson/* 277100979Srwatson * When relabeling a process, call out to the policies for the maximum 278165425Srwatson * permission allowed for each object type we know about in its memory space, 279165425Srwatson * and revoke access (in the least surprising ways we know) when necessary. 280165425Srwatson * The process lock is not held here. 281100979Srwatson */ 282107271Srwatsonvoid 283100979Srwatsonmac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms(struct thread *td, struct ucred *cred) 284100979Srwatson{ 285100979Srwatson 286100979Srwatson /* XXX freeze all other threads */ 287100979Srwatson mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(td, cred, 288100979Srwatson &td->td_proc->p_vmspace->vm_map); 289100979Srwatson /* XXX allow other threads to continue */ 290100979Srwatson} 291100979Srwatson 292100979Srwatsonstatic __inline const char * 293100979Srwatsonprot2str(vm_prot_t prot) 294100979Srwatson{ 295100979Srwatson 296100979Srwatson switch (prot & VM_PROT_ALL) { 297100979Srwatson case VM_PROT_READ: 298100979Srwatson return ("r--"); 299100979Srwatson case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE: 300100979Srwatson return ("rw-"); 301100979Srwatson case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE: 302100979Srwatson return ("r-x"); 303100979Srwatson case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE | VM_PROT_EXECUTE: 304100979Srwatson return ("rwx"); 305100979Srwatson case VM_PROT_WRITE: 306100979Srwatson return ("-w-"); 307100979Srwatson case VM_PROT_EXECUTE: 308100979Srwatson return ("--x"); 309100979Srwatson case VM_PROT_WRITE | VM_PROT_EXECUTE: 310100979Srwatson return ("-wx"); 311100979Srwatson default: 312100979Srwatson return ("---"); 313100979Srwatson } 314100979Srwatson} 315100979Srwatson 316100979Srwatsonstatic void 317100979Srwatsonmac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(struct thread *td, struct ucred *cred, 318100979Srwatson struct vm_map *map) 319100979Srwatson{ 320100979Srwatson struct vm_map_entry *vme; 321150913Scsjp int vfslocked, result; 322104546Srwatson vm_prot_t revokeperms; 323151115Scsjp vm_object_t backing_object, object; 324100979Srwatson vm_ooffset_t offset; 325100979Srwatson struct vnode *vp; 326156225Stegge struct mount *mp; 327100979Srwatson 328103136Srwatson if (!mac_mmap_revocation) 329103136Srwatson return; 330103136Srwatson 331100979Srwatson vm_map_lock_read(map); 332100979Srwatson for (vme = map->header.next; vme != &map->header; vme = vme->next) { 333100979Srwatson if (vme->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_IS_SUB_MAP) { 334100979Srwatson mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(td, cred, 335100979Srwatson vme->object.sub_map); 336100979Srwatson continue; 337100979Srwatson } 338100979Srwatson /* 339100979Srwatson * Skip over entries that obviously are not shared. 340100979Srwatson */ 341100979Srwatson if (vme->eflags & (MAP_ENTRY_COW | MAP_ENTRY_NOSYNC) || 342100979Srwatson !vme->max_protection) 343100979Srwatson continue; 344100979Srwatson /* 345100979Srwatson * Drill down to the deepest backing object. 346100979Srwatson */ 347100979Srwatson offset = vme->offset; 348100979Srwatson object = vme->object.vm_object; 349100979Srwatson if (object == NULL) 350100979Srwatson continue; 351151115Scsjp VM_OBJECT_LOCK(object); 352151115Scsjp while ((backing_object = object->backing_object) != NULL) { 353151115Scsjp VM_OBJECT_LOCK(backing_object); 354150923Scsjp offset += object->backing_object_offset; 355151115Scsjp VM_OBJECT_UNLOCK(object); 356151115Scsjp object = backing_object; 357100979Srwatson } 358151115Scsjp VM_OBJECT_UNLOCK(object); 359100979Srwatson /* 360165425Srwatson * At the moment, vm_maps and objects aren't considered by 361165425Srwatson * the MAC system, so only things with backing by a normal 362165425Srwatson * object (read: vnodes) are checked. 363100979Srwatson */ 364100979Srwatson if (object->type != OBJT_VNODE) 365100979Srwatson continue; 366100979Srwatson vp = (struct vnode *)object->handle; 367150913Scsjp vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(vp->v_mount); 368175202Sattilio vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY); 369104546Srwatson result = vme->max_protection; 370172930Srwatson mac_vnode_check_mmap_downgrade(cred, vp, &result); 371100979Srwatson VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td); 372100979Srwatson /* 373165425Srwatson * Find out what maximum protection we may be allowing now 374165425Srwatson * but a policy needs to get removed. 375100979Srwatson */ 376100979Srwatson revokeperms = vme->max_protection & ~result; 377150913Scsjp if (!revokeperms) { 378150913Scsjp VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked); 379100979Srwatson continue; 380150913Scsjp } 381102949Sbde printf("pid %ld: revoking %s perms from %#lx:%ld " 382102949Sbde "(max %s/cur %s)\n", (long)td->td_proc->p_pid, 383102949Sbde prot2str(revokeperms), (u_long)vme->start, 384102949Sbde (long)(vme->end - vme->start), 385100979Srwatson prot2str(vme->max_protection), prot2str(vme->protection)); 386100979Srwatson vm_map_lock_upgrade(map); 387100979Srwatson /* 388100979Srwatson * This is the really simple case: if a map has more 389100979Srwatson * max_protection than is allowed, but it's not being 390165425Srwatson * actually used (that is, the current protection is still 391165425Srwatson * allowed), we can just wipe it out and do nothing more. 392100979Srwatson */ 393100979Srwatson if ((vme->protection & revokeperms) == 0) { 394100979Srwatson vme->max_protection -= revokeperms; 395100979Srwatson } else { 396100979Srwatson if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_WRITE) { 397100979Srwatson /* 398100979Srwatson * In the more complicated case, flush out all 399100979Srwatson * pending changes to the object then turn it 400100979Srwatson * copy-on-write. 401100979Srwatson */ 402100979Srwatson vm_object_reference(object); 403156225Stegge (void) vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT); 404175202Sattilio vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY); 405113955Salc VM_OBJECT_LOCK(object); 406100979Srwatson vm_object_page_clean(object, 407100979Srwatson OFF_TO_IDX(offset), 408100979Srwatson OFF_TO_IDX(offset + vme->end - vme->start + 409100979Srwatson PAGE_MASK), 410100979Srwatson OBJPC_SYNC); 411113955Salc VM_OBJECT_UNLOCK(object); 412100979Srwatson VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td); 413156225Stegge vn_finished_write(mp); 414100979Srwatson vm_object_deallocate(object); 415100979Srwatson /* 416100979Srwatson * Why bother if there's no read permissions 417100979Srwatson * anymore? For the rest, we need to leave 418100979Srwatson * the write permissions on for COW, or 419100979Srwatson * remove them entirely if configured to. 420100979Srwatson */ 421100979Srwatson if (!mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow) { 422100979Srwatson vme->max_protection &= ~VM_PROT_WRITE; 423100979Srwatson vme->protection &= ~VM_PROT_WRITE; 424100979Srwatson } if ((revokeperms & VM_PROT_READ) == 0) 425100979Srwatson vme->eflags |= MAP_ENTRY_COW | 426100979Srwatson MAP_ENTRY_NEEDS_COPY; 427100979Srwatson } 428100979Srwatson if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_EXECUTE) { 429100979Srwatson vme->max_protection &= ~VM_PROT_EXECUTE; 430100979Srwatson vme->protection &= ~VM_PROT_EXECUTE; 431100979Srwatson } 432100979Srwatson if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_READ) { 433100979Srwatson vme->max_protection = 0; 434100979Srwatson vme->protection = 0; 435100979Srwatson } 436100979Srwatson pmap_protect(map->pmap, vme->start, vme->end, 437100979Srwatson vme->protection & ~revokeperms); 438100979Srwatson vm_map_simplify_entry(map, vme); 439100979Srwatson } 440100979Srwatson vm_map_lock_downgrade(map); 441150913Scsjp VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked); 442100979Srwatson } 443100979Srwatson vm_map_unlock_read(map); 444100979Srwatson} 445100979Srwatson 446100979Srwatson/* 447100979Srwatson * When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege 448100979Srwatson * to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified 449100979Srwatson * buffer cache. 450100979Srwatson */ 451121361Srwatsonvoid 452172930Srwatsonmac_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel) 453100979Srwatson{ 454100979Srwatson 455172930Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(cred_relabel, cred, newlabel); 456100979Srwatson} 457100979Srwatson 458100979Srwatsonint 459172930Srwatsonmac_cred_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel) 460100979Srwatson{ 461100979Srwatson int error; 462100979Srwatson 463172930Srwatson MAC_CHECK(cred_check_relabel, cred, newlabel); 464100979Srwatson 465100979Srwatson return (error); 466100979Srwatson} 467100979Srwatson 468100979Srwatsonint 469172930Srwatsonmac_cred_check_visible(struct ucred *cr1, struct ucred *cr2) 470100979Srwatson{ 471100979Srwatson int error; 472100979Srwatson 473172930Srwatson MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, cr1, cr2); 474100979Srwatson 475100979Srwatson return (error); 476100979Srwatson} 477100979Srwatson 478100979Srwatsonint 479172930Srwatsonmac_proc_check_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p) 480100979Srwatson{ 481100979Srwatson int error; 482100979Srwatson 483168955Srwatson PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); 484102103Srwatson 485172930Srwatson MAC_CHECK(proc_check_debug, cred, p); 486100979Srwatson 487100979Srwatson return (error); 488100979Srwatson} 489100979Srwatson 490100979Srwatsonint 491172930Srwatsonmac_proc_check_sched(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p) 492100979Srwatson{ 493100979Srwatson int error; 494100979Srwatson 495168955Srwatson PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); 496102103Srwatson 497172930Srwatson MAC_CHECK(proc_check_sched, cred, p); 498100979Srwatson 499100979Srwatson return (error); 500100979Srwatson} 501100979Srwatson 502100979Srwatsonint 503172930Srwatsonmac_proc_check_signal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p, int signum) 504100979Srwatson{ 505100979Srwatson int error; 506100979Srwatson 507168955Srwatson PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); 508102103Srwatson 509172930Srwatson MAC_CHECK(proc_check_signal, cred, p, signum); 510100979Srwatson 511100979Srwatson return (error); 512100979Srwatson} 513145147Srwatson 514145147Srwatsonint 515172930Srwatsonmac_proc_check_setuid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, uid_t uid) 516145147Srwatson{ 517145147Srwatson int error; 518145147Srwatson 519168955Srwatson PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); 520145147Srwatson 521172930Srwatson MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setuid, cred, uid); 522145147Srwatson return (error); 523145147Srwatson} 524145147Srwatson 525145147Srwatsonint 526172930Srwatsonmac_proc_check_seteuid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, uid_t euid) 527145147Srwatson{ 528145147Srwatson int error; 529145147Srwatson 530168955Srwatson PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); 531145147Srwatson 532172930Srwatson MAC_CHECK(proc_check_seteuid, cred, euid); 533145147Srwatson return (error); 534145147Srwatson} 535145147Srwatson 536145147Srwatsonint 537172930Srwatsonmac_proc_check_setgid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, gid_t gid) 538145147Srwatson{ 539145147Srwatson int error; 540145147Srwatson 541168955Srwatson PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); 542145147Srwatson 543172930Srwatson MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setgid, cred, gid); 544168955Srwatson 545145147Srwatson return (error); 546145147Srwatson} 547145147Srwatson 548145147Srwatsonint 549172930Srwatsonmac_proc_check_setegid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, gid_t egid) 550145147Srwatson{ 551145147Srwatson int error; 552145147Srwatson 553168955Srwatson PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); 554145147Srwatson 555172930Srwatson MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setegid, cred, egid); 556168955Srwatson 557145147Srwatson return (error); 558145147Srwatson} 559145147Srwatson 560145147Srwatsonint 561172930Srwatsonmac_proc_check_setgroups(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, int ngroups, 562168955Srwatson gid_t *gidset) 563145147Srwatson{ 564145147Srwatson int error; 565145147Srwatson 566168955Srwatson PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); 567145147Srwatson 568172930Srwatson MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setgroups, cred, ngroups, gidset); 569145147Srwatson return (error); 570145147Srwatson} 571145147Srwatson 572145147Srwatsonint 573172930Srwatsonmac_proc_check_setreuid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid, 574168955Srwatson uid_t euid) 575145147Srwatson{ 576145147Srwatson int error; 577145147Srwatson 578168955Srwatson PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); 579145147Srwatson 580172930Srwatson MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setreuid, cred, ruid, euid); 581168955Srwatson 582145147Srwatson return (error); 583145147Srwatson} 584145147Srwatson 585145147Srwatsonint 586172930Srwatsonmac_proc_check_setregid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid, 587168955Srwatson gid_t egid) 588145147Srwatson{ 589145147Srwatson int error; 590145147Srwatson 591145147Srwatson PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED); 592145147Srwatson 593172930Srwatson MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setregid, cred, rgid, egid); 594168955Srwatson 595145147Srwatson return (error); 596145147Srwatson} 597145147Srwatson 598145147Srwatsonint 599172930Srwatsonmac_proc_check_setresuid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid, 600168955Srwatson uid_t euid, uid_t suid) 601145147Srwatson{ 602145147Srwatson int error; 603145147Srwatson 604168955Srwatson PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); 605145147Srwatson 606172930Srwatson MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setresuid, cred, ruid, euid, suid); 607145147Srwatson return (error); 608145147Srwatson} 609145147Srwatson 610145147Srwatsonint 611172930Srwatsonmac_proc_check_setresgid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid, 612168955Srwatson gid_t egid, gid_t sgid) 613145147Srwatson{ 614145147Srwatson int error; 615145147Srwatson 616168955Srwatson PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); 617145147Srwatson 618172930Srwatson MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setresgid, cred, rgid, egid, sgid); 619168955Srwatson 620145147Srwatson return (error); 621145147Srwatson} 622145234Srwatson 623145234Srwatsonint 624172930Srwatsonmac_proc_check_wait(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p) 625145234Srwatson{ 626145234Srwatson int error; 627145234Srwatson 628168955Srwatson PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); 629145234Srwatson 630172930Srwatson MAC_CHECK(proc_check_wait, cred, p); 631145234Srwatson 632145234Srwatson return (error); 633145234Srwatson} 634