mac.4 revision 109284
Copyright (c) 2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
All rights reserved.

This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris Costello
at Safeport Network Services and Network Associates Labs, the
Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
DARPA CHATS research program.

Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
are met:
1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.

THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
SUCH DAMAGE.

$FreeBSD: head/share/man/man4/mac.4 109284 2003-01-15 06:11:13Z chris $
.Dd JANUARY 8, 2003 .Os .Dt MAC 4 .Sh NAME .Nm mac .Nd Mandatory Access Control .Sh SYNOPSIS .Cd "options MAC" .Sh DESCRIPTION .Ss Introduction The Mandatory Access Control, or MAC, framework allows administrators to finely control system security by providing for a loadable security policy architecture. It is important to note that due to its nature, MAC security policies may only further restrict security; they cannot override traditional UNIX security provisions such as file permissions and superuser checks.

p Currently, the following MAC policy modules are shipped with .Fx : l -column ".Xr mac_seeotheruids 4" "low-watermark mac policy" ".Em Labeling" "boot only" t Em Name Ta Em Description Ta Em Labeling Ta Em "Load time" t Xr mac_biba 4 Ta "Biba integrity policy" Ta yes Ta boot only t Xr mac_bsdextended 4 Ta "File system firewall" Ta no Ta any time t Xr mac_ifoff 4 Ta "Interface silencing" Ta no Ta any time t Xr mac_lomac 4 Ta "Low-Watermark MAC policy" Ta yes Ta boot only t Xr mac_mls 4 Ta "Confidentiality policy" Ta yes Ta boot only t Xr mac_none 4 Ta "Sample no-op policy" Ta no Ta any time t Xr mac_partition 4 Ta "Process partition policy" Ta yes Ta any time t Xr mac_seeotheruids 4 Ta "See-other-UIDs policy" Ta no Ta any time t Xr mac_test 4 Ta "MAC testing policy" Ta no Ta any time .El .Ss MAC Labels Each system subject (processes, sockets, etc.) and each system object (file system objects, sockets, etc.) can carry with it a MAC label. MAC labels can contain data in an arbitrary format used by the MAC policies in order to help determine how to determine access rights for a given operation. Most MAC labels on system subjects and objects can be modified directly or indirectly by the system administrator. More information on the format for MAC labels can be found in the .Xr maclabel 7 man page. .Ss Setting MAC labels From the command line, each type of system object has its own means for setting and modifying its MAC policy label. l -column "user login process" "Xr login.conf 5" -offset indent t Em "Subject/Object" Ta Em "Utility" t "File system object" Ta Xr setfmac 8 t "Network interface" Ta Xr ifconfig 8 t "TTY (by login class)" Ta Xr login.conf 5 t "User (by login class)" Ta Xr login.conf 5 .El

p Additionally, the .Xr setpmac 8 command can be used to run a command with a different process label than the shell's current label. .Ss Programming With MAC MAC security enforcement itself is transparent to application programs, with the exception that some programs may need to be aware of additional .Xr errno 2 returns from various system calls.

p The interface for retrieving, handling, and setting policy labels is documented in the .Xr mac 3 man page. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr mac 3 , .Xr mac_biba 4 , .Xr mac_bsdextended 4 , .Xr mac_ifoff 4 , .Xr mac_lomac 4 , .Xr mac_mls 4 , .Xr mac_none 4 , .Xr mac_partition 4 , .Xr mac_seeotheruids 4 , .Xr mac_test 4 , .Xr login.5 , .Xr maclabel 7 , .Xr getfmac 8 , .Xr setfmac 8 , .Xr getpmac 8 , .Xr setpmac 8 , .Xr mac 9 .Sh HISTORY The .Nm implementation first appeared in .Fx 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. .Sh AUTHORS This software was contributed to the .Fx Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.