t1_lib.c revision 306230
1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112#include <stdio.h> 113#include <openssl/objects.h> 114#include <openssl/evp.h> 115#include <openssl/hmac.h> 116#include <openssl/ocsp.h> 117#include <openssl/rand.h> 118#include "ssl_locl.h" 119 120const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 121 122#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 123static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 125 SSL_SESSION **psess); 126#endif 127 128SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { 129 tls1_enc, 130 tls1_mac, 131 tls1_setup_key_block, 132 tls1_generate_master_secret, 133 tls1_change_cipher_state, 134 tls1_final_finish_mac, 135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 136 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 139 tls1_alert_code, 140 tls1_export_keying_material, 141}; 142 143long tls1_default_timeout(void) 144{ 145 /* 146 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for 147 * http, the cache would over fill 148 */ 149 return (60 * 60 * 2); 150} 151 152int tls1_new(SSL *s) 153{ 154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) 155 return (0); 156 s->method->ssl_clear(s); 157 return (1); 158} 159 160void tls1_free(SSL *s) 161{ 162#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 163 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) { 164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); 165 } 166#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ 167 ssl3_free(s); 168} 169 170void tls1_clear(SSL *s) 171{ 172 ssl3_clear(s); 173 s->version = s->method->version; 174} 175 176#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 177 178static int nid_list[] = { 179 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 180 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 181 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 182 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 183 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 184 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 185 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 186 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 187 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 188 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 189 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 190 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 191 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 192 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 193 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 194 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 195 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 196 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 197 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 198 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 199 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 200 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 201 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 202 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 203 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ 204}; 205 206static int pref_list[] = { 207# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 208 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 209 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 210# endif 211 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 212# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 213 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 214 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 215# endif 216 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 217# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 218 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 219 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 220# endif 221 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 222 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 223# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 224 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 225 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 226 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 227# endif 228 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 229 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 230# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 231 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 232 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 233# endif 234 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 235 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 236# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 237 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 238 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 239 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 240# endif 241 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 242 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 243 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 244}; 245 246int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) 247{ 248 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */ 249 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > 250 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0]))) 251 return 0; 252 return nid_list[curve_id - 1]; 253} 254 255int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 256{ 257 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */ 258 switch (nid) { 259 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 260 return 1; 261 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 262 return 2; 263 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 264 return 3; 265 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 266 return 4; 267 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 268 return 5; 269 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 270 return 6; 271 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 272 return 7; 273 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 274 return 8; 275 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 276 return 9; 277 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 278 return 10; 279 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 280 return 11; 281 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 282 return 12; 283 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 284 return 13; 285 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 286 return 14; 287 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 288 return 15; 289 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 290 return 16; 291 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 292 return 17; 293 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 294 return 18; 295 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 296 return 19; 297 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 298 return 20; 299 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 300 return 21; 301 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 302 return 22; 303 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 304 return 23; 305 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 306 return 24; 307 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 308 return 25; 309 default: 310 return 0; 311 } 312} 313#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 314 315#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 316 317/* 318 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this 319 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. 320 */ 321 322# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 323# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ 324# else 325# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, 326# endif 327 328# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 329# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ 330# else 331# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, 332# endif 333 334# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 335# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 336 /* */ 337# else 338# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, 339# endif 340 341# define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ 342 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ 343 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ 344 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 345 346static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { 347# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 348 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) 349 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 350# endif 351# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 352 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 353 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) 354# endif 355# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 356 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) 357# endif 358}; 359 360int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) 361{ 362 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 363 if (p) 364 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen); 365 return (int)slen; 366} 367 368unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, 369 unsigned char *limit) 370{ 371 int extdatalen = 0; 372 unsigned char *orig = buf; 373 unsigned char *ret = buf; 374 375 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 376 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 377 return orig; 378 379 ret += 2; 380 381 if (ret >= limit) 382 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 383 384 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { 385 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 386 unsigned long size_str; 387 long lenmax; 388 389 /*- 390 * check for enough space. 391 * 4 for the servername type and entension length 392 * 2 for servernamelist length 393 * 1 for the hostname type 394 * 2 for hostname length 395 * + hostname length 396 */ 397 398 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 399 || (size_str = 400 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 401 return NULL; 402 403 /* extension type and length */ 404 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); 405 s2n(size_str + 5, ret); 406 407 /* length of servername list */ 408 s2n(size_str + 3, ret); 409 410 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 411 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 412 s2n(size_str, ret); 413 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 414 ret += size_str; 415 } 416 417 /* Add RI if renegotiating */ 418 if (s->renegotiate) { 419 int el; 420 421 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { 422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 423 return NULL; 424 } 425 426 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 427 return NULL; 428 429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); 430 s2n(el, ret); 431 432 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 434 return NULL; 435 } 436 437 ret += el; 438 } 439# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 440 /* Add SRP username if there is one */ 441 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the 442 * Client Hello message */ 443 444 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); 445 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { 446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 447 return NULL; 448 } 449 450 /*- 451 * check for enough space. 452 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length 453 * 1 for the srp user identity 454 * + srp user identity length 455 */ 456 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) 457 return NULL; 458 459 /* fill in the extension */ 460 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); 461 s2n(login_len + 1, ret); 462 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len; 463 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); 464 ret += login_len; 465 } 466# endif 467 468# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 469 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) { 470 /* 471 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message 472 */ 473 long lenmax; 474 475 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) 476 return NULL; 477 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) 478 return NULL; 479 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) { 480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 481 return NULL; 482 } 483 484 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); 485 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret); 486 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 487 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, 488 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 489 ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 490 } 491 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) { 492 /* 493 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message 494 */ 495 long lenmax; 496 497 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) 498 return NULL; 499 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) 500 return NULL; 501 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) { 502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 503 return NULL; 504 } 505 506 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); 507 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); 508 509 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); 510 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, 511 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 512 ret += s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 513 } 514# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 515 516 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { 517 int ticklen; 518 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 519 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 520 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 521 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { 522 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 523 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 524 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 525 return NULL; 526 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, 527 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); 528 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 529 } else 530 ticklen = 0; 531 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 532 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 533 goto skip_ext; 534 /* 535 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for 536 * ticket 537 */ 538 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) 539 return NULL; 540 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); 541 s2n(ticklen, ret); 542 if (ticklen) { 543 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 544 ret += ticklen; 545 } 546 } 547 skip_ext: 548 549 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 550 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6) 551 return NULL; 552 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); 553 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret); 554 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret); 555 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs)); 556 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 557 } 558# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 559 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 560 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 561 562 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) 563 return NULL; 564 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 565 return NULL; 566 567 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 568 s2n(col + 2, ret); 569 s2n(col, ret); 570 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); 571 ret += col; 572 } 573# endif 574 575 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && 576 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 577 int i; 578 long extlen, idlen, itmp; 579 OCSP_RESPID *id; 580 581 idlen = 0; 582 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { 583 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 584 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); 585 if (itmp <= 0) 586 return NULL; 587 idlen += itmp + 2; 588 } 589 590 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { 591 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); 592 if (extlen < 0) 593 return NULL; 594 } else 595 extlen = 0; 596 597 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) 598 return NULL; 599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 600 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) 601 return NULL; 602 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); 603 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 604 s2n(idlen, ret); 605 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { 606 /* save position of id len */ 607 unsigned char *q = ret; 608 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 609 /* skip over id len */ 610 ret += 2; 611 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); 612 /* write id len */ 613 s2n(itmp, q); 614 } 615 s2n(extlen, ret); 616 if (extlen > 0) 617 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); 618 } 619# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 620 /* Add Heartbeat extension */ 621 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) 622 return NULL; 623 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); 624 s2n(1, ret); 625 /*- 626 * Set mode: 627 * 1: peer may send requests 628 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 629 */ 630 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 631 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 632 else 633 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 634# endif 635 636# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 637 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { 638 /* 639 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support 640 * for Next Protocol Negotiation 641 */ 642 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 643 return NULL; 644 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); 645 s2n(0, ret); 646 } 647# endif 648 649# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 650 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { 651 int el; 652 653 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 654 655 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 656 return NULL; 657 658 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); 659 s2n(el, ret); 660 661 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 663 return NULL; 664 } 665 ret += el; 666 } 667# endif 668 /* 669 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See 670 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this 671 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always 672 * appear last. 673 */ 674 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { 675 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 676 /* 677 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the 678 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c 679 * does not. 680 */ 681 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) 682 hlen -= 5; 683 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { 684 hlen = 0x200 - hlen; 685 if (hlen >= 4) 686 hlen -= 4; 687 else 688 hlen = 0; 689 690 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); 691 s2n(hlen, ret); 692 memset(ret, 0, hlen); 693 ret += hlen; 694 } 695 } 696 697 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) 698 return orig; 699 700 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 701 return ret; 702} 703 704unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, 705 unsigned char *limit) 706{ 707 int extdatalen = 0; 708 unsigned char *orig = buf; 709 unsigned char *ret = buf; 710# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 711 int next_proto_neg_seen; 712# endif 713 714 /* 715 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation 716 */ 717 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 718 return orig; 719 720 ret += 2; 721 if (ret >= limit) 722 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 723 724 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 725 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { 726 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 727 return NULL; 728 729 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); 730 s2n(0, ret); 731 } 732 733 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { 734 int el; 735 736 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { 737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 738 return NULL; 739 } 740 741 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 742 return NULL; 743 744 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); 745 s2n(el, ret); 746 747 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 749 return NULL; 750 } 751 752 ret += el; 753 } 754# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 755 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) { 756 /* 757 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message 758 */ 759 long lenmax; 760 761 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) 762 return NULL; 763 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) 764 return NULL; 765 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) { 766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 767 return NULL; 768 } 769 770 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); 771 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret); 772 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 773 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, 774 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 775 ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 776 777 } 778 /* 779 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves 780 * extension 781 */ 782# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 783 784 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { 785 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 786 return NULL; 787 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); 788 s2n(0, ret); 789 } 790 791 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { 792 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 793 return NULL; 794 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 795 s2n(0, ret); 796 } 797# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 798 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 799 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 800 801 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) 802 return NULL; 803 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 804 return NULL; 805 806 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 807 s2n(sol + 2, ret); 808 s2n(sol, ret); 809 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); 810 ret += sol; 811 } 812# endif 813 814# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 815 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { 816 int el; 817 818 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 819 820 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 821 return NULL; 822 823 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); 824 s2n(el, ret); 825 826 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 828 return NULL; 829 } 830 ret += el; 831 } 832# endif 833 834 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 835 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) 836 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) { 837 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 838 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ 839 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ 840 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 841 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 842 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 843 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 844 }; 845 if (limit - ret < 36) 846 return NULL; 847 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36); 848 ret += 36; 849 850 } 851# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 852 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ 853 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) { 854 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) 855 return NULL; 856 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); 857 s2n(1, ret); 858 /*- 859 * Set mode: 860 * 1: peer may send requests 861 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 862 */ 863 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 864 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 865 else 866 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 867 868 } 869# endif 870 871# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 872 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; 873 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 874 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { 875 const unsigned char *npa; 876 unsigned int npalen; 877 int r; 878 879 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, 880 s-> 881 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); 882 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 883 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) 884 return NULL; 885 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); 886 s2n(npalen, ret); 887 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); 888 ret += npalen; 889 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 890 } 891 } 892# endif 893 894 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) 895 return orig; 896 897 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 898 return ret; 899} 900 901# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 902/*- 903 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X 904 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. 905 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: 906 * SNI, 907 * elliptic_curves 908 * ec_point_formats 909 * 910 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, 911 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. 912 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from 913 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). 914 */ 915static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 916 const unsigned char *limit) 917{ 918 unsigned short type, size; 919 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 920 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 921 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 922 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 923 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 924 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 925 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 926 927 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 928 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 929 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 930 0x00, /* uncompressed */ 931 }; 932 933 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 934 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { 935 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 936 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 937 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 938 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 939 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 940 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 941 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 942 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ 943 }; 944 945 if (limit - data <= 2) 946 return; 947 data += 2; 948 949 if (limit - data < 4) 950 return; 951 n2s(data, type); 952 n2s(data, size); 953 954 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 955 return; 956 957 if (limit - data < size) 958 return; 959 data += size; 960 961 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 962 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 963 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); 964 965 if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2)) 966 return; 967 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) 968 return; 969 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) 970 return; 971 } else { 972 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 973 974 if (limit - data != (int)(len)) 975 return; 976 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) 977 return; 978 } 979 980 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; 981} 982# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 983 984int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, 985 unsigned char *limit, int *al) 986{ 987 unsigned short type; 988 unsigned short size; 989 unsigned short len; 990 unsigned char *data = *p; 991 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 992 int sigalg_seen = 0; 993 994 s->servername_done = 0; 995 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 996# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 997 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 998# endif 999 1000# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1001 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 1002 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 1003# endif 1004 1005# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1006 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) 1007 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit); 1008# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1009 1010# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1011 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { 1012 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); 1013 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; 1014 } 1015# endif 1016 1017 s->srtp_profile = NULL; 1018 1019 if (data == limit) 1020 goto ri_check; 1021 1022 if (limit - data < 2) 1023 goto err; 1024 1025 n2s(data, len); 1026 1027 if (limit - data != len) 1028 goto err; 1029 1030 while (limit - data >= 4) { 1031 n2s(data, type); 1032 n2s(data, size); 1033 1034 if (limit - data < size) 1035 goto err; 1036# if 0 1037 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); 1038# endif 1039 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1040 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1041/*- 1042 * The servername extension is treated as follows: 1043 * 1044 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 1045 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 1046 * in which case an fatal alert is generated. 1047 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 1048 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 1049 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 1050 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 1051 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 1052 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 1053 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 1054 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 1055 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 1056 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 1057 * the value of the Host: field. 1058 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 1059 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the 1060 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername 1061 * extension. 1062 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 1063 * 1064 */ 1065 1066 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { 1067 unsigned char *sdata; 1068 int servname_type; 1069 int dsize; 1070 1071 if (size < 2) 1072 goto err; 1073 n2s(data, dsize); 1074 size -= 2; 1075 if (dsize > size) 1076 goto err; 1077 1078 sdata = data; 1079 while (dsize > 3) { 1080 servname_type = *(sdata++); 1081 n2s(sdata, len); 1082 dsize -= 3; 1083 1084 if (len > dsize) 1085 goto err; 1086 1087 if (s->servername_done == 0) 1088 switch (servname_type) { 1089 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: 1090 if (!s->hit) { 1091 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) 1092 goto err; 1093 1094 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { 1095 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1096 return 0; 1097 } 1098 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = 1099 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { 1100 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1101 return 0; 1102 } 1103 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); 1104 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; 1105 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { 1106 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); 1107 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 1108 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1109 return 0; 1110 } 1111 s->servername_done = 1; 1112 1113 } else 1114 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname 1115 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 1116 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, 1117 (char *)sdata, len) == 0; 1118 1119 break; 1120 1121 default: 1122 break; 1123 } 1124 1125 dsize -= len; 1126 } 1127 if (dsize != 0) 1128 goto err; 1129 1130 } 1131# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1132 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { 1133 if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) 1134 goto err; 1135 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 1136 goto err; 1137 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) 1138 return -1; 1139 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); 1140 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; 1141 1142 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) 1143 goto err; 1144 } 1145# endif 1146 1147# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1148 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { 1149 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1150 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1151 1152 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) 1153 goto err; 1154 if (!s->hit) { 1155 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 1156 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1157 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; 1158 } 1159 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1160 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = 1161 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { 1162 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1163 return 0; 1164 } 1165 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 1166 ecpointformatlist_length; 1167 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, 1168 ecpointformatlist_length); 1169 } 1170# if 0 1171 fprintf(stderr, 1172 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", 1173 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 1174 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1175 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1176 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 1177 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 1178# endif 1179 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { 1180 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1181 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); 1182 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); 1183 1184 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || 1185 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 || 1186 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */ 1187 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) 1188 goto err; 1189 1190 if (!s->hit) { 1191 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) 1192 goto err; 1193 1194 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1195 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = 1196 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { 1197 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1198 return 0; 1199 } 1200 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 1201 ellipticcurvelist_length; 1202 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, 1203 ellipticcurvelist_length); 1204 } 1205# if 0 1206 fprintf(stderr, 1207 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", 1208 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 1209 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 1210 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) 1211 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 1212 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 1213# endif 1214 } 1215# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1216# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1217 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1218 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 1219 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1220 1221 if (size < 2) { 1222 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1223 return 0; 1224 } 1225 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1226 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { 1227 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1228 return 0; 1229 } 1230 1231 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1232 /* shouldn't really happen */ 1233 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1234 } 1235 1236 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1237 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1238 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 1239 else 1240 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = 1241 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1242 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 1243 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1244 return 0; 1245 } 1246 } 1247# endif 1248 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 1249 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1250 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, 1251 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1252 { 1253 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1254 return 0; 1255 } 1256 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { 1257 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1258 return 0; 1259 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1260 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { 1261 int dsize; 1262 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) 1263 goto err; 1264 sigalg_seen = 1; 1265 n2s(data, dsize); 1266 size -= 2; 1267 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) 1268 goto err; 1269 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) 1270 goto err; 1271 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1272 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 1273 1274 if (size < 5) 1275 goto err; 1276 1277 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; 1278 size--; 1279 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { 1280 const unsigned char *sdata; 1281 int dsize; 1282 /* Read in responder_id_list */ 1283 n2s(data, dsize); 1284 size -= 2; 1285 if (dsize > size) 1286 goto err; 1287 1288 /* 1289 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake 1290 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 1291 */ 1292 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, 1293 OCSP_RESPID_free); 1294 if (dsize > 0) { 1295 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); 1296 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) { 1297 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1298 return 0; 1299 } 1300 } else { 1301 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; 1302 } 1303 1304 while (dsize > 0) { 1305 OCSP_RESPID *id; 1306 int idsize; 1307 if (dsize < 4) 1308 goto err; 1309 n2s(data, idsize); 1310 dsize -= 2 + idsize; 1311 size -= 2 + idsize; 1312 if (dsize < 0) 1313 goto err; 1314 sdata = data; 1315 data += idsize; 1316 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); 1317 if (!id) 1318 goto err; 1319 if (data != sdata) { 1320 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1321 goto err; 1322 } 1323 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { 1324 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1325 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1326 return 0; 1327 } 1328 } 1329 1330 /* Read in request_extensions */ 1331 if (size < 2) 1332 goto err; 1333 n2s(data, dsize); 1334 size -= 2; 1335 if (dsize != size) 1336 goto err; 1337 sdata = data; 1338 if (dsize > 0) { 1339 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { 1340 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, 1341 X509_EXTENSION_free); 1342 } 1343 1344 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = 1345 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); 1346 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) 1347 goto err; 1348 } 1349 } 1350 /* 1351 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. 1352 */ 1353 else 1354 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 1355 } 1356# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1357 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { 1358 switch (data[0]) { 1359 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ 1360 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1361 break; 1362 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ 1363 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1364 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1365 break; 1366 default: 1367 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1368 return 0; 1369 } 1370 } 1371# endif 1372# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1373 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1374 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 1375 /*- 1376 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a 1377 * renegotiation. 1378 * 1379 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we 1380 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on 1381 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when 1382 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an 1383 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing 1384 * anything like that, but this might change). 1385 * 1386 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake 1387 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 1388 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen 1389 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new 1390 * Finished message could have been computed.) 1391 */ 1392 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1393 } 1394# endif 1395 1396 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 1397# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1398 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) 1399 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { 1400 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1401 return 0; 1402 } 1403# endif 1404 1405 data += size; 1406 } 1407 1408 /* Spurious data on the end */ 1409 if (data != limit) 1410 goto err; 1411 1412 *p = data; 1413 1414 ri_check: 1415 1416 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 1417 1418 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && 1419 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 1420 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1422 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1423 return 0; 1424 } 1425 1426 return 1; 1427err: 1428 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1429 return 0; 1430} 1431 1432# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1433/* 1434 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No 1435 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly 1436 * fill the length of the block. 1437 */ 1438static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) 1439{ 1440 unsigned int off = 0; 1441 1442 while (off < len) { 1443 if (d[off] == 0) 1444 return 0; 1445 off += d[off]; 1446 off++; 1447 } 1448 1449 return off == len; 1450} 1451# endif 1452 1453int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, 1454 int n, int *al) 1455{ 1456 unsigned short length; 1457 unsigned short type; 1458 unsigned short size; 1459 unsigned char *data = *p; 1460 int tlsext_servername = 0; 1461 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 1462 1463# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1464 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1465# endif 1466 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 1467 1468# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1469 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 1470 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 1471# endif 1472 1473 if ((d + n) - data <= 2) 1474 goto ri_check; 1475 1476 n2s(data, length); 1477 if ((d + n) - data != length) { 1478 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1479 return 0; 1480 } 1481 1482 while ((d + n) - data >= 4) { 1483 n2s(data, type); 1484 n2s(data, size); 1485 1486 if ((d + n) - data < size) 1487 goto ri_check; 1488 1489 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1490 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1491 1492 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { 1493 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { 1494 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1495 return 0; 1496 } 1497 tlsext_servername = 1; 1498 } 1499# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1500 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { 1501 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1502 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1503 1504 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 1505 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) { 1506 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1507 return 0; 1508 } 1509 if (!s->hit) { 1510 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1511 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 1512 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1513 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = 1514 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { 1515 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1516 return 0; 1517 } 1518 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 1519 ecpointformatlist_length; 1520 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, 1521 ecpointformatlist_length); 1522 } 1523# if 0 1524 fprintf(stderr, 1525 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); 1526 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1527 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1528 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 1529 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 1530# endif 1531 } 1532# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1533 1534 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 1535 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1536 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, 1537 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1538 { 1539 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1540 return 0; 1541 } 1542 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1543 || (size > 0)) { 1544 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1545 return 0; 1546 } 1547 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1548 } 1549# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1550 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1551 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 1552 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1553 1554 if (size < 2) { 1555 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1556 return 0; 1557 } 1558 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1559 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { 1560 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1561 return 0; 1562 } 1563 1564 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1565 /* shouldn't really happen */ 1566 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1567 } 1568 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 1569 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1570 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 1571 } else { 1572 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = 1573 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1574 } 1575 1576 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 1577 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1578 return 0; 1579 } 1580 } 1581# endif 1582 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1583 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 1584 /* 1585 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status 1586 * request message. 1587 */ 1588 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { 1589 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1590 return 0; 1591 } 1592 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ 1593 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1594 } 1595# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1596 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1597 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 1598 unsigned char *selected; 1599 unsigned char selected_len; 1600 1601 /* We must have requested it. */ 1602 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { 1603 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1604 return 0; 1605 } 1606 /* The data must be valid */ 1607 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) { 1608 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1609 return 0; 1610 } 1611 if (s-> 1612 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, 1613 size, 1614 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != 1615 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 1616 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1617 return 0; 1618 } 1619 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 1620 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { 1621 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1622 return 0; 1623 } 1624 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); 1625 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; 1626 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1627 } 1628# endif 1629 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { 1630 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1631 return 0; 1632 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1633 } 1634# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1635 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { 1636 switch (data[0]) { 1637 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ 1638 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1639 break; 1640 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ 1641 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1642 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1643 break; 1644 default: 1645 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1646 return 0; 1647 } 1648 } 1649# endif 1650# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1651 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { 1652 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1653 return 0; 1654 } 1655# endif 1656 1657 data += size; 1658 } 1659 1660 if (data != d + n) { 1661 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1662 return 0; 1663 } 1664 1665 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { 1666 if (s->tlsext_hostname) { 1667 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { 1668 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 1669 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { 1670 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1671 return 0; 1672 } 1673 } else { 1674 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1675 return 0; 1676 } 1677 } 1678 } 1679 1680 *p = data; 1681 1682 ri_check: 1683 1684 /* 1685 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid 1686 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello 1687 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. 1688 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which 1689 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on 1690 * initial connect only. 1691 */ 1692 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) 1693 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 1694 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 1696 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1697 return 0; 1698 } 1699 1700 return 1; 1701} 1702 1703int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1704{ 1705# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1706 /* 1707 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 1708 * suite, send the point formats and elliptic curves we support. 1709 */ 1710 int using_ecc = 0; 1711 int i; 1712 unsigned char *j; 1713 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 1714 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 1715 1716 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { 1717 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 1718 1719 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 1720 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 1721 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe) 1722 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { 1723 using_ecc = 1; 1724 break; 1725 } 1726 } 1727 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION); 1728 if (using_ecc) { 1729 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 1730 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1731 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) { 1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1733 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1734 return -1; 1735 } 1736 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1737 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1738 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = 1739 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1740 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = 1741 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1742 1743 /* we support all named elliptic curves in RFC 4492 */ 1744 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) 1745 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); 1746 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 1747 sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2; 1748 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = 1749 OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { 1750 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1752 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1753 return -1; 1754 } 1755 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i < 1756 sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) { 1757 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]); 1758 s2n(id, j); 1759 } 1760 } 1761# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1762 1763# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1764 { 1765 int r = 1; 1766 1767 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { 1768 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, 1769 s-> 1770 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1771 if (!r) 1772 return -1; 1773 } 1774 1775 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1776 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1777 /* shouldn't really happen */ 1778 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1779 } 1780 1781 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 1782 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1783 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 1784 } else { 1785 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = 1786 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, 1787 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1788 } 1789 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1791 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1792 return -1; 1793 } 1794 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = 1795 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1796 } 1797 1798 if (r == 2) 1799 /* 1800 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate 1801 * server opaque PRF input 1802 */ 1803 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = 1804 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1805 } 1806# endif 1807 1808 return 1; 1809} 1810 1811int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1812{ 1813# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1814 /* 1815 * If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats 1816 * we support if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note 1817 * that the server is not supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. 1818 */ 1819 1820 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1821 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1822 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) 1823 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 1824 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 1825 1826 if (using_ecc) { 1827 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 1828 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1829 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) { 1830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 1831 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1832 return -1; 1833 } 1834 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1835 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1836 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = 1837 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1838 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = 1839 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1840 } 1841# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1842 1843 return 1; 1844} 1845 1846int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) 1847{ 1848 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 1849 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1850 1851# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1852 /* 1853 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely 1854 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1855 */ 1856 /* 1857 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely 1858 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1859 */ 1860# endif 1861 1862 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1863 ret = 1864 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 1865 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1866 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL 1867 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1868 ret = 1869 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 1870 s-> 1871 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1872 1873# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1874 { 1875 /* 1876 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we 1877 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this 1878 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). 1879 */ 1880 1881 int r = 1; 1882 1883 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { 1884 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, 1885 s-> 1886 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1887 if (!r) { 1888 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1889 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1890 goto err; 1891 } 1892 } 1893 1894 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1895 /* shouldn't really happen */ 1896 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1897 } 1898 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; 1899 1900 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1901 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 1902 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 1903 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) { 1904 /* 1905 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF 1906 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! 1907 */ 1908 1909 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 1910 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1911 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 1912 } else { 1913 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = 1914 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, 1915 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1916 } 1917 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 1918 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1919 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1920 goto err; 1921 } 1922 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = 1923 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1924 } 1925 } 1926 1927 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 1928 /* 1929 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we 1930 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the 1931 * handshake. 1932 */ 1933 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1934 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1935 } 1936 } 1937 1938 err: 1939# endif 1940 switch (ret) { 1941 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1942 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1943 return -1; 1944 1945 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 1946 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 1947 return 1; 1948 1949 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1950 s->servername_done = 0; 1951 default: 1952 return 1; 1953 } 1954} 1955 1956int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) 1957{ 1958 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 1959 int al; 1960 1961 /* 1962 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be 1963 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has 1964 * changed, and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because 1965 * this may influence which certificate is sent 1966 */ 1967 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { 1968 int r; 1969 CERT_PKEY *certpkey; 1970 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); 1971 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ 1972 if (certpkey == NULL) { 1973 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1974 return 1; 1975 } 1976 /* 1977 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate 1978 * et al can pick it up. 1979 */ 1980 s->cert->key = certpkey; 1981 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 1982 switch (r) { 1983 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 1984 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1985 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1986 break; 1987 /* status request response should be sent */ 1988 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 1989 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 1990 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1991 else 1992 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1993 break; 1994 /* something bad happened */ 1995 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1996 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1997 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1998 goto err; 1999 } 2000 } else 2001 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 2002 2003 err: 2004 switch (ret) { 2005 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2006 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2007 return -1; 2008 2009 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2010 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 2011 return 1; 2012 2013 default: 2014 return 1; 2015 } 2016} 2017 2018int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2019{ 2020 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 2021 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2022 2023# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2024 /* 2025 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 2026 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it 2027 * must contain uncompressed. 2028 */ 2029 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2030 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2031 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 2032 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) 2033 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 2034 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) 2035 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) 2036 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { 2037 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 2038 size_t i; 2039 unsigned char *list; 2040 int found_uncompressed = 0; 2041 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 2042 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { 2043 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { 2044 found_uncompressed = 1; 2045 break; 2046 } 2047 } 2048 if (!found_uncompressed) { 2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 2050 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 2051 return -1; 2052 } 2053 } 2054 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 2055# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2056 2057 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2058 ret = 2059 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 2060 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2061 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL 2062 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2063 ret = 2064 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 2065 s-> 2066 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2067 2068# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2069 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) { 2070 /* 2071 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on 2072 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a 2073 * value from the server too. 2074 */ 2075 2076 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2077 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2078 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2079 } 2080 2081 /* 2082 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to 2083 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. 2084 */ 2085 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || 2086 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != 2087 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) { 2088 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2089 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2090 } 2091 } 2092# endif 2093 2094 /* 2095 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the 2096 * callback 2097 */ 2098 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) 2099 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { 2100 int r; 2101 /* 2102 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no 2103 * response. 2104 */ 2105 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) { 2106 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); 2107 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; 2108 } 2109 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; 2110 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 2111 if (r == 0) { 2112 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; 2113 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2114 } 2115 if (r < 0) { 2116 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2117 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2118 } 2119 } 2120 2121 switch (ret) { 2122 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2123 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2124 return -1; 2125 2126 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2127 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 2128 return 1; 2129 2130 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2131 s->servername_done = 0; 2132 default: 2133 return 1; 2134 } 2135} 2136 2137/*- 2138 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the 2139 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle 2140 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. 2141 * 2142 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will 2143 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket 2144 * extension, if any. 2145 * len: the length of the session ID. 2146 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. 2147 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2148 * point to the resulting session. 2149 * 2150 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key 2151 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will 2152 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. 2153 * 2154 * Returns: 2155 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2156 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). 2157 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports 2158 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. 2159 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but 2160 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. 2161 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. 2162 * 2163 * Side effects: 2164 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue 2165 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support 2166 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have 2167 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if 2168 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. 2169 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. 2170 */ 2171int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, 2172 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) 2173{ 2174 /* Point after session ID in client hello */ 2175 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; 2176 unsigned short i; 2177 2178 *ret = NULL; 2179 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 2180 2181 /* 2182 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful 2183 * resumption. 2184 */ 2185 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 2186 return 0; 2187 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) 2188 return 0; 2189 if (p >= limit) 2190 return -1; 2191 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 2192 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 2193 i = *(p++); 2194 2195 if (limit - p <= i) 2196 return -1; 2197 2198 p += i; 2199 } 2200 /* Skip past cipher list */ 2201 n2s(p, i); 2202 if (limit - p <= i) 2203 return -1; 2204 p += i; 2205 2206 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ 2207 i = *(p++); 2208 if (limit - p < i) 2209 return -1; 2210 p += i; 2211 2212 /* Now at start of extensions */ 2213 if (limit - p <= 2) 2214 return 0; 2215 n2s(p, i); 2216 while (limit - p >= 4) { 2217 unsigned short type, size; 2218 n2s(p, type); 2219 n2s(p, size); 2220 if (limit - p < size) 2221 return 0; 2222 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 2223 int r; 2224 if (size == 0) { 2225 /* 2226 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have 2227 * one. 2228 */ 2229 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2230 return 1; 2231 } 2232 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { 2233 /* 2234 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than 2235 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger 2236 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to 2237 * calculate the master secret later. 2238 */ 2239 return 2; 2240 } 2241 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); 2242 switch (r) { 2243 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ 2244 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2245 return 2; 2246 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ 2247 return r; 2248 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ 2249 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2250 return 3; 2251 default: /* fatal error */ 2252 return -1; 2253 } 2254 } 2255 p += size; 2256 } 2257 return 0; 2258} 2259 2260/*- 2261 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. 2262 * 2263 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. 2264 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. 2265 * sess_id: points at the session ID. 2266 * sesslen: the length of the session ID. 2267 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2268 * point to the resulting session. 2269 * 2270 * Returns: 2271 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2272 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. 2273 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. 2274 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. 2275 */ 2276static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, 2277 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, 2278 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) 2279{ 2280 SSL_SESSION *sess; 2281 unsigned char *sdec; 2282 const unsigned char *p; 2283 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 2284 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 2285 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2286 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2287 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 2288 2289 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 2290 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2291 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2292 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 2293 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 2294 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 2295 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 2296 if (rv < 0) 2297 return -1; 2298 if (rv == 0) 2299 return 2; 2300 if (rv == 2) 2301 renew_ticket = 1; 2302 } else { 2303 /* Check key name matches */ 2304 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 2305 return 2; 2306 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 2307 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 2308 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2309 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); 2310 } 2311 /* 2312 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity 2313 * checks on ticket. 2314 */ 2315 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 2316 if (mlen < 0) { 2317 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2318 return -1; 2319 } 2320 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */ 2321 if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) { 2322 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2323 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2324 return 2; 2325 } 2326 2327 eticklen -= mlen; 2328 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 2329 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); 2330 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); 2331 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2332 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { 2333 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2334 return 2; 2335 } 2336 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 2337 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 2338 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2339 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2340 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 2341 if (!sdec) { 2342 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2343 return -1; 2344 } 2345 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); 2346 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { 2347 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2348 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 2349 return 2; 2350 } 2351 slen += mlen; 2352 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2353 p = sdec; 2354 2355 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 2356 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 2357 if (sess) { 2358 /* 2359 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect 2360 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session 2361 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by 2362 * standard. 2363 */ 2364 if (sesslen) 2365 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 2366 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 2367 *psess = sess; 2368 if (renew_ticket) 2369 return 4; 2370 else 2371 return 3; 2372 } 2373 ERR_clear_error(); 2374 /* 2375 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. 2376 */ 2377 return 2; 2378} 2379 2380/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ 2381 2382typedef struct { 2383 int nid; 2384 int id; 2385} tls12_lookup; 2386 2387static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { 2388# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 2389 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, 2390# endif 2391# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2392 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, 2393# endif 2394# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2395 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, 2396 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, 2397# endif 2398# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2399 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, 2400 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} 2401# endif 2402}; 2403 2404static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { 2405# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2406 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, 2407# endif 2408# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2409 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, 2410# endif 2411# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2412 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} 2413# endif 2414}; 2415 2416static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2417{ 2418 size_t i; 2419 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { 2420 if (table[i].nid == nid) 2421 return table[i].id; 2422 } 2423 return -1; 2424} 2425 2426# if 0 2427static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2428{ 2429 size_t i; 2430 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { 2431 if (table[i].id == id) 2432 return table[i].nid; 2433 } 2434 return -1; 2435} 2436# endif 2437 2438int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, 2439 const EVP_MD *md) 2440{ 2441 int sig_id, md_id; 2442 if (!md) 2443 return 0; 2444 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, 2445 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2446 if (md_id == -1) 2447 return 0; 2448 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); 2449 if (sig_id == -1) 2450 return 0; 2451 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; 2452 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; 2453 return 1; 2454} 2455 2456int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) 2457{ 2458 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, 2459 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2460} 2461 2462const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) 2463{ 2464 switch (hash_alg) { 2465# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2466 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: 2467 return EVP_sha1(); 2468# endif 2469# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2470 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: 2471 return EVP_sha224(); 2472 2473 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: 2474 return EVP_sha256(); 2475# endif 2476# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2477 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: 2478 return EVP_sha384(); 2479 2480 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: 2481 return EVP_sha512(); 2482# endif 2483 default: 2484 return NULL; 2485 2486 } 2487} 2488 2489/* Set preferred digest for each key type */ 2490 2491int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) 2492{ 2493 int i, idx; 2494 const EVP_MD *md; 2495 CERT *c = s->cert; 2496 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */ 2497 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) 2498 return 1; 2499 /* Should never happen */ 2500 if (!c) 2501 return 0; 2502 2503 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; 2504 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; 2505 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL; 2506 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL; 2507 2508 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) { 2509 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i + 1]; 2510 2511 switch (sig_alg) { 2512# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2513 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 2514 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; 2515 break; 2516# endif 2517# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2518 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 2519 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; 2520 break; 2521# endif 2522# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2523 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 2524 idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; 2525 break; 2526# endif 2527 default: 2528 continue; 2529 } 2530 2531 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) { 2532 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg); 2533 if (md) { 2534 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 2535 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) 2536 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 2537 } 2538 } 2539 2540 } 2541 2542 /* 2543 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not 2544 * supported it stays as NULL. 2545 */ 2546# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2547 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) 2548 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2549# endif 2550# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2551 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) { 2552 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2553 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2554 } 2555# endif 2556# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2557 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) 2558 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2559# endif 2560 return 1; 2561} 2562 2563#endif 2564 2565#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2566int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2567{ 2568 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; 2569 unsigned short hbtype; 2570 unsigned int payload; 2571 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2572 2573 if (s->msg_callback) 2574 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2575 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, 2576 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2577 2578 /* Read type and payload length first */ 2579 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 2580 return 0; /* silently discard */ 2581 hbtype = *p++; 2582 n2s(p, payload); 2583 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 2584 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ 2585 pl = p; 2586 2587 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { 2588 unsigned char *buffer, *bp; 2589 int r; 2590 2591 /* 2592 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type, 2593 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding 2594 */ 2595 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2596 bp = buffer; 2597 2598 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ 2599 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; 2600 s2n(payload, bp); 2601 memcpy(bp, pl, payload); 2602 bp += payload; 2603 /* Random padding */ 2604 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) { 2605 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 2606 return -1; 2607 } 2608 2609 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 2610 3 + payload + padding); 2611 2612 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) 2613 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2614 buffer, 3 + payload + padding, 2615 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2616 2617 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 2618 2619 if (r < 0) 2620 return r; 2621 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { 2622 unsigned int seq; 2623 2624 /* 2625 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 2626 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number 2627 */ 2628 n2s(pl, seq); 2629 2630 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { 2631 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 2632 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 2633 } 2634 } 2635 2636 return 0; 2637} 2638 2639int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2640{ 2641 unsigned char *buf, *p; 2642 int ret = -1; 2643 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ 2644 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2645 2646 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ 2647 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || 2648 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { 2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); 2650 return -1; 2651 } 2652 2653 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ 2654 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { 2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); 2656 return -1; 2657 } 2658 2659 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ 2660 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) { 2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 2662 return -1; 2663 } 2664 2665 /* 2666 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14 2667 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. 2668 */ 2669 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); 2670 2671 /*- 2672 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number 2673 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add 2674 * some random stuff. 2675 * - Message Type, 1 byte 2676 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) 2677 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) 2678 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) 2679 * - Padding 2680 */ 2681 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2682 p = buf; 2683 /* Message Type */ 2684 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; 2685 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ 2686 s2n(payload, p); 2687 /* Sequence number */ 2688 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); 2689 /* 16 random bytes */ 2690 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) { 2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2692 goto err; 2693 } 2694 p += 16; 2695 /* Random padding */ 2696 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) { 2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2698 goto err; 2699 } 2700 2701 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); 2702 if (ret >= 0) { 2703 if (s->msg_callback) 2704 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2705 buf, 3 + payload + padding, 2706 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2707 2708 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; 2709 } 2710 2711err: 2712 OPENSSL_free(buf); 2713 2714 return ret; 2715} 2716#endif 2717