s3_srvr.c revision 273399
1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124/* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 152#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 153 154#include <stdio.h> 155#include "ssl_locl.h" 156#include "kssl_lcl.h" 157#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" 158#include <openssl/buffer.h> 159#include <openssl/rand.h> 160#include <openssl/objects.h> 161#include <openssl/evp.h> 162#include <openssl/hmac.h> 163#include <openssl/x509.h> 164#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 165#include <openssl/dh.h> 166#endif 167#include <openssl/bn.h> 168#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 169#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 170#endif 171#include <openssl/md5.h> 172 173static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 174 175static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 176 { 177 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 178 return(SSLv3_server_method()); 179 else 180 return(NULL); 181 } 182 183#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 184static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) 185 { 186 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; 187 188 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 189 190 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && 191 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) 192 { 193 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) 194 { 195 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, 196 we do so if There is no srp login name */ 197 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; 198 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 199 } 200 else 201 { 202 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al); 203 } 204 } 205 return ret; 206 } 207#endif 208 209IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 210 ssl3_accept, 211 ssl_undefined_function, 212 ssl3_get_server_method) 213 214int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 215 { 216 BUF_MEM *buf; 217 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); 218 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; 219 int ret= -1; 220 int new_state,state,skip=0; 221 222 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); 223 ERR_clear_error(); 224 clear_sys_error(); 225 226 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 227 cb=s->info_callback; 228 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 229 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 230 231 /* init things to blank */ 232 s->in_handshake++; 233 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 234 235 if (s->cert == NULL) 236 { 237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 238 return(-1); 239 } 240 241#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 242 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we 243 * already got and don't await it anymore, because 244 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway. 245 */ 246 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) 247 { 248 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 249 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 250 } 251#endif 252 253 for (;;) 254 { 255 state=s->state; 256 257 switch (s->state) 258 { 259 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 260 s->renegotiate=1; 261 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 262 263 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 264 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 265 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 266 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 267 268 s->server=1; 269 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); 270 271 if ((s->version>>8) != 3) 272 { 273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 274 return -1; 275 } 276 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 277 278 if (s->init_buf == NULL) 279 { 280 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) 281 { 282 ret= -1; 283 goto end; 284 } 285 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) 286 { 287 ret= -1; 288 goto end; 289 } 290 s->init_buf=buf; 291 } 292 293 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) 294 { 295 ret= -1; 296 goto end; 297 } 298 299 s->init_num=0; 300 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 301 302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) 303 { 304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that 305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 306 */ 307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } 308 309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 312 } 313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && 314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 315 { 316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with 317 * client that doesn't support secure 318 * renegotiation. 319 */ 320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 322 ret = -1; 323 goto end; 324 } 325 else 326 { 327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, 328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */ 329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 331 } 332 break; 333 334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 336 337 s->shutdown=0; 338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 339 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 342 s->init_num=0; 343 344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 345 break; 346 347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 348 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 349 break; 350 351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 354 355 s->shutdown=0; 356 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) 357 { 358 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 359 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 360 } 361#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 362 { 363 int al; 364 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0) 365 { 366 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */ 367 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 368 goto end; 369 } 370 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) 371 { 372 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 373 /* This is not really an error but the only means to 374 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */ 375 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) 376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 377 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 378 ret= -1; 379 goto end; 380 } 381 } 382#endif 383 384 s->renegotiate = 2; 385 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 386 s->init_num=0; 387 break; 388 389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 390 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 391 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 392 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 393#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 394 if (s->hit) 395 { 396 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 398 else 399 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 400 } 401#else 402 if (s->hit) 403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 404#endif 405 else 406 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 407 s->init_num=0; 408 break; 409 410 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 411 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 412 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 413 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ 414 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP)) 415 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) 416 { 417 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 418 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 419#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 420 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 422 else 423 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 424 } 425 else 426 { 427 skip = 1; 428 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 429 } 430#else 431 } 432 else 433 skip=1; 434 435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 436#endif 437 s->init_num=0; 438 break; 439 440 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 441 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 442 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 443 444 /* clear this, it may get reset by 445 * send_server_key_exchange */ 446 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) 447#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 448 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) 449#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 450 ) 451 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key 452 * even when forbidden by protocol specs 453 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to 454 * be able to handle this) */ 455 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 456 else 457 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; 458 459 460 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or 461 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate 462 * 463 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints 464 * 465 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange 466 * message only if the cipher suite is either 467 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the 468 * server certificate contains the server's 469 * public key for key exchange. 470 */ 471 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp 472 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity 473 * hint if provided */ 474#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 475 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) 476#endif 477#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 478 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ 479 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 480#endif 481 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH)) 482 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 483 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 484 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 485 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 486 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 487 ) 488 ) 489 ) 490 ) 491 { 492 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 493 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 494 } 495 else 496 skip=1; 497 498 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 499 s->init_num=0; 500 break; 501 502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 504 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 505 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 506 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, 507 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ 508 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 509 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 510 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites 511 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts 512 * and in RFC 2246): */ 513 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && 514 /* ... except when the application insists on verification 515 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ 516 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 517 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ 518 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || 519 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ 520 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) 521 /* With normal PSK Certificates and 522 * Certificate Requests are omitted */ 523 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) 524 { 525 /* no cert request */ 526 skip=1; 527 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; 528 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 529 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 530 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 531 return -1; 532 } 533 else 534 { 535 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; 536 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 537 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 538#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 539 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 540#else 541 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 542 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 543#endif 544 s->init_num=0; 545 } 546 break; 547 548 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 549 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 550 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); 551 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 552 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 553 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 554 s->init_num=0; 555 break; 556 557 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 558 559 /* This code originally checked to see if 560 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO 561 * and then flushed. This caused problems 562 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed 563 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue 564 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING 565 * still exist. So instead we just flush 566 * unconditionally. 567 */ 568 569 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; 570 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) 571 { 572 ret= -1; 573 goto end; 574 } 575 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 576 577 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; 578 break; 579 580 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 581 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 582 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ 583 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); 584 if (ret <= 0) 585 goto end; 586 if (ret == 2) 587 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; 588 else { 589 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 590 { 591 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 592 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 593 } 594 s->init_num=0; 595 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 596 } 597 break; 598 599 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 600 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 601 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 602 if (ret <= 0) 603 goto end; 604 if (ret == 2) 605 { 606 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when 607 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in 608 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify 609 * message is not sent. 610 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when 611 * the client uses its key from the certificate 612 * for key exchange. 613 */ 614#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 615 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 616#else 617 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 618 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 619 else 620 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 621#endif 622 s->init_num = 0; 623 } 624 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 625 { 626 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 627 s->init_num=0; 628 if (!s->session->peer) 629 break; 630 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer 631 * at this point and digest cached records. 632 */ 633 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) 634 { 635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 636 return -1; 637 } 638 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 639 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 640 return -1; 641 } 642 else 643 { 644 int offset=0; 645 int dgst_num; 646 647 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 648 s->init_num=0; 649 650 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is 651 * a client cert, it can be verified 652 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify 653 * should be generalized. But it is next step 654 */ 655 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 656 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 657 return -1; 658 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++) 659 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) 660 { 661 int dgst_size; 662 663 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset])); 664 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); 665 if (dgst_size < 0) 666 { 667 ret = -1; 668 goto end; 669 } 670 offset+=dgst_size; 671 } 672 } 673 break; 674 675 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 676 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 677 678 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 679 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ 680 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 681 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 682 683#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 684 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 685#else 686 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 687 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 688 else 689 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 690#endif 691 s->init_num=0; 692 break; 693 694#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 695 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: 696 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: 697 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s); 698 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 699 s->init_num = 0; 700 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 701 break; 702#endif 703 704 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 705 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 706 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 707 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 708 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 709 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 710 if (s->hit) 711 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 712#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 713 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 714 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 715#endif 716 else 717 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 718 s->init_num=0; 719 break; 720 721#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 722 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 723 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 724 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 725 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 726 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 727 s->init_num=0; 728 break; 729 730 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 731 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 732 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 733 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 734 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 735 s->init_num=0; 736 break; 737 738#endif 739 740 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 741 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 742 743 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 744 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) 745 { ret= -1; goto end; } 746 747 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 748 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 749 750 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 751 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 752 s->init_num=0; 753 754 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 755 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 756 { 757 ret= -1; 758 goto end; 759 } 760 761 break; 762 763 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 764 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 765 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, 766 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 767 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 768 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 769 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 770 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 771 if (s->hit) 772 { 773#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 774 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 775#else 776 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 777 { 778 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 779 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 780 } 781 else 782 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 783#endif 784 } 785 else 786 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; 787 s->init_num=0; 788 break; 789 790 case SSL_ST_OK: 791 /* clean a few things up */ 792 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 793 794 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 795 s->init_buf=NULL; 796 797 /* remove buffering on output */ 798 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 799 800 s->init_num=0; 801 802 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ 803 { 804 s->renegotiate=0; 805 s->new_session=0; 806 807 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 808 809 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 810 /* s->server=1; */ 811 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; 812 813 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); 814 } 815 816 ret = 1; 817 goto end; 818 /* break; */ 819 820 default: 821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 822 ret= -1; 823 goto end; 824 /* break; */ 825 } 826 827 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) 828 { 829 if (s->debug) 830 { 831 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 832 goto end; 833 } 834 835 836 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) 837 { 838 new_state=s->state; 839 s->state=state; 840 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); 841 s->state=new_state; 842 } 843 } 844 skip=0; 845 } 846end: 847 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 848 849 s->in_handshake--; 850 if (cb != NULL) 851 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); 852 return(ret); 853 } 854 855int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 856 { 857 unsigned char *p; 858 859 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) 860 { 861 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 862 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 863 *(p++)=0; 864 *(p++)=0; 865 *(p++)=0; 866 867 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 868 /* number of bytes to write */ 869 s->init_num=4; 870 s->init_off=0; 871 } 872 873 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 874 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 875 } 876 877int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) 878 { 879 int ok; 880 long n; 881 882 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, 883 * so permit appropriate message length */ 884 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 885 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 886 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 887 -1, 888 s->max_cert_list, 889 &ok); 890 if (!ok) return((int)n); 891 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 892 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) 893 { 894 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per 895 * negotiation. */ 896 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) 897 { 898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); 899 return -1; 900 } 901 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, 902 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */ 903#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 904 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 905 { 906 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 907 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 908 } 909#endif 910#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 911 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) 912 { 913 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 914 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 915 } 916#endif 917 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 918 return 2; 919 } 920 return 1; 921} 922 923int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 924 { 925 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; 926 unsigned int cookie_len; 927 long n; 928 unsigned long id; 929 unsigned char *p,*d,*q; 930 SSL_CIPHER *c; 931#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 932 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; 933#endif 934 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; 935 936 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. 937 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, 938 * This down switching should be handled by a different method. 939 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with 940 * TLSv1. 941 */ 942 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A 943 ) 944 { 945 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 946 } 947 s->first_packet=1; 948 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 949 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 950 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 951 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 952 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 953 &ok); 954 955 if (!ok) return((int)n); 956 s->first_packet=0; 957 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 958 959 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header 960 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ 961 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; 962 p+=2; 963 964 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || 965 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) 966 { 967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 968 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 969 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) 970 { 971 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ 972 s->version = s->client_version; 973 } 974 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 975 goto f_err; 976 } 977 978 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't 979 * contain one, just return since we do not want to 980 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... 981 */ 982 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) 983 { 984 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; 985 986 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 987 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); 988 989 if (cookie_length == 0) 990 return 1; 991 } 992 993 /* load the client random */ 994 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 995 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 996 997 /* get the session-id */ 998 j= *(p++); 999 1000 s->hit=0; 1001 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation. 1002 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests 1003 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather 1004 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security 1005 * won't even compile against older library versions). 1006 * 1007 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request 1008 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers, 1009 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 1010 * setting will be ignored. 1011 */ 1012 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) 1013 { 1014 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 1015 goto err; 1016 } 1017 else 1018 { 1019 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 1020 if (i == 1) 1021 { /* previous session */ 1022 s->hit=1; 1023 } 1024 else if (i == -1) 1025 goto err; 1026 else /* i == 0 */ 1027 { 1028 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 1029 goto err; 1030 } 1031 } 1032 1033 p+=j; 1034 1035 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 1036 { 1037 /* cookie stuff */ 1038 cookie_len = *(p++); 1039 1040 /* 1041 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 1042 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 1043 * does not cause an overflow. 1044 */ 1045 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) 1046 { 1047 /* too much data */ 1048 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1050 goto f_err; 1051 } 1052 1053 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 1054 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 1055 cookie_len > 0) 1056 { 1057 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 1058 1059 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) 1060 { 1061 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 1062 cookie_len) == 0) 1063 { 1064 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1066 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1067 goto f_err; 1068 } 1069 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 1070 } 1071 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 1072 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ 1073 { 1074 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1076 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1077 goto f_err; 1078 } 1079 1080 ret = 2; 1081 } 1082 1083 p += cookie_len; 1084 } 1085 1086 n2s(p,i); 1087 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) 1088 { 1089 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ 1090 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 1092 goto f_err; 1093 } 1094 if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) 1095 { 1096 /* not enough data */ 1097 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1099 goto f_err; 1100 } 1101 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) 1102 == NULL)) 1103 { 1104 goto err; 1105 } 1106 p+=i; 1107 1108 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 1109 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) 1110 { 1111 j=0; 1112 id=s->session->cipher->id; 1113 1114#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1115 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers)); 1116#endif 1117 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) 1118 { 1119 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i); 1120#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1121 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 1122 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 1123#endif 1124 if (c->id == id) 1125 { 1126 j=1; 1127 break; 1128 } 1129 } 1130/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade 1131 * attack: CVE-2010-4180. 1132 */ 1133#if 0 1134 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) 1135 { 1136 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may 1137 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to 1138 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server 1139 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not 1140 * enabled, though. */ 1141 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 1142 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) 1143 { 1144 s->session->cipher = c; 1145 j = 1; 1146 } 1147 } 1148#endif 1149 if (j == 0) 1150 { 1151 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher 1152 * list if we are asked to reuse it */ 1153 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1155 goto f_err; 1156 } 1157 } 1158 1159 /* compression */ 1160 i= *(p++); 1161 if ((p+i) > (d+n)) 1162 { 1163 /* not enough data */ 1164 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1166 goto f_err; 1167 } 1168 q=p; 1169 for (j=0; j<i; j++) 1170 { 1171 if (p[j] == 0) break; 1172 } 1173 1174 p+=i; 1175 if (j >= i) 1176 { 1177 /* no compress */ 1178 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1180 goto f_err; 1181 } 1182 1183#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1184 /* TLS extensions*/ 1185 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) 1186 { 1187 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) 1188 { 1189 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ 1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1191 goto f_err; 1192 } 1193 } 1194 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1196 goto err; 1197 } 1198 1199 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this 1200 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate 1201 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow 1202 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */ 1203 { 1204 unsigned char *pos; 1205 pos=s->s3->server_random; 1206 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) 1207 { 1208 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1209 goto f_err; 1210 } 1211 } 1212 1213 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) 1214 { 1215 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; 1216 1217 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1218 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, 1219 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) 1220 { 1221 s->hit=1; 1222 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 1223 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK; 1224 1225 ciphers=NULL; 1226 1227 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1228 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1229 if (pref_cipher == NULL) 1230 { 1231 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1233 goto f_err; 1234 } 1235 1236 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher; 1237 1238 if (s->cipher_list) 1239 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1240 1241 if (s->cipher_list_by_id) 1242 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1243 1244 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1245 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1246 } 1247 } 1248#endif 1249 1250 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1251 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 1252 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ 1253 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; 1254#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1255 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1256 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) 1257 { 1258 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1259 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1260 /* Can't disable compression */ 1261 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) 1262 { 1263 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1265 goto f_err; 1266 } 1267 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1268 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) 1269 { 1270 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 1271 if (comp_id == comp->id) 1272 { 1273 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 1274 break; 1275 } 1276 } 1277 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1278 { 1279 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1281 goto f_err; 1282 } 1283 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 1284 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) 1285 { 1286 if (q[m] == comp_id) 1287 break; 1288 } 1289 if (m >= i) 1290 { 1291 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 1293 goto f_err; 1294 } 1295 } 1296 else if (s->hit) 1297 comp = NULL; 1298 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) 1299 { /* See if we have a match */ 1300 int m,nn,o,v,done=0; 1301 1302 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1303 for (m=0; m<nn; m++) 1304 { 1305 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 1306 v=comp->id; 1307 for (o=0; o<i; o++) 1308 { 1309 if (v == q[o]) 1310 { 1311 done=1; 1312 break; 1313 } 1314 } 1315 if (done) break; 1316 } 1317 if (done) 1318 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 1319 else 1320 comp=NULL; 1321 } 1322#else 1323 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 1324 * using compression. 1325 */ 1326 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) 1327 { 1328 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1330 goto f_err; 1331 } 1332#endif 1333 1334 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must 1335 * pick a cipher */ 1336 1337 if (!s->hit) 1338 { 1339#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1340 s->session->compress_meth=0; 1341#else 1342 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; 1343#endif 1344 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1345 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1346 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 1347 if (ciphers == NULL) 1348 { 1349 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); 1351 goto f_err; 1352 } 1353 ciphers=NULL; 1354 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, 1355 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1356 1357 if (c == NULL) 1358 { 1359 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1361 goto f_err; 1362 } 1363 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; 1364 } 1365 else 1366 { 1367 /* Session-id reuse */ 1368#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1369 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1370 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; 1371 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; 1372 1373 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1374 { 1375 sk=s->session->ciphers; 1376 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) 1377 { 1378 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); 1379 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) 1380 nc=c; 1381 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1382 ec=c; 1383 } 1384 if (nc != NULL) 1385 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; 1386 else if (ec != NULL) 1387 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; 1388 else 1389 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1390 } 1391 else 1392#endif 1393 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1394 } 1395 1396 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) 1397 { 1398 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 1399 { 1400 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1401 goto f_err; 1402 } 1403 } 1404 1405 /* we now have the following setup. 1406 * client_random 1407 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1408 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1409 * compression - basically ignored right now 1410 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1411 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1412 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1413 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1414 */ 1415 1416 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1417 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) 1418 { 1419 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) 1420 { 1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1422 goto err; 1423 } 1424 } 1425 1426 if (ret < 0) ret=1; 1427 if (0) 1428 { 1429f_err: 1430 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1431 } 1432err: 1433 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1434 return(ret); 1435 } 1436 1437int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1438 { 1439 unsigned char *buf; 1440 unsigned char *p,*d; 1441 int i,sl; 1442 unsigned long l; 1443 1444 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1445 { 1446 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1447#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1448 p=s->s3->server_random; 1449 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) 1450 return -1; 1451#endif 1452 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1453 d=p= &(buf[4]); 1454 1455 *(p++)=s->version>>8; 1456 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; 1457 1458 /* Random stuff */ 1459 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1460 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1461 1462 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send 1463 * back in the server hello: 1464 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1465 * we send back the old session ID. 1466 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1467 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1468 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1469 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1470 * session ID. 1471 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1472 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1473 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1474 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1475 * to send back. 1476 */ 1477 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1478 && !s->hit) 1479 s->session->session_id_length=0; 1480 1481 sl=s->session->session_id_length; 1482 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) 1483 { 1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1485 return -1; 1486 } 1487 *(p++)=sl; 1488 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); 1489 p+=sl; 1490 1491 /* put the cipher */ 1492 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); 1493 p+=i; 1494 1495 /* put the compression method */ 1496#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1497 *(p++)=0; 1498#else 1499 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1500 *(p++)=0; 1501 else 1502 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1503#endif 1504#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1505 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) 1506 { 1507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 1508 return -1; 1509 } 1510 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1511 { 1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1513 return -1; 1514 } 1515#endif 1516 /* do the header */ 1517 l=(p-d); 1518 d=buf; 1519 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1520 l2n3(l,d); 1521 1522 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; 1523 /* number of bytes to write */ 1524 s->init_num=p-buf; 1525 s->init_off=0; 1526 } 1527 1528 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1529 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1530 } 1531 1532int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1533 { 1534 unsigned char *p; 1535 1536 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) 1537 { 1538 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1539 1540 /* do the header */ 1541 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1542 *(p++)=0; 1543 *(p++)=0; 1544 *(p++)=0; 1545 1546 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1547 /* number of bytes to write */ 1548 s->init_num=4; 1549 s->init_off=0; 1550 } 1551 1552 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1553 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1554 } 1555 1556int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1557 { 1558#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1559 unsigned char *q; 1560 int j,num; 1561 RSA *rsa; 1562 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1563 unsigned int u; 1564#endif 1565#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1566 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; 1567#endif 1568#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1569 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; 1570 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1571 int encodedlen = 0; 1572 int curve_id = 0; 1573 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1574#endif 1575 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1576 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1577 unsigned char *p,*d; 1578 int al,i; 1579 unsigned long type; 1580 int n; 1581 CERT *cert; 1582 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1583 int nr[4],kn; 1584 BUF_MEM *buf; 1585 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1586 1587 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1588 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) 1589 { 1590 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1591 cert=s->cert; 1592 1593 buf=s->init_buf; 1594 1595 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; 1596 n=0; 1597#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1598 if (type & SSL_kRSA) 1599 { 1600 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; 1601 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1602 { 1603 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1604 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1605 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1606 if(rsa == NULL) 1607 { 1608 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1610 goto f_err; 1611 } 1612 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1613 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; 1614 } 1615 if (rsa == NULL) 1616 { 1617 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1619 goto f_err; 1620 } 1621 r[0]=rsa->n; 1622 r[1]=rsa->e; 1623 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 1624 } 1625 else 1626#endif 1627#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1628 if (type & SSL_kEDH) 1629 { 1630 dhp=cert->dh_tmp; 1631 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1632 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1633 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1634 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1635 if (dhp == NULL) 1636 { 1637 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1639 goto f_err; 1640 } 1641 1642 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 1643 { 1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1645 goto err; 1646 } 1647 1648 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) 1649 { 1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1651 goto err; 1652 } 1653 1654 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; 1655 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || 1656 dhp->priv_key == NULL || 1657 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) 1658 { 1659 if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) 1660 { 1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1662 ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1663 goto err; 1664 } 1665 } 1666 else 1667 { 1668 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); 1669 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); 1670 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || 1671 (dh->priv_key == NULL)) 1672 { 1673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1674 goto err; 1675 } 1676 } 1677 r[0]=dh->p; 1678 r[1]=dh->g; 1679 r[2]=dh->pub_key; 1680 } 1681 else 1682#endif 1683#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1684 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) 1685 { 1686 const EC_GROUP *group; 1687 1688 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; 1689 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1690 { 1691 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1692 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1693 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1694 } 1695 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1696 { 1697 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1699 goto f_err; 1700 } 1701 1702 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) 1703 { 1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1705 goto err; 1706 } 1707 1708 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1709 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1710 { 1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1712 goto err; 1713 } 1714 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) 1715 { 1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1717 goto err; 1718 } 1719 1720 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; 1721 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1722 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1723 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) 1724 { 1725 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) 1726 { 1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1728 goto err; 1729 } 1730 } 1731 1732 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1733 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1734 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) 1735 { 1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1737 goto err; 1738 } 1739 1740 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1741 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 1742 { 1743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1744 goto err; 1745 } 1746 1747 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH 1748 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 1749 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. 1750 */ 1751 if ((curve_id = 1752 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1753 == 0) 1754 { 1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1756 goto err; 1757 } 1758 1759 /* Encode the public key. 1760 * First check the size of encoding and 1761 * allocate memory accordingly. 1762 */ 1763 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1764 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1765 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1766 NULL, 0, NULL); 1767 1768 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1769 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 1770 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1771 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) 1772 { 1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1774 goto err; 1775 } 1776 1777 1778 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1779 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1780 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1781 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1782 1783 if (encodedlen == 0) 1784 { 1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1786 goto err; 1787 } 1788 1789 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; 1790 1791 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 1792 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1793 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes 1794 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1795 * structure. 1796 */ 1797 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1798 1799 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message 1800 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs 1801 */ 1802 r[0]=NULL; 1803 r[1]=NULL; 1804 r[2]=NULL; 1805 r[3]=NULL; 1806 } 1807 else 1808#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1809#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1810 if (type & SSL_kPSK) 1811 { 1812 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/ 1813 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1814 } 1815 else 1816#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1817#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1818 if (type & SSL_kSRP) 1819 { 1820 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || 1821 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || 1822 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || 1823 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) 1824 { 1825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); 1826 goto err; 1827 } 1828 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N; 1829 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g; 1830 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s; 1831 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B; 1832 } 1833 else 1834#endif 1835 { 1836 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1838 goto f_err; 1839 } 1840 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) 1841 { 1842 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1843#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1844 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) 1845 n+=1+nr[i]; 1846 else 1847#endif 1848 n+=2+nr[i]; 1849 } 1850 1851 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) 1852 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) 1853 { 1854 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md)) 1855 == NULL) 1856 { 1857 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1858 goto f_err; 1859 } 1860 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1861 } 1862 else 1863 { 1864 pkey=NULL; 1865 kn=0; 1866 } 1867 1868 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) 1869 { 1870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); 1871 goto err; 1872 } 1873 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1874 p= &(d[4]); 1875 1876 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) 1877 { 1878#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1879 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) 1880 { 1881 *p = nr[i]; 1882 p++; 1883 } 1884 else 1885#endif 1886 s2n(nr[i],p); 1887 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); 1888 p+=nr[i]; 1889 } 1890 1891#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1892 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) 1893 { 1894 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. 1895 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: 1896 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 1897 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by 1898 * the actual encoded point itself 1899 */ 1900 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1901 p += 1; 1902 *p = 0; 1903 p += 1; 1904 *p = curve_id; 1905 p += 1; 1906 *p = encodedlen; 1907 p += 1; 1908 memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 1909 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 1910 encodedlen); 1911 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1912 encodedPoint = NULL; 1913 p += encodedlen; 1914 } 1915#endif 1916 1917#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1918 if (type & SSL_kPSK) 1919 { 1920 /* copy PSK identity hint */ 1921 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 1922 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); 1923 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1924 } 1925#endif 1926 1927 /* not anonymous */ 1928 if (pkey != NULL) 1929 { 1930 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) 1931 * and p points to the space at the end. */ 1932#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1933 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA 1934 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) 1935 { 1936 q=md_buf; 1937 j=0; 1938 for (num=2; num > 0; num--) 1939 { 1940 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, 1941 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 1942 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) 1943 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); 1944 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1945 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1946 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1947 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, 1948 (unsigned int *)&i); 1949 q+=i; 1950 j+=i; 1951 } 1952 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 1953 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) 1954 { 1955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); 1956 goto err; 1957 } 1958 s2n(u,p); 1959 n+=u+2; 1960 } 1961 else 1962#endif 1963 if (md) 1964 { 1965 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature 1966 * algorithm */ 1967 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 1968 { 1969 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) 1970 { 1971 /* Should never happen */ 1972 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1974 goto f_err; 1975 } 1976 p+=2; 1977 } 1978#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 1979 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", 1980 EVP_MD_name(md)); 1981#endif 1982 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); 1983 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1984 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1985 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1986 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), 1987 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) 1988 { 1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP); 1990 goto err; 1991 } 1992 s2n(i,p); 1993 n+=i+2; 1994 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 1995 n+= 2; 1996 } 1997 else 1998 { 1999 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 2000 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 2002 goto f_err; 2003 } 2004 } 2005 2006 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 2007 l2n3(n,d); 2008 2009 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 2010 * it off */ 2011 s->init_num=n+4; 2012 s->init_off=0; 2013 } 2014 2015 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 2016 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2017 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2018f_err: 2019 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2020err: 2021#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2022 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2023 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2024#endif 2025 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2026 return(-1); 2027 } 2028 2029int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 2030 { 2031 unsigned char *p,*d; 2032 int i,j,nl,off,n; 2033 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; 2034 X509_NAME *name; 2035 BUF_MEM *buf; 2036 2037 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) 2038 { 2039 buf=s->init_buf; 2040 2041 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); 2042 2043 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 2044 p++; 2045 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); 2046 d[0]=n; 2047 p+=n; 2048 n++; 2049 2050 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 2051 { 2052 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2); 2053 s2n(nl, p); 2054 p += nl + 2; 2055 n += nl + 2; 2056 } 2057 2058 off=n; 2059 p+=2; 2060 n+=2; 2061 2062 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 2063 nl=0; 2064 if (sk != NULL) 2065 { 2066 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) 2067 { 2068 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); 2069 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL); 2070 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2)) 2071 { 2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2073 goto err; 2074 } 2075 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]); 2076 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) 2077 { 2078 s2n(j,p); 2079 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 2080 n+=2+j; 2081 nl+=2+j; 2082 } 2083 else 2084 { 2085 d=p; 2086 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 2087 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; 2088 n+=j; 2089 nl+=j; 2090 } 2091 } 2092 } 2093 /* else no CA names */ 2094 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]); 2095 s2n(nl,p); 2096 2097 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; 2098 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 2099 l2n3(n,d); 2100 2101 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 2102 * it off */ 2103 2104 s->init_num=n+4; 2105 s->init_off=0; 2106#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 2107 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) 2108 { 2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2110 goto err; 2111 } 2112 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 2113 2114 /* do the header */ 2115 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 2116 *(p++)=0; 2117 *(p++)=0; 2118 *(p++)=0; 2119 s->init_num += 4; 2120#endif 2121 2122 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 2123 } 2124 2125 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 2126 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2127err: 2128 return(-1); 2129 } 2130 2131int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2132 { 2133 int i,al,ok; 2134 long n; 2135 unsigned long alg_k; 2136 unsigned char *p; 2137#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2138 RSA *rsa=NULL; 2139 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 2140#endif 2141#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2142 BIGNUM *pub=NULL; 2143 DH *dh_srvr; 2144#endif 2145#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2146 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 2147#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2148 2149#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2150 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 2151 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 2152 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 2153 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 2154#endif 2155 2156 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2157 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2158 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 2159 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2160 2048, /* ??? */ 2161 &ok); 2162 2163 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2164 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2165 2166 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2167 2168#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2169 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 2170 { 2171 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 2172 int decrypt_len; 2173 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; 2174 2175 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 2176 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) 2177 { 2178 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 2179 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; 2180 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should 2181 * be sent already */ 2182 if (rsa == NULL) 2183 { 2184 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 2186 goto f_err; 2187 2188 } 2189 } 2190 else 2191 { 2192 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 2193 if ( (pkey == NULL) || 2194 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || 2195 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) 2196 { 2197 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2199 goto f_err; 2200 } 2201 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; 2202 } 2203 2204 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ 2205 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 2206 { 2207 n2s(p,i); 2208 if (n != i+2) 2209 { 2210 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) 2211 { 2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2213 goto err; 2214 } 2215 else 2216 p-=2; 2217 } 2218 else 2219 n=i; 2220 } 2221 2222 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because 2223 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see 2224 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of 2225 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the 2226 * case that the decrypt fails. See 2227 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ 2228 2229 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */ 2230 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, 2231 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) 2232 goto err; 2233 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 2234 ERR_clear_error(); 2235 2236 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. 2237 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */ 2238 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 2239 2240 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct 2241 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. 2242 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 2243 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version 2244 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks 2245 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other 2246 * decryption error. */ 2247 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8)); 2248 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff)); 2249 2250 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as 2251 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks 2252 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for 2253 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the 2254 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not 2255 * support the requested protocol version. If 2256 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ 2257 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) 2258 { 2259 unsigned char workaround_good; 2260 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8)); 2261 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff)); 2262 version_good |= workaround_good; 2263 } 2264 2265 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good 2266 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */ 2267 decrypt_good &= version_good; 2268 2269 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using 2270 * decrypt_good_mask. */ 2271 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++) 2272 { 2273 p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i], 2274 rand_premaster_secret[i]); 2275 } 2276 2277 s->session->master_key_length= 2278 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2279 s->session->master_key, 2280 p,i); 2281 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 2282 } 2283 else 2284#endif 2285#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2286 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) 2287 { 2288 n2s(p,i); 2289 if (n != i+2) 2290 { 2291 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) 2292 { 2293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2294 goto err; 2295 } 2296 else 2297 { 2298 p-=2; 2299 i=(int)n; 2300 } 2301 } 2302 2303 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */ 2304 { 2305 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); 2307 goto f_err; 2308 } 2309 else 2310 { 2311 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) 2312 { 2313 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2315 goto f_err; 2316 } 2317 else 2318 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; 2319 } 2320 2321 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); 2322 if (pub == NULL) 2323 { 2324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB); 2325 goto err; 2326 } 2327 2328 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); 2329 2330 if (i <= 0) 2331 { 2332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 2333 BN_clear_free(pub); 2334 goto err; 2335 } 2336 2337 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 2338 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; 2339 2340 BN_clear_free(pub); 2341 pub=NULL; 2342 s->session->master_key_length= 2343 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2344 s->session->master_key,p,i); 2345 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 2346 } 2347 else 2348#endif 2349#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2350 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) 2351 { 2352 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 2353 krb5_data enc_ticket; 2354 krb5_data authenticator; 2355 krb5_data enc_pms; 2356 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 2357 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 2358 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 2359 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2360 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 2361 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 2362 int padl, outl; 2363 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 2364 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 2365 2366 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 2367 2368 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 2369 2370 n2s(p,i); 2371 enc_ticket.length = i; 2372 2373 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) 2374 { 2375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2376 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2377 goto err; 2378 } 2379 2380 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 2381 p+=enc_ticket.length; 2382 2383 n2s(p,i); 2384 authenticator.length = i; 2385 2386 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) 2387 { 2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2389 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2390 goto err; 2391 } 2392 2393 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 2394 p+=authenticator.length; 2395 2396 n2s(p,i); 2397 enc_pms.length = i; 2398 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 2399 p+=enc_pms.length; 2400 2401 /* Note that the length is checked again below, 2402 ** after decryption 2403 */ 2404 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) 2405 { 2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2407 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2408 goto err; 2409 } 2410 2411 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 2412 enc_pms.length + 6)) 2413 { 2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2415 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2416 goto err; 2417 } 2418 2419 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2420 &kssl_err)) != 0) 2421 { 2422#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2423 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2424 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2425 if (kssl_err.text) 2426 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2427#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2429 kssl_err.reason); 2430 goto err; 2431 } 2432 2433 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, 2434 ** but will return authtime == 0. 2435 */ 2436 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2437 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) 2438 { 2439#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2440 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2441 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2442 if (kssl_err.text) 2443 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2444#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2446 kssl_err.reason); 2447 goto err; 2448 } 2449 2450 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) 2451 { 2452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2453 goto err; 2454 } 2455 2456#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2457 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2458#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2459 2460 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2461 if (enc == NULL) 2462 goto err; 2463 2464 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2465 2466 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) 2467 { 2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2469 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2470 goto err; 2471 } 2472 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, 2473 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2474 { 2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2476 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2477 goto err; 2478 } 2479 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2480 { 2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2482 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2483 goto err; 2484 } 2485 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl)) 2486 { 2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2488 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2489 goto err; 2490 } 2491 outl += padl; 2492 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2493 { 2494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2495 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2496 goto err; 2497 } 2498 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 2499 { 2500 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2501 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2502 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2503 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of 2504 * the protocol version. 2505 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2506 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) 2507 */ 2508 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) 2509 { 2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2511 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2512 goto err; 2513 } 2514 } 2515 2516 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2517 2518 s->session->master_key_length= 2519 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2520 s->session->master_key, pms, outl); 2521 2522 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) 2523 { 2524 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2525 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 2526 { 2527 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2528 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len); 2529 } 2530 } 2531 2532 2533 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2534 ** but it caused problems for apache. 2535 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2536 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2537 */ 2538 } 2539 else 2540#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2541 2542#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2543 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) 2544 { 2545 int ret = 1; 2546 int field_size = 0; 2547 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2548 const EC_GROUP *group; 2549 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2550 2551 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2552 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 2553 { 2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2555 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2556 goto err; 2557 } 2558 2559 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2560 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) 2561 { 2562 /* use the certificate */ 2563 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2564 } 2565 else 2566 { 2567 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when 2568 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. 2569 */ 2570 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2571 } 2572 2573 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2574 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2575 2576 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2577 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) 2578 { 2579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2580 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2581 goto err; 2582 } 2583 2584 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2585 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) 2586 { 2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2588 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2589 goto err; 2590 } 2591 2592 if (n == 0L) 2593 { 2594 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2595 2596 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 2597 { 2598 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2600 goto f_err; 2601 } 2602 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2603 == NULL) || 2604 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) 2605 { 2606 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client 2607 * authentication using ECDH certificates 2608 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is 2609 * never executed. When that support is 2610 * added, we ought to ensure the key 2611 * received in the certificate is 2612 * authorized for key agreement. 2613 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that 2614 * the two ECDH shares are for the same 2615 * group. 2616 */ 2617 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2619 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2620 goto f_err; 2621 } 2622 2623 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2624 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) 2625 { 2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2627 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2628 goto err; 2629 } 2630 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2631 } 2632 else 2633 { 2634 /* Get client's public key from encoded point 2635 * in the ClientKeyExchange message. 2636 */ 2637 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) 2638 { 2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2640 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2641 goto err; 2642 } 2643 2644 /* Get encoded point length */ 2645 i = *p; 2646 p += 1; 2647 if (n != 1 + i) 2648 { 2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2650 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2651 goto err; 2652 } 2653 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 2654 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) 2655 { 2656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2657 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2658 goto err; 2659 } 2660 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer 2661 * currently, so set it to the start 2662 */ 2663 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2664 } 2665 2666 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2667 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2668 if (field_size <= 0) 2669 { 2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2671 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2672 goto err; 2673 } 2674 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); 2675 if (i <= 0) 2676 { 2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2678 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2679 goto err; 2680 } 2681 2682 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2683 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2684 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2685 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2686 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 2687 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 2688 2689 /* Compute the master secret */ 2690 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ 2691 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); 2692 2693 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2694 return (ret); 2695 } 2696 else 2697#endif 2698#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2699 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) 2700 { 2701 unsigned char *t = NULL; 2702 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; 2703 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; 2704 int psk_err = 1; 2705 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; 2706 2707 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2708 2709 n2s(p,i); 2710 if (n != i+2) 2711 { 2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2713 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2714 goto psk_err; 2715 } 2716 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) 2717 { 2718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2719 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2720 goto psk_err; 2721 } 2722 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) 2723 { 2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2725 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2726 goto psk_err; 2727 } 2728 2729 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity 2730 * string for the callback */ 2731 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); 2732 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); 2733 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, 2734 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2735 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1); 2736 2737 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) 2738 { 2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2740 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2741 goto psk_err; 2742 } 2743 else if (psk_len == 0) 2744 { 2745 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */ 2746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2747 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2748 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 2749 goto psk_err; 2750 } 2751 2752 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ 2753 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len; 2754 t = psk_or_pre_ms; 2755 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); 2756 s2n(psk_len, t); 2757 memset(t, 0, psk_len); 2758 t+=psk_len; 2759 s2n(psk_len, t); 2760 2761 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) 2762 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); 2763 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p); 2764 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) 2765 { 2766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2767 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2768 goto psk_err; 2769 } 2770 2771 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) 2772 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); 2773 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 2774 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && 2775 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) 2776 { 2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2778 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2779 goto psk_err; 2780 } 2781 2782 s->session->master_key_length= 2783 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2784 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); 2785 psk_err = 0; 2786 psk_err: 2787 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2788 if (psk_err != 0) 2789 goto f_err; 2790 } 2791 else 2792#endif 2793#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2794 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 2795 { 2796 int param_len; 2797 2798 n2s(p,i); 2799 param_len=i+2; 2800 if (param_len > n) 2801 { 2802 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); 2804 goto f_err; 2805 } 2806 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) 2807 { 2808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2809 goto err; 2810 } 2811 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 2812 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) 2813 { 2814 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); 2816 goto f_err; 2817 } 2818 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) 2819 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 2820 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 2821 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) 2822 { 2823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2824 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2825 goto err; 2826 } 2827 2828 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0) 2829 { 2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2831 goto err; 2832 } 2833 2834 p+=i; 2835 } 2836 else 2837#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ 2838 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) 2839 { 2840 int ret = 0; 2841 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 2842 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 2843 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; 2844 size_t outlen=32, inlen; 2845 unsigned long alg_a; 2846 int Ttag, Tclass; 2847 long Tlen; 2848 2849 /* Get our certificate private key*/ 2850 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2851 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 2852 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; 2853 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 2854 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 2855 2856 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL); 2857 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); 2858 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 2859 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 2860 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use 2861 * a client certificate for authorization only. */ 2862 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2863 if (client_pub_pkey) 2864 { 2865 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2866 ERR_clear_error(); 2867 } 2868 /* Decrypt session key */ 2869 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || 2870 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || 2871 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) 2872 { 2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2874 goto gerr; 2875 } 2876 start = p; 2877 inlen = Tlen; 2878 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) 2879 2880 { 2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2882 goto gerr; 2883 } 2884 /* Generate master secret */ 2885 s->session->master_key_length= 2886 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2887 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32); 2888 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2889 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2890 ret = 2; 2891 else 2892 ret = 1; 2893 gerr: 2894 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2895 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2896 if (ret) 2897 return ret; 2898 else 2899 goto err; 2900 } 2901 else 2902 { 2903 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2905 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2906 goto f_err; 2907 } 2908 2909 return(1); 2910f_err: 2911 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2912#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) 2913err: 2914#endif 2915#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2916 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2917 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2918 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2919 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2920 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2921#endif 2922 return(-1); 2923 } 2924 2925int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2926 { 2927 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 2928 unsigned char *p; 2929 int al,ok,ret=0; 2930 long n; 2931 int type=0,i,j; 2932 X509 *peer; 2933 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2934 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 2935 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 2936 2937 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2938 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2939 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 2940 -1, 2941 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 2942 &ok); 2943 2944 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2945 2946 if (s->session->peer != NULL) 2947 { 2948 peer=s->session->peer; 2949 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2950 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); 2951 } 2952 else 2953 { 2954 peer=NULL; 2955 pkey=NULL; 2956 } 2957 2958 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) 2959 { 2960 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 2961 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 2962 { 2963 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); 2965 goto f_err; 2966 } 2967 ret=1; 2968 goto end; 2969 } 2970 2971 if (peer == NULL) 2972 { 2973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); 2974 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2975 goto f_err; 2976 } 2977 2978 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 2979 { 2980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 2981 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2982 goto f_err; 2983 } 2984 2985 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 2986 { 2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 2988 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2989 goto f_err; 2990 } 2991 2992 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 2993 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2994 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ 2995 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare 2996 * signature without length field */ 2997 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 2998 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) 2999 { 3000 i=64; 3001 } 3002 else 3003 { 3004 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 3005 { 3006 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 3007 /* Should never happen */ 3008 if (sigalg == -1) 3009 { 3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3011 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3012 goto f_err; 3013 } 3014 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 3015 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) 3016 { 3017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 3018 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3019 goto f_err; 3020 } 3021 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); 3022 if (md == NULL) 3023 { 3024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 3025 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3026 goto f_err; 3027 } 3028#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3029fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 3030#endif 3031 p += 2; 3032 n -= 2; 3033 } 3034 n2s(p,i); 3035 n-=2; 3036 if (i > n) 3037 { 3038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3039 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3040 goto f_err; 3041 } 3042 } 3043 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 3044 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) 3045 { 3046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 3047 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3048 goto f_err; 3049 } 3050 3051 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 3052 { 3053 long hdatalen = 0; 3054 void *hdata; 3055 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 3056 if (hdatalen <= 0) 3057 { 3058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3059 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3060 goto f_err; 3061 } 3062#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3063 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", 3064 EVP_MD_name(md)); 3065#endif 3066 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) 3067 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) 3068 { 3069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3070 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3071 goto f_err; 3072 } 3073 3074 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0) 3075 { 3076 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 3078 goto f_err; 3079 } 3080 } 3081 else 3082#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3083 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) 3084 { 3085 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3086 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 3087 pkey->pkey.rsa); 3088 if (i < 0) 3089 { 3090 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 3092 goto f_err; 3093 } 3094 if (i == 0) 3095 { 3096 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 3098 goto f_err; 3099 } 3100 } 3101 else 3102#endif 3103#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3104 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) 3105 { 3106 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3107 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3108 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); 3109 if (j <= 0) 3110 { 3111 /* bad signature */ 3112 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 3114 goto f_err; 3115 } 3116 } 3117 else 3118#endif 3119#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3120 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 3121 { 3122 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3123 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3124 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); 3125 if (j <= 0) 3126 { 3127 /* bad signature */ 3128 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3130 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3131 goto f_err; 3132 } 3133 } 3134 else 3135#endif 3136 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) 3137 { unsigned char signature[64]; 3138 int idx; 3139 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL); 3140 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); 3141 if (i!=64) { 3142 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i); 3143 } 3144 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) { 3145 signature[63-idx]=p[idx]; 3146 } 3147 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32); 3148 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3149 if (j<=0) 3150 { 3151 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3153 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3154 goto f_err; 3155 } 3156 } 3157 else 3158 { 3159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3160 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 3161 goto f_err; 3162 } 3163 3164 3165 ret=1; 3166 if (0) 3167 { 3168f_err: 3169 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 3170 } 3171end: 3172 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 3173 { 3174 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); 3175 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; 3176 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 3177 } 3178 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 3179 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 3180 return(ret); 3181 } 3182 3183int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 3184 { 3185 int i,ok,al,ret= -1; 3186 X509 *x=NULL; 3187 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; 3188 const unsigned char *p,*q; 3189 unsigned char *d; 3190 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; 3191 3192 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3193 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 3194 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 3195 -1, 3196 s->max_cert_list, 3197 &ok); 3198 3199 if (!ok) return((int)n); 3200 3201 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) 3202 { 3203 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3204 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 3205 { 3206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3207 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3208 goto f_err; 3209 } 3210 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ 3211 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 3212 { 3213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 3214 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3215 goto f_err; 3216 } 3217 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 3218 return(1); 3219 } 3220 3221 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) 3222 { 3223 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 3225 goto f_err; 3226 } 3227 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3228 3229 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) 3230 { 3231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3232 goto err; 3233 } 3234 3235 n2l3(p,llen); 3236 if (llen+3 != n) 3237 { 3238 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3240 goto f_err; 3241 } 3242 for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) 3243 { 3244 n2l3(p,l); 3245 if ((l+nc+3) > llen) 3246 { 3247 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3249 goto f_err; 3250 } 3251 3252 q=p; 3253 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); 3254 if (x == NULL) 3255 { 3256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 3257 goto err; 3258 } 3259 if (p != (q+l)) 3260 { 3261 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3263 goto f_err; 3264 } 3265 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) 3266 { 3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3268 goto err; 3269 } 3270 x=NULL; 3271 nc+=l+3; 3272 } 3273 3274 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) 3275 { 3276 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 3277 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) 3278 { 3279 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 3281 goto f_err; 3282 } 3283 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 3284 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3285 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 3286 { 3287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3288 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3289 goto f_err; 3290 } 3291 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 3292 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 3293 { 3294 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3295 goto f_err; 3296 } 3297 } 3298 else 3299 { 3300 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); 3301 if (i <= 0) 3302 { 3303 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 3304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 3305 goto f_err; 3306 } 3307 } 3308 3309 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 3310 X509_free(s->session->peer); 3311 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); 3312 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 3313 3314 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL 3315 * when we arrive here. */ 3316 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 3317 { 3318 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 3319 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 3320 { 3321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3322 goto err; 3323 } 3324 } 3325 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 3326 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 3327 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; 3328 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the 3329 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ 3330 3331 sk=NULL; 3332 3333 ret=1; 3334 if (0) 3335 { 3336f_err: 3337 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 3338 } 3339err: 3340 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); 3341 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); 3342 return(ret); 3343 } 3344 3345int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 3346 { 3347 unsigned long l; 3348 X509 *x; 3349 3350 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) 3351 { 3352 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); 3353 if (x == NULL) 3354 { 3355 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 3356 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || 3357 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) 3358 { 3359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3360 return(0); 3361 } 3362 } 3363 3364 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x); 3365 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 3366 s->init_num=(int)l; 3367 s->init_off=0; 3368 } 3369 3370 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 3371 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3372 } 3373 3374#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 3375/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 3376int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 3377 { 3378 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) 3379 { 3380 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; 3381 const unsigned char *const_p; 3382 int len, slen_full, slen; 3383 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3384 unsigned int hlen; 3385 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3386 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3387 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3388 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3389 unsigned char key_name[16]; 3390 3391 /* get session encoding length */ 3392 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3393 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is 3394 * too long 3395 */ 3396 if (slen_full > 0xFF00) 3397 return -1; 3398 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); 3399 if (!senc) 3400 return -1; 3401 p = senc; 3402 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); 3403 3404 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */ 3405 const_p = senc; 3406 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 3407 if (sess == NULL) 3408 { 3409 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3410 return -1; 3411 } 3412 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ 3413 3414 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 3415 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */ 3416 { 3417 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3418 return -1; 3419 } 3420 p = senc; 3421 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); 3422 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3423 3424 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3425 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length 3426 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 3427 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 3428 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 3429 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 3430 */ 3431 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 3432 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + 3433 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 3434 return -1; 3435 3436 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3437 /* do the header */ 3438 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 3439 /* Skip message length for now */ 3440 p += 3; 3441 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3442 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3443 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present 3444 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values 3445 * from parent ctx. 3446 */ 3447 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 3448 { 3449 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 3450 &hctx, 1) < 0) 3451 { 3452 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3453 return -1; 3454 } 3455 } 3456 else 3457 { 3458 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); 3459 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3460 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); 3461 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3462 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 3463 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 3464 } 3465 3466 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): 3467 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity), 3468 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long 3469 * as their sessions. */ 3470 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); 3471 3472 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 3473 p += 2; 3474 /* Output key name */ 3475 macstart = p; 3476 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 3477 p += 16; 3478 /* output IV */ 3479 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 3480 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3481 /* Encrypt session data */ 3482 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); 3483 p += len; 3484 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); 3485 p += len; 3486 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3487 3488 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); 3489 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); 3490 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3491 3492 p += hlen; 3493 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 3494 /* Total length */ 3495 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3496 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; 3497 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ 3498 p += 4; 3499 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ 3500 3501 /* number of bytes to write */ 3502 s->init_num= len; 3503 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 3504 s->init_off=0; 3505 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3506 } 3507 3508 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 3509 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3510 } 3511 3512int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 3513 { 3514 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) 3515 { 3516 unsigned char *p; 3517 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3518 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + 3519 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 3520 * + (ocsp response) 3521 */ 3522 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) 3523 return -1; 3524 3525 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3526 3527 /* do the header */ 3528 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 3529 /* message length */ 3530 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); 3531 /* status type */ 3532 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; 3533 /* length of OCSP response */ 3534 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 3535 /* actual response */ 3536 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 3537 /* number of bytes to write */ 3538 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 3539 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 3540 s->init_off = 0; 3541 } 3542 3543 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 3544 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3545 } 3546 3547# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 3548/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It 3549 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */ 3550int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) 3551 { 3552 int ok; 3553 int proto_len, padding_len; 3554 long n; 3555 const unsigned char *p; 3556 3557 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the 3558 * extension in their ClientHello */ 3559 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 3560 { 3561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); 3562 return -1; 3563 } 3564 3565 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3566 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, 3567 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, 3568 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 3569 514, /* See the payload format below */ 3570 &ok); 3571 3572 if (!ok) 3573 return((int)n); 3574 3575 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received 3576 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset 3577 * by ssl3_get_finished). */ 3578 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 3579 { 3580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); 3581 return -1; 3582 } 3583 3584 if (n < 2) 3585 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ 3586 3587 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3588 3589 /* The payload looks like: 3590 * uint8 proto_len; 3591 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 3592 * uint8 padding_len; 3593 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 3594 */ 3595 proto_len = p[0]; 3596 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) 3597 return 0; 3598 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; 3599 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) 3600 return 0; 3601 3602 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); 3603 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) 3604 { 3605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3606 return 0; 3607 } 3608 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); 3609 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; 3610 3611 return 1; 3612 } 3613# endif 3614#endif 3615