mac_process.c revision 123173
1100894Srwatson/*- 2100894Srwatson * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Robert N. M. Watson 3100894Srwatson * Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin 4113681Srwatson * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. 5100894Srwatson * All rights reserved. 6100894Srwatson * 7100894Srwatson * This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the 8100894Srwatson * TrustedBSD Project. 9100894Srwatson * 10106392Srwatson * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network 11106392Srwatson * Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network 12106392Srwatson * Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), 13106392Srwatson * as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. 14100894Srwatson * 15100894Srwatson * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 16100894Srwatson * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 17100894Srwatson * are met: 18100894Srwatson * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 19100894Srwatson * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 20100894Srwatson * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 21100894Srwatson * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 22100894Srwatson * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 23100894Srwatson * 24100894Srwatson * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND 25100894Srwatson * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 26100894Srwatson * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 27100894Srwatson * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 28100894Srwatson * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 29100894Srwatson * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 30100894Srwatson * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 31100894Srwatson * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 32100894Srwatson * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 33100894Srwatson * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 34100894Srwatson * SUCH DAMAGE. 35100894Srwatson */ 36116182Sobrien 37116182Sobrien#include <sys/cdefs.h> 38116182Sobrien__FBSDID("$FreeBSD: head/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c 123173 2003-12-06 21:48:03Z rwatson $"); 39116182Sobrien 40100894Srwatson#include "opt_mac.h" 41101173Srwatson 42100894Srwatson#include <sys/param.h> 43106856Srwatson#include <sys/condvar.h> 44106468Srwatson#include <sys/imgact.h> 45100979Srwatson#include <sys/kernel.h> 46100979Srwatson#include <sys/lock.h> 47102949Sbde#include <sys/malloc.h> 48100979Srwatson#include <sys/mutex.h> 49100979Srwatson#include <sys/mac.h> 50100979Srwatson#include <sys/proc.h> 51116701Srwatson#include <sys/sbuf.h> 52100979Srwatson#include <sys/systm.h> 53100979Srwatson#include <sys/vnode.h> 54100979Srwatson#include <sys/mount.h> 55100979Srwatson#include <sys/file.h> 56100979Srwatson#include <sys/namei.h> 57100979Srwatson#include <sys/sysctl.h> 58100894Srwatson 59100979Srwatson#include <vm/vm.h> 60100979Srwatson#include <vm/pmap.h> 61100979Srwatson#include <vm/vm_map.h> 62100979Srwatson#include <vm/vm_object.h> 63100979Srwatson 64100979Srwatson#include <sys/mac_policy.h> 65100979Srwatson 66121361Srwatson#include <security/mac/mac_internal.h> 67100979Srwatson 68121361Srwatsonint mac_enforce_process = 1; 69100979SrwatsonSYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_process, CTLFLAG_RW, 70100979Srwatson &mac_enforce_process, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on inter-process operations"); 71100979SrwatsonTUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_process", &mac_enforce_process); 72100979Srwatson 73121361Srwatsonint mac_enforce_vm = 1; 74103514SrwatsonSYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_vm, CTLFLAG_RW, 75103514Srwatson &mac_enforce_vm, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on vm operations"); 76104236SrwatsonTUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_vm", &mac_enforce_vm); 77103514Srwatson 78103136Srwatsonstatic int mac_mmap_revocation = 1; 79103136SrwatsonSYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation, CTLFLAG_RW, 80103136Srwatson &mac_mmap_revocation, 0, "Revoke mmap access to files on subject " 81103136Srwatson "relabel"); 82121361Srwatson 83101892Srwatsonstatic int mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow = 0; 84100979SrwatsonSYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation_via_cow, CTLFLAG_RW, 85100979Srwatson &mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow, 0, "Revoke mmap access to files via " 86100979Srwatson "copy-on-write semantics, or by removing all write access"); 87100979Srwatson 88101988Srwatson#ifdef MAC_DEBUG 89121361Srwatsonstatic unsigned int nmaccreds, nmacprocs; 90104517SrwatsonSYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, creds, CTLFLAG_RD, 91100979Srwatson &nmaccreds, 0, "number of ucreds in use"); 92107105SrwatsonSYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, procs, CTLFLAG_RD, 93107105Srwatson &nmacprocs, 0, "number of procs in use"); 94101988Srwatson#endif 95100979Srwatson 96100979Srwatsonstatic void mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(struct thread *td, 97100979Srwatson struct ucred *cred, struct vm_map *map); 98100979Srwatson 99122524Srwatsonstruct label * 100122524Srwatsonmac_cred_label_alloc(void) 101104521Srwatson{ 102122524Srwatson struct label *label; 103104521Srwatson 104122524Srwatson label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK); 105105694Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(init_cred_label, label); 106119184Srwatson MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmaccreds); 107122524Srwatson return (label); 108104521Srwatson} 109104521Srwatson 110104521Srwatsonvoid 111105694Srwatsonmac_init_cred(struct ucred *cred) 112105694Srwatson{ 113105694Srwatson 114122524Srwatson cred->cr_label = mac_cred_label_alloc(); 115105694Srwatson} 116105694Srwatson 117122524Srwatsonstatic struct label * 118122524Srwatsonmac_proc_label_alloc(void) 119122524Srwatson{ 120122524Srwatson struct label *label; 121122524Srwatson 122122524Srwatson label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK); 123122524Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(init_proc_label, label); 124122524Srwatson MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacprocs); 125122524Srwatson return (label); 126122524Srwatson} 127122524Srwatson 128105694Srwatsonvoid 129107105Srwatsonmac_init_proc(struct proc *p) 130107105Srwatson{ 131107105Srwatson 132122524Srwatson p->p_label = mac_proc_label_alloc(); 133107105Srwatson} 134107105Srwatson 135105988Srwatsonvoid 136122524Srwatsonmac_cred_label_free(struct label *label) 137104521Srwatson{ 138104521Srwatson 139105694Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(destroy_cred_label, label); 140122524Srwatson mac_labelzone_free(label); 141119184Srwatson MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_DEC(&nmaccreds); 142104521Srwatson} 143104521Srwatson 144104521Srwatsonvoid 145105694Srwatsonmac_destroy_cred(struct ucred *cred) 146105694Srwatson{ 147105694Srwatson 148122524Srwatson mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label); 149122524Srwatson cred->cr_label = NULL; 150105694Srwatson} 151105694Srwatson 152122524Srwatsonstatic void 153122524Srwatsonmac_proc_label_free(struct label *label) 154122524Srwatson{ 155122524Srwatson 156122524Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(destroy_proc_label, label); 157122524Srwatson mac_labelzone_free(label); 158122524Srwatson MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_DEC(&nmacprocs); 159122524Srwatson} 160122524Srwatson 161105694Srwatsonvoid 162107105Srwatsonmac_destroy_proc(struct proc *p) 163107105Srwatson{ 164107105Srwatson 165122524Srwatson mac_proc_label_free(p->p_label); 166122524Srwatson p->p_label = NULL; 167107105Srwatson} 168107105Srwatson 169121361Srwatsonint 170105694Srwatsonmac_externalize_cred_label(struct label *label, char *elements, 171122159Srwatson char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen) 172105694Srwatson{ 173104522Srwatson int error; 174104522Srwatson 175121507Srwatson MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen); 176104522Srwatson 177104522Srwatson return (error); 178104522Srwatson} 179104522Srwatson 180121361Srwatsonint 181105694Srwatsonmac_internalize_cred_label(struct label *label, char *string) 182105694Srwatson{ 183105694Srwatson int error; 184105694Srwatson 185121507Srwatson MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string); 186105694Srwatson 187105694Srwatson return (error); 188105694Srwatson} 189105694Srwatson 190104522Srwatson/* 191104522Srwatson * Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other 192104522Srwatson * kernel processes and threads are spawned. 193104522Srwatson */ 194104521Srwatsonvoid 195104522Srwatsonmac_create_proc0(struct ucred *cred) 196104522Srwatson{ 197104522Srwatson 198104522Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(create_proc0, cred); 199104522Srwatson} 200104522Srwatson 201104522Srwatson/* 202104522Srwatson * Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other 203104522Srwatson * userland processes and threads are spawned. 204104522Srwatson */ 205104522Srwatsonvoid 206104522Srwatsonmac_create_proc1(struct ucred *cred) 207104522Srwatson{ 208104522Srwatson 209104522Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(create_proc1, cred); 210104522Srwatson} 211104522Srwatson 212104522Srwatsonvoid 213104522Srwatsonmac_thread_userret(struct thread *td) 214104522Srwatson{ 215104522Srwatson 216104522Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(thread_userret, td); 217104522Srwatson} 218104522Srwatson 219104522Srwatson/* 220104522Srwatson * When a new process is created, its label must be initialized. Generally, 221104522Srwatson * this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible 222104522Srwatson * deltas. This function allows that processing to take place. 223104522Srwatson */ 224104522Srwatsonvoid 225123173Srwatsonmac_copy_cred(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest) 226104522Srwatson{ 227104522Srwatson 228123173Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(copy_cred_label, src->cr_label, dest->cr_label); 229104522Srwatson} 230104522Srwatson 231105988Srwatsonint 232122524Srwatsonmac_execve_enter(struct image_params *imgp, struct mac *mac_p) 233106468Srwatson{ 234122524Srwatson struct label *label; 235106468Srwatson struct mac mac; 236106468Srwatson char *buffer; 237106468Srwatson int error; 238106468Srwatson 239106468Srwatson if (mac_p == NULL) 240106468Srwatson return (0); 241106468Srwatson 242106468Srwatson error = copyin(mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac)); 243106468Srwatson if (error) 244106468Srwatson return (error); 245106468Srwatson 246106468Srwatson error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac); 247106468Srwatson if (error) 248106468Srwatson return (error); 249106468Srwatson 250111119Simp buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); 251106468Srwatson error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, buffer, mac.m_buflen, NULL); 252106468Srwatson if (error) { 253106468Srwatson free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); 254106468Srwatson return (error); 255106468Srwatson } 256106468Srwatson 257122524Srwatson label = mac_cred_label_alloc(); 258122524Srwatson error = mac_internalize_cred_label(label, buffer); 259106468Srwatson free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); 260106468Srwatson if (error) { 261122524Srwatson mac_cred_label_free(label); 262106468Srwatson return (error); 263106468Srwatson } 264122524Srwatson imgp->execlabel = label; 265106468Srwatson return (0); 266106468Srwatson} 267106468Srwatson 268100979Srwatsonvoid 269106468Srwatsonmac_execve_exit(struct image_params *imgp) 270100979Srwatson{ 271122524Srwatson if (imgp->execlabel != NULL) { 272122524Srwatson mac_cred_label_free(imgp->execlabel); 273122524Srwatson imgp->execlabel = NULL; 274122524Srwatson } 275106468Srwatson} 276100979Srwatson 277100979Srwatson/* 278100979Srwatson * When relabeling a process, call out to the policies for the maximum 279100979Srwatson * permission allowed for each object type we know about in its 280100979Srwatson * memory space, and revoke access (in the least surprising ways we 281100979Srwatson * know) when necessary. The process lock is not held here. 282100979Srwatson */ 283107271Srwatsonvoid 284100979Srwatsonmac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms(struct thread *td, struct ucred *cred) 285100979Srwatson{ 286100979Srwatson 287100979Srwatson /* XXX freeze all other threads */ 288100979Srwatson mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(td, cred, 289100979Srwatson &td->td_proc->p_vmspace->vm_map); 290100979Srwatson /* XXX allow other threads to continue */ 291100979Srwatson} 292100979Srwatson 293100979Srwatsonstatic __inline const char * 294100979Srwatsonprot2str(vm_prot_t prot) 295100979Srwatson{ 296100979Srwatson 297100979Srwatson switch (prot & VM_PROT_ALL) { 298100979Srwatson case VM_PROT_READ: 299100979Srwatson return ("r--"); 300100979Srwatson case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE: 301100979Srwatson return ("rw-"); 302100979Srwatson case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE: 303100979Srwatson return ("r-x"); 304100979Srwatson case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE | VM_PROT_EXECUTE: 305100979Srwatson return ("rwx"); 306100979Srwatson case VM_PROT_WRITE: 307100979Srwatson return ("-w-"); 308100979Srwatson case VM_PROT_EXECUTE: 309100979Srwatson return ("--x"); 310100979Srwatson case VM_PROT_WRITE | VM_PROT_EXECUTE: 311100979Srwatson return ("-wx"); 312100979Srwatson default: 313100979Srwatson return ("---"); 314100979Srwatson } 315100979Srwatson} 316100979Srwatson 317100979Srwatsonstatic void 318100979Srwatsonmac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(struct thread *td, struct ucred *cred, 319100979Srwatson struct vm_map *map) 320100979Srwatson{ 321100979Srwatson struct vm_map_entry *vme; 322104546Srwatson int result; 323104546Srwatson vm_prot_t revokeperms; 324100979Srwatson vm_object_t object; 325100979Srwatson vm_ooffset_t offset; 326100979Srwatson struct vnode *vp; 327100979Srwatson 328103136Srwatson if (!mac_mmap_revocation) 329103136Srwatson return; 330103136Srwatson 331100979Srwatson vm_map_lock_read(map); 332100979Srwatson for (vme = map->header.next; vme != &map->header; vme = vme->next) { 333100979Srwatson if (vme->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_IS_SUB_MAP) { 334100979Srwatson mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(td, cred, 335100979Srwatson vme->object.sub_map); 336100979Srwatson continue; 337100979Srwatson } 338100979Srwatson /* 339100979Srwatson * Skip over entries that obviously are not shared. 340100979Srwatson */ 341100979Srwatson if (vme->eflags & (MAP_ENTRY_COW | MAP_ENTRY_NOSYNC) || 342100979Srwatson !vme->max_protection) 343100979Srwatson continue; 344100979Srwatson /* 345100979Srwatson * Drill down to the deepest backing object. 346100979Srwatson */ 347100979Srwatson offset = vme->offset; 348100979Srwatson object = vme->object.vm_object; 349100979Srwatson if (object == NULL) 350100979Srwatson continue; 351100979Srwatson while (object->backing_object != NULL) { 352100979Srwatson object = object->backing_object; 353100979Srwatson offset += object->backing_object_offset; 354100979Srwatson } 355100979Srwatson /* 356100979Srwatson * At the moment, vm_maps and objects aren't considered 357100979Srwatson * by the MAC system, so only things with backing by a 358100979Srwatson * normal object (read: vnodes) are checked. 359100979Srwatson */ 360100979Srwatson if (object->type != OBJT_VNODE) 361100979Srwatson continue; 362100979Srwatson vp = (struct vnode *)object->handle; 363100979Srwatson vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td); 364104546Srwatson result = vme->max_protection; 365104546Srwatson mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade(cred, vp, &result); 366100979Srwatson VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td); 367100979Srwatson /* 368100979Srwatson * Find out what maximum protection we may be allowing 369100979Srwatson * now but a policy needs to get removed. 370100979Srwatson */ 371100979Srwatson revokeperms = vme->max_protection & ~result; 372100979Srwatson if (!revokeperms) 373100979Srwatson continue; 374102949Sbde printf("pid %ld: revoking %s perms from %#lx:%ld " 375102949Sbde "(max %s/cur %s)\n", (long)td->td_proc->p_pid, 376102949Sbde prot2str(revokeperms), (u_long)vme->start, 377102949Sbde (long)(vme->end - vme->start), 378100979Srwatson prot2str(vme->max_protection), prot2str(vme->protection)); 379100979Srwatson vm_map_lock_upgrade(map); 380100979Srwatson /* 381100979Srwatson * This is the really simple case: if a map has more 382100979Srwatson * max_protection than is allowed, but it's not being 383100979Srwatson * actually used (that is, the current protection is 384100979Srwatson * still allowed), we can just wipe it out and do 385100979Srwatson * nothing more. 386100979Srwatson */ 387100979Srwatson if ((vme->protection & revokeperms) == 0) { 388100979Srwatson vme->max_protection -= revokeperms; 389100979Srwatson } else { 390100979Srwatson if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_WRITE) { 391100979Srwatson /* 392100979Srwatson * In the more complicated case, flush out all 393100979Srwatson * pending changes to the object then turn it 394100979Srwatson * copy-on-write. 395100979Srwatson */ 396100979Srwatson vm_object_reference(object); 397100979Srwatson vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td); 398113955Salc VM_OBJECT_LOCK(object); 399100979Srwatson vm_object_page_clean(object, 400100979Srwatson OFF_TO_IDX(offset), 401100979Srwatson OFF_TO_IDX(offset + vme->end - vme->start + 402100979Srwatson PAGE_MASK), 403100979Srwatson OBJPC_SYNC); 404113955Salc VM_OBJECT_UNLOCK(object); 405100979Srwatson VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td); 406100979Srwatson vm_object_deallocate(object); 407100979Srwatson /* 408100979Srwatson * Why bother if there's no read permissions 409100979Srwatson * anymore? For the rest, we need to leave 410100979Srwatson * the write permissions on for COW, or 411100979Srwatson * remove them entirely if configured to. 412100979Srwatson */ 413100979Srwatson if (!mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow) { 414100979Srwatson vme->max_protection &= ~VM_PROT_WRITE; 415100979Srwatson vme->protection &= ~VM_PROT_WRITE; 416100979Srwatson } if ((revokeperms & VM_PROT_READ) == 0) 417100979Srwatson vme->eflags |= MAP_ENTRY_COW | 418100979Srwatson MAP_ENTRY_NEEDS_COPY; 419100979Srwatson } 420100979Srwatson if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_EXECUTE) { 421100979Srwatson vme->max_protection &= ~VM_PROT_EXECUTE; 422100979Srwatson vme->protection &= ~VM_PROT_EXECUTE; 423100979Srwatson } 424100979Srwatson if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_READ) { 425100979Srwatson vme->max_protection = 0; 426100979Srwatson vme->protection = 0; 427100979Srwatson } 428100979Srwatson pmap_protect(map->pmap, vme->start, vme->end, 429100979Srwatson vme->protection & ~revokeperms); 430100979Srwatson vm_map_simplify_entry(map, vme); 431100979Srwatson } 432100979Srwatson vm_map_lock_downgrade(map); 433100979Srwatson } 434100979Srwatson vm_map_unlock_read(map); 435100979Srwatson} 436100979Srwatson 437100979Srwatson/* 438100979Srwatson * When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege 439100979Srwatson * to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified 440100979Srwatson * buffer cache. 441100979Srwatson */ 442121361Srwatsonvoid 443100979Srwatsonmac_relabel_cred(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel) 444100979Srwatson{ 445100979Srwatson 446100979Srwatson MAC_PERFORM(relabel_cred, cred, newlabel); 447100979Srwatson} 448100979Srwatson 449100979Srwatsonint 450100979Srwatsonmac_check_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel) 451100979Srwatson{ 452100979Srwatson int error; 453100979Srwatson 454100979Srwatson MAC_CHECK(check_cred_relabel, cred, newlabel); 455100979Srwatson 456100979Srwatson return (error); 457100979Srwatson} 458100979Srwatson 459100979Srwatsonint 460100979Srwatsonmac_check_cred_visible(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2) 461100979Srwatson{ 462100979Srwatson int error; 463100979Srwatson 464100979Srwatson if (!mac_enforce_process) 465100979Srwatson return (0); 466100979Srwatson 467100979Srwatson MAC_CHECK(check_cred_visible, u1, u2); 468100979Srwatson 469100979Srwatson return (error); 470100979Srwatson} 471100979Srwatson 472100979Srwatsonint 473100979Srwatsonmac_check_proc_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc) 474100979Srwatson{ 475100979Srwatson int error; 476100979Srwatson 477102103Srwatson PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED); 478102103Srwatson 479100979Srwatson if (!mac_enforce_process) 480100979Srwatson return (0); 481100979Srwatson 482100979Srwatson MAC_CHECK(check_proc_debug, cred, proc); 483100979Srwatson 484100979Srwatson return (error); 485100979Srwatson} 486100979Srwatson 487100979Srwatsonint 488100979Srwatsonmac_check_proc_sched(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc) 489100979Srwatson{ 490100979Srwatson int error; 491100979Srwatson 492102103Srwatson PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED); 493102103Srwatson 494100979Srwatson if (!mac_enforce_process) 495100979Srwatson return (0); 496100979Srwatson 497100979Srwatson MAC_CHECK(check_proc_sched, cred, proc); 498100979Srwatson 499100979Srwatson return (error); 500100979Srwatson} 501100979Srwatson 502100979Srwatsonint 503100979Srwatsonmac_check_proc_signal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc, int signum) 504100979Srwatson{ 505100979Srwatson int error; 506100979Srwatson 507102103Srwatson PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED); 508102103Srwatson 509100979Srwatson if (!mac_enforce_process) 510100979Srwatson return (0); 511100979Srwatson 512100979Srwatson MAC_CHECK(check_proc_signal, cred, proc, signum); 513100979Srwatson 514100979Srwatson return (error); 515100979Srwatson} 516