t1_lib.c revision 273415
1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112#include <stdio.h> 113#include <openssl/objects.h> 114#include <openssl/evp.h> 115#include <openssl/hmac.h> 116#include <openssl/ocsp.h> 117#include <openssl/rand.h> 118#include "ssl_locl.h" 119 120const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 121 122#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 123static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 125 SSL_SESSION **psess); 126#endif 127 128SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ 129 tls1_enc, 130 tls1_mac, 131 tls1_setup_key_block, 132 tls1_generate_master_secret, 133 tls1_change_cipher_state, 134 tls1_final_finish_mac, 135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 136 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 139 tls1_alert_code, 140 tls1_export_keying_material, 141 }; 142 143long tls1_default_timeout(void) 144 { 145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec 146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */ 147 return(60*60*2); 148 } 149 150int tls1_new(SSL *s) 151 { 152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0); 153 s->method->ssl_clear(s); 154 return(1); 155 } 156 157void tls1_free(SSL *s) 158 { 159#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) 161 { 162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); 163 } 164#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ 165 ssl3_free(s); 166 } 167 168void tls1_clear(SSL *s) 169 { 170 ssl3_clear(s); 171 s->version = s->method->version; 172 } 173 174#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 175 176static int nid_list[] = 177 { 178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ 203 }; 204 205static int pref_list[] = 206 { 207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 232 }; 233 234int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) 235 { 236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ 237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > 238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))) 239 return 0; 240 return nid_list[curve_id-1]; 241 } 242 243int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 244 { 245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ 246 switch (nid) 247 { 248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 249 return 1; 250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 251 return 2; 252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 253 return 3; 254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 255 return 4; 256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 257 return 5; 258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 259 return 6; 260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 261 return 7; 262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 263 return 8; 264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 265 return 9; 266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 267 return 10; 268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 269 return 11; 270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 271 return 12; 272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 273 return 13; 274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 275 return 14; 276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 277 return 15; 278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 279 return 16; 280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 281 return 17; 282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 283 return 18; 284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 285 return 19; 286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 287 return 20; 288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 289 return 21; 290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 291 return 22; 292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 293 return 23; 294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 295 return 24; 296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 297 return 25; 298 default: 299 return 0; 300 } 301 } 302#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 303 304#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 305 306/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this 307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. 308 */ 309 310#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 311#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ 312#else 313#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, 314#endif 315 316#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 317#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ 318#else 319#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, 320#endif 321 322#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 323#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */ 324#else 325#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, 326#endif 327 328#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ 329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ 330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ 331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 332 333static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { 334#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) 336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 337#endif 338#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) 341#endif 342#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) 344#endif 345#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 346 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5) 347#endif 348}; 349 350int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) 351 { 352 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 353#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 354 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */ 355 if (FIPS_mode()) 356 slen -= 2; 357#endif 358 if (p) 359 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen); 360 return (int)slen; 361 } 362 363unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) 364 { 365 int extdatalen=0; 366 unsigned char *ret = p; 367 368 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 369 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION 370 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 371 return p; 372 373 ret+=2; 374 375 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 376 377 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 378 { 379 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 380 unsigned long size_str; 381 long lenmax; 382 383 /* check for enough space. 384 4 for the servername type and entension length 385 2 for servernamelist length 386 1 for the hostname type 387 2 for hostname length 388 + hostname length 389 */ 390 391 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 392 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 393 return NULL; 394 395 /* extension type and length */ 396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 397 s2n(size_str+5,ret); 398 399 /* length of servername list */ 400 s2n(size_str+3,ret); 401 402 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 403 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 404 s2n(size_str,ret); 405 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 406 ret+=size_str; 407 } 408 409 /* Add RI if renegotiating */ 410 if (s->renegotiate) 411 { 412 int el; 413 414 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 415 { 416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 417 return NULL; 418 } 419 420 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 421 422 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 423 s2n(el,ret); 424 425 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 426 { 427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 428 return NULL; 429 } 430 431 ret += el; 432 } 433 434#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 435 /* Add SRP username if there is one */ 436 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 437 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */ 438 439 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); 440 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) 441 { 442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 443 return NULL; 444 } 445 446 /* check for enough space. 447 4 for the srp type type and entension length 448 1 for the srp user identity 449 + srp user identity length 450 */ 451 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL; 452 453 /* fill in the extension */ 454 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret); 455 s2n(login_len+1,ret); 456 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len; 457 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); 458 ret+=login_len; 459 } 460#endif 461 462#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && 464 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 465 { 466 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ 467 long lenmax; 468 469 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 470 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 471 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 472 { 473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 474 return NULL; 475 } 476 477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 478 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 479 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 480 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 481 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 482 } 483 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL && 484 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 485 { 486 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ 487 long lenmax; 488 489 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; 490 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 491 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) 492 { 493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 494 return NULL; 495 } 496 497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret); 498 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); 499 500 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for 501 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes. 502 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html 503 * resolves this to two bytes. 504 */ 505 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); 506 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 507 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 508 } 509#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 510 511 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 512 { 513 int ticklen; 514 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 515 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 516 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 517 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) 518 { 519 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 520 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 521 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 522 return NULL; 523 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, 524 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, 525 ticklen); 526 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 527 } 528 else 529 ticklen = 0; 530 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 531 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 532 goto skip_ext; 533 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len 534 * rest for ticket 535 */ 536 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL; 537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 538 s2n(ticklen,ret); 539 if (ticklen) 540 { 541 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 542 ret += ticklen; 543 } 544 } 545 skip_ext: 546 547 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 548 { 549 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6) 550 return NULL; 551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret); 552 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret); 553 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret); 554 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs)); 555 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 556 } 557 558#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 559 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 560 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 561 { 562 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 563 564 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) 565 return NULL; 566 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 567 return NULL; 568 569 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 570 s2n(col + 2, ret); 571 s2n(col, ret); 572 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); 573 ret += col; 574 } 575#endif 576 577 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && 578 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 579 { 580 int i; 581 long extlen, idlen, itmp; 582 OCSP_RESPID *id; 583 584 idlen = 0; 585 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 586 { 587 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 588 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); 589 if (itmp <= 0) 590 return NULL; 591 idlen += itmp + 2; 592 } 593 594 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) 595 { 596 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); 597 if (extlen < 0) 598 return NULL; 599 } 600 else 601 extlen = 0; 602 603 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; 604 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 605 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) 606 return NULL; 607 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); 608 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 609 s2n(idlen, ret); 610 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 611 { 612 /* save position of id len */ 613 unsigned char *q = ret; 614 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 615 /* skip over id len */ 616 ret += 2; 617 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); 618 /* write id len */ 619 s2n(itmp, q); 620 } 621 s2n(extlen, ret); 622 if (extlen > 0) 623 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); 624 } 625 626#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 627 /* Add Heartbeat extension */ 628 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); 629 s2n(1,ret); 630 /* Set mode: 631 * 1: peer may send requests 632 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 633 */ 634 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 635 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 636 else 637 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 638#endif 639 640#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 641 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) 642 { 643 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its 644 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */ 645 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 646 return NULL; 647 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); 648 s2n(0,ret); 649 } 650#endif 651 652#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 653 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) 654 { 655 int el; 656 657 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 658 659 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 660 661 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); 662 s2n(el,ret); 663 664 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 665 { 666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 667 return NULL; 668 } 669 ret += el; 670 } 671#endif 672 673 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 674 return p; 675 676 s2n(extdatalen,p); 677 return ret; 678 } 679 680unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) 681 { 682 int extdatalen=0; 683 unsigned char *ret = p; 684#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 685 int next_proto_neg_seen; 686#endif 687 688 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ 689 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 690 return p; 691 692 ret+=2; 693 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 694 695 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 696 { 697 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 698 699 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 700 s2n(0,ret); 701 } 702 703 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) 704 { 705 int el; 706 707 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 708 { 709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 710 return NULL; 711 } 712 713 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 714 715 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 716 s2n(el,ret); 717 718 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 719 { 720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 721 return NULL; 722 } 723 724 ret += el; 725 } 726 727#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 728 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && 729 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 730 { 731 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ 732 long lenmax; 733 734 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 735 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 736 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 737 { 738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 739 return NULL; 740 } 741 742 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 743 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 744 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 745 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 746 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 747 748 } 749 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */ 750#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 751 752 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected 753 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 754 { 755 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 756 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 757 s2n(0,ret); 758 } 759 760 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 761 { 762 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 763 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); 764 s2n(0,ret); 765 } 766 767#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 768 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 769 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 770 { 771 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 772 773 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) 774 return NULL; 775 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 776 return NULL; 777 778 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 779 s2n(sol + 2, ret); 780 s2n(sol, ret); 781 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); 782 ret += sol; 783 } 784#endif 785 786#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 787 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) 788 { 789 int el; 790 791 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 792 793 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 794 795 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); 796 s2n(el,ret); 797 798 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 799 { 800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 801 return NULL; 802 } 803 ret+=el; 804 } 805#endif 806 807 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) 808 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) 809 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 810 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/ 811 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/ 812 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 813 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 814 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 815 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17}; 816 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL; 817 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36); 818 ret+=36; 819 820 } 821 822#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 823 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ 824 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) 825 { 826 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); 827 s2n(1,ret); 828 /* Set mode: 829 * 1: peer may send requests 830 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 831 */ 832 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 833 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 834 else 835 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 836 837 } 838#endif 839 840#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 841 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; 842 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 843 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) 844 { 845 const unsigned char *npa; 846 unsigned int npalen; 847 int r; 848 849 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); 850 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) 851 { 852 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL; 853 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); 854 s2n(npalen,ret); 855 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); 856 ret += npalen; 857 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 858 } 859 } 860#endif 861 862 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 863 return p; 864 865 s2n(extdatalen,p); 866 return ret; 867 } 868 869int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 870 { 871 unsigned short type; 872 unsigned short size; 873 unsigned short len; 874 unsigned char *data = *p; 875 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 876 int sigalg_seen = 0; 877 878 s->servername_done = 0; 879 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 880#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 881 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 882#endif 883 884#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 885 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 886 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 887#endif 888 889 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 890 goto ri_check; 891 n2s(data,len); 892 893 if (data > (d+n-len)) 894 goto ri_check; 895 896 while (data <= (d+n-4)) 897 { 898 n2s(data,type); 899 n2s(data,size); 900 901 if (data+size > (d+n)) 902 goto ri_check; 903#if 0 904 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size); 905#endif 906 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 907 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, 908 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 909/* The servername extension is treated as follows: 910 911 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 912 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 913 in which case an fatal alert is generated. 914 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 915 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 916 to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 917 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 918 it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 919 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 920 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 921 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 922 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 923 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 924 the value of the Host: field. 925 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 926 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, 927 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. 928 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 929 930*/ 931 932 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 933 { 934 unsigned char *sdata; 935 int servname_type; 936 int dsize; 937 938 if (size < 2) 939 { 940 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 941 return 0; 942 } 943 n2s(data,dsize); 944 size -= 2; 945 if (dsize > size ) 946 { 947 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 948 return 0; 949 } 950 951 sdata = data; 952 while (dsize > 3) 953 { 954 servname_type = *(sdata++); 955 n2s(sdata,len); 956 dsize -= 3; 957 958 if (len > dsize) 959 { 960 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 961 return 0; 962 } 963 if (s->servername_done == 0) 964 switch (servname_type) 965 { 966 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: 967 if (!s->hit) 968 { 969 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname) 970 { 971 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 972 return 0; 973 } 974 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) 975 { 976 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 977 return 0; 978 } 979 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) 980 { 981 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 982 return 0; 983 } 984 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); 985 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; 986 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { 987 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); 988 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 989 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 990 return 0; 991 } 992 s->servername_done = 1; 993 994 } 995 else 996 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname 997 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 998 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; 999 1000 break; 1001 1002 default: 1003 break; 1004 } 1005 1006 dsize -= len; 1007 } 1008 if (dsize != 0) 1009 { 1010 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1011 return 0; 1012 } 1013 1014 } 1015#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1016 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) 1017 { 1018 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1)) 1019 { 1020 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1021 return 0; 1022 } 1023 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 1024 { 1025 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1026 return 0; 1027 } 1028 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) 1029 return -1; 1030 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); 1031 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0'; 1032 1033 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) 1034 { 1035 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1036 return 0; 1037 } 1038 } 1039#endif 1040 1041#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1042 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && 1043 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1044 { 1045 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1046 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1047 1048 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) 1049 { 1050 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1051 return 0; 1052 } 1053 if (!s->hit) 1054 { 1055 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) 1056 { 1057 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1058 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; 1059 } 1060 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1061 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 1062 { 1063 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1064 return 0; 1065 } 1066 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 1067 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 1068 } 1069#if 0 1070 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 1071 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1072 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1073 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1074 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1075#endif 1076 } 1077 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves && 1078 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1079 { 1080 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1081 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); 1082 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); 1083 1084 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || 1085 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1) 1086 { 1087 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1088 return 0; 1089 } 1090 if (!s->hit) 1091 { 1092 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) 1093 { 1094 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1095 return 0; 1096 } 1097 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1098 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 1099 { 1100 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1101 return 0; 1102 } 1103 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; 1104 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); 1105 } 1106#if 0 1107 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 1108 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 1109 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) 1110 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1111 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1112#endif 1113 } 1114#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1115#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1116 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1117 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1118 { 1119 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1120 1121 if (size < 2) 1122 { 1123 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1124 return 0; 1125 } 1126 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1127 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 1128 { 1129 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1130 return 0; 1131 } 1132 1133 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1134 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1135 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1136 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1137 else 1138 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1139 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1140 { 1141 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1142 return 0; 1143 } 1144 } 1145#endif 1146 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1147 { 1148 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1149 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1150 { 1151 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1152 return 0; 1153 } 1154 } 1155 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1156 { 1157 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1158 return 0; 1159 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1160 } 1161 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) 1162 { 1163 int dsize; 1164 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) 1165 { 1166 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1167 return 0; 1168 } 1169 sigalg_seen = 1; 1170 n2s(data,dsize); 1171 size -= 2; 1172 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) 1173 { 1174 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1175 return 0; 1176 } 1177 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) 1178 { 1179 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1180 return 0; 1181 } 1182 } 1183 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1184 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 1185 { 1186 1187 if (size < 5) 1188 { 1189 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1190 return 0; 1191 } 1192 1193 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; 1194 size--; 1195 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) 1196 { 1197 const unsigned char *sdata; 1198 int dsize; 1199 /* Read in responder_id_list */ 1200 n2s(data,dsize); 1201 size -= 2; 1202 if (dsize > size ) 1203 { 1204 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1205 return 0; 1206 } 1207 while (dsize > 0) 1208 { 1209 OCSP_RESPID *id; 1210 int idsize; 1211 if (dsize < 4) 1212 { 1213 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1214 return 0; 1215 } 1216 n2s(data, idsize); 1217 dsize -= 2 + idsize; 1218 size -= 2 + idsize; 1219 if (dsize < 0) 1220 { 1221 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1222 return 0; 1223 } 1224 sdata = data; 1225 data += idsize; 1226 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, 1227 &sdata, idsize); 1228 if (!id) 1229 { 1230 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1231 return 0; 1232 } 1233 if (data != sdata) 1234 { 1235 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1236 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1237 return 0; 1238 } 1239 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids 1240 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = 1241 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) 1242 { 1243 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1244 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1245 return 0; 1246 } 1247 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( 1248 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) 1249 { 1250 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1251 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1252 return 0; 1253 } 1254 } 1255 1256 /* Read in request_extensions */ 1257 if (size < 2) 1258 { 1259 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1260 return 0; 1261 } 1262 n2s(data,dsize); 1263 size -= 2; 1264 if (dsize != size) 1265 { 1266 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1267 return 0; 1268 } 1269 sdata = data; 1270 if (dsize > 0) 1271 { 1272 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) 1273 { 1274 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, 1275 X509_EXTENSION_free); 1276 } 1277 1278 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = 1279 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, 1280 &sdata, dsize); 1281 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts 1282 || (data + dsize != sdata)) 1283 { 1284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1285 return 0; 1286 } 1287 } 1288 } 1289 /* We don't know what to do with any other type 1290 * so ignore it. 1291 */ 1292 else 1293 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 1294 } 1295#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1296 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) 1297 { 1298 switch(data[0]) 1299 { 1300 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ 1301 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1302 break; 1303 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ 1304 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1305 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1306 break; 1307 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1308 return 0; 1309 } 1310 } 1311#endif 1312#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1313 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1314 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) 1315 { 1316 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a 1317 * renegotiation. 1318 * 1319 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we 1320 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on 1321 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when 1322 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an 1323 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing 1324 * anything like that, but this might change). 1325 1326 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake 1327 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 1328 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen 1329 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new 1330 * Finished message could have been computed.) */ 1331 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1332 } 1333#endif 1334 1335 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 1336#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1337 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) 1338 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) 1339 { 1340 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, 1341 al)) 1342 return 0; 1343 } 1344#endif 1345 1346 data+=size; 1347 } 1348 1349 *p = data; 1350 1351 ri_check: 1352 1353 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 1354 1355 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && 1356 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1357 { 1358 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1360 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1361 return 0; 1362 } 1363 1364 return 1; 1365 } 1366 1367#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1368/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No 1369 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill 1370 * the length of the block. */ 1371static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) 1372 { 1373 unsigned int off = 0; 1374 1375 while (off < len) 1376 { 1377 if (d[off] == 0) 1378 return 0; 1379 off += d[off]; 1380 off++; 1381 } 1382 1383 return off == len; 1384 } 1385#endif 1386 1387int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 1388 { 1389 unsigned short length; 1390 unsigned short type; 1391 unsigned short size; 1392 unsigned char *data = *p; 1393 int tlsext_servername = 0; 1394 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 1395 1396#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1397 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1398#endif 1399 1400#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1401 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 1402 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 1403#endif 1404 1405 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 1406 goto ri_check; 1407 1408 n2s(data,length); 1409 if (data+length != d+n) 1410 { 1411 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1412 return 0; 1413 } 1414 1415 while(data <= (d+n-4)) 1416 { 1417 n2s(data,type); 1418 n2s(data,size); 1419 1420 if (data+size > (d+n)) 1421 goto ri_check; 1422 1423 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1424 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, 1425 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1426 1427 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1428 { 1429 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) 1430 { 1431 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1432 return 0; 1433 } 1434 tlsext_servername = 1; 1435 } 1436 1437#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1438 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && 1439 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1440 { 1441 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1442 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1443 1444 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 1445 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) 1446 { 1447 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1448 return 0; 1449 } 1450 if (!s->hit) 1451 { 1452 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1453 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1454 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 1455 { 1456 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1457 return 0; 1458 } 1459 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 1460 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 1461 } 1462#if 0 1463 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); 1464 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1465 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1466 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1467 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1468#endif 1469 } 1470#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1471 1472 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1473 { 1474 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1475 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1476 { 1477 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1478 return 0; 1479 } 1480 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1481 || (size > 0)) 1482 { 1483 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1484 return 0; 1485 } 1486 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1487 } 1488#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1489 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1490 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1491 { 1492 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1493 1494 if (size < 2) 1495 { 1496 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1497 return 0; 1498 } 1499 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1500 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 1501 { 1502 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1503 return 0; 1504 } 1505 1506 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1507 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1508 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1509 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1510 else 1511 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1512 1513 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1514 { 1515 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1516 return 0; 1517 } 1518 } 1519#endif 1520 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1521 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1522 { 1523 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested 1524 * a status request message. 1525 */ 1526 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) 1527 { 1528 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1529 return 0; 1530 } 1531 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ 1532 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1533 } 1534#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1535 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1536 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) 1537 { 1538 unsigned char *selected; 1539 unsigned char selected_len; 1540 1541 /* We must have requested it. */ 1542 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) 1543 { 1544 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1545 return 0; 1546 } 1547 /* The data must be valid */ 1548 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) 1549 { 1550 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1551 return 0; 1552 } 1553 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) 1554 { 1555 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1556 return 0; 1557 } 1558 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 1559 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) 1560 { 1561 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1562 return 0; 1563 } 1564 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); 1565 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; 1566 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1567 } 1568#endif 1569 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1570 { 1571 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1572 return 0; 1573 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1574 } 1575#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1576 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) 1577 { 1578 switch(data[0]) 1579 { 1580 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ 1581 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1582 break; 1583 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ 1584 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1585 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1586 break; 1587 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1588 return 0; 1589 } 1590 } 1591#endif 1592#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1593 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) 1594 { 1595 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, 1596 al)) 1597 return 0; 1598 } 1599#endif 1600 1601 data+=size; 1602 } 1603 1604 if (data != d+n) 1605 { 1606 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1607 return 0; 1608 } 1609 1610 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) 1611 { 1612 if (s->tlsext_hostname) 1613 { 1614 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) 1615 { 1616 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 1617 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) 1618 { 1619 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1620 return 0; 1621 } 1622 } 1623 else 1624 { 1625 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1626 return 0; 1627 } 1628 } 1629 } 1630 1631 *p = data; 1632 1633 ri_check: 1634 1635 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to 1636 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server 1637 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an 1638 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server 1639 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI 1640 * absence on initial connect only. 1641 */ 1642 if (!renegotiate_seen 1643 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) 1644 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1645 { 1646 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 1648 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1649 return 0; 1650 } 1651 1652 return 1; 1653 } 1654 1655 1656int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1657 { 1658#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1659 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats 1660 * and elliptic curves we support. 1661 */ 1662 int using_ecc = 0; 1663 int i; 1664 unsigned char *j; 1665 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 1666 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 1667 1668 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) 1669 { 1670 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 1671 1672 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 1673 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 1674 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 1675 { 1676 using_ecc = 1; 1677 break; 1678 } 1679 } 1680 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION); 1681 if (using_ecc) 1682 { 1683 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1684 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 1685 { 1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1687 return -1; 1688 } 1689 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1690 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1691 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1692 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1693 1694 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */ 1695 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); 1696 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2; 1697 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 1698 { 1699 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1701 return -1; 1702 } 1703 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i < 1704 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) 1705 { 1706 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]); 1707 s2n(id,j); 1708 } 1709 } 1710#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1711 1712#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1713 { 1714 int r = 1; 1715 1716 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 1717 { 1718 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1719 if (!r) 1720 return -1; 1721 } 1722 1723 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 1724 { 1725 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1726 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1727 1728 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1729 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1730 else 1731 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1732 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1733 { 1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1735 return -1; 1736 } 1737 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1738 } 1739 1740 if (r == 2) 1741 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */ 1742 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1743 } 1744#endif 1745 1746 return 1; 1747 } 1748 1749int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1750 { 1751#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1752 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support 1753 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not 1754 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. 1755 */ 1756 1757 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1758 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1759 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 1760 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 1761 1762 if (using_ecc) 1763 { 1764 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1765 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 1766 { 1767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1768 return -1; 1769 } 1770 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1771 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1772 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1773 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1774 } 1775#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1776 1777 return 1; 1778 } 1779 1780int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) 1781 { 1782 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 1783 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1784 1785#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1786 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in 1787 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1788 */ 1789 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in 1790 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1791 */ 1792#endif 1793 1794 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1795 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1796 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1797 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1798 1799#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1800 { 1801 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), 1802 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, 1803 * so this has to happen here in 1804 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */ 1805 1806 int r = 1; 1807 1808 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 1809 { 1810 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1811 if (!r) 1812 { 1813 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1814 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1815 goto err; 1816 } 1817 } 1818 1819 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1820 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1821 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; 1822 1823 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 1824 { 1825 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 1826 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) 1827 { 1828 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input 1829 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */ 1830 1831 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1832 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1833 else 1834 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1835 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1836 { 1837 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1838 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1839 goto err; 1840 } 1841 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1842 } 1843 } 1844 1845 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1846 { 1847 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, 1848 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; 1849 * abort the handshake. 1850 */ 1851 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1852 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1853 } 1854 } 1855 1856 err: 1857#endif 1858 switch (ret) 1859 { 1860 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1861 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1862 return -1; 1863 1864 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 1865 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 1866 return 1; 1867 1868 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1869 s->servername_done=0; 1870 default: 1871 return 1; 1872 } 1873 } 1874 1875int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) 1876 { 1877 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 1878 int al; 1879 1880 /* If status request then ask callback what to do. 1881 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 1882 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher 1883 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent 1884 */ 1885 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 1886 { 1887 int r; 1888 CERT_PKEY *certpkey; 1889 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); 1890 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ 1891 if (certpkey == NULL) 1892 { 1893 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1894 return 1; 1895 } 1896 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so 1897 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up. 1898 */ 1899 s->cert->key = certpkey; 1900 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 1901 switch (r) 1902 { 1903 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 1904 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1905 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1906 break; 1907 /* status request response should be sent */ 1908 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 1909 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 1910 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1911 else 1912 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1913 break; 1914 /* something bad happened */ 1915 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1916 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1917 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1918 goto err; 1919 } 1920 } 1921 else 1922 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1923 1924 err: 1925 switch (ret) 1926 { 1927 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1928 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1929 return -1; 1930 1931 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 1932 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 1933 return 1; 1934 1935 default: 1936 return 1; 1937 } 1938 } 1939 1940int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1941 { 1942 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 1943 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1944 1945#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1946 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 1947 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension 1948 * it must contain uncompressed. 1949 */ 1950 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1951 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1952 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 1953 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 1954 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 1955 { 1956 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 1957 size_t i; 1958 unsigned char *list; 1959 int found_uncompressed = 0; 1960 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1961 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1962 { 1963 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) 1964 { 1965 found_uncompressed = 1; 1966 break; 1967 } 1968 } 1969 if (!found_uncompressed) 1970 { 1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 1972 return -1; 1973 } 1974 } 1975 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 1976#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1977 1978 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1979 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1980 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1981 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1982 1983#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1984 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) 1985 { 1986 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs. 1987 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */ 1988 1989 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1990 { 1991 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1992 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1993 } 1994 1995 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check 1996 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */ 1997 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || 1998 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) 1999 { 2000 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2001 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2002 } 2003 } 2004#endif 2005 2006 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one 2007 * tell the callback 2008 */ 2009 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) 2010 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 2011 { 2012 int r; 2013 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows 2014 * there is no response. 2015 */ 2016 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 2017 { 2018 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); 2019 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; 2020 } 2021 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; 2022 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 2023 if (r == 0) 2024 { 2025 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; 2026 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2027 } 2028 if (r < 0) 2029 { 2030 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2031 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2032 } 2033 } 2034 2035 switch (ret) 2036 { 2037 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2038 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2039 return -1; 2040 2041 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2042 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 2043 return 1; 2044 2045 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2046 s->servername_done=0; 2047 default: 2048 return 1; 2049 } 2050 } 2051 2052/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the 2053 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle 2054 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. 2055 * 2056 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will 2057 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket 2058 * extension, if any. 2059 * len: the length of the session ID. 2060 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. 2061 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2062 * point to the resulting session. 2063 * 2064 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key 2065 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will 2066 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. 2067 * 2068 * Returns: 2069 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2070 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). 2071 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports 2072 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. 2073 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but 2074 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. 2075 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. 2076 * 2077 * Side effects: 2078 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue 2079 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support 2080 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have 2081 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if 2082 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. 2083 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. 2084 */ 2085int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, 2086 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) 2087 { 2088 /* Point after session ID in client hello */ 2089 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; 2090 unsigned short i; 2091 2092 *ret = NULL; 2093 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 2094 2095 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present 2096 * to permit stateful resumption. 2097 */ 2098 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 2099 return 0; 2100 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) 2101 return 0; 2102 if (p >= limit) 2103 return -1; 2104 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 2105 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 2106 { 2107 i = *(p++); 2108 p+= i; 2109 if (p >= limit) 2110 return -1; 2111 } 2112 /* Skip past cipher list */ 2113 n2s(p, i); 2114 p+= i; 2115 if (p >= limit) 2116 return -1; 2117 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ 2118 i = *(p++); 2119 p += i; 2120 if (p > limit) 2121 return -1; 2122 /* Now at start of extensions */ 2123 if ((p + 2) >= limit) 2124 return 0; 2125 n2s(p, i); 2126 while ((p + 4) <= limit) 2127 { 2128 unsigned short type, size; 2129 n2s(p, type); 2130 n2s(p, size); 2131 if (p + size > limit) 2132 return 0; 2133 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 2134 { 2135 int r; 2136 if (size == 0) 2137 { 2138 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't 2139 * currently have one. */ 2140 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2141 return 1; 2142 } 2143 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) 2144 { 2145 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be 2146 * decrypted rather than generating the session 2147 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated 2148 * handshake based on external mechanism to 2149 * calculate the master secret later. */ 2150 return 2; 2151 } 2152 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); 2153 switch (r) 2154 { 2155 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ 2156 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2157 return 2; 2158 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ 2159 return r; 2160 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ 2161 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2162 return 3; 2163 default: /* fatal error */ 2164 return -1; 2165 } 2166 } 2167 p += size; 2168 } 2169 return 0; 2170 } 2171 2172/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. 2173 * 2174 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. 2175 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. 2176 * sess_id: points at the session ID. 2177 * sesslen: the length of the session ID. 2178 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2179 * point to the resulting session. 2180 * 2181 * Returns: 2182 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2183 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. 2184 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. 2185 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. 2186 */ 2187static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, 2188 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 2189 SSL_SESSION **psess) 2190 { 2191 SSL_SESSION *sess; 2192 unsigned char *sdec; 2193 const unsigned char *p; 2194 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 2195 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 2196 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2197 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2198 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 2199 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ 2200 if (eticklen < 48) 2201 return 2; 2202 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 2203 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2204 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2205 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 2206 { 2207 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 2208 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 2209 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 2210 if (rv < 0) 2211 return -1; 2212 if (rv == 0) 2213 return 2; 2214 if (rv == 2) 2215 renew_ticket = 1; 2216 } 2217 else 2218 { 2219 /* Check key name matches */ 2220 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 2221 return 2; 2222 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 2223 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 2224 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2225 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); 2226 } 2227 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and 2228 * integrity checks on ticket. 2229 */ 2230 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 2231 if (mlen < 0) 2232 { 2233 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2234 return -1; 2235 } 2236 eticklen -= mlen; 2237 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 2238 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); 2239 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); 2240 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2241 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) 2242 { 2243 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2244 return 2; 2245 } 2246 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 2247 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 2248 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2249 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2250 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 2251 if (!sdec) 2252 { 2253 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2254 return -1; 2255 } 2256 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); 2257 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) 2258 return 2; 2259 slen += mlen; 2260 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2261 p = sdec; 2262 2263 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 2264 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 2265 if (sess) 2266 { 2267 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to 2268 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to 2269 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero 2270 * as required by standard. 2271 */ 2272 if (sesslen) 2273 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 2274 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 2275 *psess = sess; 2276 if (renew_ticket) 2277 return 4; 2278 else 2279 return 3; 2280 } 2281 ERR_clear_error(); 2282 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new 2283 * ticket. */ 2284 return 2; 2285 } 2286 2287/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ 2288 2289typedef struct 2290 { 2291 int nid; 2292 int id; 2293 } tls12_lookup; 2294 2295static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { 2296#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 2297 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, 2298#endif 2299#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2300 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, 2301#endif 2302#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2303 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, 2304 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, 2305#endif 2306#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2307 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, 2308 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} 2309#endif 2310}; 2311 2312static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { 2313#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2314 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, 2315#endif 2316#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2317 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, 2318#endif 2319#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2320 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} 2321#endif 2322}; 2323 2324static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2325 { 2326 size_t i; 2327 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) 2328 { 2329 if (table[i].nid == nid) 2330 return table[i].id; 2331 } 2332 return -1; 2333 } 2334#if 0 2335static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2336 { 2337 size_t i; 2338 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) 2339 { 2340 if (table[i].id == id) 2341 return table[i].nid; 2342 } 2343 return -1; 2344 } 2345#endif 2346 2347int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) 2348 { 2349 int sig_id, md_id; 2350 if (!md) 2351 return 0; 2352 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, 2353 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2354 if (md_id == -1) 2355 return 0; 2356 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); 2357 if (sig_id == -1) 2358 return 0; 2359 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; 2360 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; 2361 return 1; 2362 } 2363 2364int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) 2365 { 2366 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, 2367 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2368 } 2369 2370const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) 2371 { 2372 switch(hash_alg) 2373 { 2374#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 2375 case TLSEXT_hash_md5: 2376#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 2377 if (FIPS_mode()) 2378 return NULL; 2379#endif 2380 return EVP_md5(); 2381#endif 2382#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2383 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: 2384 return EVP_sha1(); 2385#endif 2386#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2387 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: 2388 return EVP_sha224(); 2389 2390 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: 2391 return EVP_sha256(); 2392#endif 2393#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2394 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: 2395 return EVP_sha384(); 2396 2397 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: 2398 return EVP_sha512(); 2399#endif 2400 default: 2401 return NULL; 2402 2403 } 2404 } 2405 2406/* Set preferred digest for each key type */ 2407 2408int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) 2409 { 2410 int i, idx; 2411 const EVP_MD *md; 2412 CERT *c = s->cert; 2413 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */ 2414 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) 2415 return 1; 2416 /* Should never happen */ 2417 if (!c) 2418 return 0; 2419 2420 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; 2421 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; 2422 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL; 2423 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL; 2424 2425 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) 2426 { 2427 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1]; 2428 2429 switch(sig_alg) 2430 { 2431#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2432 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 2433 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; 2434 break; 2435#endif 2436#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2437 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 2438 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; 2439 break; 2440#endif 2441#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2442 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 2443 idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; 2444 break; 2445#endif 2446 default: 2447 continue; 2448 } 2449 2450 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) 2451 { 2452 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg); 2453 if (md) 2454 { 2455 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 2456 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) 2457 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 2458 } 2459 } 2460 2461 } 2462 2463 2464 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not 2465 * supported it stays as NULL. 2466 */ 2467#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2468 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) 2469 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2470#endif 2471#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2472 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) 2473 { 2474 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2475 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2476 } 2477#endif 2478#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2479 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) 2480 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2481#endif 2482 return 1; 2483 } 2484 2485#endif 2486 2487#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2488int 2489tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2490 { 2491 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; 2492 unsigned short hbtype; 2493 unsigned int payload; 2494 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2495 2496 if (s->msg_callback) 2497 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2498 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, 2499 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2500 2501 /* Read type and payload length first */ 2502 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 2503 return 0; /* silently discard */ 2504 hbtype = *p++; 2505 n2s(p, payload); 2506 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 2507 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ 2508 pl = p; 2509 2510 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) 2511 { 2512 unsigned char *buffer, *bp; 2513 int r; 2514 2515 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes 2516 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus 2517 * payload, plus padding 2518 */ 2519 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2520 bp = buffer; 2521 2522 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ 2523 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; 2524 s2n(payload, bp); 2525 memcpy(bp, pl, payload); 2526 bp += payload; 2527 /* Random padding */ 2528 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding); 2529 2530 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding); 2531 2532 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) 2533 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2534 buffer, 3 + payload + padding, 2535 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2536 2537 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 2538 2539 if (r < 0) 2540 return r; 2541 } 2542 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) 2543 { 2544 unsigned int seq; 2545 2546 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), 2547 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the 2548 * sequence number */ 2549 n2s(pl, seq); 2550 2551 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) 2552 { 2553 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 2554 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 2555 } 2556 } 2557 2558 return 0; 2559 } 2560 2561int 2562tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2563 { 2564 unsigned char *buf, *p; 2565 int ret; 2566 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ 2567 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2568 2569 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ 2570 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || 2571 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) 2572 { 2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); 2574 return -1; 2575 } 2576 2577 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ 2578 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) 2579 { 2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); 2581 return -1; 2582 } 2583 2584 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ 2585 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) 2586 { 2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 2588 return -1; 2589 } 2590 2591 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding 2592 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. 2593 */ 2594 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); 2595 2596 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number 2597 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add 2598 * some random stuff. 2599 * - Message Type, 1 byte 2600 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) 2601 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) 2602 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) 2603 * - Padding 2604 */ 2605 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2606 p = buf; 2607 /* Message Type */ 2608 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; 2609 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ 2610 s2n(payload, p); 2611 /* Sequence number */ 2612 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); 2613 /* 16 random bytes */ 2614 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16); 2615 p += 16; 2616 /* Random padding */ 2617 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding); 2618 2619 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); 2620 if (ret >= 0) 2621 { 2622 if (s->msg_callback) 2623 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2624 buf, 3 + payload + padding, 2625 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2626 2627 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; 2628 } 2629 2630 OPENSSL_free(buf); 2631 2632 return ret; 2633 } 2634#endif 2635