t1_lib.c revision 271304
1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112#include <stdio.h> 113#include <openssl/objects.h> 114#include <openssl/evp.h> 115#include <openssl/hmac.h> 116#include <openssl/ocsp.h> 117#include <openssl/rand.h> 118#include "ssl_locl.h" 119 120const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 121 122#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 123static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 125 SSL_SESSION **psess); 126#endif 127 128SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ 129 tls1_enc, 130 tls1_mac, 131 tls1_setup_key_block, 132 tls1_generate_master_secret, 133 tls1_change_cipher_state, 134 tls1_final_finish_mac, 135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 136 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 139 tls1_alert_code, 140 tls1_export_keying_material, 141 }; 142 143long tls1_default_timeout(void) 144 { 145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec 146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */ 147 return(60*60*2); 148 } 149 150int tls1_new(SSL *s) 151 { 152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0); 153 s->method->ssl_clear(s); 154 return(1); 155 } 156 157void tls1_free(SSL *s) 158 { 159#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) 161 { 162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); 163 } 164#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ 165 ssl3_free(s); 166 } 167 168void tls1_clear(SSL *s) 169 { 170 ssl3_clear(s); 171 s->version = s->method->version; 172 } 173 174#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 175 176static int nid_list[] = 177 { 178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ 203 }; 204 205static int pref_list[] = 206 { 207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 232 }; 233 234int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) 235 { 236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ 237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > 238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))) 239 return 0; 240 return nid_list[curve_id-1]; 241 } 242 243int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 244 { 245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ 246 switch (nid) 247 { 248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 249 return 1; 250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 251 return 2; 252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 253 return 3; 254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 255 return 4; 256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 257 return 5; 258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 259 return 6; 260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 261 return 7; 262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 263 return 8; 264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 265 return 9; 266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 267 return 10; 268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 269 return 11; 270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 271 return 12; 272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 273 return 13; 274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 275 return 14; 276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 277 return 15; 278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 279 return 16; 280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 281 return 17; 282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 283 return 18; 284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 285 return 19; 286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 287 return 20; 288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 289 return 21; 290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 291 return 22; 292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 293 return 23; 294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 295 return 24; 296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 297 return 25; 298 default: 299 return 0; 300 } 301 } 302#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 303 304#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 305 306/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this 307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. 308 */ 309 310#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 311#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ 312#else 313#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, 314#endif 315 316#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 317#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ 318#else 319#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, 320#endif 321 322#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 323#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */ 324#else 325#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, 326#endif 327 328#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ 329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ 330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ 331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 332 333static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { 334#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) 336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 337#endif 338#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) 341#endif 342#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) 344#endif 345#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 346 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5) 347#endif 348}; 349 350int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) 351 { 352 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 353#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 354 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */ 355 if (FIPS_mode()) 356 slen -= 2; 357#endif 358 if (p) 359 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen); 360 return (int)slen; 361 } 362 363unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) 364 { 365 int extdatalen=0; 366 unsigned char *ret = p; 367 368 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 369 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION 370 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 371 return p; 372 373 ret+=2; 374 375 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 376 377 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 378 { 379 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 380 unsigned long size_str; 381 long lenmax; 382 383 /* check for enough space. 384 4 for the servername type and entension length 385 2 for servernamelist length 386 1 for the hostname type 387 2 for hostname length 388 + hostname length 389 */ 390 391 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 392 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 393 return NULL; 394 395 /* extension type and length */ 396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 397 s2n(size_str+5,ret); 398 399 /* length of servername list */ 400 s2n(size_str+3,ret); 401 402 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 403 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 404 s2n(size_str,ret); 405 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 406 ret+=size_str; 407 } 408 409 /* Add RI if renegotiating */ 410 if (s->renegotiate) 411 { 412 int el; 413 414 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 415 { 416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 417 return NULL; 418 } 419 420 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 421 422 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 423 s2n(el,ret); 424 425 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 426 { 427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 428 return NULL; 429 } 430 431 ret += el; 432 } 433 434#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 435 /* Add SRP username if there is one */ 436 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 437 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */ 438 439 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); 440 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) 441 { 442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 443 return NULL; 444 } 445 446 /* check for enough space. 447 4 for the srp type type and entension length 448 1 for the srp user identity 449 + srp user identity length 450 */ 451 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL; 452 453 /* fill in the extension */ 454 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret); 455 s2n(login_len+1,ret); 456 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len; 457 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); 458 ret+=login_len; 459 } 460#endif 461 462#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && 464 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 465 { 466 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ 467 long lenmax; 468 469 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 470 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 471 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 472 { 473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 474 return NULL; 475 } 476 477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 478 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 479 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 480 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 481 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 482 } 483 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL && 484 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 485 { 486 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ 487 long lenmax; 488 489 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; 490 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 491 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) 492 { 493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 494 return NULL; 495 } 496 497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret); 498 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); 499 500 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for 501 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes. 502 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html 503 * resolves this to two bytes. 504 */ 505 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); 506 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 507 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 508 } 509#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 510 511 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 512 { 513 int ticklen; 514 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 515 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 516 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 517 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) 518 { 519 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 520 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 521 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 522 return NULL; 523 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, 524 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, 525 ticklen); 526 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 527 } 528 else 529 ticklen = 0; 530 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 531 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 532 goto skip_ext; 533 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len 534 * rest for ticket 535 */ 536 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL; 537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 538 s2n(ticklen,ret); 539 if (ticklen) 540 { 541 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 542 ret += ticklen; 543 } 544 } 545 skip_ext: 546 547 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 548 { 549 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6) 550 return NULL; 551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret); 552 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret); 553 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret); 554 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs)); 555 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 556 } 557 558#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 559 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 560 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 561 { 562 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 563 564 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) 565 return NULL; 566 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 567 return NULL; 568 569 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 570 s2n(col + 2, ret); 571 s2n(col, ret); 572 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); 573 ret += col; 574 } 575#endif 576 577 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && 578 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 579 { 580 int i; 581 long extlen, idlen, itmp; 582 OCSP_RESPID *id; 583 584 idlen = 0; 585 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 586 { 587 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 588 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); 589 if (itmp <= 0) 590 return NULL; 591 idlen += itmp + 2; 592 } 593 594 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) 595 { 596 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); 597 if (extlen < 0) 598 return NULL; 599 } 600 else 601 extlen = 0; 602 603 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; 604 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 605 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) 606 return NULL; 607 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); 608 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 609 s2n(idlen, ret); 610 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 611 { 612 /* save position of id len */ 613 unsigned char *q = ret; 614 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 615 /* skip over id len */ 616 ret += 2; 617 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); 618 /* write id len */ 619 s2n(itmp, q); 620 } 621 s2n(extlen, ret); 622 if (extlen > 0) 623 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); 624 } 625 626#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 627 /* Add Heartbeat extension */ 628 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); 629 s2n(1,ret); 630 /* Set mode: 631 * 1: peer may send requests 632 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 633 */ 634 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 635 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 636 else 637 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 638#endif 639 640#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 641 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) 642 { 643 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its 644 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */ 645 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 646 return NULL; 647 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); 648 s2n(0,ret); 649 } 650#endif 651 652#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 653 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) 654 { 655 int el; 656 657 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 658 659 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 660 661 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); 662 s2n(el,ret); 663 664 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 665 { 666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 667 return NULL; 668 } 669 ret += el; 670 } 671#endif 672 673 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 674 return p; 675 676 s2n(extdatalen,p); 677 return ret; 678 } 679 680unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) 681 { 682 int extdatalen=0; 683 unsigned char *ret = p; 684#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 685 int next_proto_neg_seen; 686#endif 687 688 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ 689 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 690 return p; 691 692 ret+=2; 693 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 694 695 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 696 { 697 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 698 699 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 700 s2n(0,ret); 701 } 702 703 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) 704 { 705 int el; 706 707 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 708 { 709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 710 return NULL; 711 } 712 713 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 714 715 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 716 s2n(el,ret); 717 718 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 719 { 720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 721 return NULL; 722 } 723 724 ret += el; 725 } 726 727#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 728 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && 729 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 730 { 731 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ 732 long lenmax; 733 734 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 735 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 736 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 737 { 738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 739 return NULL; 740 } 741 742 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 743 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 744 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 745 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 746 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 747 748 } 749 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */ 750#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 751 752 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected 753 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 754 { 755 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 756 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 757 s2n(0,ret); 758 } 759 760 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 761 { 762 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 763 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); 764 s2n(0,ret); 765 } 766 767#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 768 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 769 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 770 { 771 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 772 773 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) 774 return NULL; 775 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 776 return NULL; 777 778 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 779 s2n(sol + 2, ret); 780 s2n(sol, ret); 781 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); 782 ret += sol; 783 } 784#endif 785 786#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 787 if(s->srtp_profile) 788 { 789 int el; 790 791 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 792 793 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 794 795 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); 796 s2n(el,ret); 797 798 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 799 { 800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 801 return NULL; 802 } 803 ret+=el; 804 } 805#endif 806 807 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) 808 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) 809 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 810 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/ 811 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/ 812 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 813 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 814 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 815 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17}; 816 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL; 817 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36); 818 ret+=36; 819 820 } 821 822#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 823 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ 824 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) 825 { 826 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); 827 s2n(1,ret); 828 /* Set mode: 829 * 1: peer may send requests 830 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 831 */ 832 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 833 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 834 else 835 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 836 837 } 838#endif 839 840#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 841 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; 842 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 843 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) 844 { 845 const unsigned char *npa; 846 unsigned int npalen; 847 int r; 848 849 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); 850 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) 851 { 852 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL; 853 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); 854 s2n(npalen,ret); 855 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); 856 ret += npalen; 857 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 858 } 859 } 860#endif 861 862 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 863 return p; 864 865 s2n(extdatalen,p); 866 return ret; 867 } 868 869int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 870 { 871 unsigned short type; 872 unsigned short size; 873 unsigned short len; 874 unsigned char *data = *p; 875 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 876 int sigalg_seen = 0; 877 878 s->servername_done = 0; 879 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 880#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 881 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 882#endif 883 884#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 885 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 886 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 887#endif 888 889 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 890 goto ri_check; 891 n2s(data,len); 892 893 if (data > (d+n-len)) 894 goto ri_check; 895 896 while (data <= (d+n-4)) 897 { 898 n2s(data,type); 899 n2s(data,size); 900 901 if (data+size > (d+n)) 902 goto ri_check; 903#if 0 904 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size); 905#endif 906 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 907 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, 908 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 909/* The servername extension is treated as follows: 910 911 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 912 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 913 in which case an fatal alert is generated. 914 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 915 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 916 to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 917 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 918 it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 919 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 920 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 921 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 922 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 923 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 924 the value of the Host: field. 925 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 926 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, 927 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. 928 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 929 930*/ 931 932 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 933 { 934 unsigned char *sdata; 935 int servname_type; 936 int dsize; 937 938 if (size < 2) 939 { 940 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 941 return 0; 942 } 943 n2s(data,dsize); 944 size -= 2; 945 if (dsize > size ) 946 { 947 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 948 return 0; 949 } 950 951 sdata = data; 952 while (dsize > 3) 953 { 954 servname_type = *(sdata++); 955 n2s(sdata,len); 956 dsize -= 3; 957 958 if (len > dsize) 959 { 960 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 961 return 0; 962 } 963 if (s->servername_done == 0) 964 switch (servname_type) 965 { 966 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: 967 if (!s->hit) 968 { 969 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname) 970 { 971 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 972 return 0; 973 } 974 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) 975 { 976 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 977 return 0; 978 } 979 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) 980 { 981 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 982 return 0; 983 } 984 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); 985 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; 986 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { 987 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); 988 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 989 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 990 return 0; 991 } 992 s->servername_done = 1; 993 994 } 995 else 996 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname 997 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 998 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; 999 1000 break; 1001 1002 default: 1003 break; 1004 } 1005 1006 dsize -= len; 1007 } 1008 if (dsize != 0) 1009 { 1010 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1011 return 0; 1012 } 1013 1014 } 1015#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1016 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) 1017 { 1018 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1)) 1019 { 1020 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1021 return 0; 1022 } 1023 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 1024 { 1025 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1026 return 0; 1027 } 1028 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) 1029 return -1; 1030 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); 1031 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0'; 1032 1033 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) 1034 { 1035 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1036 return 0; 1037 } 1038 } 1039#endif 1040 1041#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1042 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && 1043 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1044 { 1045 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1046 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1047 1048 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) 1049 { 1050 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1051 return 0; 1052 } 1053 if (!s->hit) 1054 { 1055 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) 1056 { 1057 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1058 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; 1059 } 1060 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1061 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 1062 { 1063 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1064 return 0; 1065 } 1066 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 1067 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 1068 } 1069#if 0 1070 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 1071 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1072 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1073 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1074 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1075#endif 1076 } 1077 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves && 1078 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1079 { 1080 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1081 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); 1082 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); 1083 1084 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || 1085 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1) 1086 { 1087 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1088 return 0; 1089 } 1090 if (!s->hit) 1091 { 1092 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) 1093 { 1094 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1095 return 0; 1096 } 1097 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1098 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 1099 { 1100 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1101 return 0; 1102 } 1103 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; 1104 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); 1105 } 1106#if 0 1107 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 1108 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 1109 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) 1110 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1111 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1112#endif 1113 } 1114#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1115#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1116 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1117 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1118 { 1119 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1120 1121 if (size < 2) 1122 { 1123 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1124 return 0; 1125 } 1126 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1127 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 1128 { 1129 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1130 return 0; 1131 } 1132 1133 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1134 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1135 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1136 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1137 else 1138 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1139 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1140 { 1141 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1142 return 0; 1143 } 1144 } 1145#endif 1146 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1147 { 1148 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1149 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1150 { 1151 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1152 return 0; 1153 } 1154 } 1155 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1156 { 1157 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1158 return 0; 1159 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1160 } 1161 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) 1162 { 1163 int dsize; 1164 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) 1165 { 1166 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1167 return 0; 1168 } 1169 sigalg_seen = 1; 1170 n2s(data,dsize); 1171 size -= 2; 1172 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) 1173 { 1174 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1175 return 0; 1176 } 1177 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) 1178 { 1179 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1180 return 0; 1181 } 1182 } 1183 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1184 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 1185 { 1186 1187 if (size < 5) 1188 { 1189 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1190 return 0; 1191 } 1192 1193 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; 1194 size--; 1195 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) 1196 { 1197 const unsigned char *sdata; 1198 int dsize; 1199 /* Read in responder_id_list */ 1200 n2s(data,dsize); 1201 size -= 2; 1202 if (dsize > size ) 1203 { 1204 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1205 return 0; 1206 } 1207 while (dsize > 0) 1208 { 1209 OCSP_RESPID *id; 1210 int idsize; 1211 if (dsize < 4) 1212 { 1213 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1214 return 0; 1215 } 1216 n2s(data, idsize); 1217 dsize -= 2 + idsize; 1218 size -= 2 + idsize; 1219 if (dsize < 0) 1220 { 1221 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1222 return 0; 1223 } 1224 sdata = data; 1225 data += idsize; 1226 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, 1227 &sdata, idsize); 1228 if (!id) 1229 { 1230 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1231 return 0; 1232 } 1233 if (data != sdata) 1234 { 1235 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1236 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1237 return 0; 1238 } 1239 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids 1240 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = 1241 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) 1242 { 1243 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1244 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1245 return 0; 1246 } 1247 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( 1248 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) 1249 { 1250 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1251 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1252 return 0; 1253 } 1254 } 1255 1256 /* Read in request_extensions */ 1257 if (size < 2) 1258 { 1259 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1260 return 0; 1261 } 1262 n2s(data,dsize); 1263 size -= 2; 1264 if (dsize != size) 1265 { 1266 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1267 return 0; 1268 } 1269 sdata = data; 1270 if (dsize > 0) 1271 { 1272 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) 1273 { 1274 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, 1275 X509_EXTENSION_free); 1276 } 1277 1278 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = 1279 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, 1280 &sdata, dsize); 1281 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts 1282 || (data + dsize != sdata)) 1283 { 1284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1285 return 0; 1286 } 1287 } 1288 } 1289 /* We don't know what to do with any other type 1290 * so ignore it. 1291 */ 1292 else 1293 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 1294 } 1295#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1296 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) 1297 { 1298 switch(data[0]) 1299 { 1300 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ 1301 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1302 break; 1303 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ 1304 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1305 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1306 break; 1307 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1308 return 0; 1309 } 1310 } 1311#endif 1312#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1313 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1314 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) 1315 { 1316 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a 1317 * renegotiation. 1318 * 1319 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we 1320 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on 1321 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when 1322 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an 1323 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing 1324 * anything like that, but this might change). 1325 1326 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake 1327 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 1328 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen 1329 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new 1330 * Finished message could have been computed.) */ 1331 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1332 } 1333#endif 1334 1335 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 1336#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1337 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) 1338 { 1339 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, 1340 al)) 1341 return 0; 1342 } 1343#endif 1344 1345 data+=size; 1346 } 1347 1348 *p = data; 1349 1350 ri_check: 1351 1352 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 1353 1354 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && 1355 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1356 { 1357 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1359 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1360 return 0; 1361 } 1362 1363 return 1; 1364 } 1365 1366#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1367/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No 1368 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill 1369 * the length of the block. */ 1370static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) 1371 { 1372 unsigned int off = 0; 1373 1374 while (off < len) 1375 { 1376 if (d[off] == 0) 1377 return 0; 1378 off += d[off]; 1379 off++; 1380 } 1381 1382 return off == len; 1383 } 1384#endif 1385 1386int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 1387 { 1388 unsigned short length; 1389 unsigned short type; 1390 unsigned short size; 1391 unsigned char *data = *p; 1392 int tlsext_servername = 0; 1393 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 1394 1395#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1396 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1397#endif 1398 1399#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1400 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 1401 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 1402#endif 1403 1404 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 1405 goto ri_check; 1406 1407 n2s(data,length); 1408 if (data+length != d+n) 1409 { 1410 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1411 return 0; 1412 } 1413 1414 while(data <= (d+n-4)) 1415 { 1416 n2s(data,type); 1417 n2s(data,size); 1418 1419 if (data+size > (d+n)) 1420 goto ri_check; 1421 1422 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1423 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, 1424 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1425 1426 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1427 { 1428 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) 1429 { 1430 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1431 return 0; 1432 } 1433 tlsext_servername = 1; 1434 } 1435 1436#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1437 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && 1438 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1439 { 1440 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1441 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1442 1443 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 1444 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) 1445 { 1446 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1447 return 0; 1448 } 1449 if (!s->hit) 1450 { 1451 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1452 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1453 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 1454 { 1455 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1456 return 0; 1457 } 1458 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 1459 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 1460 } 1461#if 0 1462 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); 1463 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1464 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1465 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1466 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1467#endif 1468 } 1469#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1470 1471 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1472 { 1473 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1474 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1475 { 1476 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1477 return 0; 1478 } 1479 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1480 || (size > 0)) 1481 { 1482 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1483 return 0; 1484 } 1485 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1486 } 1487#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1488 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1489 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1490 { 1491 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1492 1493 if (size < 2) 1494 { 1495 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1496 return 0; 1497 } 1498 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1499 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 1500 { 1501 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1502 return 0; 1503 } 1504 1505 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1506 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1507 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1508 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1509 else 1510 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1511 1512 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1513 { 1514 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1515 return 0; 1516 } 1517 } 1518#endif 1519 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1520 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1521 { 1522 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested 1523 * a status request message. 1524 */ 1525 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) 1526 { 1527 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1528 return 0; 1529 } 1530 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ 1531 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1532 } 1533#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1534 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1535 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) 1536 { 1537 unsigned char *selected; 1538 unsigned char selected_len; 1539 1540 /* We must have requested it. */ 1541 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) 1542 { 1543 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1544 return 0; 1545 } 1546 /* The data must be valid */ 1547 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) 1548 { 1549 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1550 return 0; 1551 } 1552 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) 1553 { 1554 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1555 return 0; 1556 } 1557 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 1558 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) 1559 { 1560 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1561 return 0; 1562 } 1563 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); 1564 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; 1565 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1566 } 1567#endif 1568 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1569 { 1570 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1571 return 0; 1572 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1573 } 1574#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1575 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) 1576 { 1577 switch(data[0]) 1578 { 1579 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ 1580 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1581 break; 1582 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ 1583 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1584 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1585 break; 1586 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1587 return 0; 1588 } 1589 } 1590#endif 1591#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1592 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) 1593 { 1594 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, 1595 al)) 1596 return 0; 1597 } 1598#endif 1599 1600 data+=size; 1601 } 1602 1603 if (data != d+n) 1604 { 1605 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1606 return 0; 1607 } 1608 1609 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) 1610 { 1611 if (s->tlsext_hostname) 1612 { 1613 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) 1614 { 1615 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 1616 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) 1617 { 1618 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1619 return 0; 1620 } 1621 } 1622 else 1623 { 1624 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1625 return 0; 1626 } 1627 } 1628 } 1629 1630 *p = data; 1631 1632 ri_check: 1633 1634 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to 1635 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server 1636 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an 1637 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server 1638 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI 1639 * absence on initial connect only. 1640 */ 1641 if (!renegotiate_seen 1642 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) 1643 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1644 { 1645 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 1647 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1648 return 0; 1649 } 1650 1651 return 1; 1652 } 1653 1654 1655int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1656 { 1657#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1658 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats 1659 * and elliptic curves we support. 1660 */ 1661 int using_ecc = 0; 1662 int i; 1663 unsigned char *j; 1664 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 1665 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 1666 1667 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) 1668 { 1669 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 1670 1671 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 1672 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 1673 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 1674 { 1675 using_ecc = 1; 1676 break; 1677 } 1678 } 1679 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION); 1680 if (using_ecc) 1681 { 1682 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1683 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 1684 { 1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1686 return -1; 1687 } 1688 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1689 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1690 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1691 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1692 1693 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */ 1694 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); 1695 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2; 1696 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 1697 { 1698 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1700 return -1; 1701 } 1702 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i < 1703 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) 1704 { 1705 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]); 1706 s2n(id,j); 1707 } 1708 } 1709#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1710 1711#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1712 { 1713 int r = 1; 1714 1715 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 1716 { 1717 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1718 if (!r) 1719 return -1; 1720 } 1721 1722 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 1723 { 1724 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1725 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1726 1727 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1728 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1729 else 1730 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1731 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1732 { 1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1734 return -1; 1735 } 1736 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1737 } 1738 1739 if (r == 2) 1740 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */ 1741 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1742 } 1743#endif 1744 1745 return 1; 1746 } 1747 1748int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1749 { 1750#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1751 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support 1752 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not 1753 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. 1754 */ 1755 1756 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1757 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1758 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 1759 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 1760 1761 if (using_ecc) 1762 { 1763 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1764 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 1765 { 1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1767 return -1; 1768 } 1769 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1770 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1771 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1772 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1773 } 1774#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1775 1776 return 1; 1777 } 1778 1779int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) 1780 { 1781 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 1782 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1783 1784#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1785 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in 1786 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1787 */ 1788 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in 1789 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1790 */ 1791#endif 1792 1793 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1794 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1795 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1796 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1797 1798#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1799 { 1800 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), 1801 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, 1802 * so this has to happen here in 1803 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */ 1804 1805 int r = 1; 1806 1807 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 1808 { 1809 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1810 if (!r) 1811 { 1812 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1813 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1814 goto err; 1815 } 1816 } 1817 1818 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1819 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1820 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; 1821 1822 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 1823 { 1824 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 1825 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) 1826 { 1827 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input 1828 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */ 1829 1830 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1831 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1832 else 1833 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1834 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1835 { 1836 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1837 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1838 goto err; 1839 } 1840 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1841 } 1842 } 1843 1844 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1845 { 1846 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, 1847 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; 1848 * abort the handshake. 1849 */ 1850 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1851 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1852 } 1853 } 1854 1855 err: 1856#endif 1857 switch (ret) 1858 { 1859 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1860 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1861 return -1; 1862 1863 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 1864 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 1865 return 1; 1866 1867 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1868 s->servername_done=0; 1869 default: 1870 return 1; 1871 } 1872 } 1873 1874int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) 1875 { 1876 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 1877 int al; 1878 1879 /* If status request then ask callback what to do. 1880 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 1881 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher 1882 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent 1883 */ 1884 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 1885 { 1886 int r; 1887 CERT_PKEY *certpkey; 1888 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); 1889 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ 1890 if (certpkey == NULL) 1891 { 1892 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1893 return 1; 1894 } 1895 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so 1896 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up. 1897 */ 1898 s->cert->key = certpkey; 1899 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 1900 switch (r) 1901 { 1902 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 1903 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1904 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1905 break; 1906 /* status request response should be sent */ 1907 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 1908 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 1909 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1910 else 1911 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1912 break; 1913 /* something bad happened */ 1914 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1915 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1916 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1917 goto err; 1918 } 1919 } 1920 else 1921 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1922 1923 err: 1924 switch (ret) 1925 { 1926 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1927 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1928 return -1; 1929 1930 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 1931 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 1932 return 1; 1933 1934 default: 1935 return 1; 1936 } 1937 } 1938 1939int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1940 { 1941 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 1942 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1943 1944#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1945 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 1946 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension 1947 * it must contain uncompressed. 1948 */ 1949 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1950 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1951 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 1952 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 1953 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 1954 { 1955 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 1956 size_t i; 1957 unsigned char *list; 1958 int found_uncompressed = 0; 1959 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1960 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1961 { 1962 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) 1963 { 1964 found_uncompressed = 1; 1965 break; 1966 } 1967 } 1968 if (!found_uncompressed) 1969 { 1970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 1971 return -1; 1972 } 1973 } 1974 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 1975#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1976 1977 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1978 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1979 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1980 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1981 1982#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1983 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) 1984 { 1985 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs. 1986 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */ 1987 1988 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1989 { 1990 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1991 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1992 } 1993 1994 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check 1995 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */ 1996 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || 1997 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) 1998 { 1999 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2000 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2001 } 2002 } 2003#endif 2004 2005 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one 2006 * tell the callback 2007 */ 2008 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) 2009 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 2010 { 2011 int r; 2012 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows 2013 * there is no response. 2014 */ 2015 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 2016 { 2017 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); 2018 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; 2019 } 2020 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; 2021 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 2022 if (r == 0) 2023 { 2024 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; 2025 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2026 } 2027 if (r < 0) 2028 { 2029 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2030 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2031 } 2032 } 2033 2034 switch (ret) 2035 { 2036 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2037 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2038 return -1; 2039 2040 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2041 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 2042 return 1; 2043 2044 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2045 s->servername_done=0; 2046 default: 2047 return 1; 2048 } 2049 } 2050 2051/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the 2052 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle 2053 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. 2054 * 2055 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will 2056 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket 2057 * extension, if any. 2058 * len: the length of the session ID. 2059 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. 2060 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2061 * point to the resulting session. 2062 * 2063 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key 2064 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will 2065 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. 2066 * 2067 * Returns: 2068 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2069 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). 2070 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports 2071 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. 2072 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but 2073 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. 2074 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. 2075 * 2076 * Side effects: 2077 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue 2078 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support 2079 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have 2080 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if 2081 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. 2082 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. 2083 */ 2084int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, 2085 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) 2086 { 2087 /* Point after session ID in client hello */ 2088 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; 2089 unsigned short i; 2090 2091 *ret = NULL; 2092 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 2093 2094 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present 2095 * to permit stateful resumption. 2096 */ 2097 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 2098 return 0; 2099 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) 2100 return 0; 2101 if (p >= limit) 2102 return -1; 2103 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 2104 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 2105 { 2106 i = *(p++); 2107 p+= i; 2108 if (p >= limit) 2109 return -1; 2110 } 2111 /* Skip past cipher list */ 2112 n2s(p, i); 2113 p+= i; 2114 if (p >= limit) 2115 return -1; 2116 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ 2117 i = *(p++); 2118 p += i; 2119 if (p > limit) 2120 return -1; 2121 /* Now at start of extensions */ 2122 if ((p + 2) >= limit) 2123 return 0; 2124 n2s(p, i); 2125 while ((p + 4) <= limit) 2126 { 2127 unsigned short type, size; 2128 n2s(p, type); 2129 n2s(p, size); 2130 if (p + size > limit) 2131 return 0; 2132 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 2133 { 2134 int r; 2135 if (size == 0) 2136 { 2137 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't 2138 * currently have one. */ 2139 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2140 return 1; 2141 } 2142 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) 2143 { 2144 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be 2145 * decrypted rather than generating the session 2146 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated 2147 * handshake based on external mechanism to 2148 * calculate the master secret later. */ 2149 return 2; 2150 } 2151 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); 2152 switch (r) 2153 { 2154 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ 2155 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2156 return 2; 2157 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ 2158 return r; 2159 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ 2160 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2161 return 3; 2162 default: /* fatal error */ 2163 return -1; 2164 } 2165 } 2166 p += size; 2167 } 2168 return 0; 2169 } 2170 2171/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. 2172 * 2173 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. 2174 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. 2175 * sess_id: points at the session ID. 2176 * sesslen: the length of the session ID. 2177 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2178 * point to the resulting session. 2179 * 2180 * Returns: 2181 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2182 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. 2183 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. 2184 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. 2185 */ 2186static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, 2187 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 2188 SSL_SESSION **psess) 2189 { 2190 SSL_SESSION *sess; 2191 unsigned char *sdec; 2192 const unsigned char *p; 2193 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 2194 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 2195 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2196 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2197 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 2198 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ 2199 if (eticklen < 48) 2200 return 2; 2201 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 2202 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2203 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2204 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 2205 { 2206 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 2207 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 2208 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 2209 if (rv < 0) 2210 return -1; 2211 if (rv == 0) 2212 return 2; 2213 if (rv == 2) 2214 renew_ticket = 1; 2215 } 2216 else 2217 { 2218 /* Check key name matches */ 2219 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 2220 return 2; 2221 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 2222 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 2223 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2224 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); 2225 } 2226 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and 2227 * integrity checks on ticket. 2228 */ 2229 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 2230 if (mlen < 0) 2231 { 2232 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2233 return -1; 2234 } 2235 eticklen -= mlen; 2236 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 2237 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); 2238 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); 2239 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2240 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) 2241 return 2; 2242 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 2243 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 2244 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2245 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2246 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 2247 if (!sdec) 2248 { 2249 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2250 return -1; 2251 } 2252 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); 2253 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) 2254 return 2; 2255 slen += mlen; 2256 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2257 p = sdec; 2258 2259 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 2260 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 2261 if (sess) 2262 { 2263 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to 2264 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to 2265 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero 2266 * as required by standard. 2267 */ 2268 if (sesslen) 2269 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 2270 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 2271 *psess = sess; 2272 if (renew_ticket) 2273 return 4; 2274 else 2275 return 3; 2276 } 2277 ERR_clear_error(); 2278 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new 2279 * ticket. */ 2280 return 2; 2281 } 2282 2283/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ 2284 2285typedef struct 2286 { 2287 int nid; 2288 int id; 2289 } tls12_lookup; 2290 2291static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { 2292#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 2293 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, 2294#endif 2295#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2296 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, 2297#endif 2298#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2299 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, 2300 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, 2301#endif 2302#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2303 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, 2304 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} 2305#endif 2306}; 2307 2308static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { 2309#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2310 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, 2311#endif 2312#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2313 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, 2314#endif 2315#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2316 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} 2317#endif 2318}; 2319 2320static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2321 { 2322 size_t i; 2323 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) 2324 { 2325 if (table[i].nid == nid) 2326 return table[i].id; 2327 } 2328 return -1; 2329 } 2330#if 0 2331static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2332 { 2333 size_t i; 2334 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) 2335 { 2336 if (table[i].id == id) 2337 return table[i].nid; 2338 } 2339 return -1; 2340 } 2341#endif 2342 2343int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) 2344 { 2345 int sig_id, md_id; 2346 if (!md) 2347 return 0; 2348 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, 2349 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2350 if (md_id == -1) 2351 return 0; 2352 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); 2353 if (sig_id == -1) 2354 return 0; 2355 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; 2356 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; 2357 return 1; 2358 } 2359 2360int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) 2361 { 2362 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, 2363 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2364 } 2365 2366const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) 2367 { 2368 switch(hash_alg) 2369 { 2370#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 2371 case TLSEXT_hash_md5: 2372#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 2373 if (FIPS_mode()) 2374 return NULL; 2375#endif 2376 return EVP_md5(); 2377#endif 2378#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2379 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: 2380 return EVP_sha1(); 2381#endif 2382#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2383 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: 2384 return EVP_sha224(); 2385 2386 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: 2387 return EVP_sha256(); 2388#endif 2389#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2390 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: 2391 return EVP_sha384(); 2392 2393 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: 2394 return EVP_sha512(); 2395#endif 2396 default: 2397 return NULL; 2398 2399 } 2400 } 2401 2402/* Set preferred digest for each key type */ 2403 2404int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) 2405 { 2406 int i, idx; 2407 const EVP_MD *md; 2408 CERT *c = s->cert; 2409 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */ 2410 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) 2411 return 1; 2412 /* Should never happen */ 2413 if (!c) 2414 return 0; 2415 2416 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; 2417 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; 2418 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL; 2419 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL; 2420 2421 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) 2422 { 2423 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1]; 2424 2425 switch(sig_alg) 2426 { 2427#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2428 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 2429 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; 2430 break; 2431#endif 2432#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2433 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 2434 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; 2435 break; 2436#endif 2437#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2438 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 2439 idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; 2440 break; 2441#endif 2442 default: 2443 continue; 2444 } 2445 2446 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) 2447 { 2448 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg); 2449 if (md) 2450 { 2451 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 2452 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) 2453 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 2454 } 2455 } 2456 2457 } 2458 2459 2460 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not 2461 * supported it stays as NULL. 2462 */ 2463#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2464 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) 2465 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2466#endif 2467#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2468 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) 2469 { 2470 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2471 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2472 } 2473#endif 2474#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2475 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) 2476 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2477#endif 2478 return 1; 2479 } 2480 2481#endif 2482 2483#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2484int 2485tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2486 { 2487 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; 2488 unsigned short hbtype; 2489 unsigned int payload; 2490 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2491 2492 if (s->msg_callback) 2493 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2494 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, 2495 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2496 2497 /* Read type and payload length first */ 2498 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 2499 return 0; /* silently discard */ 2500 hbtype = *p++; 2501 n2s(p, payload); 2502 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 2503 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ 2504 pl = p; 2505 2506 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) 2507 { 2508 unsigned char *buffer, *bp; 2509 int r; 2510 2511 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes 2512 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus 2513 * payload, plus padding 2514 */ 2515 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2516 bp = buffer; 2517 2518 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ 2519 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; 2520 s2n(payload, bp); 2521 memcpy(bp, pl, payload); 2522 bp += payload; 2523 /* Random padding */ 2524 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding); 2525 2526 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding); 2527 2528 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) 2529 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2530 buffer, 3 + payload + padding, 2531 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2532 2533 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 2534 2535 if (r < 0) 2536 return r; 2537 } 2538 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) 2539 { 2540 unsigned int seq; 2541 2542 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), 2543 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the 2544 * sequence number */ 2545 n2s(pl, seq); 2546 2547 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) 2548 { 2549 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 2550 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 2551 } 2552 } 2553 2554 return 0; 2555 } 2556 2557int 2558tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2559 { 2560 unsigned char *buf, *p; 2561 int ret; 2562 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ 2563 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2564 2565 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ 2566 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || 2567 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) 2568 { 2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); 2570 return -1; 2571 } 2572 2573 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ 2574 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) 2575 { 2576 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); 2577 return -1; 2578 } 2579 2580 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ 2581 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) 2582 { 2583 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 2584 return -1; 2585 } 2586 2587 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding 2588 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. 2589 */ 2590 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); 2591 2592 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number 2593 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add 2594 * some random stuff. 2595 * - Message Type, 1 byte 2596 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) 2597 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) 2598 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) 2599 * - Padding 2600 */ 2601 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2602 p = buf; 2603 /* Message Type */ 2604 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; 2605 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ 2606 s2n(payload, p); 2607 /* Sequence number */ 2608 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); 2609 /* 16 random bytes */ 2610 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16); 2611 p += 16; 2612 /* Random padding */ 2613 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding); 2614 2615 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); 2616 if (ret >= 0) 2617 { 2618 if (s->msg_callback) 2619 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2620 buf, 3 + payload + padding, 2621 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2622 2623 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; 2624 } 2625 2626 OPENSSL_free(buf); 2627 2628 return ret; 2629 } 2630#endif 2631