1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112#include <stdio.h> 113#include <openssl/objects.h> 114#include <openssl/evp.h> 115#include <openssl/hmac.h> 116#include <openssl/ocsp.h> 117#include <openssl/rand.h> 118#include "ssl_locl.h" 119 120const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 121 122#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 123static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 125 SSL_SESSION **psess); 126#endif 127 128SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ 129 tls1_enc, 130 tls1_mac, 131 tls1_setup_key_block, 132 tls1_generate_master_secret, 133 tls1_change_cipher_state, 134 tls1_final_finish_mac, 135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 136 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 139 tls1_alert_code, 140 tls1_export_keying_material, 141 }; 142 143long tls1_default_timeout(void) 144 { 145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec 146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */ 147 return(60*60*2); 148 } 149 150int tls1_new(SSL *s) 151 { 152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0); 153 s->method->ssl_clear(s); 154 return(1); 155 } 156 157void tls1_free(SSL *s) 158 { 159#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) 161 { 162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); 163 } 164#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ 165 ssl3_free(s); 166 } 167 168void tls1_clear(SSL *s) 169 { 170 ssl3_clear(s); 171 s->version = s->method->version; 172 } 173 174#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 175 176static int nid_list[] = 177 { 178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ 203 }; 204 205static int pref_list[] = 206 { 207#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 208 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 209 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 210#endif 211 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 212#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 213 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 214 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 215#endif 216 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 217#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 218 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 219 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 220#endif 221 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 222 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 223#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 224 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 225 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 226 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 227#endif 228 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 229 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 230#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 231 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 232 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 233#endif 234 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 235 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 236#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 237 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 238 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 239 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 240#endif 241 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 242 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 243 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 244 }; 245 246int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) 247 { 248 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */ 249 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > 250 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))) 251 return 0; 252 return nid_list[curve_id-1]; 253 } 254 255int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 256 { 257 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */ 258 switch (nid) 259 { 260 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 261 return 1; 262 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 263 return 2; 264 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 265 return 3; 266 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 267 return 4; 268 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 269 return 5; 270 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 271 return 6; 272 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 273 return 7; 274 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 275 return 8; 276 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 277 return 9; 278 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 279 return 10; 280 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 281 return 11; 282 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 283 return 12; 284 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 285 return 13; 286 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 287 return 14; 288 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 289 return 15; 290 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 291 return 16; 292 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 293 return 17; 294 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 295 return 18; 296 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 297 return 19; 298 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 299 return 20; 300 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 301 return 21; 302 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 303 return 22; 304 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 305 return 23; 306 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 307 return 24; 308 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 309 return 25; 310 default: 311 return 0; 312 } 313 } 314#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 315 316#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 317 318/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this 319 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. 320 */ 321 322#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 323#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ 324#else 325#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, 326#endif 327 328#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 329#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ 330#else 331#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, 332#endif 333 334#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 335#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */ 336#else 337#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, 338#endif 339 340#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ 341 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ 342 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ 343 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 344 345static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { 346#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 347 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) 348 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 349#endif 350#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 351 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 352 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) 353#endif 354#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 355 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) 356#endif 357}; 358 359int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) 360 { 361 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 362 if (p) 363 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen); 364 return (int)slen; 365 } 366 367unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit) 368 { 369 int extdatalen=0; 370 unsigned char *orig = buf; 371 unsigned char *ret = buf; 372 373 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 374 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION 375 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 376 return orig; 377 378 ret+=2; 379 380 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 381 382 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 383 { 384 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 385 unsigned long size_str; 386 long lenmax; 387 388 /* check for enough space. 389 4 for the servername type and entension length 390 2 for servernamelist length 391 1 for the hostname type 392 2 for hostname length 393 + hostname length 394 */ 395 396 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 397 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 398 return NULL; 399 400 /* extension type and length */ 401 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 402 s2n(size_str+5,ret); 403 404 /* length of servername list */ 405 s2n(size_str+3,ret); 406 407 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 408 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 409 s2n(size_str,ret); 410 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 411 ret+=size_str; 412 } 413 414 /* Add RI if renegotiating */ 415 if (s->renegotiate) 416 { 417 int el; 418 419 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 420 { 421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 422 return NULL; 423 } 424 425 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 426 427 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 428 s2n(el,ret); 429 430 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 431 { 432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 433 return NULL; 434 } 435 436 ret += el; 437 } 438 439#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 440 /* Add SRP username if there is one */ 441 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 442 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */ 443 444 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); 445 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) 446 { 447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 448 return NULL; 449 } 450 451 /* check for enough space. 452 4 for the srp type type and entension length 453 1 for the srp user identity 454 + srp user identity length 455 */ 456 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL; 457 458 /* fill in the extension */ 459 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret); 460 s2n(login_len+1,ret); 461 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len; 462 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); 463 ret+=login_len; 464 } 465#endif 466 467#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 468 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 469 { 470 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ 471 long lenmax; 472 473 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 474 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 475 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 476 { 477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 478 return NULL; 479 } 480 481 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 482 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 483 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 484 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 485 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 486 } 487 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) 488 { 489 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ 490 long lenmax; 491 492 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; 493 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 494 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) 495 { 496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 497 return NULL; 498 } 499 500 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret); 501 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); 502 503 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); 504 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 505 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 506 } 507#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 508 509 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 510 { 511 int ticklen; 512 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 513 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 514 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 515 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) 516 { 517 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 518 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 519 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 520 return NULL; 521 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, 522 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, 523 ticklen); 524 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 525 } 526 else 527 ticklen = 0; 528 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 529 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 530 goto skip_ext; 531 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len 532 * rest for ticket 533 */ 534 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL; 535 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 536 s2n(ticklen,ret); 537 if (ticklen) 538 { 539 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 540 ret += ticklen; 541 } 542 } 543 skip_ext: 544 545 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 546 { 547 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6) 548 return NULL; 549 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret); 550 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret); 551 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret); 552 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs)); 553 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 554 } 555 556#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 557 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 558 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 559 { 560 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 561 562 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) 563 return NULL; 564 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 565 return NULL; 566 567 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 568 s2n(col + 2, ret); 569 s2n(col, ret); 570 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); 571 ret += col; 572 } 573#endif 574 575 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && 576 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 577 { 578 int i; 579 long extlen, idlen, itmp; 580 OCSP_RESPID *id; 581 582 idlen = 0; 583 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 584 { 585 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 586 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); 587 if (itmp <= 0) 588 return NULL; 589 idlen += itmp + 2; 590 } 591 592 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) 593 { 594 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); 595 if (extlen < 0) 596 return NULL; 597 } 598 else 599 extlen = 0; 600 601 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; 602 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 603 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) 604 return NULL; 605 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); 606 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 607 s2n(idlen, ret); 608 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 609 { 610 /* save position of id len */ 611 unsigned char *q = ret; 612 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 613 /* skip over id len */ 614 ret += 2; 615 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); 616 /* write id len */ 617 s2n(itmp, q); 618 } 619 s2n(extlen, ret); 620 if (extlen > 0) 621 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); 622 } 623 624#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 625 /* Add Heartbeat extension */ 626 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) 627 return NULL; 628 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); 629 s2n(1,ret); 630 /* Set mode: 631 * 1: peer may send requests 632 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 633 */ 634 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 635 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 636 else 637 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 638#endif 639 640#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 641 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) 642 { 643 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its 644 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */ 645 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 646 return NULL; 647 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); 648 s2n(0,ret); 649 } 650#endif 651 652#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 653 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) 654 { 655 int el; 656 657 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 658 659 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 660 661 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); 662 s2n(el,ret); 663 664 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 665 { 666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 667 return NULL; 668 } 669 ret += el; 670 } 671#endif 672 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. 673 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 674 * 675 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing 676 * extensions it MUST always appear last. 677 */ 678 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) 679 { 680 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 681 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages 682 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while 683 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not. 684 */ 685 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) 686 hlen -= 5; 687 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) 688 { 689 hlen = 0x200 - hlen; 690 if (hlen >= 4) 691 hlen -= 4; 692 else 693 hlen = 0; 694 695 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); 696 s2n(hlen, ret); 697 memset(ret, 0, hlen); 698 ret += hlen; 699 } 700 } 701 702 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) 703 return orig; 704 705 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 706 return ret; 707 } 708 709unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit) 710 { 711 int extdatalen=0; 712 unsigned char *orig = buf; 713 unsigned char *ret = buf; 714#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 715 int next_proto_neg_seen; 716#endif 717 718 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ 719 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 720 return orig; 721 722 ret+=2; 723 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 724 725 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 726 { 727 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 728 729 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 730 s2n(0,ret); 731 } 732 733 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) 734 { 735 int el; 736 737 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 738 { 739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 740 return NULL; 741 } 742 743 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 744 745 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 746 s2n(el,ret); 747 748 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 749 { 750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 751 return NULL; 752 } 753 754 ret += el; 755 } 756 757#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 758 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 759 { 760 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ 761 long lenmax; 762 763 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 764 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 765 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 766 { 767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 768 return NULL; 769 } 770 771 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 772 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 773 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 774 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 775 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 776 777 } 778 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */ 779#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 780 781 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected 782 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 783 { 784 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 785 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 786 s2n(0,ret); 787 } 788 789 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 790 { 791 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 792 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); 793 s2n(0,ret); 794 } 795 796#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 797 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 798 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 799 { 800 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 801 802 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) 803 return NULL; 804 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 805 return NULL; 806 807 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 808 s2n(sol + 2, ret); 809 s2n(sol, ret); 810 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); 811 ret += sol; 812 } 813#endif 814 815#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 816 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) 817 { 818 int el; 819 820 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 821 822 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 823 824 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); 825 s2n(el,ret); 826 827 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 828 { 829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 830 return NULL; 831 } 832 ret+=el; 833 } 834#endif 835 836 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) 837 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) 838 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 839 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/ 840 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/ 841 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 842 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 843 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 844 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17}; 845 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL; 846 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36); 847 ret+=36; 848 849 } 850 851#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 852 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ 853 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) 854 { 855 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) 856 return NULL; 857 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); 858 s2n(1,ret); 859 /* Set mode: 860 * 1: peer may send requests 861 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 862 */ 863 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 864 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 865 else 866 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 867 868 } 869#endif 870 871#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 872 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; 873 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 874 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) 875 { 876 const unsigned char *npa; 877 unsigned int npalen; 878 int r; 879 880 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); 881 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) 882 { 883 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL; 884 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); 885 s2n(npalen,ret); 886 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); 887 ret += npalen; 888 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 889 } 890 } 891#endif 892 893 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) 894 return orig; 895 896 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 897 return ret; 898 } 899 900#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 901/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X 902 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. 903 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: 904 * SNI, 905 * elliptic_curves 906 * ec_point_formats 907 * 908 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, 909 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. 910 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from 911 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). 912 */ 913static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) { 914 unsigned short type, size; 915 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 916 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 917 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 918 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 919 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 920 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 921 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 922 923 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 924 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 925 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 926 0x00, /* uncompressed */ 927 }; 928 929 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 930 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { 931 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 932 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 933 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 934 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 935 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 936 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 937 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 938 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ 939 }; 940 941 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 942 return; 943 data += 2; 944 945 if (data > (d+n-4)) 946 return; 947 n2s(data,type); 948 n2s(data,size); 949 950 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 951 return; 952 953 if (data+size > d+n) 954 return; 955 data += size; 956 957 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 958 { 959 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 960 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); 961 962 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n) 963 return; 964 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) 965 return; 966 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) 967 return; 968 } 969 else 970 { 971 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 972 973 if (data + len != d+n) 974 return; 975 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) 976 return; 977 } 978 979 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; 980} 981#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 982 983int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 984 { 985 unsigned short type; 986 unsigned short size; 987 unsigned short len; 988 unsigned char *data = *p; 989 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 990 int sigalg_seen = 0; 991 992 s->servername_done = 0; 993 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 994#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 995 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 996#endif 997 998#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 999 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 1000 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 1001#endif 1002 1003#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1004 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) 1005 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n); 1006#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1007 1008#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1009 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 1010 { 1011 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); 1012 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; 1013 } 1014#endif 1015 1016 s->srtp_profile = NULL; 1017 1018 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 1019 goto ri_check; 1020 n2s(data,len); 1021 1022 if (data > (d+n-len)) 1023 goto ri_check; 1024 1025 while (data <= (d+n-4)) 1026 { 1027 n2s(data,type); 1028 n2s(data,size); 1029 1030 if (data+size > (d+n)) 1031 goto ri_check; 1032#if 0 1033 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size); 1034#endif 1035 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1036 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, 1037 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1038/* The servername extension is treated as follows: 1039 1040 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 1041 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 1042 in which case an fatal alert is generated. 1043 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 1044 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 1045 to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 1046 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 1047 it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 1048 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 1049 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 1050 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 1051 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 1052 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 1053 the value of the Host: field. 1054 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 1055 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, 1056 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. 1057 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 1058 1059*/ 1060 1061 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1062 { 1063 unsigned char *sdata; 1064 int servname_type; 1065 int dsize; 1066 1067 if (size < 2) 1068 { 1069 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1070 return 0; 1071 } 1072 n2s(data,dsize); 1073 size -= 2; 1074 if (dsize > size ) 1075 { 1076 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1077 return 0; 1078 } 1079 1080 sdata = data; 1081 while (dsize > 3) 1082 { 1083 servname_type = *(sdata++); 1084 n2s(sdata,len); 1085 dsize -= 3; 1086 1087 if (len > dsize) 1088 { 1089 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1090 return 0; 1091 } 1092 if (s->servername_done == 0) 1093 switch (servname_type) 1094 { 1095 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: 1096 if (!s->hit) 1097 { 1098 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname) 1099 { 1100 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1101 return 0; 1102 } 1103 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) 1104 { 1105 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1106 return 0; 1107 } 1108 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) 1109 { 1110 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1111 return 0; 1112 } 1113 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); 1114 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; 1115 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { 1116 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); 1117 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 1118 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1119 return 0; 1120 } 1121 s->servername_done = 1; 1122 1123 } 1124 else 1125 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname 1126 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 1127 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; 1128 1129 break; 1130 1131 default: 1132 break; 1133 } 1134 1135 dsize -= len; 1136 } 1137 if (dsize != 0) 1138 { 1139 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1140 return 0; 1141 } 1142 1143 } 1144#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1145 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) 1146 { 1147 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1)) 1148 { 1149 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1150 return 0; 1151 } 1152 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 1153 { 1154 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1155 return 0; 1156 } 1157 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) 1158 return -1; 1159 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); 1160 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0'; 1161 1162 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) 1163 { 1164 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1165 return 0; 1166 } 1167 } 1168#endif 1169 1170#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1171 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) 1172 { 1173 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1174 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1175 1176 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) 1177 { 1178 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1179 return 0; 1180 } 1181 if (!s->hit) 1182 { 1183 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) 1184 { 1185 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1186 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; 1187 } 1188 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1189 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 1190 { 1191 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1192 return 0; 1193 } 1194 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 1195 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 1196 } 1197#if 0 1198 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 1199 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1200 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1201 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1202 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1203#endif 1204 } 1205 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) 1206 { 1207 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1208 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); 1209 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); 1210 1211 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || 1212 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 || 1213 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */ 1214 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) 1215 { 1216 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1217 return 0; 1218 } 1219 if (!s->hit) 1220 { 1221 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) 1222 { 1223 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1224 return 0; 1225 } 1226 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1227 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 1228 { 1229 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1230 return 0; 1231 } 1232 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; 1233 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); 1234 } 1235#if 0 1236 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 1237 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 1238 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) 1239 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1240 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1241#endif 1242 } 1243#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1244#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1245 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1246 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1247 { 1248 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1249 1250 if (size < 2) 1251 { 1252 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1253 return 0; 1254 } 1255 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1256 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 1257 { 1258 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1259 return 0; 1260 } 1261 1262 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1263 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1264 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1265 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1266 else 1267 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1268 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1269 { 1270 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1271 return 0; 1272 } 1273 } 1274#endif 1275 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1276 { 1277 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1278 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1279 { 1280 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1281 return 0; 1282 } 1283 } 1284 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1285 { 1286 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1287 return 0; 1288 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1289 } 1290 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) 1291 { 1292 int dsize; 1293 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) 1294 { 1295 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1296 return 0; 1297 } 1298 sigalg_seen = 1; 1299 n2s(data,dsize); 1300 size -= 2; 1301 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) 1302 { 1303 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1304 return 0; 1305 } 1306 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) 1307 { 1308 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1309 return 0; 1310 } 1311 } 1312 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1313 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1314 { 1315 1316 if (size < 5) 1317 { 1318 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1319 return 0; 1320 } 1321 1322 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; 1323 size--; 1324 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) 1325 { 1326 const unsigned char *sdata; 1327 int dsize; 1328 /* Read in responder_id_list */ 1329 n2s(data,dsize); 1330 size -= 2; 1331 if (dsize > size ) 1332 { 1333 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1334 return 0; 1335 } 1336 while (dsize > 0) 1337 { 1338 OCSP_RESPID *id; 1339 int idsize; 1340 if (dsize < 4) 1341 { 1342 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1343 return 0; 1344 } 1345 n2s(data, idsize); 1346 dsize -= 2 + idsize; 1347 size -= 2 + idsize; 1348 if (dsize < 0) 1349 { 1350 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1351 return 0; 1352 } 1353 sdata = data; 1354 data += idsize; 1355 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, 1356 &sdata, idsize); 1357 if (!id) 1358 { 1359 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1360 return 0; 1361 } 1362 if (data != sdata) 1363 { 1364 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1365 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1366 return 0; 1367 } 1368 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids 1369 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = 1370 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) 1371 { 1372 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1373 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1374 return 0; 1375 } 1376 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( 1377 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) 1378 { 1379 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1380 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1381 return 0; 1382 } 1383 } 1384 1385 /* Read in request_extensions */ 1386 if (size < 2) 1387 { 1388 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1389 return 0; 1390 } 1391 n2s(data,dsize); 1392 size -= 2; 1393 if (dsize != size) 1394 { 1395 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1396 return 0; 1397 } 1398 sdata = data; 1399 if (dsize > 0) 1400 { 1401 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) 1402 { 1403 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, 1404 X509_EXTENSION_free); 1405 } 1406 1407 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = 1408 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, 1409 &sdata, dsize); 1410 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts 1411 || (data + dsize != sdata)) 1412 { 1413 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1414 return 0; 1415 } 1416 } 1417 } 1418 /* We don't know what to do with any other type 1419 * so ignore it. 1420 */ 1421 else 1422 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 1423 } 1424#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1425 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) 1426 { 1427 switch(data[0]) 1428 { 1429 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ 1430 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1431 break; 1432 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ 1433 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1434 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1435 break; 1436 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1437 return 0; 1438 } 1439 } 1440#endif 1441#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1442 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1443 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) 1444 { 1445 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a 1446 * renegotiation. 1447 * 1448 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we 1449 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on 1450 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when 1451 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an 1452 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing 1453 * anything like that, but this might change). 1454 1455 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake 1456 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 1457 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen 1458 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new 1459 * Finished message could have been computed.) */ 1460 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1461 } 1462#endif 1463 1464 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 1465#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1466 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) 1467 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) 1468 { 1469 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, 1470 al)) 1471 return 0; 1472 } 1473#endif 1474 1475 data+=size; 1476 } 1477 1478 *p = data; 1479 1480 ri_check: 1481 1482 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 1483 1484 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && 1485 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1486 { 1487 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1489 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1490 return 0; 1491 } 1492 1493 return 1; 1494 } 1495 1496#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1497/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No 1498 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill 1499 * the length of the block. */ 1500static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) 1501 { 1502 unsigned int off = 0; 1503 1504 while (off < len) 1505 { 1506 if (d[off] == 0) 1507 return 0; 1508 off += d[off]; 1509 off++; 1510 } 1511 1512 return off == len; 1513 } 1514#endif 1515 1516int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 1517 { 1518 unsigned short length; 1519 unsigned short type; 1520 unsigned short size; 1521 unsigned char *data = *p; 1522 int tlsext_servername = 0; 1523 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 1524 1525#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1526 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1527#endif 1528 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 1529 1530#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1531 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 1532 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 1533#endif 1534 1535 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 1536 goto ri_check; 1537 1538 n2s(data,length); 1539 if (data+length != d+n) 1540 { 1541 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1542 return 0; 1543 } 1544 1545 while(data <= (d+n-4)) 1546 { 1547 n2s(data,type); 1548 n2s(data,size); 1549 1550 if (data+size > (d+n)) 1551 goto ri_check; 1552 1553 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1554 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, 1555 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1556 1557 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1558 { 1559 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) 1560 { 1561 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1562 return 0; 1563 } 1564 tlsext_servername = 1; 1565 } 1566 1567#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1568 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) 1569 { 1570 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1571 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1572 1573 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 1574 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) 1575 { 1576 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1577 return 0; 1578 } 1579 if (!s->hit) 1580 { 1581 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1582 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1583 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 1584 { 1585 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1586 return 0; 1587 } 1588 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 1589 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 1590 } 1591#if 0 1592 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); 1593 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1594 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1595 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1596 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1597#endif 1598 } 1599#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1600 1601 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1602 { 1603 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1604 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1605 { 1606 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1607 return 0; 1608 } 1609 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1610 || (size > 0)) 1611 { 1612 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1613 return 0; 1614 } 1615 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1616 } 1617#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1618 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1619 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1620 { 1621 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1622 1623 if (size < 2) 1624 { 1625 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1626 return 0; 1627 } 1628 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1629 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 1630 { 1631 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1632 return 0; 1633 } 1634 1635 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1636 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1637 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1638 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1639 else 1640 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1641 1642 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1643 { 1644 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1645 return 0; 1646 } 1647 } 1648#endif 1649 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1650 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1651 { 1652 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested 1653 * a status request message. 1654 */ 1655 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) 1656 { 1657 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1658 return 0; 1659 } 1660 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ 1661 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1662 } 1663#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1664 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1665 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) 1666 { 1667 unsigned char *selected; 1668 unsigned char selected_len; 1669 1670 /* We must have requested it. */ 1671 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) 1672 { 1673 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1674 return 0; 1675 } 1676 /* The data must be valid */ 1677 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) 1678 { 1679 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1680 return 0; 1681 } 1682 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) 1683 { 1684 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1685 return 0; 1686 } 1687 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 1688 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) 1689 { 1690 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1691 return 0; 1692 } 1693 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); 1694 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; 1695 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1696 } 1697#endif 1698 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1699 { 1700 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1701 return 0; 1702 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1703 } 1704#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1705 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) 1706 { 1707 switch(data[0]) 1708 { 1709 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ 1710 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1711 break; 1712 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ 1713 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1714 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1715 break; 1716 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1717 return 0; 1718 } 1719 } 1720#endif 1721#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1722 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) 1723 { 1724 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, 1725 al)) 1726 return 0; 1727 } 1728#endif 1729 1730 data+=size; 1731 } 1732 1733 if (data != d+n) 1734 { 1735 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1736 return 0; 1737 } 1738 1739 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) 1740 { 1741 if (s->tlsext_hostname) 1742 { 1743 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) 1744 { 1745 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 1746 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) 1747 { 1748 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1749 return 0; 1750 } 1751 } 1752 else 1753 { 1754 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1755 return 0; 1756 } 1757 } 1758 } 1759 1760 *p = data; 1761 1762 ri_check: 1763 1764 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to 1765 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server 1766 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an 1767 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server 1768 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI 1769 * absence on initial connect only. 1770 */ 1771 if (!renegotiate_seen 1772 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) 1773 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1774 { 1775 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 1777 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1778 return 0; 1779 } 1780 1781 return 1; 1782 } 1783 1784 1785int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1786 { 1787#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1788 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats 1789 * and elliptic curves we support. 1790 */ 1791 int using_ecc = 0; 1792 int i; 1793 unsigned char *j; 1794 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 1795 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 1796 1797 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) 1798 { 1799 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 1800 1801 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 1802 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 1803 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 1804 { 1805 using_ecc = 1; 1806 break; 1807 } 1808 } 1809 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION); 1810 if (using_ecc) 1811 { 1812 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1813 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 1814 { 1815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1816 return -1; 1817 } 1818 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1819 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1820 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1821 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1822 1823 /* we support all named elliptic curves in RFC 4492 */ 1824 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); 1825 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2; 1826 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 1827 { 1828 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1830 return -1; 1831 } 1832 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i < 1833 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) 1834 { 1835 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]); 1836 s2n(id,j); 1837 } 1838 } 1839#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1840 1841#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1842 { 1843 int r = 1; 1844 1845 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 1846 { 1847 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1848 if (!r) 1849 return -1; 1850 } 1851 1852 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 1853 { 1854 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1855 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1856 1857 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1858 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1859 else 1860 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1861 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1862 { 1863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1864 return -1; 1865 } 1866 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1867 } 1868 1869 if (r == 2) 1870 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */ 1871 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1872 } 1873#endif 1874 1875 return 1; 1876 } 1877 1878int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1879 { 1880#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1881 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support 1882 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not 1883 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. 1884 */ 1885 1886 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1887 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1888 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 1889 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 1890 1891 if (using_ecc) 1892 { 1893 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1894 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 1895 { 1896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1897 return -1; 1898 } 1899 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1900 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1901 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1902 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1903 } 1904#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1905 1906 return 1; 1907 } 1908 1909int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) 1910 { 1911 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 1912 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1913 1914#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1915 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in 1916 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1917 */ 1918 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in 1919 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1920 */ 1921#endif 1922 1923 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1924 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1925 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1926 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1927 1928#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1929 { 1930 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), 1931 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, 1932 * so this has to happen here in 1933 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */ 1934 1935 int r = 1; 1936 1937 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 1938 { 1939 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1940 if (!r) 1941 { 1942 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1943 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1944 goto err; 1945 } 1946 } 1947 1948 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1949 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1950 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; 1951 1952 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 1953 { 1954 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 1955 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) 1956 { 1957 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input 1958 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */ 1959 1960 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1961 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1962 else 1963 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1964 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1965 { 1966 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1967 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1968 goto err; 1969 } 1970 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1971 } 1972 } 1973 1974 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1975 { 1976 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, 1977 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; 1978 * abort the handshake. 1979 */ 1980 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1981 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1982 } 1983 } 1984 1985 err: 1986#endif 1987 switch (ret) 1988 { 1989 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1990 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1991 return -1; 1992 1993 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 1994 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 1995 return 1; 1996 1997 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1998 s->servername_done=0; 1999 default: 2000 return 1; 2001 } 2002 } 2003 2004int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) 2005 { 2006 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 2007 int al; 2008 2009 /* If status request then ask callback what to do. 2010 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 2011 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher 2012 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent 2013 */ 2014 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 2015 { 2016 int r; 2017 CERT_PKEY *certpkey; 2018 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); 2019 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ 2020 if (certpkey == NULL) 2021 { 2022 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 2023 return 1; 2024 } 2025 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so 2026 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up. 2027 */ 2028 s->cert->key = certpkey; 2029 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 2030 switch (r) 2031 { 2032 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 2033 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2034 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 2035 break; 2036 /* status request response should be sent */ 2037 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 2038 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 2039 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 2040 else 2041 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 2042 break; 2043 /* something bad happened */ 2044 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2045 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2046 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2047 goto err; 2048 } 2049 } 2050 else 2051 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 2052 2053 err: 2054 switch (ret) 2055 { 2056 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2057 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2058 return -1; 2059 2060 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2061 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 2062 return 1; 2063 2064 default: 2065 return 1; 2066 } 2067 } 2068 2069int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2070 { 2071 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 2072 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2073 2074#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2075 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 2076 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension 2077 * it must contain uncompressed. 2078 */ 2079 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2080 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2081 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 2082 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 2083 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 2084 { 2085 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 2086 size_t i; 2087 unsigned char *list; 2088 int found_uncompressed = 0; 2089 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 2090 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 2091 { 2092 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) 2093 { 2094 found_uncompressed = 1; 2095 break; 2096 } 2097 } 2098 if (!found_uncompressed) 2099 { 2100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 2101 return -1; 2102 } 2103 } 2104 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 2105#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2106 2107 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2108 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2109 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2110 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2111 2112#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2113 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) 2114 { 2115 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs. 2116 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */ 2117 2118 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 2119 { 2120 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2121 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2122 } 2123 2124 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check 2125 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */ 2126 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || 2127 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) 2128 { 2129 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2130 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2131 } 2132 } 2133#endif 2134 2135 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one 2136 * tell the callback 2137 */ 2138 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) 2139 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 2140 { 2141 int r; 2142 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows 2143 * there is no response. 2144 */ 2145 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 2146 { 2147 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); 2148 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; 2149 } 2150 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; 2151 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 2152 if (r == 0) 2153 { 2154 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; 2155 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2156 } 2157 if (r < 0) 2158 { 2159 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2160 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2161 } 2162 } 2163 2164 switch (ret) 2165 { 2166 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2167 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2168 return -1; 2169 2170 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2171 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 2172 return 1; 2173 2174 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2175 s->servername_done=0; 2176 default: 2177 return 1; 2178 } 2179 } 2180 2181/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the 2182 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle 2183 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. 2184 * 2185 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will 2186 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket 2187 * extension, if any. 2188 * len: the length of the session ID. 2189 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. 2190 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2191 * point to the resulting session. 2192 * 2193 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key 2194 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will 2195 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. 2196 * 2197 * Returns: 2198 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2199 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). 2200 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports 2201 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. 2202 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but 2203 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. 2204 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. 2205 * 2206 * Side effects: 2207 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue 2208 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support 2209 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have 2210 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if 2211 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. 2212 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. 2213 */ 2214int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, 2215 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) 2216 { 2217 /* Point after session ID in client hello */ 2218 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; 2219 unsigned short i; 2220 2221 *ret = NULL; 2222 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 2223 2224 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present 2225 * to permit stateful resumption. 2226 */ 2227 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 2228 return 0; 2229 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) 2230 return 0; 2231 if (p >= limit) 2232 return -1; 2233 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 2234 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 2235 { 2236 i = *(p++); 2237 p+= i; 2238 if (p >= limit) 2239 return -1; 2240 } 2241 /* Skip past cipher list */ 2242 n2s(p, i); 2243 p+= i; 2244 if (p >= limit) 2245 return -1; 2246 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ 2247 i = *(p++); 2248 p += i; 2249 if (p > limit) 2250 return -1; 2251 /* Now at start of extensions */ 2252 if ((p + 2) >= limit) 2253 return 0; 2254 n2s(p, i); 2255 while ((p + 4) <= limit) 2256 { 2257 unsigned short type, size; 2258 n2s(p, type); 2259 n2s(p, size); 2260 if (p + size > limit) 2261 return 0; 2262 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 2263 { 2264 int r; 2265 if (size == 0) 2266 { 2267 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't 2268 * currently have one. */ 2269 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2270 return 1; 2271 } 2272 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) 2273 { 2274 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be 2275 * decrypted rather than generating the session 2276 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated 2277 * handshake based on external mechanism to 2278 * calculate the master secret later. */ 2279 return 2; 2280 } 2281 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); 2282 switch (r) 2283 { 2284 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ 2285 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2286 return 2; 2287 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ 2288 return r; 2289 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ 2290 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2291 return 3; 2292 default: /* fatal error */ 2293 return -1; 2294 } 2295 } 2296 p += size; 2297 } 2298 return 0; 2299 } 2300 2301/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. 2302 * 2303 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. 2304 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. 2305 * sess_id: points at the session ID. 2306 * sesslen: the length of the session ID. 2307 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2308 * point to the resulting session. 2309 * 2310 * Returns: 2311 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2312 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. 2313 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. 2314 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. 2315 */ 2316static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, 2317 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 2318 SSL_SESSION **psess) 2319 { 2320 SSL_SESSION *sess; 2321 unsigned char *sdec; 2322 const unsigned char *p; 2323 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 2324 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 2325 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2326 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2327 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 2328 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ 2329 if (eticklen < 48) 2330 return 2; 2331 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 2332 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2333 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2334 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 2335 { 2336 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 2337 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 2338 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 2339 if (rv < 0) 2340 return -1; 2341 if (rv == 0) 2342 return 2; 2343 if (rv == 2) 2344 renew_ticket = 1; 2345 } 2346 else 2347 { 2348 /* Check key name matches */ 2349 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 2350 return 2; 2351 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 2352 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 2353 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2354 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); 2355 } 2356 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and 2357 * integrity checks on ticket. 2358 */ 2359 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 2360 if (mlen < 0) 2361 { 2362 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2363 return -1; 2364 } 2365 eticklen -= mlen; 2366 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 2367 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); 2368 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); 2369 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2370 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) 2371 { 2372 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2373 return 2; 2374 } 2375 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 2376 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 2377 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2378 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2379 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 2380 if (!sdec) 2381 { 2382 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2383 return -1; 2384 } 2385 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); 2386 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) 2387 { 2388 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2389 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 2390 return 2; 2391 } 2392 slen += mlen; 2393 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2394 p = sdec; 2395 2396 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 2397 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 2398 if (sess) 2399 { 2400 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to 2401 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to 2402 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero 2403 * as required by standard. 2404 */ 2405 if (sesslen) 2406 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 2407 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 2408 *psess = sess; 2409 if (renew_ticket) 2410 return 4; 2411 else 2412 return 3; 2413 } 2414 ERR_clear_error(); 2415 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new 2416 * ticket. */ 2417 return 2; 2418 } 2419 2420/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ 2421 2422typedef struct 2423 { 2424 int nid; 2425 int id; 2426 } tls12_lookup; 2427 2428static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { 2429#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 2430 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, 2431#endif 2432#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2433 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, 2434#endif 2435#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2436 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, 2437 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, 2438#endif 2439#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2440 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, 2441 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} 2442#endif 2443}; 2444 2445static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { 2446#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2447 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, 2448#endif 2449#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2450 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, 2451#endif 2452#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2453 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} 2454#endif 2455}; 2456 2457static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2458 { 2459 size_t i; 2460 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) 2461 { 2462 if (table[i].nid == nid) 2463 return table[i].id; 2464 } 2465 return -1; 2466 } 2467#if 0 2468static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2469 { 2470 size_t i; 2471 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) 2472 { 2473 if (table[i].id == id) 2474 return table[i].nid; 2475 } 2476 return -1; 2477 } 2478#endif 2479 2480int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) 2481 { 2482 int sig_id, md_id; 2483 if (!md) 2484 return 0; 2485 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, 2486 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2487 if (md_id == -1) 2488 return 0; 2489 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); 2490 if (sig_id == -1) 2491 return 0; 2492 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; 2493 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; 2494 return 1; 2495 } 2496 2497int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) 2498 { 2499 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, 2500 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2501 } 2502 2503const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) 2504 { 2505 switch(hash_alg) 2506 { 2507#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2508 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: 2509 return EVP_sha1(); 2510#endif 2511#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2512 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: 2513 return EVP_sha224(); 2514 2515 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: 2516 return EVP_sha256(); 2517#endif 2518#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2519 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: 2520 return EVP_sha384(); 2521 2522 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: 2523 return EVP_sha512(); 2524#endif 2525 default: 2526 return NULL; 2527 2528 } 2529 } 2530 2531/* Set preferred digest for each key type */ 2532 2533int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) 2534 { 2535 int i, idx; 2536 const EVP_MD *md; 2537 CERT *c = s->cert; 2538 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */ 2539 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) 2540 return 1; 2541 /* Should never happen */ 2542 if (!c) 2543 return 0; 2544 2545 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; 2546 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; 2547 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL; 2548 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL; 2549 2550 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) 2551 { 2552 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1]; 2553 2554 switch(sig_alg) 2555 { 2556#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2557 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 2558 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; 2559 break; 2560#endif 2561#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2562 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 2563 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; 2564 break; 2565#endif 2566#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2567 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 2568 idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; 2569 break; 2570#endif 2571 default: 2572 continue; 2573 } 2574 2575 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) 2576 { 2577 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg); 2578 if (md) 2579 { 2580 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 2581 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) 2582 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 2583 } 2584 } 2585 2586 } 2587 2588 2589 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not 2590 * supported it stays as NULL. 2591 */ 2592#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2593 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) 2594 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2595#endif 2596#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2597 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) 2598 { 2599 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2600 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2601 } 2602#endif 2603#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2604 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) 2605 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2606#endif 2607 return 1; 2608 } 2609 2610#endif 2611 2612#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2613int 2614tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2615 { 2616 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; 2617 unsigned short hbtype; 2618 unsigned int payload; 2619 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2620 2621 if (s->msg_callback) 2622 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2623 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, 2624 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2625 2626 /* Read type and payload length first */ 2627 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 2628 return 0; /* silently discard */ 2629 hbtype = *p++; 2630 n2s(p, payload); 2631 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 2632 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ 2633 pl = p; 2634 2635 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) 2636 { 2637 unsigned char *buffer, *bp; 2638 int r; 2639 2640 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes 2641 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus 2642 * payload, plus padding 2643 */ 2644 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2645 bp = buffer; 2646 2647 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ 2648 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; 2649 s2n(payload, bp); 2650 memcpy(bp, pl, payload); 2651 bp += payload; 2652 /* Random padding */ 2653 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding); 2654 2655 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding); 2656 2657 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) 2658 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2659 buffer, 3 + payload + padding, 2660 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2661 2662 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 2663 2664 if (r < 0) 2665 return r; 2666 } 2667 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) 2668 { 2669 unsigned int seq; 2670 2671 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), 2672 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the 2673 * sequence number */ 2674 n2s(pl, seq); 2675 2676 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) 2677 { 2678 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 2679 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 2680 } 2681 } 2682 2683 return 0; 2684 } 2685 2686int 2687tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2688 { 2689 unsigned char *buf, *p; 2690 int ret; 2691 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ 2692 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2693 2694 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ 2695 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || 2696 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) 2697 { 2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); 2699 return -1; 2700 } 2701 2702 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ 2703 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) 2704 { 2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); 2706 return -1; 2707 } 2708 2709 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ 2710 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) 2711 { 2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 2713 return -1; 2714 } 2715 2716 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding 2717 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. 2718 */ 2719 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); 2720 2721 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number 2722 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add 2723 * some random stuff. 2724 * - Message Type, 1 byte 2725 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) 2726 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) 2727 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) 2728 * - Padding 2729 */ 2730 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2731 p = buf; 2732 /* Message Type */ 2733 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; 2734 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ 2735 s2n(payload, p); 2736 /* Sequence number */ 2737 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); 2738 /* 16 random bytes */ 2739 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16); 2740 p += 16; 2741 /* Random padding */ 2742 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding); 2743 2744 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); 2745 if (ret >= 0) 2746 { 2747 if (s->msg_callback) 2748 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2749 buf, 3 + payload + padding, 2750 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2751 2752 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; 2753 } 2754 2755 OPENSSL_free(buf); 2756 2757 return ret; 2758 } 2759#endif 2760