s3_srvr.c revision 277195
1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124/* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 152#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 153 154#include <stdio.h> 155#include "ssl_locl.h" 156#include "kssl_lcl.h" 157#include <openssl/buffer.h> 158#include <openssl/rand.h> 159#include <openssl/objects.h> 160#include <openssl/evp.h> 161#include <openssl/hmac.h> 162#include <openssl/x509.h> 163#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 164#include <openssl/dh.h> 165#endif 166#include <openssl/bn.h> 167#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 168#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 169#endif 170#include <openssl/md5.h> 171 172static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 173 174static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 175 { 176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 177 return(SSLv3_server_method()); 178 else 179 return(NULL); 180 } 181 182#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 183static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) 184 { 185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; 186 187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 188 189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && 190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) 191 { 192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) 193 { 194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, 195 we do so if There is no srp login name */ 196 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; 197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 198 } 199 else 200 { 201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al); 202 } 203 } 204 return ret; 205 } 206#endif 207 208IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 209 ssl3_accept, 210 ssl_undefined_function, 211 ssl3_get_server_method) 212 213int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 214 { 215 BUF_MEM *buf; 216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); 217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; 218 int ret= -1; 219 int new_state,state,skip=0; 220 221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); 222 ERR_clear_error(); 223 clear_sys_error(); 224 225 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 226 cb=s->info_callback; 227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 229 230 /* init things to blank */ 231 s->in_handshake++; 232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 233 234 if (s->cert == NULL) 235 { 236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 237 return(-1); 238 } 239 240#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we 242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because 243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway. 244 */ 245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) 246 { 247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 248 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 249 } 250#endif 251 252 for (;;) 253 { 254 state=s->state; 255 256 switch (s->state) 257 { 258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 259 s->renegotiate=1; 260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 261 262 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 263 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 266 267 s->server=1; 268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); 269 270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3) 271 { 272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 273 return -1; 274 } 275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 276 277 if (s->init_buf == NULL) 278 { 279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) 280 { 281 ret= -1; 282 goto end; 283 } 284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) 285 { 286 ret= -1; 287 goto end; 288 } 289 s->init_buf=buf; 290 } 291 292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) 293 { 294 ret= -1; 295 goto end; 296 } 297 298 s->init_num=0; 299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 300 301 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) 302 { 303 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that 304 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 305 */ 306 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } 307 308 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 310 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 311 } 312 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && 313 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 314 { 315 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with 316 * client that doesn't support secure 317 * renegotiation. 318 */ 319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 320 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 321 ret = -1; 322 goto end; 323 } 324 else 325 { 326 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, 327 * we will just send a HelloRequest */ 328 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 329 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 330 } 331 break; 332 333 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 335 336 s->shutdown=0; 337 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 338 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 339 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 340 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 341 s->init_num=0; 342 343 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 344 break; 345 346 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 347 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 348 break; 349 350 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 353 354 s->shutdown=0; 355 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) 356 { 357 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 358 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 359 } 360#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 361 { 362 int al; 363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0) 364 { 365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */ 366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 367 goto end; 368 } 369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) 370 { 371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to 373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */ 374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) 375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 377 ret= -1; 378 goto end; 379 } 380 } 381#endif 382 383 s->renegotiate = 2; 384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 385 s->init_num=0; 386 break; 387 388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 391 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 392#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 393 if (s->hit) 394 { 395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 397 else 398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 399 } 400#else 401 if (s->hit) 402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 403#endif 404 else 405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 406 s->init_num=0; 407 break; 408 409 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 410 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 411 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 412 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ 413 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) 414 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) 415 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) 416 { 417 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 418 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 419#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 420 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 422 else 423 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 424 } 425 else 426 { 427 skip = 1; 428 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 429 } 430#else 431 } 432 else 433 skip=1; 434 435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 436#endif 437 s->init_num=0; 438 break; 439 440 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 441 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 442 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 443 444 /* 445 * clear this, it may get reset by 446 * send_server_key_exchange 447 */ 448 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; 449 450 451 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or 452 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate 453 * 454 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints 455 * 456 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange 457 * message only if the cipher suite is either 458 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the 459 * server certificate contains the server's 460 * public key for key exchange. 461 */ 462 if (0 463 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity 464 * hint if provided */ 465#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 466 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) 467#endif 468#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 469 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ 470 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 471#endif 472 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH)) 473 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 474 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 475 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 476 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 477 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 478 ) 479 ) 480 ) 481 ) 482 { 483 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 484 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 485 } 486 else 487 skip=1; 488 489 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 490 s->init_num=0; 491 break; 492 493 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 494 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 495 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 496 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 497 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, 498 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ 499 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 500 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 501 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites 502 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts 503 * and in RFC 2246): */ 504 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && 505 /* ... except when the application insists on verification 506 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ 507 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 508 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ 509 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) 510 /* With normal PSK Certificates and 511 * Certificate Requests are omitted */ 512 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) 513 { 514 /* no cert request */ 515 skip=1; 516 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; 517 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 518 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 519 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 520 return -1; 521 } 522 else 523 { 524 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; 525 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 526 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 527#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 528 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 529#else 530 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 531 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 532#endif 533 s->init_num=0; 534 } 535 break; 536 537 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 538 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 539 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); 540 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 541 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 543 s->init_num=0; 544 break; 545 546 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 547 548 /* This code originally checked to see if 549 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO 550 * and then flushed. This caused problems 551 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed 552 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue 553 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING 554 * still exist. So instead we just flush 555 * unconditionally. 556 */ 557 558 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; 559 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) 560 { 561 ret= -1; 562 goto end; 563 } 564 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 565 566 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; 567 break; 568 569 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 570 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 571 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ 572 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); 573 if (ret <= 0) 574 goto end; 575 if (ret == 2) 576 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; 577 else { 578 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 579 { 580 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 581 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 582 } 583 s->init_num=0; 584 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 585 } 586 break; 587 588 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 589 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 590 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 591 if (ret <= 0) 592 goto end; 593 if (ret == 2) 594 { 595 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when 596 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in 597 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify 598 * message is not sent. 599 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when 600 * the client uses its key from the certificate 601 * for key exchange. 602 */ 603#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 604 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 605#else 606 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 607 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 608 else 609 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 610#endif 611 s->init_num = 0; 612 } 613 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 614 { 615 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 616 s->init_num=0; 617 if (!s->session->peer) 618 break; 619 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer 620 * at this point and digest cached records. 621 */ 622 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) 623 { 624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 625 return -1; 626 } 627 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 628 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 629 return -1; 630 } 631 else 632 { 633 int offset=0; 634 int dgst_num; 635 636 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 637 s->init_num=0; 638 639 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is 640 * a client cert, it can be verified 641 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify 642 * should be generalized. But it is next step 643 */ 644 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 645 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 646 return -1; 647 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++) 648 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) 649 { 650 int dgst_size; 651 652 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset])); 653 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); 654 if (dgst_size < 0) 655 { 656 ret = -1; 657 goto end; 658 } 659 offset+=dgst_size; 660 } 661 } 662 break; 663 664 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 665 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 666 667 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 668 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ 669 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 670 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 671 672#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 673 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 674#else 675 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 676 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 677 else 678 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 679#endif 680 s->init_num=0; 681 break; 682 683#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 684 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: 685 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: 686 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s); 687 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 688 s->init_num = 0; 689 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 690 break; 691#endif 692 693 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 694 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 695 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 696 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 697 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 698 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 699 if (s->hit) 700 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 701#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 702 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 703 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 704#endif 705 else 706 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 707 s->init_num=0; 708 break; 709 710#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 711 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 712 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 713 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 714 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 715 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 716 s->init_num=0; 717 break; 718 719 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 720 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 721 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 722 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 723 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 724 s->init_num=0; 725 break; 726 727#endif 728 729 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 730 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 731 732 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 733 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) 734 { ret= -1; goto end; } 735 736 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 737 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 738 739 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 740 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 741 s->init_num=0; 742 743 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 744 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 745 { 746 ret= -1; 747 goto end; 748 } 749 750 break; 751 752 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 753 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 754 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, 755 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 756 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 757 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 758 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 759 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 760 if (s->hit) 761 { 762#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 763 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 764#else 765 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 766 { 767 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 768 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 769 } 770 else 771 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 772#endif 773 } 774 else 775 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; 776 s->init_num=0; 777 break; 778 779 case SSL_ST_OK: 780 /* clean a few things up */ 781 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 782 783 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 784 s->init_buf=NULL; 785 786 /* remove buffering on output */ 787 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 788 789 s->init_num=0; 790 791 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ 792 { 793 s->renegotiate=0; 794 s->new_session=0; 795 796 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 797 798 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 799 /* s->server=1; */ 800 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; 801 802 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); 803 } 804 805 ret = 1; 806 goto end; 807 /* break; */ 808 809 default: 810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 811 ret= -1; 812 goto end; 813 /* break; */ 814 } 815 816 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) 817 { 818 if (s->debug) 819 { 820 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 821 goto end; 822 } 823 824 825 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) 826 { 827 new_state=s->state; 828 s->state=state; 829 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); 830 s->state=new_state; 831 } 832 } 833 skip=0; 834 } 835end: 836 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 837 838 s->in_handshake--; 839 if (cb != NULL) 840 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); 841 return(ret); 842 } 843 844int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 845 { 846 unsigned char *p; 847 848 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) 849 { 850 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 851 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 852 *(p++)=0; 853 *(p++)=0; 854 *(p++)=0; 855 856 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 857 /* number of bytes to write */ 858 s->init_num=4; 859 s->init_off=0; 860 } 861 862 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 863 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 864 } 865 866int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) 867 { 868 int ok; 869 long n; 870 871 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, 872 * so permit appropriate message length */ 873 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 874 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 875 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 876 -1, 877 s->max_cert_list, 878 &ok); 879 if (!ok) return((int)n); 880 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 881 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) 882 { 883 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per 884 * negotiation. */ 885 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) 886 { 887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); 888 return -1; 889 } 890 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, 891 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */ 892#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 893 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 894 { 895 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 896 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 897 } 898#endif 899#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 900 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) 901 { 902 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 903 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 904 } 905#endif 906 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 907 return 2; 908 } 909 return 1; 910} 911 912int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 913 { 914 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; 915 unsigned int cookie_len; 916 long n; 917 unsigned long id; 918 unsigned char *p,*d,*q; 919 SSL_CIPHER *c; 920#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 921 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; 922#endif 923 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; 924 925 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. 926 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, 927 * This down switching should be handled by a different method. 928 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with 929 * TLSv1. 930 */ 931 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A 932 ) 933 { 934 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 935 } 936 s->first_packet=1; 937 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 938 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 939 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 940 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 941 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 942 &ok); 943 944 if (!ok) return((int)n); 945 s->first_packet=0; 946 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 947 948 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header 949 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ 950 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; 951 p+=2; 952 953 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || 954 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) 955 { 956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 957 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) 958 { 959 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ 960 s->version = s->client_version; 961 } 962 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 963 goto f_err; 964 } 965 966 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't 967 * contain one, just return since we do not want to 968 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... 969 */ 970 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) 971 { 972 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; 973 974 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 975 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); 976 977 if (cookie_length == 0) 978 return 1; 979 } 980 981 /* load the client random */ 982 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 983 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 984 985 /* get the session-id */ 986 j= *(p++); 987 988 s->hit=0; 989 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation. 990 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests 991 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather 992 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security 993 * won't even compile against older library versions). 994 * 995 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request 996 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers, 997 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 998 * setting will be ignored. 999 */ 1000 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) 1001 { 1002 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 1003 goto err; 1004 } 1005 else 1006 { 1007 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 1008 if (i == 1) 1009 { /* previous session */ 1010 s->hit=1; 1011 } 1012 else if (i == -1) 1013 goto err; 1014 else /* i == 0 */ 1015 { 1016 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 1017 goto err; 1018 } 1019 } 1020 1021 p+=j; 1022 1023 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 1024 { 1025 /* cookie stuff */ 1026 cookie_len = *(p++); 1027 1028 /* 1029 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 1030 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 1031 * does not cause an overflow. 1032 */ 1033 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) 1034 { 1035 /* too much data */ 1036 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1038 goto f_err; 1039 } 1040 1041 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 1042 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 1043 cookie_len > 0) 1044 { 1045 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 1046 1047 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) 1048 { 1049 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 1050 cookie_len) == 0) 1051 { 1052 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1054 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1055 goto f_err; 1056 } 1057 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 1058 } 1059 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 1060 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ 1061 { 1062 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1064 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1065 goto f_err; 1066 } 1067 1068 ret = 2; 1069 } 1070 1071 p += cookie_len; 1072 } 1073 1074 n2s(p,i); 1075 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) 1076 { 1077 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ 1078 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 1080 goto f_err; 1081 } 1082 if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) 1083 { 1084 /* not enough data */ 1085 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1087 goto f_err; 1088 } 1089 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) 1090 == NULL)) 1091 { 1092 goto err; 1093 } 1094 p+=i; 1095 1096 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 1097 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) 1098 { 1099 j=0; 1100 id=s->session->cipher->id; 1101 1102#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1103 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers)); 1104#endif 1105 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) 1106 { 1107 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i); 1108#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1109 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 1110 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 1111#endif 1112 if (c->id == id) 1113 { 1114 j=1; 1115 break; 1116 } 1117 } 1118/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade 1119 * attack: CVE-2010-4180. 1120 */ 1121#if 0 1122 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) 1123 { 1124 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may 1125 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to 1126 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server 1127 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not 1128 * enabled, though. */ 1129 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 1130 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) 1131 { 1132 s->session->cipher = c; 1133 j = 1; 1134 } 1135 } 1136#endif 1137 if (j == 0) 1138 { 1139 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher 1140 * list if we are asked to reuse it */ 1141 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1143 goto f_err; 1144 } 1145 } 1146 1147 /* compression */ 1148 i= *(p++); 1149 if ((p+i) > (d+n)) 1150 { 1151 /* not enough data */ 1152 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1154 goto f_err; 1155 } 1156 q=p; 1157 for (j=0; j<i; j++) 1158 { 1159 if (p[j] == 0) break; 1160 } 1161 1162 p+=i; 1163 if (j >= i) 1164 { 1165 /* no compress */ 1166 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1168 goto f_err; 1169 } 1170 1171#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1172 /* TLS extensions*/ 1173 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) 1174 { 1175 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) 1176 { 1177 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ 1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1179 goto f_err; 1180 } 1181 } 1182 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1184 goto err; 1185 } 1186 1187 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this 1188 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate 1189 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow 1190 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */ 1191 { 1192 unsigned long Time; 1193 unsigned char *pos; 1194 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ 1195 pos=s->s3->server_random; 1196 l2n(Time,pos); 1197 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) 1198 { 1199 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1200 goto f_err; 1201 } 1202 } 1203 1204 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) 1205 { 1206 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; 1207 1208 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1209 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, 1210 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) 1211 { 1212 s->hit=1; 1213 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 1214 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK; 1215 1216 ciphers=NULL; 1217 1218 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1219 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1220 if (pref_cipher == NULL) 1221 { 1222 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1224 goto f_err; 1225 } 1226 1227 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher; 1228 1229 if (s->cipher_list) 1230 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1231 1232 if (s->cipher_list_by_id) 1233 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1234 1235 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1236 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1237 } 1238 } 1239#endif 1240 1241 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1242 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 1243 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ 1244 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; 1245#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1246 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1247 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) 1248 { 1249 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1250 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1251 /* Can't disable compression */ 1252 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) 1253 { 1254 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1256 goto f_err; 1257 } 1258 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1259 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) 1260 { 1261 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 1262 if (comp_id == comp->id) 1263 { 1264 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 1265 break; 1266 } 1267 } 1268 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1269 { 1270 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1272 goto f_err; 1273 } 1274 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 1275 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) 1276 { 1277 if (q[m] == comp_id) 1278 break; 1279 } 1280 if (m >= i) 1281 { 1282 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 1284 goto f_err; 1285 } 1286 } 1287 else if (s->hit) 1288 comp = NULL; 1289 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) 1290 { /* See if we have a match */ 1291 int m,nn,o,v,done=0; 1292 1293 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1294 for (m=0; m<nn; m++) 1295 { 1296 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 1297 v=comp->id; 1298 for (o=0; o<i; o++) 1299 { 1300 if (v == q[o]) 1301 { 1302 done=1; 1303 break; 1304 } 1305 } 1306 if (done) break; 1307 } 1308 if (done) 1309 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 1310 else 1311 comp=NULL; 1312 } 1313#else 1314 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 1315 * using compression. 1316 */ 1317 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) 1318 { 1319 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1321 goto f_err; 1322 } 1323#endif 1324 1325 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must 1326 * pick a cipher */ 1327 1328 if (!s->hit) 1329 { 1330#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1331 s->session->compress_meth=0; 1332#else 1333 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; 1334#endif 1335 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1336 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1337 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 1338 if (ciphers == NULL) 1339 { 1340 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); 1342 goto f_err; 1343 } 1344 ciphers=NULL; 1345 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, 1346 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1347 1348 if (c == NULL) 1349 { 1350 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1352 goto f_err; 1353 } 1354 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; 1355 } 1356 else 1357 { 1358 /* Session-id reuse */ 1359#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1360 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1361 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; 1362 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; 1363 1364 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1365 { 1366 sk=s->session->ciphers; 1367 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) 1368 { 1369 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); 1370 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) 1371 nc=c; 1372 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1373 ec=c; 1374 } 1375 if (nc != NULL) 1376 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; 1377 else if (ec != NULL) 1378 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; 1379 else 1380 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1381 } 1382 else 1383#endif 1384 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1385 } 1386 1387 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) 1388 { 1389 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 1390 { 1391 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1392 goto f_err; 1393 } 1394 } 1395 1396 /* we now have the following setup. 1397 * client_random 1398 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1399 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1400 * compression - basically ignored right now 1401 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1402 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1403 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1404 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1405 */ 1406 1407 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1408 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) 1409 { 1410 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) 1411 { 1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1413 goto err; 1414 } 1415 } 1416 1417 if (ret < 0) ret=1; 1418 if (0) 1419 { 1420f_err: 1421 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1422 } 1423err: 1424 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1425 return(ret); 1426 } 1427 1428int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1429 { 1430 unsigned char *buf; 1431 unsigned char *p,*d; 1432 int i,sl; 1433 unsigned long l; 1434#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1435 unsigned long Time; 1436#endif 1437 1438 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1439 { 1440 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1441#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1442 p=s->s3->server_random; 1443 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */ 1444 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ 1445 l2n(Time,p); 1446 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) 1447 return -1; 1448#endif 1449 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1450 d=p= &(buf[4]); 1451 1452 *(p++)=s->version>>8; 1453 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; 1454 1455 /* Random stuff */ 1456 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1457 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1458 1459 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send 1460 * back in the server hello: 1461 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1462 * we send back the old session ID. 1463 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1464 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1465 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1466 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1467 * session ID. 1468 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1469 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1470 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1471 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1472 * to send back. 1473 */ 1474 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1475 && !s->hit) 1476 s->session->session_id_length=0; 1477 1478 sl=s->session->session_id_length; 1479 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) 1480 { 1481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1482 return -1; 1483 } 1484 *(p++)=sl; 1485 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); 1486 p+=sl; 1487 1488 /* put the cipher */ 1489 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); 1490 p+=i; 1491 1492 /* put the compression method */ 1493#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1494 *(p++)=0; 1495#else 1496 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1497 *(p++)=0; 1498 else 1499 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1500#endif 1501#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1502 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) 1503 { 1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 1505 return -1; 1506 } 1507 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1508 { 1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1510 return -1; 1511 } 1512#endif 1513 /* do the header */ 1514 l=(p-d); 1515 d=buf; 1516 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1517 l2n3(l,d); 1518 1519 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; 1520 /* number of bytes to write */ 1521 s->init_num=p-buf; 1522 s->init_off=0; 1523 } 1524 1525 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1526 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1527 } 1528 1529int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1530 { 1531 unsigned char *p; 1532 1533 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) 1534 { 1535 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1536 1537 /* do the header */ 1538 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1539 *(p++)=0; 1540 *(p++)=0; 1541 *(p++)=0; 1542 1543 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1544 /* number of bytes to write */ 1545 s->init_num=4; 1546 s->init_off=0; 1547 } 1548 1549 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1550 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1551 } 1552 1553int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1554 { 1555#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1556 unsigned char *q; 1557 int j,num; 1558 RSA *rsa; 1559 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1560 unsigned int u; 1561#endif 1562#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1563 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; 1564#endif 1565#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1566 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; 1567 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1568 int encodedlen = 0; 1569 int curve_id = 0; 1570 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1571#endif 1572 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1573 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1574 unsigned char *p,*d; 1575 int al,i; 1576 unsigned long type; 1577 int n; 1578 CERT *cert; 1579 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1580 int nr[4],kn; 1581 BUF_MEM *buf; 1582 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1583 1584 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1585 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) 1586 { 1587 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1588 cert=s->cert; 1589 1590 buf=s->init_buf; 1591 1592 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; 1593 n=0; 1594#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1595 if (type & SSL_kRSA) 1596 { 1597 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; 1598 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1599 { 1600 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1601 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1602 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1603 if(rsa == NULL) 1604 { 1605 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1607 goto f_err; 1608 } 1609 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1610 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; 1611 } 1612 if (rsa == NULL) 1613 { 1614 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1616 goto f_err; 1617 } 1618 r[0]=rsa->n; 1619 r[1]=rsa->e; 1620 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 1621 } 1622 else 1623#endif 1624#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1625 if (type & SSL_kEDH) 1626 { 1627 dhp=cert->dh_tmp; 1628 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1629 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1630 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1631 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1632 if (dhp == NULL) 1633 { 1634 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1636 goto f_err; 1637 } 1638 1639 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 1640 { 1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1642 goto err; 1643 } 1644 1645 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) 1646 { 1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1648 goto err; 1649 } 1650 1651 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; 1652 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || 1653 dhp->priv_key == NULL || 1654 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) 1655 { 1656 if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) 1657 { 1658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1659 ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1660 goto err; 1661 } 1662 } 1663 else 1664 { 1665 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); 1666 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); 1667 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || 1668 (dh->priv_key == NULL)) 1669 { 1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1671 goto err; 1672 } 1673 } 1674 r[0]=dh->p; 1675 r[1]=dh->g; 1676 r[2]=dh->pub_key; 1677 } 1678 else 1679#endif 1680#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1681 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) 1682 { 1683 const EC_GROUP *group; 1684 1685 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; 1686 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1687 { 1688 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1689 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1690 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1691 } 1692 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1693 { 1694 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1696 goto f_err; 1697 } 1698 1699 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) 1700 { 1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1702 goto err; 1703 } 1704 1705 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1706 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1707 { 1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1709 goto err; 1710 } 1711 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) 1712 { 1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1714 goto err; 1715 } 1716 1717 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; 1718 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1719 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1720 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) 1721 { 1722 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) 1723 { 1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1725 goto err; 1726 } 1727 } 1728 1729 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1730 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1731 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) 1732 { 1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1734 goto err; 1735 } 1736 1737 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1738 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 1739 { 1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1741 goto err; 1742 } 1743 1744 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH 1745 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 1746 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. 1747 */ 1748 if ((curve_id = 1749 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1750 == 0) 1751 { 1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1753 goto err; 1754 } 1755 1756 /* Encode the public key. 1757 * First check the size of encoding and 1758 * allocate memory accordingly. 1759 */ 1760 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1761 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1762 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1763 NULL, 0, NULL); 1764 1765 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1766 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 1767 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1768 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) 1769 { 1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1771 goto err; 1772 } 1773 1774 1775 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1776 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1777 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1778 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1779 1780 if (encodedlen == 0) 1781 { 1782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1783 goto err; 1784 } 1785 1786 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; 1787 1788 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 1789 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1790 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes 1791 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1792 * structure. 1793 */ 1794 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1795 1796 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message 1797 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs 1798 */ 1799 r[0]=NULL; 1800 r[1]=NULL; 1801 r[2]=NULL; 1802 r[3]=NULL; 1803 } 1804 else 1805#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1806#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1807 if (type & SSL_kPSK) 1808 { 1809 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/ 1810 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1811 } 1812 else 1813#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1814#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1815 if (type & SSL_kSRP) 1816 { 1817 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || 1818 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || 1819 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || 1820 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) 1821 { 1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); 1823 goto err; 1824 } 1825 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N; 1826 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g; 1827 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s; 1828 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B; 1829 } 1830 else 1831#endif 1832 { 1833 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1835 goto f_err; 1836 } 1837 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++) 1838 { 1839 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1840#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1841 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) 1842 n+=1+nr[i]; 1843 else 1844#endif 1845 n+=2+nr[i]; 1846 } 1847 1848 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) 1849 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) 1850 { 1851 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md)) 1852 == NULL) 1853 { 1854 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1855 goto f_err; 1856 } 1857 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1858 } 1859 else 1860 { 1861 pkey=NULL; 1862 kn=0; 1863 } 1864 1865 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) 1866 { 1867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); 1868 goto err; 1869 } 1870 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1871 p= &(d[4]); 1872 1873 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++) 1874 { 1875#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1876 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) 1877 { 1878 *p = nr[i]; 1879 p++; 1880 } 1881 else 1882#endif 1883 s2n(nr[i],p); 1884 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); 1885 p+=nr[i]; 1886 } 1887 1888#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1889 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) 1890 { 1891 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. 1892 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: 1893 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 1894 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by 1895 * the actual encoded point itself 1896 */ 1897 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1898 p += 1; 1899 *p = 0; 1900 p += 1; 1901 *p = curve_id; 1902 p += 1; 1903 *p = encodedlen; 1904 p += 1; 1905 memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 1906 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 1907 encodedlen); 1908 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1909 encodedPoint = NULL; 1910 p += encodedlen; 1911 } 1912#endif 1913 1914#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1915 if (type & SSL_kPSK) 1916 { 1917 /* copy PSK identity hint */ 1918 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 1919 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); 1920 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1921 } 1922#endif 1923 1924 /* not anonymous */ 1925 if (pkey != NULL) 1926 { 1927 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) 1928 * and p points to the space at the end. */ 1929#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1930 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA 1931 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) 1932 { 1933 q=md_buf; 1934 j=0; 1935 for (num=2; num > 0; num--) 1936 { 1937 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, 1938 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 1939 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) 1940 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); 1941 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1942 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1943 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1944 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, 1945 (unsigned int *)&i); 1946 q+=i; 1947 j+=i; 1948 } 1949 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 1950 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) 1951 { 1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); 1953 goto err; 1954 } 1955 s2n(u,p); 1956 n+=u+2; 1957 } 1958 else 1959#endif 1960 if (md) 1961 { 1962 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature 1963 * algorithm */ 1964 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 1965 { 1966 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) 1967 { 1968 /* Should never happen */ 1969 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1971 goto f_err; 1972 } 1973 p+=2; 1974 } 1975#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 1976 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", 1977 EVP_MD_name(md)); 1978#endif 1979 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); 1980 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1981 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1982 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1983 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), 1984 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) 1985 { 1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP); 1987 goto err; 1988 } 1989 s2n(i,p); 1990 n+=i+2; 1991 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 1992 n+= 2; 1993 } 1994 else 1995 { 1996 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 1997 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 1999 goto f_err; 2000 } 2001 } 2002 2003 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 2004 l2n3(n,d); 2005 2006 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 2007 * it off */ 2008 s->init_num=n+4; 2009 s->init_off=0; 2010 } 2011 2012 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 2013 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2014 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2015f_err: 2016 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2017err: 2018#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2019 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2020 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2021#endif 2022 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2023 return(-1); 2024 } 2025 2026int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 2027 { 2028 unsigned char *p,*d; 2029 int i,j,nl,off,n; 2030 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; 2031 X509_NAME *name; 2032 BUF_MEM *buf; 2033 2034 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) 2035 { 2036 buf=s->init_buf; 2037 2038 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); 2039 2040 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 2041 p++; 2042 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); 2043 d[0]=n; 2044 p+=n; 2045 n++; 2046 2047 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 2048 { 2049 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2); 2050 s2n(nl, p); 2051 p += nl + 2; 2052 n += nl + 2; 2053 } 2054 2055 off=n; 2056 p+=2; 2057 n+=2; 2058 2059 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 2060 nl=0; 2061 if (sk != NULL) 2062 { 2063 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) 2064 { 2065 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); 2066 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL); 2067 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2)) 2068 { 2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2070 goto err; 2071 } 2072 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]); 2073 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) 2074 { 2075 s2n(j,p); 2076 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 2077 n+=2+j; 2078 nl+=2+j; 2079 } 2080 else 2081 { 2082 d=p; 2083 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 2084 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; 2085 n+=j; 2086 nl+=j; 2087 } 2088 } 2089 } 2090 /* else no CA names */ 2091 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]); 2092 s2n(nl,p); 2093 2094 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; 2095 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 2096 l2n3(n,d); 2097 2098 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 2099 * it off */ 2100 2101 s->init_num=n+4; 2102 s->init_off=0; 2103#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 2104 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 2105 2106 /* do the header */ 2107 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 2108 *(p++)=0; 2109 *(p++)=0; 2110 *(p++)=0; 2111 s->init_num += 4; 2112#endif 2113 2114 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 2115 } 2116 2117 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 2118 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2119err: 2120 return(-1); 2121 } 2122 2123int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2124 { 2125 int i,al,ok; 2126 long n; 2127 unsigned long alg_k; 2128 unsigned char *p; 2129#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2130 RSA *rsa=NULL; 2131 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 2132#endif 2133#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2134 BIGNUM *pub=NULL; 2135 DH *dh_srvr; 2136#endif 2137#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2138 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 2139#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2140 2141#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2142 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 2143 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 2144 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 2145 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 2146#endif 2147 2148 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2149 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2150 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 2151 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2152 2048, /* ??? */ 2153 &ok); 2154 2155 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2156 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2157 2158 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2159 2160#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2161 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 2162 { 2163 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 2164 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) 2165 { 2166 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 2167 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; 2168 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should 2169 * be sent already */ 2170 if (rsa == NULL) 2171 { 2172 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 2174 goto f_err; 2175 2176 } 2177 } 2178 else 2179 { 2180 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 2181 if ( (pkey == NULL) || 2182 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || 2183 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) 2184 { 2185 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2187 goto f_err; 2188 } 2189 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; 2190 } 2191 2192 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ 2193 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 2194 { 2195 n2s(p,i); 2196 if (n != i+2) 2197 { 2198 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) 2199 { 2200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2201 goto err; 2202 } 2203 else 2204 p-=2; 2205 } 2206 else 2207 n=i; 2208 } 2209 2210 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 2211 2212 al = -1; 2213 2214 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2215 { 2216 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2217 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ 2218 } 2219 2220 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 2221 { 2222 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2223 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2224 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2225 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 2226 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 2227 * protocol version. 2228 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ 2229 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) && 2230 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) 2231 { 2232 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2233 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ 2234 2235 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 2236 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version 2237 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would 2238 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext 2239 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except 2240 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, 2241 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */ 2242 } 2243 } 2244 2245 if (al != -1) 2246 { 2247 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure 2248 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding 2249 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */ 2250 ERR_clear_error(); 2251 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 2252 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8; 2253 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; 2254 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ 2255 goto err; 2256 } 2257 2258 s->session->master_key_length= 2259 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2260 s->session->master_key, 2261 p,i); 2262 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 2263 } 2264 else 2265#endif 2266#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2267 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) 2268 { 2269 n2s(p,i); 2270 if (n != i+2) 2271 { 2272 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) 2273 { 2274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2275 goto err; 2276 } 2277 else 2278 { 2279 p-=2; 2280 i=(int)n; 2281 } 2282 } 2283 2284 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */ 2285 { 2286 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); 2288 goto f_err; 2289 } 2290 else 2291 { 2292 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) 2293 { 2294 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2296 goto f_err; 2297 } 2298 else 2299 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; 2300 } 2301 2302 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); 2303 if (pub == NULL) 2304 { 2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB); 2306 goto err; 2307 } 2308 2309 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); 2310 2311 if (i <= 0) 2312 { 2313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 2314 BN_clear_free(pub); 2315 goto err; 2316 } 2317 2318 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 2319 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; 2320 2321 BN_clear_free(pub); 2322 pub=NULL; 2323 s->session->master_key_length= 2324 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2325 s->session->master_key,p,i); 2326 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 2327 } 2328 else 2329#endif 2330#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2331 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) 2332 { 2333 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 2334 krb5_data enc_ticket; 2335 krb5_data authenticator; 2336 krb5_data enc_pms; 2337 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 2338 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 2339 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 2340 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2341 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 2342 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 2343 int padl, outl; 2344 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 2345 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 2346 2347 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 2348 2349 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 2350 2351 n2s(p,i); 2352 enc_ticket.length = i; 2353 2354 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) 2355 { 2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2357 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2358 goto err; 2359 } 2360 2361 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 2362 p+=enc_ticket.length; 2363 2364 n2s(p,i); 2365 authenticator.length = i; 2366 2367 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) 2368 { 2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2370 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2371 goto err; 2372 } 2373 2374 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 2375 p+=authenticator.length; 2376 2377 n2s(p,i); 2378 enc_pms.length = i; 2379 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 2380 p+=enc_pms.length; 2381 2382 /* Note that the length is checked again below, 2383 ** after decryption 2384 */ 2385 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) 2386 { 2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2388 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2389 goto err; 2390 } 2391 2392 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 2393 enc_pms.length + 6)) 2394 { 2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2396 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2397 goto err; 2398 } 2399 2400 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2401 &kssl_err)) != 0) 2402 { 2403#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2404 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2405 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2406 if (kssl_err.text) 2407 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2408#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2410 kssl_err.reason); 2411 goto err; 2412 } 2413 2414 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, 2415 ** but will return authtime == 0. 2416 */ 2417 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2418 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) 2419 { 2420#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2421 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2422 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2423 if (kssl_err.text) 2424 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2425#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2427 kssl_err.reason); 2428 goto err; 2429 } 2430 2431 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) 2432 { 2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2434 goto err; 2435 } 2436 2437#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2438 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2439#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2440 2441 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2442 if (enc == NULL) 2443 goto err; 2444 2445 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2446 2447 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) 2448 { 2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2450 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2451 goto err; 2452 } 2453 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, 2454 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2455 { 2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2457 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2458 goto err; 2459 } 2460 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2461 { 2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2463 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2464 goto err; 2465 } 2466 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl)) 2467 { 2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2469 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2470 goto err; 2471 } 2472 outl += padl; 2473 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2474 { 2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2476 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2477 goto err; 2478 } 2479 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 2480 { 2481 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2482 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2483 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2484 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of 2485 * the protocol version. 2486 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2487 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) 2488 */ 2489 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) 2490 { 2491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2492 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2493 goto err; 2494 } 2495 } 2496 2497 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2498 2499 s->session->master_key_length= 2500 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2501 s->session->master_key, pms, outl); 2502 2503 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) 2504 { 2505 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2506 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 2507 { 2508 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2509 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len); 2510 } 2511 } 2512 2513 2514 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2515 ** but it caused problems for apache. 2516 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2517 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2518 */ 2519 } 2520 else 2521#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2522 2523#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2524 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) 2525 { 2526 int ret = 1; 2527 int field_size = 0; 2528 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2529 const EC_GROUP *group; 2530 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2531 2532 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2533 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 2534 { 2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2536 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2537 goto err; 2538 } 2539 2540 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2541 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) 2542 { 2543 /* use the certificate */ 2544 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2545 } 2546 else 2547 { 2548 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when 2549 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. 2550 */ 2551 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2552 } 2553 2554 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2555 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2556 2557 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2558 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) 2559 { 2560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2561 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2562 goto err; 2563 } 2564 2565 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2566 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) 2567 { 2568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2569 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2570 goto err; 2571 } 2572 2573 if (n == 0L) 2574 { 2575 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2576 2577 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 2578 { 2579 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2581 goto f_err; 2582 } 2583 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2584 == NULL) || 2585 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) 2586 { 2587 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client 2588 * authentication using ECDH certificates 2589 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is 2590 * never executed. When that support is 2591 * added, we ought to ensure the key 2592 * received in the certificate is 2593 * authorized for key agreement. 2594 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that 2595 * the two ECDH shares are for the same 2596 * group. 2597 */ 2598 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2600 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2601 goto f_err; 2602 } 2603 2604 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2605 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) 2606 { 2607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2608 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2609 goto err; 2610 } 2611 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2612 } 2613 else 2614 { 2615 /* Get client's public key from encoded point 2616 * in the ClientKeyExchange message. 2617 */ 2618 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) 2619 { 2620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2621 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2622 goto err; 2623 } 2624 2625 /* Get encoded point length */ 2626 i = *p; 2627 p += 1; 2628 if (n != 1 + i) 2629 { 2630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2631 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2632 goto err; 2633 } 2634 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 2635 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) 2636 { 2637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2638 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2639 goto err; 2640 } 2641 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer 2642 * currently, so set it to the start 2643 */ 2644 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2645 } 2646 2647 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2648 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2649 if (field_size <= 0) 2650 { 2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2652 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2653 goto err; 2654 } 2655 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); 2656 if (i <= 0) 2657 { 2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2659 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2660 goto err; 2661 } 2662 2663 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2664 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2665 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2666 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2667 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 2668 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 2669 2670 /* Compute the master secret */ 2671 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ 2672 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); 2673 2674 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2675 return (ret); 2676 } 2677 else 2678#endif 2679#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2680 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) 2681 { 2682 unsigned char *t = NULL; 2683 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; 2684 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; 2685 int psk_err = 1; 2686 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; 2687 2688 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2689 2690 n2s(p,i); 2691 if (n != i+2) 2692 { 2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2694 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2695 goto psk_err; 2696 } 2697 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) 2698 { 2699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2700 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2701 goto psk_err; 2702 } 2703 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) 2704 { 2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2706 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2707 goto psk_err; 2708 } 2709 2710 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity 2711 * string for the callback */ 2712 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); 2713 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); 2714 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, 2715 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2716 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1); 2717 2718 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) 2719 { 2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2721 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2722 goto psk_err; 2723 } 2724 else if (psk_len == 0) 2725 { 2726 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */ 2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2728 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2729 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 2730 goto psk_err; 2731 } 2732 2733 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ 2734 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len; 2735 t = psk_or_pre_ms; 2736 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); 2737 s2n(psk_len, t); 2738 memset(t, 0, psk_len); 2739 t+=psk_len; 2740 s2n(psk_len, t); 2741 2742 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) 2743 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); 2744 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p); 2745 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) 2746 { 2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2748 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2749 goto psk_err; 2750 } 2751 2752 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) 2753 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); 2754 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 2755 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && 2756 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) 2757 { 2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2759 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2760 goto psk_err; 2761 } 2762 2763 s->session->master_key_length= 2764 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2765 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); 2766 psk_err = 0; 2767 psk_err: 2768 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2769 if (psk_err != 0) 2770 goto f_err; 2771 } 2772 else 2773#endif 2774#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2775 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 2776 { 2777 int param_len; 2778 2779 n2s(p,i); 2780 param_len=i+2; 2781 if (param_len > n) 2782 { 2783 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); 2785 goto f_err; 2786 } 2787 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) 2788 { 2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2790 goto err; 2791 } 2792 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 2793 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) 2794 { 2795 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); 2797 goto f_err; 2798 } 2799 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) 2800 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 2801 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 2802 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) 2803 { 2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2805 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2806 goto err; 2807 } 2808 2809 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0) 2810 { 2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2812 goto err; 2813 } 2814 2815 p+=i; 2816 } 2817 else 2818#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ 2819 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) 2820 { 2821 int ret = 0; 2822 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 2823 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 2824 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; 2825 size_t outlen=32, inlen; 2826 unsigned long alg_a; 2827 2828 /* Get our certificate private key*/ 2829 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2830 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 2831 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; 2832 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 2833 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 2834 2835 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL); 2836 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); 2837 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 2838 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 2839 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use 2840 * a client certificate for authorization only. */ 2841 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2842 if (client_pub_pkey) 2843 { 2844 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2845 ERR_clear_error(); 2846 } 2847 /* Decrypt session key */ 2848 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))) 2849 { 2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2851 goto gerr; 2852 } 2853 if (p[1] == 0x81) 2854 { 2855 start = p+3; 2856 inlen = p[2]; 2857 } 2858 else if (p[1] < 0x80) 2859 { 2860 start = p+2; 2861 inlen = p[1]; 2862 } 2863 else 2864 { 2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2866 goto gerr; 2867 } 2868 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) 2869 2870 { 2871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2872 goto gerr; 2873 } 2874 /* Generate master secret */ 2875 s->session->master_key_length= 2876 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2877 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32); 2878 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2879 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2880 ret = 2; 2881 else 2882 ret = 1; 2883 gerr: 2884 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2885 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2886 if (ret) 2887 return ret; 2888 else 2889 goto err; 2890 } 2891 else 2892 { 2893 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2895 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2896 goto f_err; 2897 } 2898 2899 return(1); 2900f_err: 2901 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2902#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) 2903err: 2904#endif 2905#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2906 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2907 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2908 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2909 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2910 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2911#endif 2912 return(-1); 2913 } 2914 2915int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2916 { 2917 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 2918 unsigned char *p; 2919 int al,ok,ret=0; 2920 long n; 2921 int type=0,i,j; 2922 X509 *peer; 2923 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2924 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 2925 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 2926 2927 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2928 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2929 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 2930 -1, 2931 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */ 2932 &ok); 2933 2934 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2935 2936 if (s->session->peer != NULL) 2937 { 2938 peer=s->session->peer; 2939 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2940 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); 2941 } 2942 else 2943 { 2944 peer=NULL; 2945 pkey=NULL; 2946 } 2947 2948 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) 2949 { 2950 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 2951 if (peer != NULL) 2952 { 2953 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); 2955 goto f_err; 2956 } 2957 ret=1; 2958 goto end; 2959 } 2960 2961 if (peer == NULL) 2962 { 2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); 2964 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2965 goto f_err; 2966 } 2967 2968 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 2969 { 2970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 2971 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2972 goto f_err; 2973 } 2974 2975 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 2976 { 2977 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 2978 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2979 goto f_err; 2980 } 2981 2982 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 2983 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2984 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ 2985 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare 2986 * signature without length field */ 2987 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 2988 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) 2989 { 2990 i=64; 2991 } 2992 else 2993 { 2994 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 2995 { 2996 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 2997 /* Should never happen */ 2998 if (sigalg == -1) 2999 { 3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3001 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3002 goto f_err; 3003 } 3004 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 3005 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) 3006 { 3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 3008 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3009 goto f_err; 3010 } 3011 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); 3012 if (md == NULL) 3013 { 3014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 3015 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3016 goto f_err; 3017 } 3018#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3019fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 3020#endif 3021 p += 2; 3022 n -= 2; 3023 } 3024 n2s(p,i); 3025 n-=2; 3026 if (i > n) 3027 { 3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3029 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3030 goto f_err; 3031 } 3032 } 3033 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 3034 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) 3035 { 3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 3037 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3038 goto f_err; 3039 } 3040 3041 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 3042 { 3043 long hdatalen = 0; 3044 void *hdata; 3045 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 3046 if (hdatalen <= 0) 3047 { 3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3049 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3050 goto f_err; 3051 } 3052#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3053 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", 3054 EVP_MD_name(md)); 3055#endif 3056 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) 3057 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) 3058 { 3059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3060 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3061 goto f_err; 3062 } 3063 3064 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0) 3065 { 3066 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 3068 goto f_err; 3069 } 3070 } 3071 else 3072#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3073 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) 3074 { 3075 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3076 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 3077 pkey->pkey.rsa); 3078 if (i < 0) 3079 { 3080 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 3082 goto f_err; 3083 } 3084 if (i == 0) 3085 { 3086 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 3088 goto f_err; 3089 } 3090 } 3091 else 3092#endif 3093#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3094 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) 3095 { 3096 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3097 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3098 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); 3099 if (j <= 0) 3100 { 3101 /* bad signature */ 3102 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 3104 goto f_err; 3105 } 3106 } 3107 else 3108#endif 3109#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3110 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 3111 { 3112 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3113 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3114 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); 3115 if (j <= 0) 3116 { 3117 /* bad signature */ 3118 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3120 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3121 goto f_err; 3122 } 3123 } 3124 else 3125#endif 3126 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) 3127 { unsigned char signature[64]; 3128 int idx; 3129 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL); 3130 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); 3131 if (i!=64) { 3132 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i); 3133 } 3134 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) { 3135 signature[63-idx]=p[idx]; 3136 } 3137 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32); 3138 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3139 if (j<=0) 3140 { 3141 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3143 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3144 goto f_err; 3145 } 3146 } 3147 else 3148 { 3149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3150 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 3151 goto f_err; 3152 } 3153 3154 3155 ret=1; 3156 if (0) 3157 { 3158f_err: 3159 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 3160 } 3161end: 3162 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 3163 { 3164 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); 3165 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; 3166 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 3167 } 3168 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 3169 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 3170 return(ret); 3171 } 3172 3173int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 3174 { 3175 int i,ok,al,ret= -1; 3176 X509 *x=NULL; 3177 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; 3178 const unsigned char *p,*q; 3179 unsigned char *d; 3180 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; 3181 3182 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3183 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 3184 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 3185 -1, 3186 s->max_cert_list, 3187 &ok); 3188 3189 if (!ok) return((int)n); 3190 3191 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) 3192 { 3193 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3194 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 3195 { 3196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3197 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3198 goto f_err; 3199 } 3200 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ 3201 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 3202 { 3203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 3204 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3205 goto f_err; 3206 } 3207 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 3208 return(1); 3209 } 3210 3211 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) 3212 { 3213 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 3215 goto f_err; 3216 } 3217 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3218 3219 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) 3220 { 3221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3222 goto err; 3223 } 3224 3225 n2l3(p,llen); 3226 if (llen+3 != n) 3227 { 3228 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3230 goto f_err; 3231 } 3232 for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) 3233 { 3234 n2l3(p,l); 3235 if ((l+nc+3) > llen) 3236 { 3237 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3239 goto f_err; 3240 } 3241 3242 q=p; 3243 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); 3244 if (x == NULL) 3245 { 3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 3247 goto err; 3248 } 3249 if (p != (q+l)) 3250 { 3251 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3253 goto f_err; 3254 } 3255 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) 3256 { 3257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3258 goto err; 3259 } 3260 x=NULL; 3261 nc+=l+3; 3262 } 3263 3264 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) 3265 { 3266 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 3267 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) 3268 { 3269 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 3271 goto f_err; 3272 } 3273 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 3274 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3275 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 3276 { 3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3278 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3279 goto f_err; 3280 } 3281 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 3282 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 3283 { 3284 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3285 goto f_err; 3286 } 3287 } 3288 else 3289 { 3290 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); 3291 if (i <= 0) 3292 { 3293 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 3294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 3295 goto f_err; 3296 } 3297 } 3298 3299 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 3300 X509_free(s->session->peer); 3301 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); 3302 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 3303 3304 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL 3305 * when we arrive here. */ 3306 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 3307 { 3308 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 3309 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 3310 { 3311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3312 goto err; 3313 } 3314 } 3315 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 3316 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 3317 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; 3318 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the 3319 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ 3320 3321 sk=NULL; 3322 3323 ret=1; 3324 if (0) 3325 { 3326f_err: 3327 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 3328 } 3329err: 3330 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); 3331 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); 3332 return(ret); 3333 } 3334 3335int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 3336 { 3337 unsigned long l; 3338 X509 *x; 3339 3340 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) 3341 { 3342 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); 3343 if (x == NULL) 3344 { 3345 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 3346 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || 3347 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) 3348 { 3349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3350 return(0); 3351 } 3352 } 3353 3354 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x); 3355 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 3356 s->init_num=(int)l; 3357 s->init_off=0; 3358 } 3359 3360 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 3361 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3362 } 3363 3364#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 3365/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 3366int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 3367 { 3368 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) 3369 { 3370 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; 3371 const unsigned char *const_p; 3372 int len, slen_full, slen; 3373 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3374 unsigned int hlen; 3375 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3376 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3377 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3378 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3379 unsigned char key_name[16]; 3380 3381 /* get session encoding length */ 3382 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3383 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is 3384 * too long 3385 */ 3386 if (slen_full > 0xFF00) 3387 return -1; 3388 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); 3389 if (!senc) 3390 return -1; 3391 p = senc; 3392 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); 3393 3394 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */ 3395 const_p = senc; 3396 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 3397 if (sess == NULL) 3398 { 3399 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3400 return -1; 3401 } 3402 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ 3403 3404 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 3405 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */ 3406 { 3407 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3408 return -1; 3409 } 3410 p = senc; 3411 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); 3412 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3413 3414 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3415 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length 3416 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 3417 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 3418 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 3419 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 3420 */ 3421 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 3422 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + 3423 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 3424 return -1; 3425 3426 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3427 /* do the header */ 3428 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 3429 /* Skip message length for now */ 3430 p += 3; 3431 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3432 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3433 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present 3434 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values 3435 * from parent ctx. 3436 */ 3437 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 3438 { 3439 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 3440 &hctx, 1) < 0) 3441 { 3442 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3443 return -1; 3444 } 3445 } 3446 else 3447 { 3448 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); 3449 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3450 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); 3451 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3452 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 3453 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 3454 } 3455 3456 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): 3457 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity), 3458 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long 3459 * as their sessions. */ 3460 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); 3461 3462 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 3463 p += 2; 3464 /* Output key name */ 3465 macstart = p; 3466 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 3467 p += 16; 3468 /* output IV */ 3469 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 3470 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3471 /* Encrypt session data */ 3472 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); 3473 p += len; 3474 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); 3475 p += len; 3476 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3477 3478 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); 3479 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); 3480 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3481 3482 p += hlen; 3483 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 3484 /* Total length */ 3485 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3486 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; 3487 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ 3488 p += 4; 3489 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ 3490 3491 /* number of bytes to write */ 3492 s->init_num= len; 3493 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 3494 s->init_off=0; 3495 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3496 } 3497 3498 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 3499 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3500 } 3501 3502int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 3503 { 3504 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) 3505 { 3506 unsigned char *p; 3507 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3508 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + 3509 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 3510 * + (ocsp response) 3511 */ 3512 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) 3513 return -1; 3514 3515 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3516 3517 /* do the header */ 3518 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 3519 /* message length */ 3520 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); 3521 /* status type */ 3522 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; 3523 /* length of OCSP response */ 3524 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 3525 /* actual response */ 3526 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 3527 /* number of bytes to write */ 3528 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 3529 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 3530 s->init_off = 0; 3531 } 3532 3533 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 3534 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3535 } 3536 3537# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 3538/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It 3539 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */ 3540int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) 3541 { 3542 int ok; 3543 int proto_len, padding_len; 3544 long n; 3545 const unsigned char *p; 3546 3547 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the 3548 * extension in their ClientHello */ 3549 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 3550 { 3551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); 3552 return -1; 3553 } 3554 3555 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3556 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, 3557 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, 3558 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 3559 514, /* See the payload format below */ 3560 &ok); 3561 3562 if (!ok) 3563 return((int)n); 3564 3565 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received 3566 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset 3567 * by ssl3_get_finished). */ 3568 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 3569 { 3570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); 3571 return -1; 3572 } 3573 3574 if (n < 2) 3575 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ 3576 3577 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3578 3579 /* The payload looks like: 3580 * uint8 proto_len; 3581 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 3582 * uint8 padding_len; 3583 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 3584 */ 3585 proto_len = p[0]; 3586 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) 3587 return 0; 3588 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; 3589 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) 3590 return 0; 3591 3592 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); 3593 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) 3594 { 3595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3596 return 0; 3597 } 3598 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); 3599 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; 3600 3601 return 1; 3602 } 3603# endif 3604#endif 3605