s3_pkt.c revision 277195
1/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112#include <stdio.h> 113#include <errno.h> 114#define USE_SOCKETS 115#include "ssl_locl.h" 116#include <openssl/evp.h> 117#include <openssl/buffer.h> 118#include <openssl/rand.h> 119 120static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 121 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); 122static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); 123 124int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) 125 { 126 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase 127 * packet by another n bytes. 128 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified 129 * by s->packet and s->packet_length. 130 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf 131 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) 132 */ 133 int i,len,left; 134 long align=0; 135 unsigned char *pkt; 136 SSL3_BUFFER *rb; 137 138 if (n <= 0) return n; 139 140 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf); 141 if (rb->buf == NULL) 142 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) 143 return -1; 144 145 left = rb->left; 146#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 147 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 148 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); 149#endif 150 151 if (!extend) 152 { 153 /* start with empty packet ... */ 154 if (left == 0) 155 rb->offset = align; 156 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) 157 { 158 /* check if next packet length is large 159 * enough to justify payload alignment... */ 160 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; 161 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA 162 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128) 163 { 164 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted 165 * and its length field is insane, we can 166 * only be led to wrong decision about 167 * whether memmove will occur or not. 168 * Header values has no effect on memmove 169 * arguments and therefore no buffer 170 * overrun can be triggered. */ 171 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left); 172 rb->offset = align; 173 } 174 } 175 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; 176 s->packet_length = 0; 177 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ 178 } 179 180 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets 181 * because the read operation returns the whole packet 182 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */ 183 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 184 { 185 if (left == 0 && extend) 186 return 0; 187 if (left > 0 && n > left) 188 n = left; 189 } 190 191 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ 192 if (left >= n) 193 { 194 s->packet_length+=n; 195 rb->left=left-n; 196 rb->offset+=n; 197 return(n); 198 } 199 200 /* else we need to read more data */ 201 202 len = s->packet_length; 203 pkt = rb->buf+align; 204 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 205 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet', 206 * 'left' extra ones at the end */ 207 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */ 208 { 209 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left); 210 s->packet = pkt; 211 rb->offset = len + align; 212 } 213 214 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */ 215 { 216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 217 return -1; 218 } 219 220 if (!s->read_ahead) 221 /* ignore max parameter */ 222 max = n; 223 else 224 { 225 if (max < n) 226 max = n; 227 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) 228 max = rb->len - rb->offset; 229 } 230 231 while (left < n) 232 { 233 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf 234 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to 235 * len+max if possible) */ 236 237 clear_sys_error(); 238 if (s->rbio != NULL) 239 { 240 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 241 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left); 242 } 243 else 244 { 245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); 246 i = -1; 247 } 248 249 if (i <= 0) 250 { 251 rb->left = left; 252 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && 253 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 254 if (len+left == 0) 255 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 256 return(i); 257 } 258 left+=i; 259 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because 260 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed 261 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */ 262 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 263 { 264 if (n > left) 265 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ 266 } 267 } 268 269 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ 270 rb->offset += n; 271 rb->left = left - n; 272 s->packet_length += n; 273 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 274 return(n); 275 } 276 277/* Call this to get a new input record. 278 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error 279 * or non-blocking IO. 280 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in 281 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record 282 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data 283 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes 284 */ 285/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ 286static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) 287 { 288 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al; 289 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1; 290 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 291 SSL_SESSION *sess; 292 unsigned char *p; 293 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 294 short version; 295 unsigned mac_size, orig_len; 296 size_t extra; 297 298 rr= &(s->s3->rrec); 299 sess=s->session; 300 301 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) 302 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; 303 else 304 extra=0; 305 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) 306 { 307 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 308 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */ 309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 310 return -1; 311 } 312 313again: 314 /* check if we have the header */ 315 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || 316 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) 317 { 318 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); 319 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */ 320 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY; 321 322 p=s->packet; 323 324 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ 325 rr->type= *(p++); 326 ssl_major= *(p++); 327 ssl_minor= *(p++); 328 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; 329 n2s(p,rr->length); 330#if 0 331fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); 332#endif 333 334 /* Lets check version */ 335 if (!s->first_packet) 336 { 337 if (version != s->version) 338 { 339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 340 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)) 341 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ 342 s->version = (unsigned short)version; 343 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 344 goto f_err; 345 } 346 } 347 348 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) 349 { 350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 351 goto err; 352 } 353 354 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) 355 { 356 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 358 goto f_err; 359 } 360 361 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ 362 } 363 364 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ 365 366 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) 367 { 368 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ 369 i=rr->length; 370 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1); 371 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */ 372 /* now n == rr->length, 373 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ 374 } 375 376 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ 377 378 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, 379 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet 380 */ 381 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); 382 383 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' 384 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which 385 * need to be copied into rr->data by either 386 * the decryption or by the decompression 387 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer, 388 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ 389 390 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] 391 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ 392 393 /* check is not needed I believe */ 394 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra) 395 { 396 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 398 goto f_err; 399 } 400 401 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ 402 rr->data=rr->input; 403 404 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); 405 /* enc_err is: 406 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. 407 * 1: if the padding is valid 408 * -1: if the padding is invalid */ 409 if (enc_err == 0) 410 { 411 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; 412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); 413 goto f_err; 414 } 415 416#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 417printf("dec %d\n",rr->length); 418{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } 419printf("\n"); 420#endif 421 422 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ 423 if ((sess != NULL) && 424 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && 425 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) 426 { 427 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ 428 unsigned char *mac = NULL; 429 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 430 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 431 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); 432 433 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */ 434 orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8); 435 436 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was 437 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, 438 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different 439 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. 440 */ 441 if (orig_len < mac_size || 442 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ 443 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && 444 orig_len < mac_size+1)) 445 { 446 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 448 goto f_err; 449 } 450 451 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 452 { 453 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes 454 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract 455 * the MAC in constant time from within the record, 456 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes. 457 * */ 458 mac = mac_tmp; 459 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); 460 rr->length -= mac_size; 461 } 462 else 463 { 464 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| 465 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's 466 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */ 467 rr->length -= mac_size; 468 mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; 469 } 470 471 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */); 472 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) 473 enc_err = -1; 474 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size) 475 enc_err = -1; 476 } 477 478 if (enc_err < 0) 479 { 480 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, 481 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption 482 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, 483 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this 484 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ 485 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; 486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 487 goto f_err; 488 } 489 490 /* r->length is now just compressed */ 491 if (s->expand != NULL) 492 { 493 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra) 494 { 495 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 497 goto f_err; 498 } 499 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) 500 { 501 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; 502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); 503 goto f_err; 504 } 505 } 506 507 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra) 508 { 509 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 511 goto f_err; 512 } 513 514 rr->off=0; 515 /* So at this point the following is true 516 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record 517 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record 518 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte 519 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment 520 * after use :-). 521 */ 522 523 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ 524 s->packet_length=0; 525 526 /* just read a 0 length packet */ 527 if (rr->length == 0) goto again; 528 529#if 0 530fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); 531#endif 532 533 return(1); 534 535f_err: 536 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 537err: 538 return(ret); 539 } 540 541int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) 542 { 543#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 544 int i; 545 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 546 547 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec); 548 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp, 549 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length); 550 if (i < 0) 551 return(0); 552 else 553 rr->length=i; 554 rr->data=rr->comp; 555#endif 556 return(1); 557 } 558 559int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) 560 { 561#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 562 int i; 563 SSL3_RECORD *wr; 564 565 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec); 566 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data, 567 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, 568 wr->input,(int)wr->length); 569 if (i < 0) 570 return(0); 571 else 572 wr->length=i; 573 574 wr->input=wr->data; 575#endif 576 return(1); 577 } 578 579/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' 580 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. 581 */ 582int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) 583 { 584 const unsigned char *buf=buf_; 585 unsigned int tot,n,nw; 586 int i; 587 588 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 589 tot=s->s3->wnum; 590 s->s3->wnum=0; 591 592 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) 593 { 594 i=s->handshake_func(s); 595 if (i < 0) return(i); 596 if (i == 0) 597 { 598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 599 return -1; 600 } 601 } 602 603 n=(len-tot); 604 for (;;) 605 { 606 if (n > s->max_send_fragment) 607 nw=s->max_send_fragment; 608 else 609 nw=n; 610 611 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); 612 if (i <= 0) 613 { 614 s->s3->wnum=tot; 615 return i; 616 } 617 618 if ((i == (int)n) || 619 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 620 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) 621 { 622 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment 623 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */ 624 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; 625 626 return tot+i; 627 } 628 629 n-=i; 630 tot+=i; 631 } 632 } 633 634static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 635 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) 636 { 637 unsigned char *p,*plen; 638 int i,mac_size,clear=0; 639 int prefix_len=0; 640 int eivlen; 641 long align=0; 642 SSL3_RECORD *wr; 643 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); 644 SSL_SESSION *sess; 645 646 if (wb->buf == NULL) 647 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) 648 return -1; 649 650 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written 651 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ 652 if (wb->left != 0) 653 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len)); 654 655 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ 656 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) 657 { 658 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 659 if (i <= 0) 660 return(i); 661 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ 662 /* we may have released our buffer, so get it again */ 663 if (wb->buf == NULL) 664 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) 665 return -1; 666 } 667 668 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) 669 return 0; 670 671 wr= &(s->s3->wrec); 672 sess=s->session; 673 674 if ( (sess == NULL) || 675 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || 676 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) 677 { 678#if 1 679 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ 680#else 681 clear=1; 682#endif 683 mac_size=0; 684 } 685 else 686 { 687 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); 688 if (mac_size < 0) 689 goto err; 690 } 691 692 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ 693 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) 694 { 695 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites 696 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ 697 698 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 699 { 700 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; 701 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment 702 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later 703 * together with the actual payload) */ 704 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); 705 if (prefix_len <= 0) 706 goto err; 707 708 if (prefix_len > 709 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) 710 { 711 /* insufficient space */ 712 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 713 goto err; 714 } 715 } 716 717 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; 718 } 719 720 if (create_empty_fragment) 721 { 722#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 723 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, 724 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so 725 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can 726 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */ 727 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 728 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); 729#endif 730 p = wb->buf + align; 731 wb->offset = align; 732 } 733 else if (prefix_len) 734 { 735 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len; 736 } 737 else 738 { 739#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 740 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 741 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); 742#endif 743 p = wb->buf + align; 744 wb->offset = align; 745 } 746 747 /* write the header */ 748 749 *(p++)=type&0xff; 750 wr->type=type; 751 752 *(p++)=(s->version>>8); 753 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 754 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0 755 */ 756 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B 757 && !s->renegotiate 758 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) 759 *(p++) = 0x1; 760 else 761 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; 762 763 /* field where we are to write out packet length */ 764 plen=p; 765 p+=2; 766 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */ 767 if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) 768 { 769 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); 770 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 771 { 772 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); 773 if (eivlen <= 1) 774 eivlen = 0; 775 } 776 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ 777 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 778 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 779 else 780 eivlen = 0; 781 } 782 else 783 eivlen = 0; 784 785 /* lets setup the record stuff. */ 786 wr->data=p + eivlen; 787 wr->length=(int)len; 788 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf; 789 790 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into 791 * wr->data */ 792 793 /* first we compress */ 794 if (s->compress != NULL) 795 { 796 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) 797 { 798 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); 799 goto err; 800 } 801 } 802 else 803 { 804 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length); 805 wr->input=wr->data; 806 } 807 808 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input 809 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. 810 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ 811 812 if (mac_size != 0) 813 { 814 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0) 815 goto err; 816 wr->length+=mac_size; 817 } 818 819 wr->input=p; 820 wr->data=p; 821 822 if (eivlen) 823 { 824 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) 825 goto err; */ 826 wr->length += eivlen; 827 } 828 829 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ 830 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1); 831 832 /* record length after mac and block padding */ 833 s2n(wr->length,plen); 834 835 /* we should now have 836 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is 837 * wr->length long */ 838 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ 839 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 840 841 if (create_empty_fragment) 842 { 843 /* we are in a recursive call; 844 * just return the length, don't write out anything here 845 */ 846 return wr->length; 847 } 848 849 /* now let's set up wb */ 850 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; 851 852 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */ 853 s->s3->wpend_tot=len; 854 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf; 855 s->s3->wpend_type=type; 856 s->s3->wpend_ret=len; 857 858 /* we now just need to write the buffer */ 859 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len); 860err: 861 return -1; 862 } 863 864/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ 865int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 866 unsigned int len) 867 { 868 int i; 869 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); 870 871/* XXXX */ 872 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) 873 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && 874 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) 875 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) 876 { 877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); 878 return(-1); 879 } 880 881 for (;;) 882 { 883 clear_sys_error(); 884 if (s->wbio != NULL) 885 { 886 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; 887 i=BIO_write(s->wbio, 888 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), 889 (unsigned int)wb->left); 890 } 891 else 892 { 893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); 894 i= -1; 895 } 896 if (i == wb->left) 897 { 898 wb->left=0; 899 wb->offset+=i; 900 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && 901 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 902 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 903 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 904 return(s->s3->wpend_ret); 905 } 906 else if (i <= 0) { 907 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || 908 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 909 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole 910 point in using a datagram service */ 911 wb->left = 0; 912 } 913 return(i); 914 } 915 wb->offset+=i; 916 wb->left-=i; 917 } 918 } 919 920/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. 921 * 'type' is one of the following: 922 * 923 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) 924 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) 925 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) 926 * 927 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first 928 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). 929 * 930 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as 931 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really 932 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. 933 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store 934 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol 935 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): 936 * Change cipher spec protocol 937 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored 938 * Alert protocol 939 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) 940 * Handshake protocol 941 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have 942 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages 943 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers 944 * Application data protocol 945 * none of our business 946 */ 947int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) 948 { 949 int al,i,j,ret; 950 unsigned int n; 951 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 952 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL; 953 954 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ 955 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) 956 return(-1); 957 958 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || 959 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) 960 { 961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 962 return -1; 963 } 964 965 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 966 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ 967 { 968 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; 969 unsigned char *dst = buf; 970 unsigned int k; 971 972 /* peek == 0 */ 973 n = 0; 974 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 975 { 976 *dst++ = *src++; 977 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; 978 n++; 979 } 980 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ 981 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) 982 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; 983 return n; 984 } 985 986 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ 987 988 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) 989 { 990 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ 991 i=s->handshake_func(s); 992 if (i < 0) return(i); 993 if (i == 0) 994 { 995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 996 return(-1); 997 } 998 } 999start: 1000 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 1001 1002 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record 1003 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data 1004 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read 1005 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ 1006 rr = &(s->s3->rrec); 1007 1008 /* get new packet if necessary */ 1009 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) 1010 { 1011 ret=ssl3_get_record(s); 1012 if (ret <= 0) return(ret); 1013 } 1014 1015 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ 1016 1017 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, 1018 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ 1019 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) 1020 { 1021 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); 1023 goto f_err; 1024 } 1025 1026 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away 1027 * (even in 'peek' mode) */ 1028 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) 1029 { 1030 rr->length=0; 1031 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 1032 return(0); 1033 } 1034 1035 1036 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ 1037 { 1038 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we 1039 * are doing a handshake for the first time */ 1040 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && 1041 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) 1042 { 1043 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); 1045 goto f_err; 1046 } 1047 1048 if (len <= 0) return(len); 1049 1050 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) 1051 n = rr->length; 1052 else 1053 n = (unsigned int)len; 1054 1055 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n); 1056 if (!peek) 1057 { 1058 rr->length-=n; 1059 rr->off+=n; 1060 if (rr->length == 0) 1061 { 1062 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 1063 rr->off=0; 1064 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) 1065 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 1066 } 1067 } 1068 return(n); 1069 } 1070 1071 1072 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake 1073 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ 1074 1075 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, 1076 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. 1077 */ 1078 { 1079 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; 1080 unsigned char *dest = NULL; 1081 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; 1082 1083 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) 1084 { 1085 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; 1086 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; 1087 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; 1088 } 1089 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) 1090 { 1091 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; 1092 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; 1093 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; 1094 } 1095#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1096 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) 1097 { 1098 tls1_process_heartbeat(s); 1099 1100 /* Exit and notify application to read again */ 1101 rr->length = 0; 1102 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 1103 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); 1104 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); 1105 return(-1); 1106 } 1107#endif 1108 1109 if (dest_maxlen > 0) 1110 { 1111 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ 1112 if (rr->length < n) 1113 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ 1114 1115 /* now move 'n' bytes: */ 1116 while (n-- > 0) 1117 { 1118 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; 1119 rr->length--; 1120 } 1121 1122 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) 1123 goto start; /* fragment was too small */ 1124 } 1125 } 1126 1127 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1128 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. 1129 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ 1130 1131 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ 1132 if ((!s->server) && 1133 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && 1134 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && 1135 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) 1136 { 1137 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; 1138 1139 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || 1140 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || 1141 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) 1142 { 1143 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); 1145 goto f_err; 1146 } 1147 1148 if (s->msg_callback) 1149 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1150 1151 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && 1152 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && 1153 !s->s3->renegotiate) 1154 { 1155 ssl3_renegotiate(s); 1156 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) 1157 { 1158 i=s->handshake_func(s); 1159 if (i < 0) return(i); 1160 if (i == 0) 1161 { 1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1163 return(-1); 1164 } 1165 1166 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) 1167 { 1168 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ 1169 { 1170 BIO *bio; 1171 /* In the case where we try to read application data, 1172 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with 1173 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may 1174 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ 1175 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 1176 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); 1177 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1178 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1179 return(-1); 1180 } 1181 } 1182 } 1183 } 1184 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, 1185 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ 1186 goto start; 1187 } 1188 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't 1189 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. 1190 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) 1191 */ 1192 if (s->server && 1193 SSL_is_init_finished(s) && 1194 !s->s3->send_connection_binding && 1195 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && 1196 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && 1197 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && 1198 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && 1199 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1200 1201 { 1202 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/ 1203 rr->length = 0; 1204 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1205 goto start; 1206 } 1207 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) 1208 { 1209 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; 1210 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; 1211 1212 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; 1213 1214 if (s->msg_callback) 1215 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1216 1217 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1218 cb=s->info_callback; 1219 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1220 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 1221 1222 if (cb != NULL) 1223 { 1224 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; 1225 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); 1226 } 1227 1228 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */ 1229 { 1230 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; 1231 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) 1232 { 1233 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1234 return(0); 1235 } 1236 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested 1237 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with 1238 * a fatal alert because if application tried to 1239 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and 1240 * expects it to succeed. 1241 * 1242 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we 1243 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on. 1244 */ 1245 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) 1246 { 1247 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1249 goto f_err; 1250 } 1251#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME 1252 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) 1253 return(0); 1254#endif 1255 } 1256 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ 1257 { 1258 char tmp[16]; 1259 1260 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 1261 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; 1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); 1263 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr); 1264 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp); 1265 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1266 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); 1267 return(0); 1268 } 1269 else 1270 { 1271 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); 1273 goto f_err; 1274 } 1275 1276 goto start; 1277 } 1278 1279 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */ 1280 { 1281 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 1282 rr->length=0; 1283 return(0); 1284 } 1285 1286 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) 1287 { 1288 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know 1289 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ 1290 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || 1291 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) 1292 { 1293 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); 1295 goto f_err; 1296 } 1297 1298 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ 1299 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) 1300 { 1301 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1303 goto f_err; 1304 } 1305 1306 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) 1307 { 1308 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1310 goto f_err; 1311 } 1312 1313 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 1314 1315 rr->length=0; 1316 1317 if (s->msg_callback) 1318 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1319 1320 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; 1321 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) 1322 goto err; 1323 else 1324 goto start; 1325 } 1326 1327 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ 1328 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) 1329 { 1330 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && 1331 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) 1332 { 1333#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and 1334 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting 1335 * protocol violations): */ 1336 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server) 1337 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT 1338 :SSL_ST_CONNECT; 1339#else 1340 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; 1341#endif 1342 s->renegotiate=1; 1343 s->new_session=1; 1344 } 1345 i=s->handshake_func(s); 1346 if (i < 0) return(i); 1347 if (i == 0) 1348 { 1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1350 return(-1); 1351 } 1352 1353 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) 1354 { 1355 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ 1356 { 1357 BIO *bio; 1358 /* In the case where we try to read application data, 1359 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with 1360 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may 1361 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ 1362 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 1363 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); 1364 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1365 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1366 return(-1); 1367 } 1368 } 1369 goto start; 1370 } 1371 1372 switch (rr->type) 1373 { 1374 default: 1375#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS 1376 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: 1377 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert. 1378 */ 1379 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) 1380 { 1381 rr->length = 0; 1382 goto start; 1383 } 1384#endif 1385 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1387 goto f_err; 1388 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: 1389 case SSL3_RT_ALERT: 1390 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: 1391 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception 1392 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that 1393 * should not happen when type != rr->type */ 1394 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1396 goto f_err; 1397 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: 1398 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, 1399 * but have application data. If the library was 1400 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data 1401 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data 1402 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), 1403 * we will indulge it. 1404 */ 1405 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && 1406 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && 1407 (( 1408 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && 1409 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && 1410 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1411 ) || ( 1412 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && 1413 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && 1414 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) 1415 ) 1416 )) 1417 { 1418 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; 1419 return(-1); 1420 } 1421 else 1422 { 1423 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1425 goto f_err; 1426 } 1427 } 1428 /* not reached */ 1429 1430f_err: 1431 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1432err: 1433 return(-1); 1434 } 1435 1436int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) 1437 { 1438 int i; 1439 const char *sender; 1440 int slen; 1441 1442 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) 1443 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; 1444 else 1445 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; 1446 1447 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) 1448 { 1449 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) 1450 { 1451 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ 1452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1453 return (0); 1454 } 1455 1456 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 1457 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0); 1458 } 1459 1460 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i)) 1461 return(0); 1462 1463 /* we have to record the message digest at 1464 * this point so we can get it before we read 1465 * the finished message */ 1466 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) 1467 { 1468 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; 1469 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; 1470 } 1471 else 1472 { 1473 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; 1474 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; 1475 } 1476 1477 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, 1478 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); 1479 1480 return(1); 1481 } 1482 1483int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) 1484 { 1485 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ 1486 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); 1487 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) 1488 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */ 1489 if (desc < 0) return -1; 1490 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ 1491 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) 1492 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); 1493 1494 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; 1495 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level; 1496 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc; 1497 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ 1498 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 1499 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written 1500 * some time in the future */ 1501 return -1; 1502 } 1503 1504int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) 1505 { 1506 int i,j; 1507 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; 1508 1509 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0; 1510 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); 1511 if (i <= 0) 1512 { 1513 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; 1514 } 1515 else 1516 { 1517 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. 1518 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, 1519 * we will not worry too much. */ 1520 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) 1521 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); 1522 1523 if (s->msg_callback) 1524 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1525 1526 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1527 cb=s->info_callback; 1528 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1529 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 1530 1531 if (cb != NULL) 1532 { 1533 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; 1534 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j); 1535 } 1536 } 1537 return(i); 1538 } 1539