d1_pkt.c revision 277195
1/* ssl/d1_pkt.c */
2/*
3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
5 */
6/* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
8 *
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
11 * are met:
12 *
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15 *
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
19 *    distribution.
20 *
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
25 *
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
30 *
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
34 *
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
36 *    acknowledgment:
37 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
39 *
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
53 *
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
57 *
58 */
59/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
61 *
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
65 *
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
72 *
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
79 *
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
82 * are met:
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
90 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
97 *
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
108 * SUCH DAMAGE.
109 *
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
114 */
115
116#include <stdio.h>
117#include <errno.h>
118#define USE_SOCKETS
119#include "ssl_locl.h"
120#include <openssl/evp.h>
121#include <openssl/buffer.h>
122#include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123#include <openssl/rand.h>
124
125/* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
126static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2)
127{	int ret,sat,brw,i;
128
129	if (sizeof(long) == 8) do
130	{	const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1};
131		long l;
132
133		if (is_endian.little)			break;
134		/* not reached on little-endians */
135		/* following test is redundant, because input is
136		 * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
137		if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7)	break;
138
139		l  = *((long *)v1);
140		l -= *((long *)v2);
141		if (l>128)		return 128;
142		else if (l<-128)	return -128;
143		else			return (int)l;
144	} while (0);
145
146	ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7];
147	sat = 0;
148	brw = ret>>8;	/* brw is either 0 or -1 */
149	if (ret & 0x80)
150	{	for (i=6;i>=0;i--)
151		{	brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
152			sat |= ~brw;
153			brw >>= 8;
154		}
155	}
156	else
157	{	for (i=6;i>=0;i--)
158		{	brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
159			sat |= brw;
160			brw >>= 8;
161		}
162	}
163	brw <<= 8;	/* brw is either 0 or -256 */
164
165	if (sat&0xff)	return brw | 0x80;
166	else		return brw + (ret&0xFF);
167}
168
169static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
170	int len, int peek);
171static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
172static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
173static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
174    unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
175#if 0
176static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
177	unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
178#endif
179static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
180	unsigned char *priority);
181static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
182
183/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
184static int
185dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
186    {
187    DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
188
189    rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
190
191    if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
192        OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
193
194    s->packet = rdata->packet;
195    s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
196    memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
197    memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
198
199	/* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
200	memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
201
202    return(1);
203    }
204
205
206static int
207dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
208	{
209	DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
210	pitem *item;
211
212	/* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
213	if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
214		return 0;
215
216	rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
217	item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
218	if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
219		{
220		if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
221		if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
222
223		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
224		return(0);
225		}
226
227	rdata->packet = s->packet;
228	rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
229	memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
230	memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
231
232	item->data = rdata;
233
234#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
235	/* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
236	if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
237	    (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
238		BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
239	}
240#endif
241
242	s->packet = NULL;
243	s->packet_length = 0;
244	memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
245	memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
246
247	if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
248		{
249		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
250		if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
251			OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
252		OPENSSL_free(rdata);
253		pitem_free(item);
254		return(-1);
255		}
256
257	/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
258	if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
259		{
260		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
261		if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
262			OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
263		OPENSSL_free(rdata);
264		pitem_free(item);
265		return(-1);
266		}
267
268	return(1);
269	}
270
271
272static int
273dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
274    {
275    pitem *item;
276
277    item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
278    if (item)
279        {
280        dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
281
282        OPENSSL_free(item->data);
283		pitem_free(item);
284
285        return(1);
286        }
287
288    return(0);
289    }
290
291
292/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
293 * yet */
294#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
295                   dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
296                   &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
297
298/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
299#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
300                   dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
301                   &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
302
303static int
304dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
305    {
306    pitem *item;
307
308    item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
309    if (item)
310        {
311        /* Check if epoch is current. */
312        if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
313            return(1);  /* Nothing to do. */
314
315        /* Process all the records. */
316        while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
317            {
318            dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
319            if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
320                return(0);
321            if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
322                s->s3->rrec.seq_num)<0)
323                return -1;
324            }
325        }
326
327    /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
328     * have been processed */
329    s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
330    s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
331
332    return(1);
333    }
334
335
336#if 0
337
338static int
339dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
340	{
341	pitem *item;
342	PQ_64BIT priority =
343		(((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
344		((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
345
346	if ( ! SSL_in_init(s))  /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
347							   nothing buffered */
348		return 0;
349
350
351	item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
352	if (item && item->priority == priority)
353		{
354		/* Check if we've received the record of interest.  It must be
355		 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
356		 * buffering */
357		DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
358		item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
359		rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
360
361		if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
362			OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
363
364		s->packet = rdata->packet;
365		s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
366		memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
367		memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
368
369		OPENSSL_free(item->data);
370		pitem_free(item);
371
372		/* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
373		return(1);
374		}
375
376	return 0;
377	}
378
379#endif
380
381static int
382dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
383{
384	int i,al;
385	int enc_err;
386	SSL_SESSION *sess;
387	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
388	unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
389	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
390
391	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
392	sess = s->session;
393
394	/* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
395	 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
396	 */
397	rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
398
399	/* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
400	 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
401	 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
402	 * the decryption or by the decompression
403	 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
404	 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
405
406	/* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
407	 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
408
409	/* check is not needed I believe */
410	if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
411		{
412		al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
413		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
414		goto f_err;
415		}
416
417	/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
418	rr->data=rr->input;
419
420	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
421	/* enc_err is:
422	 *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
423	 *    1: if the padding is valid
424	 *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
425	if (enc_err == 0)
426		{
427		/* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
428		rr->length = 0;
429		s->packet_length = 0;
430		goto err;
431		}
432
433#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
434printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
435{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
436printf("\n");
437#endif
438
439	/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
440	if ((sess != NULL) &&
441	    (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
442	    (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
443		{
444		/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
445		unsigned char *mac = NULL;
446		unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
447		mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
448		OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
449
450		/* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
451		orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
452
453		/* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
454		 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
455		 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
456		 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
457		 */
458		if (orig_len < mac_size ||
459		    /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
460		    (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
461		     orig_len < mac_size+1))
462			{
463			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
464			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
465			goto f_err;
466			}
467
468		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
469			{
470			/* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
471			 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
472			 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
473			 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
474			 * */
475			mac = mac_tmp;
476			ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
477			rr->length -= mac_size;
478			}
479		else
480			{
481			/* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
482			 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
483			 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
484			rr->length -= mac_size;
485			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
486			}
487
488		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
489		if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
490			enc_err = -1;
491		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
492			enc_err = -1;
493		}
494
495	if (enc_err < 0)
496		{
497		/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
498		rr->length = 0;
499		s->packet_length = 0;
500		goto err;
501		}
502
503	/* r->length is now just compressed */
504	if (s->expand != NULL)
505		{
506		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
507			{
508			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
509			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
510			goto f_err;
511			}
512		if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
513			{
514			al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
515			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
516			goto f_err;
517			}
518		}
519
520	if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
521		{
522		al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
523		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
524		goto f_err;
525		}
526
527	rr->off=0;
528	/* So at this point the following is true
529	 * ssl->s3->rrec.type 	is the type of record
530	 * ssl->s3->rrec.length	== number of bytes in record
531	 * ssl->s3->rrec.off	== offset to first valid byte
532	 * ssl->s3->rrec.data	== where to take bytes from, increment
533	 *			   after use :-).
534	 */
535
536	/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
537	s->packet_length=0;
538	return(1);
539
540f_err:
541	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
542err:
543	return(0);
544}
545
546
547/* Call this to get a new input record.
548 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
549 * or non-blocking IO.
550 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
551 * ssl->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
552 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, 	 - data
553 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
554 */
555/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
556int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
557	{
558	int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
559	int i,n;
560	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
561	unsigned char *p = NULL;
562	unsigned short version;
563	DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
564	unsigned int is_next_epoch;
565
566	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
567
568	/* The epoch may have changed.  If so, process all the
569	 * pending records.  This is a non-blocking operation. */
570	if(dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)<0)
571		return -1;
572
573	/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
574	if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
575		return 1;
576
577	/* get something from the wire */
578again:
579	/* check if we have the header */
580	if (	(s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
581		(s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
582		{
583		n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
584		/* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
585		if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
586
587		/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
588		if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
589			{
590			s->packet_length = 0;
591			goto again;
592			}
593
594		s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
595
596		p=s->packet;
597
598		/* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
599		rr->type= *(p++);
600		ssl_major= *(p++);
601		ssl_minor= *(p++);
602		version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
603
604		/* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
605		n2s(p,rr->epoch);
606
607		memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
608		p+=6;
609
610		n2s(p,rr->length);
611
612		/* Lets check version */
613		if (!s->first_packet)
614			{
615			if (version != s->version)
616				{
617				/* unexpected version, silently discard */
618				rr->length = 0;
619				s->packet_length = 0;
620				goto again;
621				}
622			}
623
624		if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
625			{
626			/* wrong version, silently discard record */
627			rr->length = 0;
628			s->packet_length = 0;
629			goto again;
630			}
631
632		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
633			{
634			/* record too long, silently discard it */
635			rr->length = 0;
636			s->packet_length = 0;
637			goto again;
638			}
639
640		/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
641		}
642
643	/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
644
645	if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
646		{
647		/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
648		i=rr->length;
649		n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
650		/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
651		if ( n != i)
652			{
653			rr->length = 0;
654			s->packet_length = 0;
655			goto again;
656			}
657
658		/* now n == rr->length,
659		 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
660		}
661	s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
662
663	/* match epochs.  NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
664	bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
665	if ( bitmap == NULL)
666		{
667		rr->length = 0;
668		s->packet_length = 0;  /* dump this record */
669		goto again;   /* get another record */
670		}
671
672#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
673	/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
674	if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
675  		{
676#endif
677		/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
678		 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
679		 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
680		 * since they arrive from different connections and
681		 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
682		 */
683		if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
684		    s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
685		    s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
686		    !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
687			{
688			rr->length = 0;
689			s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
690			goto again;     /* get another record */
691			}
692#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
693  		}
694#endif
695
696	/* just read a 0 length packet */
697	if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
698
699	/* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
700	 * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
701	 * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
702	 * anything while listening.
703	 */
704	if (is_next_epoch)
705		{
706		if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
707			{
708			if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num)<0)
709				return -1;
710			dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);/* Mark receipt of record. */
711			}
712		rr->length = 0;
713		s->packet_length = 0;
714		goto again;
715		}
716
717	if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
718		{
719		rr->length = 0;
720		s->packet_length = 0;  /* dump this record */
721		goto again;   /* get another record */
722		}
723	dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);/* Mark receipt of record. */
724
725	return(1);
726
727	}
728
729/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
730 * 'type' is one of the following:
731 *
732 *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
733 *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
734 *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
735 *
736 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
737 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
738 *
739 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
740 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
741 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
742 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
743 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
744 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
745 *     Change cipher spec protocol
746 *             just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
747 *     Alert protocol
748 *             2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
749 *     Handshake protocol
750 *             4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
751 *             to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
752 *             here, anything else is handled by higher layers
753 *     Application data protocol
754 *             none of our business
755 */
756int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
757	{
758	int al,i,j,ret;
759	unsigned int n;
760	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
761	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
762
763	if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
764		if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
765			return(-1);
766
767    /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
768	if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
769		(type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
770	    (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
771		{
772		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
773		return -1;
774		}
775
776	/* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
777	if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
778		return ret;
779
780	/* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
781
782#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
783	/* Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read
784	 * app data with SCTP.
785	 */
786	if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
787	    (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
788	     (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK) &&
789	     s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
790#else
791	if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
792#endif
793		{
794		/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
795		i=s->handshake_func(s);
796		if (i < 0) return(i);
797		if (i == 0)
798			{
799			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
800			return(-1);
801			}
802		}
803
804start:
805	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
806
807	/* s->s3->rrec.type	    - is the type of record
808	 * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
809	 * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
810	 * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes. */
811	rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
812
813	/* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
814	 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
815	 * in advance, if any.
816	 */
817	if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
818		{
819		pitem *item;
820		item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
821		if (item)
822			{
823#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
824			/* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
825			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
826				{
827				DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
828				BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
829				}
830#endif
831
832			dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
833
834			OPENSSL_free(item->data);
835			pitem_free(item);
836			}
837		}
838
839	/* Check for timeout */
840	if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
841		goto start;
842
843	/* get new packet if necessary */
844	if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
845		{
846		ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
847		if (ret <= 0)
848			{
849			ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
850			/* anything other than a timeout is an error */
851			if (ret <= 0)
852				return(ret);
853			else
854				goto start;
855			}
856		}
857
858	/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
859
860	if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
861	                               * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
862		&& (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
863		{
864		/* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
865		 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
866		 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
867		 * than dropping the connection.
868		 */
869		if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num)<0)
870			{
871			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
872			return -1;
873			}
874		rr->length = 0;
875		goto start;
876		}
877
878	/* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
879	 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
880	if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
881		{
882		rr->length=0;
883		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
884		return(0);
885		}
886
887
888	if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
889		{
890		/* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
891		 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
892		if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
893			(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
894			{
895			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
896			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
897			goto f_err;
898			}
899
900		if (len <= 0) return(len);
901
902		if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
903			n = rr->length;
904		else
905			n = (unsigned int)len;
906
907		memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
908		if (!peek)
909			{
910			rr->length-=n;
911			rr->off+=n;
912			if (rr->length == 0)
913				{
914				s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
915				rr->off=0;
916				}
917			}
918
919#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
920			/* We were about to renegotiate but had to read
921			 * belated application data first, so retry.
922			 */
923			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
924			    rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
925			    (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK))
926				{
927				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
928				BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
929				BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
930				}
931
932			/* We might had to delay a close_notify alert because
933			 * of reordered app data. If there was an alert and there
934			 * is no message to read anymore, finally set shutdown.
935			 */
936			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
937			    s->d1->shutdown_received && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
938				{
939				s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
940				return(0);
941				}
942#endif
943		return(n);
944		}
945
946
947	/* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
948	 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
949
950	/* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
951	 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
952	 */
953		{
954		unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
955		unsigned char *dest = NULL;
956		unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
957
958		if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
959			{
960			dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
961			dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
962			dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
963			}
964		else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
965			{
966			dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
967			dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
968			dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
969			}
970#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
971		else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
972			{
973			dtls1_process_heartbeat(s);
974
975			/* Exit and notify application to read again */
976			rr->length = 0;
977			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
978			BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
979			BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
980			return(-1);
981			}
982#endif
983		/* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
984		else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
985			{
986			/* Application data while renegotiating
987			 * is allowed. Try again reading.
988			 */
989			if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
990				{
991				BIO *bio;
992				s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
993				bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
994				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
995				BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
996				BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
997				return(-1);
998				}
999
1000			/* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
1001			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1002			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1003			goto f_err;
1004			}
1005
1006		if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1007			{
1008            /* XDTLS:  In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
1009             *  may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
1010			if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
1011				{
1012#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1013				/*
1014				 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
1015				 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
1016				 * non-existing alert...
1017				 */
1018				FIX ME
1019#endif
1020				s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1021				rr->length = 0;
1022				goto start;
1023				}
1024
1025			/* now move 'n' bytes: */
1026			for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
1027				{
1028				dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1029				rr->length--;
1030				}
1031			*dest_len = dest_maxlen;
1032			}
1033		}
1034
1035	/* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1036	 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1037	 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1038
1039	/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1040	if ((!s->server) &&
1041		(s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1042		(s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1043		(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1044		{
1045		s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1046
1047		if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1048			(s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1049			(s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1050			{
1051			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1052			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1053			goto err;
1054			}
1055
1056		/* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
1057
1058		if (s->msg_callback)
1059			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1060				s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1061
1062		if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1063			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1064			!s->s3->renegotiate)
1065			{
1066			s->new_session = 1;
1067			ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1068			if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1069				{
1070				i=s->handshake_func(s);
1071				if (i < 0) return(i);
1072				if (i == 0)
1073					{
1074					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1075					return(-1);
1076					}
1077
1078				if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1079					{
1080					if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1081						{
1082						BIO *bio;
1083						/* In the case where we try to read application data,
1084						 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1085						 * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
1086						 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1087						s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1088						bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1089						BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1090						BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1091						return(-1);
1092						}
1093					}
1094				}
1095			}
1096		/* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1097		 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1098		goto start;
1099		}
1100
1101	if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
1102		{
1103		int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
1104		int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
1105
1106		s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1107
1108		if (s->msg_callback)
1109			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1110				s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1111
1112		if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1113			cb=s->info_callback;
1114		else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1115			cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1116
1117		if (cb != NULL)
1118			{
1119			j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1120			cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1121			}
1122
1123		if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1124			{
1125			s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1126			if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1127				{
1128#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1129				/* With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
1130				 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this
1131				 * first so that nothing gets discarded.
1132				 */
1133				if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
1134					BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
1135					{
1136					s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
1137					s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1138					BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1139					BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1140					return -1;
1141					}
1142#endif
1143				s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1144				return(0);
1145				}
1146#if 0
1147            /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1148			/* now check if it's a missing record */
1149			if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1150				{
1151				unsigned short seq;
1152				unsigned int frag_off;
1153				unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1154
1155				n2s(p, seq);
1156				n2l3(p, frag_off);
1157
1158				dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1159										 dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
1160										 frag_off, &found);
1161				if ( ! found  && SSL_in_init(s))
1162					{
1163					/* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
1164					/* requested a message not yet sent,
1165					   send an alert ourselves */
1166					ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1167						DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1168					}
1169				}
1170#endif
1171			}
1172		else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1173			{
1174			char tmp[16];
1175
1176			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1177			s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1178			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1179			BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1180			ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1181			s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1182			SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1183			return(0);
1184			}
1185		else
1186			{
1187			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1188			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1189			goto f_err;
1190			}
1191
1192		goto start;
1193		}
1194
1195	if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1196		{
1197		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1198		rr->length=0;
1199		return(0);
1200		}
1201
1202	if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1203		{
1204		struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1205		unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1206
1207		dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1208
1209		if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1210			ccs_hdr_len = 3;
1211
1212		/* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1213		 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1214		/* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1215		if (	(rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
1216			(rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1217			{
1218			i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1219			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1220			goto err;
1221			}
1222
1223		rr->length=0;
1224
1225		if (s->msg_callback)
1226			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1227				rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1228
1229		/* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
1230		 * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
1231		 */
1232		if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
1233			{
1234			goto start;
1235			}
1236
1237		s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1238
1239		s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1240		if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1241			goto err;
1242
1243		/* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1244		dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1245
1246		if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1247			s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1248
1249#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1250		/* Remember that a CCS has been received,
1251		 * so that an old key of SCTP-Auth can be
1252		 * deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored
1253		 * if no SCTP is used
1254		 */
1255		BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
1256#endif
1257
1258		goto start;
1259		}
1260
1261	/* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1262	if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1263		!s->in_handshake)
1264		{
1265		struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1266
1267		/* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1268		dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1269		if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
1270			{
1271			rr->length = 0;
1272			goto start;
1273			}
1274
1275		/* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1276		 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1277		 */
1278		if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1279			{
1280			if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
1281				return -1;
1282
1283			dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1284			rr->length = 0;
1285			goto start;
1286			}
1287
1288		if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1289			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1290			{
1291#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1292       * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1293       * protocol violations): */
1294			s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1295				?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1296				:SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1297#else
1298			s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1299#endif
1300			s->renegotiate=1;
1301			s->new_session=1;
1302			}
1303		i=s->handshake_func(s);
1304		if (i < 0) return(i);
1305		if (i == 0)
1306			{
1307			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1308			return(-1);
1309			}
1310
1311		if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1312			{
1313			if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1314				{
1315				BIO *bio;
1316				/* In the case where we try to read application data,
1317				 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1318				 * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
1319				 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1320				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1321				bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1322				BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1323				BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1324				return(-1);
1325				}
1326			}
1327		goto start;
1328		}
1329
1330	switch (rr->type)
1331		{
1332	default:
1333#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1334		/* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1335		if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1336			{
1337			rr->length = 0;
1338			goto start;
1339			}
1340#endif
1341		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1342		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1343		goto f_err;
1344	case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1345	case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1346	case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1347		/* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1348		 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1349		 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1350		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1351		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1352		goto f_err;
1353	case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1354		/* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1355		 * but have application data.  If the library was
1356		 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1357		 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1358		 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1359		 * we will indulge it.
1360		 */
1361		if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1362			(s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1363			((
1364				(s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1365				(s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1366				(s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1367				) || (
1368					(s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1369					(s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1370					(s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1371					)
1372				))
1373			{
1374			s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1375			return(-1);
1376			}
1377		else
1378			{
1379			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1380			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1381			goto f_err;
1382			}
1383		}
1384	/* not reached */
1385
1386f_err:
1387	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1388err:
1389	return(-1);
1390	}
1391
1392int
1393dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1394	{
1395	int i;
1396
1397#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1398		/* Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake
1399		 * for reading belated app data with SCTP.
1400		 */
1401		if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) ||
1402		    (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
1403		     (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)))
1404#else
1405		if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1406#endif
1407		{
1408		i=s->handshake_func(s);
1409		if (i < 0) return(i);
1410		if (i == 0)
1411			{
1412			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1413			return -1;
1414			}
1415		}
1416
1417	if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1418		{
1419			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1420			return -1;
1421		}
1422
1423	i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1424	return i;
1425	}
1426
1427
1428	/* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1429	 * is started. */
1430static int
1431have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1432	int len, int peek)
1433	{
1434
1435	if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1436		/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1437		{
1438		unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1439		unsigned char *dst = buf;
1440		unsigned int k,n;
1441
1442		/* peek == 0 */
1443		n = 0;
1444		while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1445			{
1446			*dst++ = *src++;
1447			len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1448			n++;
1449			}
1450		/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1451		for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1452			s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1453		return n;
1454		}
1455
1456	return 0;
1457	}
1458
1459
1460
1461
1462/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1463 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1464 */
1465int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1466	{
1467	int i;
1468
1469	OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1470	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1471	i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1472	return i;
1473	}
1474
1475int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1476	{
1477	unsigned char *p,*pseq;
1478	int i,mac_size,clear=0;
1479	int prefix_len = 0;
1480	SSL3_RECORD *wr;
1481	SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
1482	SSL_SESSION *sess;
1483	int bs;
1484
1485	/* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1486	 * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
1487	if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1488		{
1489		OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS:  want to see if we ever get here */
1490		return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
1491		}
1492
1493	/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1494	if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
1495		{
1496		i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1497		if (i <= 0)
1498			return(i);
1499		/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1500		}
1501
1502	if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1503		return 0;
1504
1505	wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
1506	wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
1507	sess=s->session;
1508
1509	if (	(sess == NULL) ||
1510		(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1511		(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1512		clear=1;
1513
1514	if (clear)
1515		mac_size=0;
1516	else
1517		{
1518		mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1519		if (mac_size < 0)
1520			goto err;
1521		}
1522
1523	/* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1524#if 0
1525	/* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1526	if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1527	    && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1528		{
1529		/* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1530		 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1531		 */
1532
1533		if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1534			{
1535			/* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1536			 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1537			 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1538			 * together with the actual payload) */
1539			prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1540			if (prefix_len <= 0)
1541				goto err;
1542
1543			if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
1544				{
1545				/* insufficient space */
1546				SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1547				goto err;
1548				}
1549			}
1550
1551		s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1552		}
1553#endif
1554	p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1555
1556	/* write the header */
1557
1558	*(p++)=type&0xff;
1559	wr->type=type;
1560
1561	*(p++)=(s->version>>8);
1562	*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1563
1564	/* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1565	pseq=p;
1566	p+=10;
1567
1568	/* lets setup the record stuff. */
1569
1570	/* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1571	 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1572	 */
1573	if ( s->enc_write_ctx &&
1574		(EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1575		bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1576	else
1577		bs = 0;
1578
1579	wr->data=p + bs;  /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1580	wr->length=(int)len;
1581	wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1582
1583	/* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1584	 * wr->data */
1585
1586	/* first we compress */
1587	if (s->compress != NULL)
1588		{
1589		if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1590			{
1591			SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1592			goto err;
1593			}
1594		}
1595	else
1596		{
1597		memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1598		wr->input=wr->data;
1599		}
1600
1601	/* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1602	 * from wr->input.  Length should be wr->length.
1603	 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1604
1605	if (mac_size != 0)
1606		{
1607		if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1) < 0)
1608			goto err;
1609		wr->length+=mac_size;
1610		}
1611
1612	/* this is true regardless of mac size */
1613	wr->input=p;
1614	wr->data=p;
1615
1616
1617	/* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1618	if (bs)	/* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1619		{
1620		RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
1621		/* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
1622		 * the rest of randomness */
1623		wr->length += bs;
1624		}
1625
1626	s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1627
1628	/* record length after mac and block padding */
1629/*	if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1630	(type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1631
1632	/* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1633
1634	s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1635
1636	/* XDTLS: ?? */
1637/*	else
1638	s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1639
1640	memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1641	pseq+=6;
1642	s2n(wr->length,pseq);
1643
1644	/* we should now have
1645	 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1646	 * wr->length long */
1647	wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1648	wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1649
1650#if 0  /* this is now done at the message layer */
1651	/* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1652	if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1653		dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1654			*((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1655#endif
1656
1657	ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1658
1659	if (create_empty_fragment)
1660		{
1661		/* we are in a recursive call;
1662		 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1663		 */
1664		return wr->length;
1665		}
1666
1667	/* now let's set up wb */
1668	wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1669	wb->offset = 0;
1670
1671	/* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1672	s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1673	s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1674	s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1675	s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1676
1677	/* we now just need to write the buffer */
1678	return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1679err:
1680	return -1;
1681	}
1682
1683
1684
1685static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1686	{
1687	int cmp;
1688	unsigned int shift;
1689	const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1690
1691	cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1692	if (cmp > 0)
1693		{
1694		memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1695		return 1; /* this record in new */
1696		}
1697	shift = -cmp;
1698	if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1699		return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1700	else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift))
1701		return 0; /* record previously received */
1702
1703	memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1704	return 1;
1705	}
1706
1707
1708static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1709	{
1710	int cmp;
1711	unsigned int shift;
1712	const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1713
1714	cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1715	if (cmp > 0)
1716		{
1717		shift = cmp;
1718		if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1719			bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1720		else
1721			bitmap->map = 1UL;
1722		memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8);
1723		}
1724	else	{
1725		shift = -cmp;
1726		if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1727			bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift;
1728		}
1729	}
1730
1731
1732int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1733	{
1734	int i,j;
1735	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1736	unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1737	unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1738
1739	s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1740
1741	memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1742	*ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1743	*ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1744
1745#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1746	if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1747		{
1748		s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1749#if 0
1750		if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0)  /* waiting for a new msg */
1751
1752		else
1753			s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1754#endif
1755
1756#if 0
1757		fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1758#endif
1759		l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1760		}
1761#endif
1762
1763	i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1764	if (i <= 0)
1765		{
1766		s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1767		/* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1768		}
1769	else
1770		{
1771		if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1772#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1773		    || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1774#endif
1775		    )
1776			(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1777
1778		if (s->msg_callback)
1779			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1780				2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1781
1782		if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1783			cb=s->info_callback;
1784		else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1785			cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1786
1787		if (cb != NULL)
1788			{
1789			j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1790			cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1791			}
1792		}
1793	return(i);
1794	}
1795
1796
1797static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1798dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1799    {
1800
1801    *is_next_epoch = 0;
1802
1803    /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1804    if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1805        return &s->d1->bitmap;
1806
1807    /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1808    else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1809        (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1810            rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
1811        {
1812        *is_next_epoch = 1;
1813        return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1814        }
1815
1816    return NULL;
1817    }
1818
1819#if 0
1820static int
1821dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
1822	unsigned long *offset)
1823	{
1824
1825	/* alerts are passed up immediately */
1826	if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1827		rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1828		return 0;
1829
1830	/* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1831	 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1832	 * immediately) */
1833	if ( SSL_in_init(s))
1834		{
1835		unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1836		/* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1837		if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1838			rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1839			{
1840			unsigned short seq_num;
1841			struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1842			struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1843
1844			if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1845				{
1846				dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1847				seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1848				*offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1849				}
1850			else
1851				{
1852				dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1853				seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1854				*offset = 0;
1855				}
1856
1857			/* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1858			 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1859			 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1860			if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1861				return 0;
1862			if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1863				seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1864				msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1865				return 0;
1866			else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1867				(rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1868					msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1869				return 0;
1870			else
1871				{
1872				*priority = seq_num;
1873				return 1;
1874				}
1875			}
1876		else /* unknown record type */
1877			return 0;
1878		}
1879
1880	return 0;
1881	}
1882#endif
1883
1884void
1885dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1886	{
1887	unsigned char *seq;
1888	unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1889
1890	if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
1891		{
1892		seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1893		s->d1->r_epoch++;
1894		memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1895		memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1896		}
1897	else
1898		{
1899		seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1900		memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1901		s->d1->w_epoch++;
1902		}
1903
1904	memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
1905	}
1906