1139823Simp/*- 275374Sbp * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Boris Popov 375374Sbp * All rights reserved. 475374Sbp * 5124087Stjr * Copyright (c) 2003, 2004 Tim J. Robbins. 6124087Stjr * All rights reserved. 7124087Stjr * 875374Sbp * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 975374Sbp * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 1075374Sbp * are met: 1175374Sbp * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 1275374Sbp * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 1375374Sbp * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 1475374Sbp * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 1575374Sbp * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 1675374Sbp * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 1775374Sbp * must display the following acknowledgement: 1875374Sbp * This product includes software developed by Boris Popov. 1975374Sbp * 4. Neither the name of the author nor the names of any co-contributors 2075374Sbp * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software 2175374Sbp * without specific prior written permission. 2275374Sbp * 2375374Sbp * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND 2475374Sbp * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 2575374Sbp * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 2675374Sbp * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 2775374Sbp * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 2875374Sbp * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 2975374Sbp * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 3075374Sbp * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 3175374Sbp * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 3275374Sbp * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 3375374Sbp * SUCH DAMAGE. 3475374Sbp */ 35116189Sobrien 36116189Sobrien#include <sys/cdefs.h> 37116189Sobrien__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); 38116189Sobrien 3975374Sbp#include <sys/param.h> 4075374Sbp#include <sys/malloc.h> 4175374Sbp#include <sys/kernel.h> 4275374Sbp#include <sys/systm.h> 4375374Sbp#include <sys/conf.h> 4475374Sbp#include <sys/proc.h> 4575374Sbp#include <sys/fcntl.h> 4675374Sbp#include <sys/socket.h> 4775374Sbp#include <sys/socketvar.h> 4875374Sbp#include <sys/sysctl.h> 49124087Stjr#include <sys/endian.h> 50124087Stjr#include <sys/mbuf.h> 51124087Stjr#include <sys/mchain.h> 5275374Sbp#include <sys/md4.h> 53124087Stjr#include <sys/md5.h> 5475374Sbp#include <sys/iconv.h> 5575374Sbp 5675374Sbp#include <netsmb/smb.h> 5775374Sbp#include <netsmb/smb_conn.h> 5875374Sbp#include <netsmb/smb_subr.h> 59124087Stjr#include <netsmb/smb_rq.h> 6075374Sbp#include <netsmb/smb_dev.h> 6175374Sbp 62156326Syar#include <crypto/des/des.h> 63156326Syar 6475374Sbp#include "opt_netsmb.h" 6575374Sbp 6675374Sbpstatic u_char N8[] = {0x4b, 0x47, 0x53, 0x21, 0x40, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25}; 6775374Sbp 6875374Sbp 6975374Sbpstatic void 7075374Sbpsmb_E(const u_char *key, u_char *data, u_char *dest) 7175374Sbp{ 7275374Sbp des_key_schedule *ksp; 7375374Sbp u_char kk[8]; 7475374Sbp 7575374Sbp kk[0] = key[0] & 0xfe; 7675374Sbp kk[1] = key[0] << 7 | (key[1] >> 1 & 0xfe); 7775374Sbp kk[2] = key[1] << 6 | (key[2] >> 2 & 0xfe); 7875374Sbp kk[3] = key[2] << 5 | (key[3] >> 3 & 0xfe); 7975374Sbp kk[4] = key[3] << 4 | (key[4] >> 4 & 0xfe); 8075374Sbp kk[5] = key[4] << 3 | (key[5] >> 5 & 0xfe); 8175374Sbp kk[6] = key[5] << 2 | (key[6] >> 6 & 0xfe); 8275374Sbp kk[7] = key[6] << 1; 83111119Simp ksp = malloc(sizeof(des_key_schedule), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK); 8478064Sume des_set_key((des_cblock *)kk, *ksp); 8578064Sume des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)data, (des_cblock *)dest, *ksp, 1); 8675374Sbp free(ksp, M_SMBTEMP); 8775374Sbp} 8875374Sbp 8975374Sbp 9075374Sbpint 9175374Sbpsmb_encrypt(const u_char *apwd, u_char *C8, u_char *RN) 9275374Sbp{ 9375374Sbp u_char *p, *P14, *S21; 9475374Sbp 95111119Simp p = malloc(14 + 21, M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK); 9675374Sbp bzero(p, 14 + 21); 9775374Sbp P14 = p; 9875374Sbp S21 = p + 14; 9975374Sbp bcopy(apwd, P14, min(14, strlen(apwd))); 10075374Sbp /* 10175374Sbp * S21 = concat(Ex(P14, N8), zeros(5)); 10275374Sbp */ 10375374Sbp smb_E(P14, N8, S21); 10475374Sbp smb_E(P14 + 7, N8, S21 + 8); 10575374Sbp 10675374Sbp smb_E(S21, C8, RN); 10775374Sbp smb_E(S21 + 7, C8, RN + 8); 10875374Sbp smb_E(S21 + 14, C8, RN + 16); 10975374Sbp free(p, M_SMBTEMP); 11075374Sbp return 0; 11175374Sbp} 11275374Sbp 11375374Sbpint 11475374Sbpsmb_ntencrypt(const u_char *apwd, u_char *C8, u_char *RN) 11575374Sbp{ 11675374Sbp u_char S21[21]; 11775374Sbp u_int16_t *unipwd; 11875374Sbp MD4_CTX *ctxp; 11975374Sbp int len; 12075374Sbp 12175374Sbp len = strlen(apwd); 122111119Simp unipwd = malloc((len + 1) * sizeof(u_int16_t), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK); 12375374Sbp /* 12475374Sbp * S21 = concat(MD4(U(apwd)), zeros(5)); 12575374Sbp */ 12675374Sbp smb_strtouni(unipwd, apwd); 127111119Simp ctxp = malloc(sizeof(MD4_CTX), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK); 12875374Sbp MD4Init(ctxp); 12975374Sbp MD4Update(ctxp, (u_char*)unipwd, len * sizeof(u_int16_t)); 13075374Sbp free(unipwd, M_SMBTEMP); 13175374Sbp bzero(S21, 21); 13275374Sbp MD4Final(S21, ctxp); 13375374Sbp free(ctxp, M_SMBTEMP); 13475374Sbp 13575374Sbp smb_E(S21, C8, RN); 13675374Sbp smb_E(S21 + 7, C8, RN + 8); 13775374Sbp smb_E(S21 + 14, C8, RN + 16); 13875374Sbp return 0; 13975374Sbp} 14075374Sbp 141124087Stjr/* 142124087Stjr * Calculate message authentication code (MAC) key for virtual circuit. 143124087Stjr */ 144124087Stjrint 145124087Stjrsmb_calcmackey(struct smb_vc *vcp) 146124087Stjr{ 147124087Stjr const char *pwd; 148124087Stjr u_int16_t *unipwd; 149124087Stjr int len; 150124087Stjr MD4_CTX md4; 151124087Stjr u_char S16[16], S21[21]; 152124087Stjr 153124087Stjr KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE, 154124087Stjr ("signatures not enabled")); 155124087Stjr 156124087Stjr if (vcp->vc_mackey != NULL) { 157124087Stjr free(vcp->vc_mackey, M_SMBTEMP); 158124087Stjr vcp->vc_mackey = NULL; 159124087Stjr vcp->vc_mackeylen = 0; 160124087Stjr vcp->vc_seqno = 0; 161124087Stjr } 162124087Stjr 163124087Stjr /* 164124087Stjr * The partial MAC key is the concatenation of the 16 byte session 165124087Stjr * key and the 24 byte challenge response. 166124087Stjr */ 167124087Stjr vcp->vc_mackeylen = 16 + 24; 168124087Stjr vcp->vc_mackey = malloc(vcp->vc_mackeylen, M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK); 169124087Stjr 170124087Stjr /* 171124087Stjr * Calculate session key: 172124087Stjr * MD4(MD4(U(PN))) 173124087Stjr */ 174124087Stjr pwd = smb_vc_getpass(vcp); 175124087Stjr len = strlen(pwd); 176124087Stjr unipwd = malloc((len + 1) * sizeof(u_int16_t), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK); 177124087Stjr smb_strtouni(unipwd, pwd); 178124087Stjr MD4Init(&md4); 179124087Stjr MD4Update(&md4, (u_char *)unipwd, len * sizeof(u_int16_t)); 180124087Stjr MD4Final(S16, &md4); 181124087Stjr MD4Init(&md4); 182124087Stjr MD4Update(&md4, S16, 16); 183124087Stjr MD4Final(vcp->vc_mackey, &md4); 184124087Stjr free(unipwd, M_SMBTEMP); 185124087Stjr 186124087Stjr /* 187124087Stjr * Calculate response to challenge: 188124087Stjr * Ex(concat(MD4(U(pass)), zeros(5)), C8) 189124087Stjr */ 190124087Stjr bzero(S21, 21); 191124087Stjr bcopy(S16, S21, 16); 192124087Stjr smb_E(S21, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 16); 193124087Stjr smb_E(S21 + 7, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 24); 194124087Stjr smb_E(S21 + 14, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 32); 195124087Stjr 196124087Stjr return (0); 197124087Stjr} 198124087Stjr 199124087Stjr/* 200124087Stjr * Sign request with MAC. 201124087Stjr */ 202124087Stjrint 203124087Stjrsmb_rq_sign(struct smb_rq *rqp) 204124087Stjr{ 205124087Stjr struct smb_vc *vcp = rqp->sr_vc; 206124087Stjr struct mbchain *mbp; 207124087Stjr struct mbuf *mb; 208124087Stjr MD5_CTX md5; 209124087Stjr u_char digest[16]; 210124087Stjr 211124087Stjr KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE, 212124087Stjr ("signatures not enabled")); 213124087Stjr 214124087Stjr if (vcp->vc_mackey == NULL) 215124087Stjr /* XXX Should assert that cmd == SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE. */ 216124087Stjr return (0); 217124087Stjr 218124087Stjr /* 219124087Stjr * This is a bit of a kludge. If the request is non-TRANSACTION, 220124087Stjr * or it is the first request of a transaction, give it the next 221124087Stjr * sequence number, and expect the reply to have the sequence number 222124087Stjr * following that one. Otherwise, it is a secondary request in 223124087Stjr * a transaction, and it gets the same sequence numbers as the 224124087Stjr * primary request. 225124087Stjr */ 226124087Stjr if (rqp->sr_t2 == NULL || 227124087Stjr (rqp->sr_t2->t2_flags & SMBT2_SECONDARY) == 0) { 228124087Stjr rqp->sr_seqno = vcp->vc_seqno++; 229124087Stjr rqp->sr_rseqno = vcp->vc_seqno++; 230124087Stjr } else { 231124087Stjr /* 232124087Stjr * Sequence numbers are already in the struct because 233124087Stjr * smb_t2_request_int() uses the same one for all the 234124087Stjr * requests in the transaction. 235124087Stjr * (At least we hope so.) 236124087Stjr */ 237124087Stjr KASSERT(rqp->sr_t2 == NULL || 238124087Stjr (rqp->sr_t2->t2_flags & SMBT2_SECONDARY) == 0 || 239124087Stjr rqp->sr_t2->t2_rq == rqp, 240124087Stjr ("sec t2 rq not using same smb_rq")); 241124087Stjr } 242124087Stjr 243124087Stjr /* Initialize sec. signature field to sequence number + zeros. */ 244161523Smarcel le32enc(rqp->sr_rqsig, rqp->sr_seqno); 245161523Smarcel le32enc(rqp->sr_rqsig + 4, 0); 246124087Stjr 247124087Stjr /* 248124087Stjr * Compute HMAC-MD5 of packet data, keyed by MAC key. 249124087Stjr * Store the first 8 bytes in the sec. signature field. 250124087Stjr */ 251124087Stjr smb_rq_getrequest(rqp, &mbp); 252124087Stjr MD5Init(&md5); 253124087Stjr MD5Update(&md5, vcp->vc_mackey, vcp->vc_mackeylen); 254124087Stjr for (mb = mbp->mb_top; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next) 255124087Stjr MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), mb->m_len); 256124087Stjr MD5Final(digest, &md5); 257124087Stjr bcopy(digest, rqp->sr_rqsig, 8); 258124087Stjr 259124087Stjr return (0); 260124087Stjr} 261124087Stjr 262124087Stjr/* 263124087Stjr * Verify reply signature. 264124087Stjr */ 265124087Stjrint 266124087Stjrsmb_rq_verify(struct smb_rq *rqp) 267124087Stjr{ 268124087Stjr struct smb_vc *vcp = rqp->sr_vc; 269124087Stjr struct mdchain *mdp; 270124087Stjr u_char sigbuf[8]; 271124087Stjr MD5_CTX md5; 272124087Stjr u_char digest[16]; 273124087Stjr struct mbuf *mb; 274124087Stjr 275124087Stjr KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE, 276124087Stjr ("signatures not enabled")); 277124087Stjr 278124087Stjr if (vcp->vc_mackey == NULL) 279124087Stjr /* XXX Should check that this is a SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE reply. */ 280124087Stjr return (0); 281124087Stjr 282124087Stjr /* 283124087Stjr * Compute HMAC-MD5 of packet data, keyed by MAC key. 284124087Stjr * We play games to pretend the security signature field 285124087Stjr * contains their sequence number, to avoid modifying 286124087Stjr * the packet itself. 287124087Stjr */ 288124087Stjr smb_rq_getreply(rqp, &mdp); 289124087Stjr mb = mdp->md_top; 290124087Stjr KASSERT(mb->m_len >= SMB_HDRLEN, ("forgot to m_pullup")); 291124087Stjr MD5Init(&md5); 292124087Stjr MD5Update(&md5, vcp->vc_mackey, vcp->vc_mackeylen); 293124087Stjr MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), 14); 294124087Stjr *(u_int32_t *)sigbuf = htole32(rqp->sr_rseqno); 295124087Stjr *(u_int32_t *)(sigbuf + 4) = 0; 296124087Stjr MD5Update(&md5, sigbuf, 8); 297124087Stjr MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, u_char *) + 22, mb->m_len - 22); 298124087Stjr for (mb = mb->m_next; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next) 299124087Stjr MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), mb->m_len); 300124087Stjr MD5Final(digest, &md5); 301124087Stjr 302124087Stjr /* 303124087Stjr * Now verify the signature. 304124087Stjr */ 305124087Stjr if (bcmp(mtod(mdp->md_top, u_char *) + 14, digest, 8) != 0) 306124087Stjr return (EAUTH); 307124087Stjr 308124087Stjr return (0); 309124087Stjr} 310