t1_lib.c revision 284285
1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112#include <stdio.h> 113#include <openssl/objects.h> 114#include <openssl/evp.h> 115#include <openssl/hmac.h> 116#include <openssl/ocsp.h> 117#include <openssl/rand.h> 118#include "ssl_locl.h" 119 120const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 121 122#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 123static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 125 SSL_SESSION **psess); 126#endif 127 128SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { 129 tls1_enc, 130 tls1_mac, 131 tls1_setup_key_block, 132 tls1_generate_master_secret, 133 tls1_change_cipher_state, 134 tls1_final_finish_mac, 135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 136 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 139 tls1_alert_code, 140 tls1_export_keying_material, 141}; 142 143long tls1_default_timeout(void) 144{ 145 /* 146 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for 147 * http, the cache would over fill 148 */ 149 return (60 * 60 * 2); 150} 151 152int tls1_new(SSL *s) 153{ 154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) 155 return (0); 156 s->method->ssl_clear(s); 157 return (1); 158} 159 160void tls1_free(SSL *s) 161{ 162#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 163 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) { 164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); 165 } 166#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ 167 ssl3_free(s); 168} 169 170void tls1_clear(SSL *s) 171{ 172 ssl3_clear(s); 173 s->version = s->method->version; 174} 175 176#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 177 178static int nid_list[] = { 179 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 180 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 181 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 182 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 183 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 184 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 185 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 186 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 187 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 188 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 189 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 190 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 191 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 192 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 193 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 194 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 195 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 196 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 197 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 198 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 199 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 200 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 201 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 202 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 203 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ 204}; 205 206static int pref_list[] = { 207# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 208 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 209 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 210# endif 211 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 212# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 213 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 214 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 215# endif 216 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 217# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 218 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 219 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 220# endif 221 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 222 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 223# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 224 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 225 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 226 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 227# endif 228 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 229 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 230# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 231 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 232 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 233# endif 234 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 235 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 236# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 237 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 238 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 239 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 240# endif 241 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 242 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 243 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 244}; 245 246int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) 247{ 248 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */ 249 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > 250 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0]))) 251 return 0; 252 return nid_list[curve_id - 1]; 253} 254 255int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 256{ 257 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */ 258 switch (nid) { 259 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 260 return 1; 261 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 262 return 2; 263 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 264 return 3; 265 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 266 return 4; 267 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 268 return 5; 269 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 270 return 6; 271 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 272 return 7; 273 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 274 return 8; 275 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 276 return 9; 277 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 278 return 10; 279 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 280 return 11; 281 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 282 return 12; 283 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 284 return 13; 285 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 286 return 14; 287 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 288 return 15; 289 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 290 return 16; 291 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 292 return 17; 293 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 294 return 18; 295 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 296 return 19; 297 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 298 return 20; 299 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 300 return 21; 301 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 302 return 22; 303 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 304 return 23; 305 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 306 return 24; 307 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 308 return 25; 309 default: 310 return 0; 311 } 312} 313#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 314 315#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 316 317/* 318 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this 319 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. 320 */ 321 322# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 323# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ 324# else 325# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, 326# endif 327 328# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 329# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ 330# else 331# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, 332# endif 333 334# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 335# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 336 /* */ 337# else 338# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, 339# endif 340 341# define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ 342 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ 343 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ 344 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 345 346static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { 347# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 348 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) 349 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 350# endif 351# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 352 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 353 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) 354# endif 355# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 356 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) 357# endif 358}; 359 360int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) 361{ 362 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 363 if (p) 364 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen); 365 return (int)slen; 366} 367 368unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, 369 unsigned char *limit) 370{ 371 int extdatalen = 0; 372 unsigned char *orig = buf; 373 unsigned char *ret = buf; 374 375 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 376 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 377 return orig; 378 379 ret += 2; 380 381 if (ret >= limit) 382 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 383 384 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { 385 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 386 unsigned long size_str; 387 long lenmax; 388 389 /*- 390 * check for enough space. 391 * 4 for the servername type and entension length 392 * 2 for servernamelist length 393 * 1 for the hostname type 394 * 2 for hostname length 395 * + hostname length 396 */ 397 398 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 399 || (size_str = 400 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 401 return NULL; 402 403 /* extension type and length */ 404 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); 405 s2n(size_str + 5, ret); 406 407 /* length of servername list */ 408 s2n(size_str + 3, ret); 409 410 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 411 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 412 s2n(size_str, ret); 413 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 414 ret += size_str; 415 } 416 417 /* Add RI if renegotiating */ 418 if (s->renegotiate) { 419 int el; 420 421 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { 422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 423 return NULL; 424 } 425 426 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 427 return NULL; 428 429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); 430 s2n(el, ret); 431 432 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 434 return NULL; 435 } 436 437 ret += el; 438 } 439# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 440 /* Add SRP username if there is one */ 441 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the 442 * Client Hello message */ 443 444 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); 445 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { 446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 447 return NULL; 448 } 449 450 /*- 451 * check for enough space. 452 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length 453 * 1 for the srp user identity 454 * + srp user identity length 455 */ 456 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) 457 return NULL; 458 459 /* fill in the extension */ 460 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); 461 s2n(login_len + 1, ret); 462 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len; 463 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); 464 ret += login_len; 465 } 466# endif 467 468# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 469 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) { 470 /* 471 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message 472 */ 473 long lenmax; 474 475 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) 476 return NULL; 477 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) 478 return NULL; 479 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) { 480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 481 return NULL; 482 } 483 484 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); 485 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret); 486 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 487 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, 488 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 489 ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 490 } 491 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) { 492 /* 493 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message 494 */ 495 long lenmax; 496 497 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) 498 return NULL; 499 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) 500 return NULL; 501 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) { 502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 503 return NULL; 504 } 505 506 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); 507 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); 508 509 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); 510 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, 511 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 512 ret += s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 513 } 514# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 515 516 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { 517 int ticklen; 518 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 519 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 520 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 521 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { 522 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 523 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 524 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 525 return NULL; 526 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, 527 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); 528 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 529 } else 530 ticklen = 0; 531 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 532 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 533 goto skip_ext; 534 /* 535 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for 536 * ticket 537 */ 538 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) 539 return NULL; 540 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); 541 s2n(ticklen, ret); 542 if (ticklen) { 543 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 544 ret += ticklen; 545 } 546 } 547 skip_ext: 548 549 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 550 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6) 551 return NULL; 552 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); 553 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret); 554 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret); 555 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs)); 556 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 557 } 558# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 559 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 560 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 561 562 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) 563 return NULL; 564 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 565 return NULL; 566 567 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 568 s2n(col + 2, ret); 569 s2n(col, ret); 570 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); 571 ret += col; 572 } 573# endif 574 575 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && 576 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 577 int i; 578 long extlen, idlen, itmp; 579 OCSP_RESPID *id; 580 581 idlen = 0; 582 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { 583 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 584 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); 585 if (itmp <= 0) 586 return NULL; 587 idlen += itmp + 2; 588 } 589 590 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { 591 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); 592 if (extlen < 0) 593 return NULL; 594 } else 595 extlen = 0; 596 597 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) 598 return NULL; 599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 600 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) 601 return NULL; 602 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); 603 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 604 s2n(idlen, ret); 605 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { 606 /* save position of id len */ 607 unsigned char *q = ret; 608 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 609 /* skip over id len */ 610 ret += 2; 611 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); 612 /* write id len */ 613 s2n(itmp, q); 614 } 615 s2n(extlen, ret); 616 if (extlen > 0) 617 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); 618 } 619# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 620 /* Add Heartbeat extension */ 621 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) 622 return NULL; 623 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); 624 s2n(1, ret); 625 /*- 626 * Set mode: 627 * 1: peer may send requests 628 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 629 */ 630 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 631 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 632 else 633 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 634# endif 635 636# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 637 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { 638 /* 639 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support 640 * for Next Protocol Negotiation 641 */ 642 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 643 return NULL; 644 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); 645 s2n(0, ret); 646 } 647# endif 648 649# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 650 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { 651 int el; 652 653 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 654 655 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 656 return NULL; 657 658 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); 659 s2n(el, ret); 660 661 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 663 return NULL; 664 } 665 ret += el; 666 } 667# endif 668 /* 669 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See 670 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this 671 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always 672 * appear last. 673 */ 674 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { 675 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 676 /* 677 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the 678 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c 679 * does not. 680 */ 681 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) 682 hlen -= 5; 683 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { 684 hlen = 0x200 - hlen; 685 if (hlen >= 4) 686 hlen -= 4; 687 else 688 hlen = 0; 689 690 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); 691 s2n(hlen, ret); 692 memset(ret, 0, hlen); 693 ret += hlen; 694 } 695 } 696 697 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) 698 return orig; 699 700 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 701 return ret; 702} 703 704unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, 705 unsigned char *limit) 706{ 707 int extdatalen = 0; 708 unsigned char *orig = buf; 709 unsigned char *ret = buf; 710# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 711 int next_proto_neg_seen; 712# endif 713 714 /* 715 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation 716 */ 717 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 718 return orig; 719 720 ret += 2; 721 if (ret >= limit) 722 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 723 724 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 725 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { 726 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 727 return NULL; 728 729 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); 730 s2n(0, ret); 731 } 732 733 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { 734 int el; 735 736 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { 737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 738 return NULL; 739 } 740 741 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 742 return NULL; 743 744 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); 745 s2n(el, ret); 746 747 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 749 return NULL; 750 } 751 752 ret += el; 753 } 754# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 755 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) { 756 /* 757 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message 758 */ 759 long lenmax; 760 761 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) 762 return NULL; 763 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) 764 return NULL; 765 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) { 766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 767 return NULL; 768 } 769 770 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); 771 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret); 772 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 773 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, 774 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 775 ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 776 777 } 778 /* 779 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves 780 * extension 781 */ 782# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 783 784 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { 785 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 786 return NULL; 787 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); 788 s2n(0, ret); 789 } 790 791 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { 792 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 793 return NULL; 794 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 795 s2n(0, ret); 796 } 797# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 798 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 799 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 800 801 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) 802 return NULL; 803 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 804 return NULL; 805 806 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 807 s2n(sol + 2, ret); 808 s2n(sol, ret); 809 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); 810 ret += sol; 811 } 812# endif 813 814# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 815 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { 816 int el; 817 818 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 819 820 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 821 return NULL; 822 823 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); 824 s2n(el, ret); 825 826 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 828 return NULL; 829 } 830 ret += el; 831 } 832# endif 833 834 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 835 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) 836 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) { 837 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 838 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ 839 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ 840 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 841 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 842 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 843 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 844 }; 845 if (limit - ret < 36) 846 return NULL; 847 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36); 848 ret += 36; 849 850 } 851# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 852 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ 853 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) { 854 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) 855 return NULL; 856 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); 857 s2n(1, ret); 858 /*- 859 * Set mode: 860 * 1: peer may send requests 861 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 862 */ 863 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 864 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 865 else 866 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 867 868 } 869# endif 870 871# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 872 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; 873 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 874 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { 875 const unsigned char *npa; 876 unsigned int npalen; 877 int r; 878 879 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, 880 s-> 881 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); 882 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 883 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) 884 return NULL; 885 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); 886 s2n(npalen, ret); 887 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); 888 ret += npalen; 889 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 890 } 891 } 892# endif 893 894 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) 895 return orig; 896 897 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 898 return ret; 899} 900 901# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 902/*- 903 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X 904 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. 905 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: 906 * SNI, 907 * elliptic_curves 908 * ec_point_formats 909 * 910 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, 911 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. 912 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from 913 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). 914 */ 915static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 916 const unsigned char *d, int n) 917{ 918 unsigned short type, size; 919 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 920 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 921 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 922 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 923 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 924 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 925 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 926 927 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 928 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 929 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 930 0x00, /* uncompressed */ 931 }; 932 933 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 934 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { 935 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 936 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 937 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 938 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 939 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 940 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 941 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 942 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ 943 }; 944 945 if (data >= (d + n - 2)) 946 return; 947 data += 2; 948 949 if (data > (d + n - 4)) 950 return; 951 n2s(data, type); 952 n2s(data, size); 953 954 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 955 return; 956 957 if (data + size > d + n) 958 return; 959 data += size; 960 961 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 962 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 963 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); 964 965 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n) 966 return; 967 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) 968 return; 969 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) 970 return; 971 } else { 972 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 973 974 if (data + len != d + n) 975 return; 976 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) 977 return; 978 } 979 980 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; 981} 982# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 983 984int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, 985 int n, int *al) 986{ 987 unsigned short type; 988 unsigned short size; 989 unsigned short len; 990 unsigned char *data = *p; 991 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 992 int sigalg_seen = 0; 993 994 s->servername_done = 0; 995 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 996# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 997 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 998# endif 999 1000# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1001 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 1002 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 1003# endif 1004 1005# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1006 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) 1007 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n); 1008# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1009 1010# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1011 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { 1012 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); 1013 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; 1014 } 1015# endif 1016 1017 s->srtp_profile = NULL; 1018 1019 if (data >= (d + n - 2)) { 1020 if (data != d + n) 1021 goto err; 1022 else 1023 goto ri_check; 1024 } 1025 n2s(data, len); 1026 1027 if (data > (d + n - len)) 1028 goto err; 1029 1030 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { 1031 n2s(data, type); 1032 n2s(data, size); 1033 1034 if (data + size > (d + n)) 1035 goto err; 1036# if 0 1037 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); 1038# endif 1039 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1040 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1041/*- 1042 * The servername extension is treated as follows: 1043 * 1044 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 1045 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 1046 * in which case an fatal alert is generated. 1047 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 1048 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 1049 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 1050 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 1051 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 1052 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 1053 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 1054 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 1055 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 1056 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 1057 * the value of the Host: field. 1058 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 1059 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the 1060 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername 1061 * extension. 1062 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 1063 * 1064 */ 1065 1066 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { 1067 unsigned char *sdata; 1068 int servname_type; 1069 int dsize; 1070 1071 if (size < 2) 1072 goto err; 1073 n2s(data, dsize); 1074 size -= 2; 1075 if (dsize > size) 1076 goto err; 1077 1078 sdata = data; 1079 while (dsize > 3) { 1080 servname_type = *(sdata++); 1081 n2s(sdata, len); 1082 dsize -= 3; 1083 1084 if (len > dsize) 1085 goto err; 1086 1087 if (s->servername_done == 0) 1088 switch (servname_type) { 1089 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: 1090 if (!s->hit) { 1091 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) 1092 goto err; 1093 1094 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { 1095 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1096 return 0; 1097 } 1098 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = 1099 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { 1100 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1101 return 0; 1102 } 1103 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); 1104 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; 1105 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { 1106 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); 1107 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 1108 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1109 return 0; 1110 } 1111 s->servername_done = 1; 1112 1113 } else 1114 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname 1115 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 1116 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, 1117 (char *)sdata, len) == 0; 1118 1119 break; 1120 1121 default: 1122 break; 1123 } 1124 1125 dsize -= len; 1126 } 1127 if (dsize != 0) 1128 goto err; 1129 1130 } 1131# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1132 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { 1133 if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) 1134 goto err; 1135 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 1136 goto err; 1137 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) 1138 return -1; 1139 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); 1140 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; 1141 1142 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) 1143 goto err; 1144 } 1145# endif 1146 1147# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1148 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { 1149 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1150 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1151 1152 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) 1153 goto err; 1154 if (!s->hit) { 1155 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 1156 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1157 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; 1158 } 1159 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1160 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = 1161 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { 1162 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1163 return 0; 1164 } 1165 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 1166 ecpointformatlist_length; 1167 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, 1168 ecpointformatlist_length); 1169 } 1170# if 0 1171 fprintf(stderr, 1172 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", 1173 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 1174 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1175 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1176 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 1177 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 1178# endif 1179 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { 1180 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1181 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); 1182 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); 1183 1184 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || 1185 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 || 1186 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */ 1187 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) 1188 goto err; 1189 1190 if (!s->hit) { 1191 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) 1192 goto err; 1193 1194 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1195 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = 1196 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { 1197 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1198 return 0; 1199 } 1200 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 1201 ellipticcurvelist_length; 1202 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, 1203 ellipticcurvelist_length); 1204 } 1205# if 0 1206 fprintf(stderr, 1207 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", 1208 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 1209 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 1210 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) 1211 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 1212 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 1213# endif 1214 } 1215# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1216# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1217 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1218 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 1219 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1220 1221 if (size < 2) { 1222 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1223 return 0; 1224 } 1225 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1226 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { 1227 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1228 return 0; 1229 } 1230 1231 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1232 /* shouldn't really happen */ 1233 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1234 } 1235 1236 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1237 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1238 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 1239 else 1240 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = 1241 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1242 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 1243 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1244 return 0; 1245 } 1246 } 1247# endif 1248 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 1249 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1250 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, 1251 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1252 { 1253 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1254 return 0; 1255 } 1256 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { 1257 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1258 return 0; 1259 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1260 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { 1261 int dsize; 1262 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) 1263 goto err; 1264 sigalg_seen = 1; 1265 n2s(data, dsize); 1266 size -= 2; 1267 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) 1268 goto err; 1269 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) 1270 goto err; 1271 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1272 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 1273 1274 if (size < 5) 1275 goto err; 1276 1277 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; 1278 size--; 1279 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { 1280 const unsigned char *sdata; 1281 int dsize; 1282 /* Read in responder_id_list */ 1283 n2s(data, dsize); 1284 size -= 2; 1285 if (dsize > size) 1286 goto err; 1287 while (dsize > 0) { 1288 OCSP_RESPID *id; 1289 int idsize; 1290 if (dsize < 4) 1291 goto err; 1292 n2s(data, idsize); 1293 dsize -= 2 + idsize; 1294 size -= 2 + idsize; 1295 if (dsize < 0) 1296 goto err; 1297 sdata = data; 1298 data += idsize; 1299 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); 1300 if (!id) 1301 goto err; 1302 if (data != sdata) { 1303 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1304 goto err; 1305 } 1306 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids 1307 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = 1308 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) { 1309 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1310 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1311 return 0; 1312 } 1313 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { 1314 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1315 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1316 return 0; 1317 } 1318 } 1319 1320 /* Read in request_extensions */ 1321 if (size < 2) 1322 goto err; 1323 n2s(data, dsize); 1324 size -= 2; 1325 if (dsize != size) 1326 goto err; 1327 sdata = data; 1328 if (dsize > 0) { 1329 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { 1330 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, 1331 X509_EXTENSION_free); 1332 } 1333 1334 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = 1335 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); 1336 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) 1337 goto err; 1338 } 1339 } 1340 /* 1341 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. 1342 */ 1343 else 1344 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 1345 } 1346# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1347 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { 1348 switch (data[0]) { 1349 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ 1350 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1351 break; 1352 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ 1353 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1354 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1355 break; 1356 default: 1357 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1358 return 0; 1359 } 1360 } 1361# endif 1362# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1363 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1364 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 1365 /*- 1366 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a 1367 * renegotiation. 1368 * 1369 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we 1370 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on 1371 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when 1372 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an 1373 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing 1374 * anything like that, but this might change). 1375 * 1376 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake 1377 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 1378 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen 1379 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new 1380 * Finished message could have been computed.) 1381 */ 1382 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1383 } 1384# endif 1385 1386 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 1387# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1388 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) 1389 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { 1390 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1391 return 0; 1392 } 1393# endif 1394 1395 data += size; 1396 } 1397 1398 /* Spurious data on the end */ 1399 if (data != d + n) 1400 goto err; 1401 1402 *p = data; 1403 1404 ri_check: 1405 1406 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 1407 1408 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && 1409 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 1410 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1412 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1413 return 0; 1414 } 1415 1416 return 1; 1417err: 1418 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1419 return 0; 1420} 1421 1422# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1423/* 1424 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No 1425 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly 1426 * fill the length of the block. 1427 */ 1428static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) 1429{ 1430 unsigned int off = 0; 1431 1432 while (off < len) { 1433 if (d[off] == 0) 1434 return 0; 1435 off += d[off]; 1436 off++; 1437 } 1438 1439 return off == len; 1440} 1441# endif 1442 1443int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, 1444 int n, int *al) 1445{ 1446 unsigned short length; 1447 unsigned short type; 1448 unsigned short size; 1449 unsigned char *data = *p; 1450 int tlsext_servername = 0; 1451 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 1452 1453# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1454 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1455# endif 1456 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 1457 1458# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1459 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 1460 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 1461# endif 1462 1463 if (data >= (d + n - 2)) 1464 goto ri_check; 1465 1466 n2s(data, length); 1467 if (data + length != d + n) { 1468 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1469 return 0; 1470 } 1471 1472 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { 1473 n2s(data, type); 1474 n2s(data, size); 1475 1476 if (data + size > (d + n)) 1477 goto ri_check; 1478 1479 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1480 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1481 1482 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { 1483 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { 1484 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1485 return 0; 1486 } 1487 tlsext_servername = 1; 1488 } 1489# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1490 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { 1491 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1492 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1493 1494 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 1495 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) { 1496 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1497 return 0; 1498 } 1499 if (!s->hit) { 1500 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1501 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 1502 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1503 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = 1504 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { 1505 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1506 return 0; 1507 } 1508 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 1509 ecpointformatlist_length; 1510 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, 1511 ecpointformatlist_length); 1512 } 1513# if 0 1514 fprintf(stderr, 1515 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); 1516 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1517 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1518 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 1519 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 1520# endif 1521 } 1522# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1523 1524 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 1525 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1526 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, 1527 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1528 { 1529 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1530 return 0; 1531 } 1532 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1533 || (size > 0)) { 1534 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1535 return 0; 1536 } 1537 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1538 } 1539# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1540 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1541 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 1542 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1543 1544 if (size < 2) { 1545 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1546 return 0; 1547 } 1548 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1549 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { 1550 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1551 return 0; 1552 } 1553 1554 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1555 /* shouldn't really happen */ 1556 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1557 } 1558 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 1559 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1560 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 1561 } else { 1562 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = 1563 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1564 } 1565 1566 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 1567 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1568 return 0; 1569 } 1570 } 1571# endif 1572 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1573 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 1574 /* 1575 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status 1576 * request message. 1577 */ 1578 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { 1579 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1580 return 0; 1581 } 1582 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ 1583 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1584 } 1585# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1586 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1587 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 1588 unsigned char *selected; 1589 unsigned char selected_len; 1590 1591 /* We must have requested it. */ 1592 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { 1593 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1594 return 0; 1595 } 1596 /* The data must be valid */ 1597 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) { 1598 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1599 return 0; 1600 } 1601 if (s-> 1602 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, 1603 size, 1604 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != 1605 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 1606 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1607 return 0; 1608 } 1609 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 1610 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { 1611 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1612 return 0; 1613 } 1614 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); 1615 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; 1616 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1617 } 1618# endif 1619 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { 1620 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1621 return 0; 1622 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1623 } 1624# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1625 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { 1626 switch (data[0]) { 1627 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ 1628 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1629 break; 1630 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ 1631 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1632 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1633 break; 1634 default: 1635 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1636 return 0; 1637 } 1638 } 1639# endif 1640# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1641 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { 1642 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1643 return 0; 1644 } 1645# endif 1646 1647 data += size; 1648 } 1649 1650 if (data != d + n) { 1651 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1652 return 0; 1653 } 1654 1655 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { 1656 if (s->tlsext_hostname) { 1657 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { 1658 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 1659 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { 1660 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1661 return 0; 1662 } 1663 } else { 1664 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1665 return 0; 1666 } 1667 } 1668 } 1669 1670 *p = data; 1671 1672 ri_check: 1673 1674 /* 1675 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid 1676 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello 1677 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. 1678 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which 1679 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on 1680 * initial connect only. 1681 */ 1682 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) 1683 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 1684 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 1686 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1687 return 0; 1688 } 1689 1690 return 1; 1691} 1692 1693int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1694{ 1695# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1696 /* 1697 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 1698 * suite, send the point formats and elliptic curves we support. 1699 */ 1700 int using_ecc = 0; 1701 int i; 1702 unsigned char *j; 1703 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 1704 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 1705 1706 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { 1707 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 1708 1709 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 1710 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 1711 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe) 1712 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { 1713 using_ecc = 1; 1714 break; 1715 } 1716 } 1717 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION); 1718 if (using_ecc) { 1719 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 1720 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1721 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) { 1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1723 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1724 return -1; 1725 } 1726 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1727 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1728 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = 1729 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1730 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = 1731 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1732 1733 /* we support all named elliptic curves in RFC 4492 */ 1734 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) 1735 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); 1736 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 1737 sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2; 1738 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = 1739 OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { 1740 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1742 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1743 return -1; 1744 } 1745 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i < 1746 sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) { 1747 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]); 1748 s2n(id, j); 1749 } 1750 } 1751# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1752 1753# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1754 { 1755 int r = 1; 1756 1757 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { 1758 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, 1759 s-> 1760 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1761 if (!r) 1762 return -1; 1763 } 1764 1765 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1766 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1767 /* shouldn't really happen */ 1768 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1769 } 1770 1771 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 1772 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1773 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 1774 } else { 1775 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = 1776 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, 1777 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1778 } 1779 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1781 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1782 return -1; 1783 } 1784 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = 1785 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1786 } 1787 1788 if (r == 2) 1789 /* 1790 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate 1791 * server opaque PRF input 1792 */ 1793 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = 1794 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1795 } 1796# endif 1797 1798 return 1; 1799} 1800 1801int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1802{ 1803# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1804 /* 1805 * If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats 1806 * we support if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note 1807 * that the server is not supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. 1808 */ 1809 1810 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1811 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1812 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) 1813 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 1814 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 1815 1816 if (using_ecc) { 1817 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 1818 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1819 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) { 1820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 1821 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1822 return -1; 1823 } 1824 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1825 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1826 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = 1827 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1828 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = 1829 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1830 } 1831# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1832 1833 return 1; 1834} 1835 1836int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) 1837{ 1838 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 1839 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1840 1841# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1842 /* 1843 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely 1844 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1845 */ 1846 /* 1847 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely 1848 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1849 */ 1850# endif 1851 1852 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1853 ret = 1854 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 1855 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1856 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL 1857 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1858 ret = 1859 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 1860 s-> 1861 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1862 1863# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1864 { 1865 /* 1866 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we 1867 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this 1868 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). 1869 */ 1870 1871 int r = 1; 1872 1873 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { 1874 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, 1875 s-> 1876 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1877 if (!r) { 1878 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1879 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1880 goto err; 1881 } 1882 } 1883 1884 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1885 /* shouldn't really happen */ 1886 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1887 } 1888 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; 1889 1890 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1891 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 1892 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 1893 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) { 1894 /* 1895 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF 1896 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! 1897 */ 1898 1899 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 1900 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1901 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 1902 } else { 1903 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = 1904 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, 1905 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1906 } 1907 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 1908 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1909 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1910 goto err; 1911 } 1912 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = 1913 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1914 } 1915 } 1916 1917 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 1918 /* 1919 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we 1920 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the 1921 * handshake. 1922 */ 1923 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1924 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1925 } 1926 } 1927 1928 err: 1929# endif 1930 switch (ret) { 1931 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1932 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1933 return -1; 1934 1935 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 1936 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 1937 return 1; 1938 1939 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1940 s->servername_done = 0; 1941 default: 1942 return 1; 1943 } 1944} 1945 1946int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) 1947{ 1948 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 1949 int al; 1950 1951 /* 1952 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be 1953 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has 1954 * changed, and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because 1955 * this may influence which certificate is sent 1956 */ 1957 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { 1958 int r; 1959 CERT_PKEY *certpkey; 1960 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); 1961 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ 1962 if (certpkey == NULL) { 1963 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1964 return 1; 1965 } 1966 /* 1967 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate 1968 * et al can pick it up. 1969 */ 1970 s->cert->key = certpkey; 1971 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 1972 switch (r) { 1973 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 1974 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1975 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1976 break; 1977 /* status request response should be sent */ 1978 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 1979 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 1980 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1981 else 1982 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1983 break; 1984 /* something bad happened */ 1985 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1986 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1987 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1988 goto err; 1989 } 1990 } else 1991 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1992 1993 err: 1994 switch (ret) { 1995 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1996 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1997 return -1; 1998 1999 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2000 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 2001 return 1; 2002 2003 default: 2004 return 1; 2005 } 2006} 2007 2008int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2009{ 2010 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 2011 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2012 2013# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2014 /* 2015 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 2016 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it 2017 * must contain uncompressed. 2018 */ 2019 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2020 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2021 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 2022 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) 2023 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 2024 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) 2025 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) 2026 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { 2027 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 2028 size_t i; 2029 unsigned char *list; 2030 int found_uncompressed = 0; 2031 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 2032 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { 2033 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { 2034 found_uncompressed = 1; 2035 break; 2036 } 2037 } 2038 if (!found_uncompressed) { 2039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 2040 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 2041 return -1; 2042 } 2043 } 2044 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 2045# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2046 2047 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2048 ret = 2049 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 2050 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2051 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL 2052 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2053 ret = 2054 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 2055 s-> 2056 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2057 2058# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2059 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) { 2060 /* 2061 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on 2062 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a 2063 * value from the server too. 2064 */ 2065 2066 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2067 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2068 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2069 } 2070 2071 /* 2072 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to 2073 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. 2074 */ 2075 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || 2076 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != 2077 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) { 2078 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2079 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2080 } 2081 } 2082# endif 2083 2084 /* 2085 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the 2086 * callback 2087 */ 2088 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) 2089 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { 2090 int r; 2091 /* 2092 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no 2093 * response. 2094 */ 2095 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) { 2096 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); 2097 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; 2098 } 2099 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; 2100 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 2101 if (r == 0) { 2102 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; 2103 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2104 } 2105 if (r < 0) { 2106 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2107 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2108 } 2109 } 2110 2111 switch (ret) { 2112 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2113 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2114 return -1; 2115 2116 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2117 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 2118 return 1; 2119 2120 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2121 s->servername_done = 0; 2122 default: 2123 return 1; 2124 } 2125} 2126 2127/*- 2128 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the 2129 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle 2130 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. 2131 * 2132 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will 2133 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket 2134 * extension, if any. 2135 * len: the length of the session ID. 2136 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. 2137 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2138 * point to the resulting session. 2139 * 2140 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key 2141 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will 2142 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. 2143 * 2144 * Returns: 2145 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2146 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). 2147 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports 2148 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. 2149 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but 2150 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. 2151 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. 2152 * 2153 * Side effects: 2154 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue 2155 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support 2156 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have 2157 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if 2158 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. 2159 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. 2160 */ 2161int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, 2162 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) 2163{ 2164 /* Point after session ID in client hello */ 2165 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; 2166 unsigned short i; 2167 2168 *ret = NULL; 2169 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 2170 2171 /* 2172 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful 2173 * resumption. 2174 */ 2175 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 2176 return 0; 2177 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) 2178 return 0; 2179 if (p >= limit) 2180 return -1; 2181 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 2182 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 2183 i = *(p++); 2184 p += i; 2185 if (p >= limit) 2186 return -1; 2187 } 2188 /* Skip past cipher list */ 2189 n2s(p, i); 2190 p += i; 2191 if (p >= limit) 2192 return -1; 2193 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ 2194 i = *(p++); 2195 p += i; 2196 if (p > limit) 2197 return -1; 2198 /* Now at start of extensions */ 2199 if ((p + 2) >= limit) 2200 return 0; 2201 n2s(p, i); 2202 while ((p + 4) <= limit) { 2203 unsigned short type, size; 2204 n2s(p, type); 2205 n2s(p, size); 2206 if (p + size > limit) 2207 return 0; 2208 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 2209 int r; 2210 if (size == 0) { 2211 /* 2212 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have 2213 * one. 2214 */ 2215 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2216 return 1; 2217 } 2218 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { 2219 /* 2220 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than 2221 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger 2222 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to 2223 * calculate the master secret later. 2224 */ 2225 return 2; 2226 } 2227 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); 2228 switch (r) { 2229 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ 2230 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2231 return 2; 2232 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ 2233 return r; 2234 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ 2235 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2236 return 3; 2237 default: /* fatal error */ 2238 return -1; 2239 } 2240 } 2241 p += size; 2242 } 2243 return 0; 2244} 2245 2246/*- 2247 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. 2248 * 2249 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. 2250 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. 2251 * sess_id: points at the session ID. 2252 * sesslen: the length of the session ID. 2253 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2254 * point to the resulting session. 2255 * 2256 * Returns: 2257 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2258 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. 2259 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. 2260 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. 2261 */ 2262static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, 2263 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, 2264 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) 2265{ 2266 SSL_SESSION *sess; 2267 unsigned char *sdec; 2268 const unsigned char *p; 2269 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 2270 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 2271 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2272 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2273 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 2274 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ 2275 if (eticklen < 48) 2276 return 2; 2277 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 2278 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2279 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2280 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 2281 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 2282 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 2283 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 2284 if (rv < 0) 2285 return -1; 2286 if (rv == 0) 2287 return 2; 2288 if (rv == 2) 2289 renew_ticket = 1; 2290 } else { 2291 /* Check key name matches */ 2292 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 2293 return 2; 2294 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 2295 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 2296 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2297 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); 2298 } 2299 /* 2300 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity 2301 * checks on ticket. 2302 */ 2303 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 2304 if (mlen < 0) { 2305 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2306 return -1; 2307 } 2308 eticklen -= mlen; 2309 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 2310 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); 2311 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); 2312 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2313 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { 2314 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2315 return 2; 2316 } 2317 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 2318 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 2319 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2320 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2321 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 2322 if (!sdec) { 2323 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2324 return -1; 2325 } 2326 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); 2327 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { 2328 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2329 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 2330 return 2; 2331 } 2332 slen += mlen; 2333 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2334 p = sdec; 2335 2336 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 2337 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 2338 if (sess) { 2339 /* 2340 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect 2341 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session 2342 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by 2343 * standard. 2344 */ 2345 if (sesslen) 2346 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 2347 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 2348 *psess = sess; 2349 if (renew_ticket) 2350 return 4; 2351 else 2352 return 3; 2353 } 2354 ERR_clear_error(); 2355 /* 2356 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. 2357 */ 2358 return 2; 2359} 2360 2361/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ 2362 2363typedef struct { 2364 int nid; 2365 int id; 2366} tls12_lookup; 2367 2368static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { 2369# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 2370 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, 2371# endif 2372# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2373 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, 2374# endif 2375# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2376 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, 2377 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, 2378# endif 2379# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2380 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, 2381 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} 2382# endif 2383}; 2384 2385static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { 2386# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2387 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, 2388# endif 2389# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2390 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, 2391# endif 2392# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2393 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} 2394# endif 2395}; 2396 2397static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2398{ 2399 size_t i; 2400 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { 2401 if (table[i].nid == nid) 2402 return table[i].id; 2403 } 2404 return -1; 2405} 2406 2407# if 0 2408static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2409{ 2410 size_t i; 2411 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { 2412 if (table[i].id == id) 2413 return table[i].nid; 2414 } 2415 return -1; 2416} 2417# endif 2418 2419int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, 2420 const EVP_MD *md) 2421{ 2422 int sig_id, md_id; 2423 if (!md) 2424 return 0; 2425 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, 2426 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2427 if (md_id == -1) 2428 return 0; 2429 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); 2430 if (sig_id == -1) 2431 return 0; 2432 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; 2433 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; 2434 return 1; 2435} 2436 2437int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) 2438{ 2439 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, 2440 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2441} 2442 2443const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) 2444{ 2445 switch (hash_alg) { 2446# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2447 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: 2448 return EVP_sha1(); 2449# endif 2450# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2451 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: 2452 return EVP_sha224(); 2453 2454 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: 2455 return EVP_sha256(); 2456# endif 2457# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2458 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: 2459 return EVP_sha384(); 2460 2461 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: 2462 return EVP_sha512(); 2463# endif 2464 default: 2465 return NULL; 2466 2467 } 2468} 2469 2470/* Set preferred digest for each key type */ 2471 2472int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) 2473{ 2474 int i, idx; 2475 const EVP_MD *md; 2476 CERT *c = s->cert; 2477 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */ 2478 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) 2479 return 1; 2480 /* Should never happen */ 2481 if (!c) 2482 return 0; 2483 2484 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; 2485 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; 2486 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL; 2487 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL; 2488 2489 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) { 2490 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i + 1]; 2491 2492 switch (sig_alg) { 2493# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2494 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 2495 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; 2496 break; 2497# endif 2498# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2499 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 2500 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; 2501 break; 2502# endif 2503# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2504 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 2505 idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; 2506 break; 2507# endif 2508 default: 2509 continue; 2510 } 2511 2512 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) { 2513 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg); 2514 if (md) { 2515 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 2516 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) 2517 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 2518 } 2519 } 2520 2521 } 2522 2523 /* 2524 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not 2525 * supported it stays as NULL. 2526 */ 2527# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2528 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) 2529 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2530# endif 2531# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2532 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) { 2533 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2534 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2535 } 2536# endif 2537# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2538 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) 2539 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2540# endif 2541 return 1; 2542} 2543 2544#endif 2545 2546#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2547int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2548{ 2549 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; 2550 unsigned short hbtype; 2551 unsigned int payload; 2552 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2553 2554 if (s->msg_callback) 2555 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2556 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, 2557 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2558 2559 /* Read type and payload length first */ 2560 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 2561 return 0; /* silently discard */ 2562 hbtype = *p++; 2563 n2s(p, payload); 2564 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 2565 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ 2566 pl = p; 2567 2568 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { 2569 unsigned char *buffer, *bp; 2570 int r; 2571 2572 /* 2573 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type, 2574 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding 2575 */ 2576 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2577 bp = buffer; 2578 2579 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ 2580 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; 2581 s2n(payload, bp); 2582 memcpy(bp, pl, payload); 2583 bp += payload; 2584 /* Random padding */ 2585 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) { 2586 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 2587 return -1; 2588 } 2589 2590 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 2591 3 + payload + padding); 2592 2593 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) 2594 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2595 buffer, 3 + payload + padding, 2596 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2597 2598 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 2599 2600 if (r < 0) 2601 return r; 2602 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { 2603 unsigned int seq; 2604 2605 /* 2606 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 2607 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number 2608 */ 2609 n2s(pl, seq); 2610 2611 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { 2612 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 2613 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 2614 } 2615 } 2616 2617 return 0; 2618} 2619 2620int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2621{ 2622 unsigned char *buf, *p; 2623 int ret = -1; 2624 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ 2625 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2626 2627 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ 2628 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || 2629 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { 2630 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); 2631 return -1; 2632 } 2633 2634 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ 2635 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { 2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); 2637 return -1; 2638 } 2639 2640 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ 2641 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) { 2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 2643 return -1; 2644 } 2645 2646 /* 2647 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14 2648 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. 2649 */ 2650 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); 2651 2652 /*- 2653 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number 2654 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add 2655 * some random stuff. 2656 * - Message Type, 1 byte 2657 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) 2658 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) 2659 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) 2660 * - Padding 2661 */ 2662 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2663 p = buf; 2664 /* Message Type */ 2665 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; 2666 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ 2667 s2n(payload, p); 2668 /* Sequence number */ 2669 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); 2670 /* 16 random bytes */ 2671 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) { 2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2673 goto err; 2674 } 2675 p += 16; 2676 /* Random padding */ 2677 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) { 2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2679 goto err; 2680 } 2681 2682 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); 2683 if (ret >= 0) { 2684 if (s->msg_callback) 2685 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2686 buf, 3 + payload + padding, 2687 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2688 2689 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; 2690 } 2691 2692err: 2693 OPENSSL_free(buf); 2694 2695 return ret; 2696} 2697#endif 2698