auth.c revision 124211
1/* 2 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. 3 * 4 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 5 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 6 * are met: 7 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 8 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 9 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 10 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 11 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 12 * 13 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR 14 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES 15 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. 16 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, 17 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 18 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, 19 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY 20 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT 21 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF 22 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 23 */ 24 25#include "includes.h" 26RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.49 2003/08/26 09:58:43 markus Exp $"); 27RCSID("$FreeBSD: head/crypto/openssh/auth.c 124211 2004-01-07 11:16:27Z des $"); 28 29#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H 30#include <login.h> 31#endif 32#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) 33#include <shadow.h> 34#endif /* defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) */ 35 36#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H 37#include <libgen.h> 38#endif 39 40#include "xmalloc.h" 41#include "match.h" 42#include "groupaccess.h" 43#include "log.h" 44#include "servconf.h" 45#include "auth.h" 46#include "auth-options.h" 47#include "canohost.h" 48#include "buffer.h" 49#include "bufaux.h" 50#include "uidswap.h" 51#include "tildexpand.h" 52#include "misc.h" 53#include "bufaux.h" 54#include "packet.h" 55 56/* import */ 57extern ServerOptions options; 58extern Buffer loginmsg; 59 60/* Debugging messages */ 61Buffer auth_debug; 62int auth_debug_init; 63 64/* 65 * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed 66 * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false 67 * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed 68 * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't 69 * listed there, false will be returned. 70 * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned. 71 * Otherwise true is returned. 72 */ 73int 74allowed_user(struct passwd * pw) 75{ 76 struct stat st; 77 const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL; 78 char *shell; 79 int i; 80#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) 81 struct spwd *spw = NULL; 82#endif 83 84 /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */ 85 if (!pw || !pw->pw_name) 86 return 0; 87 88#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) 89 if (!options.use_pam) 90 spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name); 91#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE 92#define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */ 93 if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL) { 94 time_t today; 95 96 today = time(NULL) / DAY; 97 debug3("allowed_user: today %d sp_expire %d sp_lstchg %d" 98 " sp_max %d", (int)today, (int)spw->sp_expire, 99 (int)spw->sp_lstchg, (int)spw->sp_max); 100 101 /* 102 * We assume account and password expiration occurs the 103 * day after the day specified. 104 */ 105 if (spw->sp_expire != -1 && today > spw->sp_expire) { 106 logit("Account %.100s has expired", pw->pw_name); 107 return 0; 108 } 109 110 if (spw->sp_lstchg == 0) { 111 logit("User %.100s password has expired (root forced)", 112 pw->pw_name); 113 return 0; 114 } 115 116 if (spw->sp_max != -1 && 117 today > spw->sp_lstchg + spw->sp_max) { 118 logit("User %.100s password has expired (password aged)", 119 pw->pw_name); 120 return 0; 121 } 122 } 123#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */ 124#endif /* defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) */ 125 126 /* grab passwd field for locked account check */ 127#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) 128 if (spw != NULL) 129 passwd = spw->sp_pwdp; 130#else 131 passwd = pw->pw_passwd; 132#endif 133 134 /* check for locked account */ 135 if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) { 136 int locked = 0; 137 138#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING 139 if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0) 140 locked = 1; 141#endif 142#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX 143 if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX, 144 strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0) 145 locked = 1; 146#endif 147#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR 148 if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR)) 149 locked = 1; 150#endif 151 if (locked) { 152 logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked", 153 pw->pw_name); 154 return 0; 155 } 156 } 157 158 /* 159 * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is 160 * legal, and means /bin/sh. 161 */ 162 shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell; 163 164 /* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */ 165 if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) { 166 logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s does not exist", 167 pw->pw_name, shell); 168 return 0; 169 } 170 if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 || 171 (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) { 172 logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s is not executable", 173 pw->pw_name, shell); 174 return 0; 175 } 176 177 if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0) { 178 hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns); 179 ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr(); 180 } 181 182 /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */ 183 if (options.num_deny_users > 0) { 184 for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) 185 if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, 186 options.deny_users[i])) { 187 logit("User %.100s not allowed because listed in DenyUsers", 188 pw->pw_name); 189 return 0; 190 } 191 } 192 /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */ 193 if (options.num_allow_users > 0) { 194 for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) 195 if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, 196 options.allow_users[i])) 197 break; 198 /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */ 199 if (i >= options.num_allow_users) { 200 logit("User %.100s not allowed because not listed in AllowUsers", 201 pw->pw_name); 202 return 0; 203 } 204 } 205 if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { 206 /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */ 207 if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { 208 logit("User %.100s not allowed because not in any group", 209 pw->pw_name); 210 return 0; 211 } 212 213 /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */ 214 if (options.num_deny_groups > 0) 215 if (ga_match(options.deny_groups, 216 options.num_deny_groups)) { 217 ga_free(); 218 logit("User %.100s not allowed because a group is listed in DenyGroups", 219 pw->pw_name); 220 return 0; 221 } 222 /* 223 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups 224 * isn't listed there 225 */ 226 if (options.num_allow_groups > 0) 227 if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups, 228 options.num_allow_groups)) { 229 ga_free(); 230 logit("User %.100s not allowed because none of user's groups are listed in AllowGroups", 231 pw->pw_name); 232 return 0; 233 } 234 ga_free(); 235 } 236 237#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE 238 /* 239 * Don't check loginrestrictions() for root account (use 240 * PermitRootLogin to control logins via ssh), or if running as 241 * non-root user (since loginrestrictions will always fail). 242 */ 243 if ((pw->pw_uid != 0) && (geteuid() == 0)) { 244 char *msg; 245 246 if (loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &msg) != 0) { 247 int loginrestrict_errno = errno; 248 249 if (msg && *msg) { 250 buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg)); 251 aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg); 252 logit("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", 253 pw->pw_name, msg); 254 } 255 /* Don't fail if /etc/nologin set */ 256 if (!(loginrestrict_errno == EPERM && 257 stat(_PATH_NOLOGIN, &st) == 0)) 258 return 0; 259 } 260 } 261#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ 262 263 /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */ 264 return 1; 265} 266 267Authctxt * 268authctxt_new(void) 269{ 270 Authctxt *authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt)); 271 memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt)); 272 return authctxt; 273} 274 275void 276auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info) 277{ 278 void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose; 279 char *authmsg; 280 281 /* Raise logging level */ 282 if (authenticated == 1 || 283 !authctxt->valid || 284 authctxt->failures >= AUTH_FAIL_LOG || 285 strcmp(method, "password") == 0) 286 authlog = logit; 287 288 if (authctxt->postponed) 289 authmsg = "Postponed"; 290 else 291 authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed"; 292 293 authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s", 294 authmsg, 295 method, 296 authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ", 297 authctxt->user, 298 get_remote_ipaddr(), 299 get_remote_port(), 300 info); 301 302#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 303 if (authenticated == 0 && strcmp(method, "password") == 0) 304 record_failed_login(authctxt->user, "ssh"); 305#endif 306} 307 308/* 309 * Check whether root logins are disallowed. 310 */ 311int 312auth_root_allowed(char *method) 313{ 314 switch (options.permit_root_login) { 315 case PERMIT_YES: 316 return 1; 317 break; 318 case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: 319 if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0) 320 return 1; 321 break; 322 case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: 323 if (forced_command) { 324 logit("Root login accepted for forced command."); 325 return 1; 326 } 327 break; 328 } 329 logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr()); 330 return 0; 331} 332 333 334/* 335 * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename 336 * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%', 337 * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username. 338 * 339 * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc. 340 */ 341char * 342expand_filename(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw) 343{ 344 Buffer buffer; 345 char *file; 346 const char *cp; 347 348 /* 349 * Build the filename string in the buffer by making the appropriate 350 * substitutions to the given file name. 351 */ 352 buffer_init(&buffer); 353 for (cp = filename; *cp; cp++) { 354 if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') { 355 buffer_append(&buffer, "%", 1); 356 cp++; 357 continue; 358 } 359 if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') { 360 buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_dir, strlen(pw->pw_dir)); 361 cp++; 362 continue; 363 } 364 if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'u') { 365 buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_name, 366 strlen(pw->pw_name)); 367 cp++; 368 continue; 369 } 370 buffer_append(&buffer, cp, 1); 371 } 372 buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1); 373 374 /* 375 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward 376 * compatible and prepend the '%h/' 377 */ 378 file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN); 379 cp = buffer_ptr(&buffer); 380 if (*cp != '/') 381 snprintf(file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, cp); 382 else 383 strlcpy(file, cp, MAXPATHLEN); 384 385 buffer_free(&buffer); 386 return file; 387} 388 389char * 390authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw) 391{ 392 return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file, pw); 393} 394 395char * 396authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw) 397{ 398 return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw); 399} 400 401/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */ 402HostStatus 403check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host, 404 const char *sysfile, const char *userfile) 405{ 406 Key *found; 407 char *user_hostfile; 408 struct stat st; 409 HostStatus host_status; 410 411 /* Check if we know the host and its host key. */ 412 found = key_new(key->type); 413 host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL); 414 415 if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) { 416 user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid); 417 if (options.strict_modes && 418 (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) && 419 ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || 420 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { 421 logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: " 422 "bad owner or modes for %.200s", 423 pw->pw_name, user_hostfile); 424 } else { 425 temporarily_use_uid(pw); 426 host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile, 427 host, key, found, NULL); 428 restore_uid(); 429 } 430 xfree(user_hostfile); 431 } 432 key_free(found); 433 434 debug2("check_key_in_hostfiles: key %s for %s", host_status == HOST_OK ? 435 "ok" : "not found", host); 436 return host_status; 437} 438 439 440/* 441 * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components 442 * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of 443 * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable. 444 * 445 * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ? 446 * 447 * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and 448 * error buffer plus max size as arguments. 449 * 450 * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure 451 */ 452int 453secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, 454 char *err, size_t errlen) 455{ 456 uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid; 457 char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN]; 458 char *cp; 459 int comparehome = 0; 460 struct stat st; 461 462 if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) { 463 snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file, 464 strerror(errno)); 465 return -1; 466 } 467 if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) 468 comparehome = 1; 469 470 /* check the open file to avoid races */ 471 if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 || 472 (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) || 473 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { 474 snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", 475 buf); 476 return -1; 477 } 478 479 /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */ 480 for (;;) { 481 if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) { 482 snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); 483 return -1; 484 } 485 strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); 486 487 debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf); 488 if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || 489 (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) || 490 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { 491 snprintf(err, errlen, 492 "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); 493 return -1; 494 } 495 496 /* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */ 497 if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) { 498 debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'", 499 buf); 500 break; 501 } 502 /* 503 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, 504 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too 505 */ 506 if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0)) 507 break; 508 } 509 return 0; 510} 511 512struct passwd * 513getpwnamallow(const char *user) 514{ 515#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP 516 extern login_cap_t *lc; 517#ifdef BSD_AUTH 518 auth_session_t *as; 519#endif 520#endif 521 struct passwd *pw; 522 523 pw = getpwnam(user); 524 if (pw == NULL) { 525 logit("Illegal user %.100s from %.100s", 526 user, get_remote_ipaddr()); 527#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 528 record_failed_login(user, "ssh"); 529#endif 530 return (NULL); 531 } 532 if (!allowed_user(pw)) 533 return (NULL); 534#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP 535 if ((lc = login_getpwclass(pw)) == NULL) { 536 debug("unable to get login class: %s", user); 537 return (NULL); 538 } 539#ifdef BSD_AUTH 540 if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 || 541 auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) { 542 debug("Approval failure for %s", user); 543 pw = NULL; 544 } 545 if (as != NULL) 546 auth_close(as); 547#endif 548#endif 549 if (pw != NULL) 550 return (pwcopy(pw)); 551 return (NULL); 552} 553 554void 555auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) 556{ 557 char buf[1024]; 558 va_list args; 559 560 if (!auth_debug_init) 561 return; 562 563 va_start(args, fmt); 564 vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); 565 va_end(args); 566 buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf); 567} 568 569void 570auth_debug_send(void) 571{ 572 char *msg; 573 574 if (!auth_debug_init) 575 return; 576 while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) { 577 msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL); 578 packet_send_debug("%s", msg); 579 xfree(msg); 580 } 581} 582 583void 584auth_debug_reset(void) 585{ 586 if (auth_debug_init) 587 buffer_clear(&auth_debug); 588 else { 589 buffer_init(&auth_debug); 590 auth_debug_init = 1; 591 } 592} 593 594struct passwd * 595fakepw(void) 596{ 597 static struct passwd fake; 598 599 memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake)); 600 fake.pw_name = "NOUSER"; 601 fake.pw_passwd = 602 "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK"; 603 fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER"; 604 fake.pw_uid = -1; 605 fake.pw_gid = -1; 606#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD 607 fake.pw_class = ""; 608#endif 609 fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist"; 610 fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist"; 611 612 return (&fake); 613} 614