1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124/* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 152#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 153 154#include <stdio.h> 155#include "ssl_locl.h" 156#include "kssl_lcl.h" 157#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" 158#include <openssl/buffer.h> 159#include <openssl/rand.h> 160#include <openssl/objects.h> 161#include <openssl/evp.h> 162#include <openssl/hmac.h> 163#include <openssl/x509.h> 164#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 165# include <openssl/dh.h> 166#endif 167#include <openssl/bn.h> 168#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 169# include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 170#endif 171#include <openssl/md5.h> 172 173#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD 174static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 175 176static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 177{ 178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 179 return (SSLv3_server_method()); 180 else 181 return (NULL); 182} 183 184IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 185 ssl3_accept, 186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) 187#endif 188#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 189static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) 190{ 191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; 192 193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 194 195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && 196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { 197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { 198 /* 199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp 200 * login name 201 */ 202 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; 203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 204 } else { 205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); 206 } 207 } 208 return ret; 209} 210#endif 211 212int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 213{ 214 BUF_MEM *buf; 215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); 216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 217 int ret = -1; 218 int new_state, state, skip = 0; 219 220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); 221 ERR_clear_error(); 222 clear_sys_error(); 223 224 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 225 cb = s->info_callback; 226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 228 229 /* init things to blank */ 230 s->in_handshake++; 231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) 232 SSL_clear(s); 233 234 if (s->cert == NULL) { 235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 236 return (-1); 237 } 238#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 239 /* 240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and 241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during 242 * handshakes anyway. 243 */ 244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { 245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 246 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 247 } 248#endif 249 250 for (;;) { 251 state = s->state; 252 253 switch (s->state) { 254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 255 s->renegotiate = 1; 256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 257 258 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 259 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 262 263 s->server = 1; 264 if (cb != NULL) 265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); 266 267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { 268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 270 return -1; 271 } 272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 273 274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) { 275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { 276 ret = -1; 277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 278 goto end; 279 } 280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { 281 BUF_MEM_free(buf); 282 ret = -1; 283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 284 goto end; 285 } 286 s->init_buf = buf; 287 } 288 289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { 290 ret = -1; 291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 292 goto end; 293 } 294 295 s->init_num = 0; 296 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; 297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 298 /* 299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. 300 */ 301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; 302 303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { 304 /* 305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the 306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 307 */ 308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { 309 ret = -1; 310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 311 goto end; 312 } 313 314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 315 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 317 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && 318 !(s->options & 319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 320 /* 321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't 322 * support secure renegotiation. 323 */ 324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, 325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 327 ret = -1; 328 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 329 goto end; 330 } else { 331 /* 332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a 333 * HelloRequest 334 */ 335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 337 } 338 break; 339 340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 342 343 s->shutdown = 0; 344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 345 if (ret <= 0) 346 goto end; 347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 349 s->init_num = 0; 350 351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 352 break; 353 354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK; 356 break; 357 358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 361 362 s->shutdown = 0; 363 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 364 if (ret <= 0) 365 goto end; 366#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 367 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D; 368 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D: 369 { 370 int al; 371 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { 372 /* 373 * callback indicates firther work to be done 374 */ 375 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 376 goto end; 377 } 378 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { 379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 380 /* 381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for 382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported. 383 */ 384 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) 385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 386 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 387 ret = -1; 388 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 389 goto end; 390 } 391 } 392#endif 393 394 s->renegotiate = 2; 395 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 396 s->init_num = 0; 397 break; 398 399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 400 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 401 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 402 if (ret <= 0) 403 goto end; 404#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 405 if (s->hit) { 406 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 407 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 408 else 409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 410 } 411#else 412 if (s->hit) 413 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 414#endif 415 else 416 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 417 s->init_num = 0; 418 break; 419 420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 421 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 422 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 423 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ 424 if (! 425 (s->s3->tmp. 426 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 | 427 SSL_aSRP)) 428&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 429 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 430 if (ret <= 0) 431 goto end; 432#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 433 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 434 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 435 else 436 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 437 } else { 438 skip = 1; 439 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 440 } 441#else 442 } else 443 skip = 1; 444 445 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 446#endif 447 s->init_num = 0; 448 break; 449 450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 451 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 452 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 453 454 /* 455 * clear this, it may get reset by 456 * send_server_key_exchange 457 */ 458 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0; 459 460 /* 461 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a 462 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For 463 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if 464 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, 465 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for 466 * key exchange. 467 */ 468 if (0 469 /* 470 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if 471 * provided 472 */ 473#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 474 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) 475#endif 476#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 477 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ 478 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 479#endif 480 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) 481 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 482 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 483 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 484 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 485 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys 486 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) * 487 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 488 ) 489 ) 490 ) 491 ) { 492 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 493 if (ret <= 0) 494 goto end; 495 } else 496 skip = 1; 497 498 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 499 s->init_num = 0; 500 break; 501 502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 504 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 505 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 506 /* 507 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert 508 * during re-negotiation: 509 */ 510 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 511 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 512 /* 513 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see 514 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in 515 * RFC 2246): 516 */ 517 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && 518 /* 519 * ... except when the application insists on 520 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts 521 * this for SSL 3) 522 */ 523 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 524 /* 525 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites 526 */ 527 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || 528 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ 529 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) 530 /* 531 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests 532 * are omitted 533 */ 534 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 535 /* no cert request */ 536 skip = 1; 537 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; 538 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 539 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 540 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 541 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 542 return -1; 543 } 544 } 545 } else { 546 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; 547 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 548 if (ret <= 0) 549 goto end; 550#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 551 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 552#else 553 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 554 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 555#endif 556 s->init_num = 0; 557 } 558 break; 559 560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 562 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); 563 if (ret <= 0) 564 goto end; 565 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 566 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 567 s->init_num = 0; 568 break; 569 570 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 571 572 /* 573 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending 574 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as 575 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely 576 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of 577 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush 578 * unconditionally. 579 */ 580 581 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 582 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { 583 ret = -1; 584 goto end; 585 } 586 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 587 588 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; 589 break; 590 591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 592 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 593 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 594 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 595 if (ret <= 0) 596 goto end; 597 } 598 s->init_num = 0; 599 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 600 break; 601 602 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 603 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 604 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 605 if (ret <= 0) 606 goto end; 607 if (ret == 2) { 608 /* 609 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH 610 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is 611 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses 612 * its key from the certificate for key exchange. 613 */ 614#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 615 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 616#else 617 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 618 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 619 else 620 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 621#endif 622 s->init_num = 0; 623 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 624 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 625 s->init_num = 0; 626 if (!s->session->peer) 627 break; 628 /* 629 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and 630 * digest cached records. 631 */ 632 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 634 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 635 return -1; 636 } 637 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 638 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 639 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 640 return -1; 641 } 642 } else { 643 int offset = 0; 644 int dgst_num; 645 646 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 647 s->init_num = 0; 648 649 /* 650 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert, 651 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for 652 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next 653 * step 654 */ 655 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 656 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 657 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 658 return -1; 659 } 660 } 661 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++) 662 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { 663 int dgst_size; 664 665 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, 666 EVP_MD_CTX_type 667 (s-> 668 s3->handshake_dgst 669 [dgst_num]), 670 &(s->s3-> 671 tmp.cert_verify_md 672 [offset])); 673 dgst_size = 674 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); 675 if (dgst_size < 0) { 676 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 677 ret = -1; 678 goto end; 679 } 680 offset += dgst_size; 681 } 682 } 683 break; 684 685 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 686 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 687 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 688 if (ret <= 0) 689 goto end; 690 691#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 692 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 693#else 694 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 695 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 696 else 697 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 698#endif 699 s->init_num = 0; 700 break; 701 702#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 703 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: 704 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: 705 /* 706 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 707 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the 708 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be 709 * cautious. 710 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 711 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 712 * the client's Finished message is read. 713 */ 714 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 715 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 716 717 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s); 718 if (ret <= 0) 719 goto end; 720 s->init_num = 0; 721 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 722 break; 723#endif 724 725 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 726 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 727 /* 728 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has 729 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 730 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. 731 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 732 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 733 * the client's Finished message is read. 734 */ 735 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 736 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 737 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 738 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 739 if (ret <= 0) 740 goto end; 741 if (s->hit) 742 s->state = SSL_ST_OK; 743#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 744 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 745 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 746#endif 747 else 748 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 749 s->init_num = 0; 750 break; 751 752#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 753 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 754 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 755 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 756 if (ret <= 0) 757 goto end; 758 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 759 s->init_num = 0; 760 break; 761 762 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 763 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 764 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 765 if (ret <= 0) 766 goto end; 767 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 768 s->init_num = 0; 769 break; 770 771#endif 772 773 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 774 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 775 776 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 777 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { 778 ret = -1; 779 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 780 goto end; 781 } 782 783 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 784 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, 785 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 786 787 if (ret <= 0) 788 goto end; 789 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 790 s->init_num = 0; 791 792 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 793 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 794 { 795 ret = -1; 796 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 797 goto end; 798 } 799 800 break; 801 802 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 803 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 804 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, 805 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, 806 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 807 s->method-> 808 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 809 s->method-> 810 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 811 if (ret <= 0) 812 goto end; 813 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 814 if (s->hit) { 815#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 816 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 817#else 818 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { 819 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 820 } else 821 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 822#endif 823 } else 824 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; 825 s->init_num = 0; 826 break; 827 828 case SSL_ST_OK: 829 /* clean a few things up */ 830 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 831 832 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 833 s->init_buf = NULL; 834 835 /* remove buffering on output */ 836 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 837 838 s->init_num = 0; 839 840 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a 841 * HelloRequest */ 842 s->renegotiate = 0; 843 s->new_session = 0; 844 845 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 846 847 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 848 /* s->server=1; */ 849 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; 850 851 if (cb != NULL) 852 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); 853 } 854 855 ret = 1; 856 goto end; 857 /* break; */ 858 859 case SSL_ST_ERR: 860 default: 861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 862 ret = -1; 863 goto end; 864 /* break; */ 865 } 866 867 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { 868 if (s->debug) { 869 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 870 goto end; 871 } 872 873 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { 874 new_state = s->state; 875 s->state = state; 876 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); 877 s->state = new_state; 878 } 879 } 880 skip = 0; 881 } 882 end: 883 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 884 885 s->in_handshake--; 886 if (cb != NULL) 887 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); 888 return (ret); 889} 890 891int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 892{ 893 894 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { 895 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0); 896 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 897 } 898 899 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 900 return ssl_do_write(s); 901} 902 903int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 904{ 905 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1; 906 unsigned int cookie_len; 907 long n; 908 unsigned long id; 909 unsigned char *p, *d; 910 SSL_CIPHER *c; 911#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 912 unsigned char *q; 913 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; 914#endif 915 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; 916 917 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet) 918 goto retry_cert; 919 920 /* 921 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are 922 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down 923 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we 924 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. 925 */ 926 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { 927 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 928 } 929 s->first_packet = 1; 930 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 931 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 932 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 933 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 934 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 935 936 if (!ok) 937 return ((int)n); 938 s->first_packet = 0; 939 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 940 941 /* 942 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte 943 * for session id length 944 */ 945 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) { 946 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 948 goto f_err; 949 } 950 951 /* 952 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may 953 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) 954 */ 955 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1]; 956 p += 2; 957 958 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version && 959 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) 960 : (s->client_version < s->version)) { 961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 962 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 963 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { 964 /* 965 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version 966 * number 967 */ 968 s->version = s->client_version; 969 } 970 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 971 goto f_err; 972 } 973 974 /* 975 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just 976 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check 977 * cookie length... 978 */ 979 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 980 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; 981 982 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 983 984 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) { 985 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 987 goto f_err; 988 } 989 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); 990 991 if (cookie_length == 0) 992 return 1; 993 } 994 995 /* load the client random */ 996 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 997 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 998 999 /* get the session-id */ 1000 j = *(p++); 1001 1002 if (p + j > d + n) { 1003 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1005 goto f_err; 1006 } 1007 1008 s->hit = 0; 1009 /* 1010 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in 1011 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally 1012 * ignore resumption requests with flag 1013 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather 1014 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this 1015 * for security won't even compile against older library versions). 1016 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to 1017 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains 1018 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the 1019 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored. 1020 */ 1021 if ((s->new_session 1022 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { 1023 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 1024 goto err; 1025 } else { 1026 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 1027 /* 1028 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated 1029 * version. 1030 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption 1031 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but 1032 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. 1033 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and 1034 * will abort the handshake with an error. 1035 */ 1036 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous 1037 * session */ 1038 s->hit = 1; 1039 } else if (i == -1) 1040 goto err; 1041 else { /* i == 0 */ 1042 1043 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 1044 goto err; 1045 } 1046 } 1047 1048 p += j; 1049 1050 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1051 /* cookie stuff */ 1052 if (p + 1 > d + n) { 1053 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1055 goto f_err; 1056 } 1057 cookie_len = *(p++); 1058 1059 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) { 1060 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1062 goto f_err; 1063 } 1064 1065 /* 1066 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 1067 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 1068 * does not cause an overflow. 1069 */ 1070 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) { 1071 /* too much data */ 1072 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1074 goto f_err; 1075 } 1076 1077 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 1078 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) { 1079 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 1080 1081 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { 1082 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 1083 cookie_len) == 0) { 1084 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1086 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1087 goto f_err; 1088 } 1089 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 1090 } 1091 /* default verification */ 1092 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 1093 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { 1094 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1096 goto f_err; 1097 } 1098 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */ 1099 ret = -2; 1100 } 1101 1102 p += cookie_len; 1103 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { 1104 /* Select version to use */ 1105 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION && 1106 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) { 1107 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; 1108 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method(); 1109 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1111 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); 1112 s->version = s->client_version; 1113 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 1114 goto f_err; 1115 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION && 1116 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) { 1117 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; 1118 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method(); 1119 } else { 1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1121 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 1122 s->version = s->client_version; 1123 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 1124 goto f_err; 1125 } 1126 s->session->ssl_version = s->version; 1127 } 1128 } 1129 1130 if (p + 2 > d + n) { 1131 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1133 goto f_err; 1134 } 1135 n2s(p, i); 1136 1137 if (i == 0) { 1138 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 1140 goto f_err; 1141 } 1142 1143 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ 1144 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) { 1145 /* not enough data */ 1146 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1148 goto f_err; 1149 } 1150 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) { 1151 goto err; 1152 } 1153 p += i; 1154 1155 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 1156 if (s->hit) { 1157 j = 0; 1158 id = s->session->cipher->id; 1159 1160#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1161 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", 1162 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); 1163#endif 1164 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 1165 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 1166#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1167 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 1168 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 1169#endif 1170 if (c->id == id) { 1171 j = 1; 1172 break; 1173 } 1174 } 1175 /* 1176 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack: 1177 * CVE-2010-4180. 1178 */ 1179#if 0 1180 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1181 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) { 1182 /* 1183 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used 1184 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead 1185 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't 1186 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the 1187 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though. 1188 */ 1189 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 1190 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { 1191 s->session->cipher = c; 1192 j = 1; 1193 } 1194 } 1195#endif 1196 if (j == 0) { 1197 /* 1198 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked 1199 * to reuse it 1200 */ 1201 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1203 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1204 goto f_err; 1205 } 1206 } 1207 1208 /* compression */ 1209 i = *(p++); 1210 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) { 1211 /* not enough data */ 1212 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1214 goto f_err; 1215 } 1216#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1217 q = p; 1218#endif 1219 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { 1220 if (p[j] == 0) 1221 break; 1222 } 1223 1224 p += i; 1225 if (j >= i) { 1226 /* no compress */ 1227 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1229 goto f_err; 1230 } 1231#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1232 /* TLS extensions */ 1233 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { 1234 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) { 1235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1236 goto err; 1237 } 1238 } 1239 1240 /* 1241 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake 1242 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before 1243 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket 1244 * processing to use it in key derivation. 1245 */ 1246 { 1247 unsigned char *pos; 1248 pos = s->s3->server_random; 1249 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { 1250 goto f_err; 1251 } 1252 } 1253 1254 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { 1255 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 1256 1257 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1258 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 1259 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, 1260 &pref_cipher, 1261 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { 1262 s->hit = 1; 1263 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1264 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; 1265 1266 ciphers = NULL; 1267 1268 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1269 pref_cipher = 1270 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, 1271 s-> 1272 session->ciphers, 1273 SSL_get_ciphers 1274 (s)); 1275 if (pref_cipher == NULL) { 1276 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1278 goto f_err; 1279 } 1280 1281 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; 1282 1283 if (s->cipher_list) 1284 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1285 1286 if (s->cipher_list_by_id) 1287 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1288 1289 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1290 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1291 } 1292 } 1293#endif 1294 1295 /* 1296 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1297 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 1298 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. 1299 */ 1300 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; 1301#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1302 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1303 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1304 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1305 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1306 /* Can't disable compression */ 1307 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) { 1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1309 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1310 goto f_err; 1311 } 1312 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1313 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { 1314 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1315 if (comp_id == comp->id) { 1316 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1317 break; 1318 } 1319 } 1320 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { 1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1322 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1323 goto f_err; 1324 } 1325 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 1326 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) { 1327 if (q[m] == comp_id) 1328 break; 1329 } 1330 if (m >= i) { 1331 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1333 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 1334 goto f_err; 1335 } 1336 } else if (s->hit) 1337 comp = NULL; 1338 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { 1339 /* See if we have a match */ 1340 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0; 1341 1342 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1343 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { 1344 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1345 v = comp->id; 1346 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) { 1347 if (v == q[o]) { 1348 done = 1; 1349 break; 1350 } 1351 } 1352 if (done) 1353 break; 1354 } 1355 if (done) 1356 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1357 else 1358 comp = NULL; 1359 } 1360#else 1361 /* 1362 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 1363 * using compression. 1364 */ 1365 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1367 goto f_err; 1368 } 1369#endif 1370 1371 /* 1372 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher 1373 */ 1374 1375 if (!s->hit) { 1376#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1377 s->session->compress_meth = 0; 1378#else 1379 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; 1380#endif 1381 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1382 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1383 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1384 if (ciphers == NULL) { 1385 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1387 goto f_err; 1388 } 1389 ciphers = NULL; 1390 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { 1391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1392 goto err; 1393 } 1394 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ 1395 retry_cert: 1396 if (s->cert->cert_cb) { 1397 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); 1398 if (rv == 0) { 1399 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); 1401 goto f_err; 1402 } 1403 if (rv < 0) { 1404 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 1405 return -1; 1406 } 1407 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1408 } 1409 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1410 1411 if (c == NULL) { 1412 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1414 goto f_err; 1415 } 1416 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; 1417 } else { 1418 /* Session-id reuse */ 1419#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1420 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1421 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL; 1422 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL; 1423 1424 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) { 1425 sk = s->session->ciphers; 1426 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { 1427 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); 1428 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) 1429 nc = c; 1430 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1431 ec = c; 1432 } 1433 if (nc != NULL) 1434 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc; 1435 else if (ec != NULL) 1436 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec; 1437 else 1438 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1439 } else 1440#endif 1441 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1442 } 1443 1444 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { 1445 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 1446 goto f_err; 1447 } 1448 1449 /*- 1450 * we now have the following setup. 1451 * client_random 1452 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1453 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1454 * compression - basically ignored right now 1455 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1456 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1457 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1458 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1459 */ 1460 1461 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1462 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { 1463 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { 1464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1465 goto err; 1466 } 1467 } 1468 1469 if (ret < 0) 1470 ret = -ret; 1471 if (0) { 1472 f_err: 1473 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1474 err: 1475 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1476 } 1477 1478 if (ciphers != NULL) 1479 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1480 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret; 1481} 1482 1483int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1484{ 1485 unsigned char *buf; 1486 unsigned char *p, *d; 1487 int i, sl; 1488 int al = 0; 1489 unsigned long l; 1490 1491 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { 1492 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1493#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1494 p = s->s3->server_random; 1495 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { 1496 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1497 return -1; 1498 } 1499#endif 1500 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1501 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 1502 1503 *(p++) = s->version >> 8; 1504 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; 1505 1506 /* Random stuff */ 1507 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1508 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1509 1510 /*- 1511 * There are several cases for the session ID to send 1512 * back in the server hello: 1513 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1514 * we send back the old session ID. 1515 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1516 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1517 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1518 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1519 * session ID. 1520 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1521 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1522 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1523 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1524 * to send back. 1525 */ 1526 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1527 && !s->hit) 1528 s->session->session_id_length = 0; 1529 1530 sl = s->session->session_id_length; 1531 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { 1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1533 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1534 return -1; 1535 } 1536 *(p++) = sl; 1537 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); 1538 p += sl; 1539 1540 /* put the cipher */ 1541 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); 1542 p += i; 1543 1544 /* put the compression method */ 1545#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1546 *(p++) = 0; 1547#else 1548 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1549 *(p++) = 0; 1550 else 1551 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1552#endif 1553#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1554 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { 1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 1556 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1557 return -1; 1558 } 1559 if ((p = 1560 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 1561 &al)) == NULL) { 1562 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1564 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1565 return -1; 1566 } 1567#endif 1568 /* do the header */ 1569 l = (p - d); 1570 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l); 1571 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; 1572 } 1573 1574 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1575 return ssl_do_write(s); 1576} 1577 1578int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1579{ 1580 1581 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { 1582 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0); 1583 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1584 } 1585 1586 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1587 return ssl_do_write(s); 1588} 1589 1590int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1591{ 1592#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1593 unsigned char *q; 1594 int j, num; 1595 RSA *rsa; 1596 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1597 unsigned int u; 1598#endif 1599#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1600 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; 1601#endif 1602#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1603 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp; 1604 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1605 int encodedlen = 0; 1606 int curve_id = 0; 1607 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1608#endif 1609 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1610 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1611 unsigned char *p, *d; 1612 int al, i; 1613 unsigned long type; 1614 int n; 1615 CERT *cert; 1616 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1617 int nr[4], kn; 1618 BUF_MEM *buf; 1619 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1620 1621 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1622 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { 1623 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1624 cert = s->cert; 1625 1626 buf = s->init_buf; 1627 1628 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; 1629 n = 0; 1630#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1631 if (type & SSL_kRSA) { 1632 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp; 1633 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { 1634 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1635 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1636 tmp.new_cipher), 1637 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> 1638 tmp.new_cipher)); 1639 if (rsa == NULL) { 1640 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1642 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1643 goto f_err; 1644 } 1645 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1646 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa; 1647 } 1648 if (rsa == NULL) { 1649 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1651 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1652 goto f_err; 1653 } 1654 r[0] = rsa->n; 1655 r[1] = rsa->e; 1656 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1; 1657 } else 1658#endif 1659#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1660 if (type & SSL_kEDH) { 1661 dhp = cert->dh_tmp; 1662 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1663 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1664 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1665 tmp.new_cipher), 1666 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> 1667 tmp.new_cipher)); 1668 if (dhp == NULL) { 1669 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1671 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1672 goto f_err; 1673 } 1674 1675 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { 1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1677 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1678 goto err; 1679 } 1680 1681 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { 1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1683 goto err; 1684 } 1685 1686 s->s3->tmp.dh = dh; 1687 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || 1688 dhp->priv_key == NULL || 1689 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) { 1690 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { 1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1692 goto err; 1693 } 1694 } else { 1695 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); 1696 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); 1697 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) { 1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1699 goto err; 1700 } 1701 } 1702 r[0] = dh->p; 1703 r[1] = dh->g; 1704 r[2] = dh->pub_key; 1705 } else 1706#endif 1707#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1708 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { 1709 const EC_GROUP *group; 1710 1711 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp; 1712 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { 1713 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ 1714 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2); 1715 if (nid != NID_undef) 1716 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); 1717 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) { 1718 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1719 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1720 tmp.new_cipher), 1721 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s-> 1722 s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1723 } 1724 if (ecdhp == NULL) { 1725 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1727 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1728 goto f_err; 1729 } 1730 1731 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { 1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1733 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1734 goto err; 1735 } 1736 1737 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1738 if (ecdhp == NULL) { 1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1740 goto err; 1741 } 1742 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) 1743 ecdh = ecdhp; 1744 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { 1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1746 goto err; 1747 } 1748 1749 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh; 1750 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1751 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1752 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { 1753 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { 1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1755 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1756 goto err; 1757 } 1758 } 1759 1760 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1761 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1762 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { 1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1764 goto err; 1765 } 1766 1767 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1768 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { 1769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1770 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1771 goto err; 1772 } 1773 1774 /* 1775 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named 1776 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is 1777 * non-zero. 1778 */ 1779 if ((curve_id = 1780 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1781 == 0) { 1782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1783 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1784 goto err; 1785 } 1786 1787 /* 1788 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and 1789 * allocate memory accordingly. 1790 */ 1791 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1792 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1793 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1794 NULL, 0, NULL); 1795 1796 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1797 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char)); 1798 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1799 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { 1800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1801 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1802 goto err; 1803 } 1804 1805 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1806 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1807 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1808 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1809 1810 if (encodedlen == 0) { 1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1812 goto err; 1813 } 1814 1815 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1816 bn_ctx = NULL; 1817 1818 /* 1819 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in 1820 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four 1821 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1822 * structure. 1823 */ 1824 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1825 1826 /* 1827 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we 1828 * can set these to NULLs 1829 */ 1830 r[0] = NULL; 1831 r[1] = NULL; 1832 r[2] = NULL; 1833 r[3] = NULL; 1834 } else 1835#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1836#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1837 if (type & SSL_kPSK) { 1838 /* 1839 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint 1840 */ 1841 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1842 } else 1843#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1844#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1845 if (type & SSL_kSRP) { 1846 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || 1847 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || 1848 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { 1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1850 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); 1851 goto err; 1852 } 1853 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; 1854 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; 1855 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; 1856 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; 1857 } else 1858#endif 1859 { 1860 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1862 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1863 goto f_err; 1864 } 1865 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 1866 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1867#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1868 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) 1869 n += 1 + nr[i]; 1870 else 1871#endif 1872 n += 2 + nr[i]; 1873 } 1874 1875 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) 1876 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 1877 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) 1878 == NULL) { 1879 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1880 goto f_err; 1881 } 1882 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1883 } else { 1884 pkey = NULL; 1885 kn = 0; 1886 } 1887 1888 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) { 1889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); 1890 goto err; 1891 } 1892 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 1893 1894 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 1895#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1896 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { 1897 *p = nr[i]; 1898 p++; 1899 } else 1900#endif 1901 s2n(nr[i], p); 1902 BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); 1903 p += nr[i]; 1904 } 1905 1906#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1907 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { 1908 /* 1909 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In 1910 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte 1911 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded 1912 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself 1913 */ 1914 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1915 p += 1; 1916 *p = 0; 1917 p += 1; 1918 *p = curve_id; 1919 p += 1; 1920 *p = encodedlen; 1921 p += 1; 1922 memcpy((unsigned char *)p, 1923 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); 1924 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1925 encodedPoint = NULL; 1926 p += encodedlen; 1927 } 1928#endif 1929 1930#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1931 if (type & SSL_kPSK) { 1932 /* copy PSK identity hint */ 1933 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 1934 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, 1935 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); 1936 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1937 } 1938#endif 1939 1940 /* not anonymous */ 1941 if (pkey != NULL) { 1942 /* 1943 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p 1944 * points to the space at the end. 1945 */ 1946#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1947 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1948 q = md_buf; 1949 j = 0; 1950 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { 1951 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, 1952 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 1953 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2) 1954 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL); 1955 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), 1956 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1957 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), 1958 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1959 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n); 1960 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i); 1961 q += i; 1962 j += i; 1963 } 1964 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 1965 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { 1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA); 1967 goto err; 1968 } 1969 s2n(u, p); 1970 n += u + 2; 1971 } else 1972#endif 1973 if (md) { 1974 /* send signature algorithm */ 1975 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1976 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { 1977 /* Should never happen */ 1978 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1980 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1981 goto f_err; 1982 } 1983 p += 2; 1984 } 1985#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 1986 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 1987#endif 1988 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); 1989 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), 1990 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1991 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), 1992 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1993 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n); 1994 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), 1995 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) { 1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); 1997 goto err; 1998 } 1999 s2n(i, p); 2000 n += i + 2; 2001 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 2002 n += 2; 2003 } else { 2004 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 2005 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2007 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 2008 goto f_err; 2009 } 2010 } 2011 2012 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n); 2013 } 2014 2015 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 2016 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2017 return ssl_do_write(s); 2018 f_err: 2019 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2020 err: 2021#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2022 if (encodedPoint != NULL) 2023 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2024 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2025#endif 2026 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2027 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2028 return (-1); 2029} 2030 2031int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 2032{ 2033 unsigned char *p, *d; 2034 int i, j, nl, off, n; 2035 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; 2036 X509_NAME *name; 2037 BUF_MEM *buf; 2038 2039 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { 2040 buf = s->init_buf; 2041 2042 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 2043 2044 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 2045 p++; 2046 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); 2047 d[0] = n; 2048 p += n; 2049 n++; 2050 2051 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2052 const unsigned char *psigs; 2053 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs); 2054 s2n(nl, p); 2055 memcpy(p, psigs, nl); 2056 p += nl; 2057 n += nl + 2; 2058 } 2059 2060 off = n; 2061 p += 2; 2062 n += 2; 2063 2064 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 2065 nl = 0; 2066 if (sk != NULL) { 2067 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { 2068 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); 2069 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); 2070 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean 2071 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) { 2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2073 ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2074 goto err; 2075 } 2076 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n; 2077 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { 2078 s2n(j, p); 2079 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); 2080 n += 2 + j; 2081 nl += 2 + j; 2082 } else { 2083 d = p; 2084 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); 2085 j -= 2; 2086 s2n(j, d); 2087 j += 2; 2088 n += j; 2089 nl += j; 2090 } 2091 } 2092 } 2093 /* else no CA names */ 2094 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off; 2095 s2n(nl, p); 2096 2097 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n); 2098 2099#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 2100 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 2101 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) { 2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2103 goto err; 2104 } 2105 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 2106 /* do the header */ 2107 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 2108 *(p++) = 0; 2109 *(p++) = 0; 2110 *(p++) = 0; 2111 s->init_num += 4; 2112 } 2113#endif 2114 2115 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 2116 } 2117 2118 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 2119 return ssl_do_write(s); 2120 err: 2121 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2122 return (-1); 2123} 2124 2125int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2126{ 2127 int i, al, ok; 2128 long n; 2129 unsigned long alg_k; 2130 unsigned char *p; 2131#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2132 RSA *rsa = NULL; 2133 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2134#endif 2135#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2136 BIGNUM *pub = NULL; 2137 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL; 2138#endif 2139#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2140 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 2141#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2142 2143#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2144 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 2145 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 2146 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 2147 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 2148#endif 2149 2150 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2151 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2152 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 2153 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); 2154 2155 if (!ok) 2156 return ((int)n); 2157 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2158 2159 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2160 2161#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2162 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { 2163 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 2164 int decrypt_len; 2165 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; 2166 size_t j; 2167 2168 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 2169 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) { 2170 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 2171 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp; 2172 /* 2173 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already 2174 */ 2175 if (rsa == NULL) { 2176 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2178 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 2179 goto f_err; 2180 2181 } 2182 } else { 2183 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 2184 if ((pkey == NULL) || 2185 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { 2186 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2188 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2189 goto f_err; 2190 } 2191 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; 2192 } 2193 2194 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ 2195 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 2196 n2s(p, i); 2197 if (n != i + 2) { 2198 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) { 2199 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2201 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2202 goto f_err; 2203 } else 2204 p -= 2; 2205 } else 2206 n = i; 2207 } 2208 2209 /* 2210 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure 2211 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire 2212 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The 2213 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the 2214 * bound is sufficient to be safe. 2215 */ 2216 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2217 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2219 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2220 goto f_err; 2221 } 2222 2223 /* 2224 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of 2225 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, 2226 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and 2227 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt 2228 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 2229 */ 2230 2231 /* 2232 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. 2233 */ 2234 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, 2235 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) 2236 goto err; 2237 decrypt_len = 2238 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 2239 ERR_clear_error(); 2240 2241 /* 2242 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will 2243 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. 2244 */ 2245 decrypt_good = 2246 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 2247 2248 /* 2249 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then 2250 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The 2251 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 2252 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number 2253 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in 2254 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. 2255 */ 2256 version_good = 2257 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); 2258 version_good &= 2259 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); 2260 2261 /* 2262 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2263 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2264 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2265 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 2266 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 2267 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such 2268 * clients. 2269 */ 2270 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { 2271 unsigned char workaround_good; 2272 workaround_good = 2273 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); 2274 workaround_good &= 2275 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); 2276 version_good |= workaround_good; 2277 } 2278 2279 /* 2280 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to 2281 * remain non-zero (0xff). 2282 */ 2283 decrypt_good &= version_good; 2284 2285 /* 2286 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using 2287 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not 2288 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees 2289 * it is still sufficiently large to read from. 2290 */ 2291 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { 2292 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j], 2293 rand_premaster_secret[j]); 2294 } 2295 2296 s->session->master_key_length = 2297 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2298 s-> 2299 session->master_key, 2300 p, 2301 sizeof 2302 (rand_premaster_secret)); 2303 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); 2304 } else 2305#endif 2306#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2307 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { 2308 int idx = -1; 2309 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; 2310 if (n > 1) { 2311 n2s(p, i); 2312 } else { 2313 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { 2314 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2316 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2317 goto f_err; 2318 } 2319 i = 0; 2320 } 2321 if (n && n != i + 2) { 2322 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) { 2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2324 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2325 goto err; 2326 } else { 2327 p -= 2; 2328 i = (int)n; 2329 } 2330 } 2331 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr) 2332 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; 2333 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd) 2334 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; 2335 if (idx >= 0) { 2336 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey; 2337 if ((skey == NULL) || 2338 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) { 2339 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2341 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2342 goto f_err; 2343 } 2344 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh; 2345 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) { 2346 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2348 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2349 goto f_err; 2350 } else 2351 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh; 2352 2353 if (n == 0L) { 2354 /* Get pubkey from cert */ 2355 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2356 if (clkey) { 2357 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1) 2358 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey); 2359 } 2360 if (dh_clnt == NULL) { 2361 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2363 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2364 goto f_err; 2365 } 2366 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey); 2367 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key; 2368 } else 2369 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL); 2370 if (pub == NULL) { 2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); 2372 goto err; 2373 } 2374 2375 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr); 2376 2377 if (i <= 0) { 2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 2379 BN_clear_free(pub); 2380 goto err; 2381 } 2382 2383 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 2384 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 2385 if (dh_clnt) 2386 DH_free(dh_clnt); 2387 else 2388 BN_clear_free(pub); 2389 pub = NULL; 2390 s->session->master_key_length = 2391 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2392 s-> 2393 session->master_key, 2394 p, i); 2395 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2396 if (dh_clnt) 2397 return 2; 2398 } else 2399#endif 2400#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2401 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { 2402 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 2403 krb5_data enc_ticket; 2404 krb5_data authenticator; 2405 krb5_data enc_pms; 2406 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 2407 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 2408 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 2409 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2410 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 2411 int padl, outl; 2412 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 2413 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 2414 int kerr = 0; 2415 2416 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 2417 2418 if (!kssl_ctx) 2419 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 2420 2421 n2s(p, i); 2422 enc_ticket.length = i; 2423 2424 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) { 2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2426 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2427 goto err; 2428 } 2429 2430 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 2431 p += enc_ticket.length; 2432 2433 n2s(p, i); 2434 authenticator.length = i; 2435 2436 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) { 2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2438 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2439 goto err; 2440 } 2441 2442 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 2443 p += authenticator.length; 2444 2445 n2s(p, i); 2446 enc_pms.length = i; 2447 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 2448 p += enc_pms.length; 2449 2450 /* 2451 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption 2452 */ 2453 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) { 2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2455 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2456 goto err; 2457 } 2458 2459 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 2460 enc_pms.length + 6)) { 2461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2462 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2463 goto err; 2464 } 2465 2466 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2467 &kssl_err)) != 0) { 2468# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2469 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2470 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2471 if (kssl_err.text) 2472 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2473# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); 2475 goto err; 2476 } 2477 2478 /* 2479 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will 2480 * return authtime == 0. 2481 */ 2482 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2483 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) { 2484# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2485 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2486 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2487 if (kssl_err.text) 2488 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2489# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); 2491 goto err; 2492 } 2493 2494 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) { 2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2496 goto err; 2497 } 2498# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2499 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2500# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2501 2502 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2503 if (enc == NULL) 2504 goto err; 2505 2506 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2507 2508 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) { 2509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2510 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2511 goto err; 2512 } 2513 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl, 2514 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2515 { 2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2517 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2518 kerr = 1; 2519 goto kclean; 2520 } 2521 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2523 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2524 kerr = 1; 2525 goto kclean; 2526 } 2527 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) { 2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2529 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2530 kerr = 1; 2531 goto kclean; 2532 } 2533 outl += padl; 2534 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2536 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2537 kerr = 1; 2538 goto kclean; 2539 } 2540 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) 2541 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { 2542 /* 2543 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as 2544 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, 2545 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH 2546 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random 2547 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If 2548 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2549 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos 2550 * cipher) 2551 */ 2552 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { 2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2554 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2555 kerr = 1; 2556 goto kclean; 2557 } 2558 } 2559 2560 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2561 2562 s->session->master_key_length = 2563 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2564 s-> 2565 session->master_key, 2566 pms, outl); 2567 2568 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) { 2569 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2570 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) { 2571 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2572 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ, 2573 len); 2574 } 2575 } 2576 2577 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2578 * but it caused problems for apache. 2579 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2580 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2581 */ 2582 2583 kclean: 2584 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms)); 2585 if (kerr) 2586 goto err; 2587 } else 2588#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2589 2590#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2591 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { 2592 int ret = 1; 2593 int field_size = 0; 2594 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2595 const EC_GROUP *group; 2596 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2597 2598 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2599 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { 2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2601 goto err; 2602 } 2603 2604 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2605 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { 2606 /* use the certificate */ 2607 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2608 } else { 2609 /* 2610 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the 2611 * ServerKeyExchange msg. 2612 */ 2613 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2614 } 2615 2616 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2617 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2618 2619 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2620 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { 2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2622 goto err; 2623 } 2624 2625 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2626 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { 2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2628 goto err; 2629 } 2630 2631 if (n == 0L) { 2632 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2633 2634 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { 2635 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2637 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2638 goto f_err; 2639 } 2640 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2641 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { 2642 /* 2643 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication 2644 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the 2645 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we 2646 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is 2647 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly 2648 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group. 2649 */ 2650 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2652 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2653 goto f_err; 2654 } 2655 2656 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2657 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey-> 2658 pkey.ec)) == 0) { 2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2660 goto err; 2661 } 2662 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2663 } else { 2664 /* 2665 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the 2666 * ClientKeyExchange message. 2667 */ 2668 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { 2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2670 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2671 goto err; 2672 } 2673 2674 /* Get encoded point length */ 2675 i = *p; 2676 p += 1; 2677 if (n != 1 + i) { 2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2679 goto err; 2680 } 2681 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { 2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2683 goto err; 2684 } 2685 /* 2686 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it 2687 * to the start 2688 */ 2689 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2690 } 2691 2692 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2693 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2694 if (field_size <= 0) { 2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2696 goto err; 2697 } 2698 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, 2699 NULL); 2700 if (i <= 0) { 2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2702 goto err; 2703 } 2704 2705 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2706 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2707 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2708 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2709 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 2710 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 2711 2712 /* Compute the master secret */ 2713 s->session->master_key_length = 2714 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2715 s-> 2716 session->master_key, 2717 p, i); 2718 2719 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2720 return (ret); 2721 } else 2722#endif 2723#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2724 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { 2725 unsigned char *t = NULL; 2726 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4]; 2727 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; 2728 int psk_err = 1; 2729 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; 2730 2731 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2732 2733 n2s(p, i); 2734 if (n != i + 2) { 2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2736 goto psk_err; 2737 } 2738 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2740 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2741 goto psk_err; 2742 } 2743 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { 2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2745 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2746 goto psk_err; 2747 } 2748 2749 /* 2750 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback 2751 */ 2752 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); 2753 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i); 2754 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, 2755 psk_or_pre_ms, 2756 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2757 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1); 2758 2759 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { 2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2761 goto psk_err; 2762 } else if (psk_len == 0) { 2763 /* 2764 * PSK related to the given identity not found 2765 */ 2766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2767 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2768 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 2769 goto psk_err; 2770 } 2771 2772 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ 2773 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len; 2774 t = psk_or_pre_ms; 2775 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); 2776 s2n(psk_len, t); 2777 memset(t, 0, psk_len); 2778 t += psk_len; 2779 s2n(psk_len, t); 2780 2781 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) 2782 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); 2783 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i); 2784 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { 2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2786 goto psk_err; 2787 } 2788 2789 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) 2790 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); 2791 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 2792 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && 2793 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { 2794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2795 goto psk_err; 2796 } 2797 2798 s->session->master_key_length = 2799 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2800 s-> 2801 session->master_key, 2802 psk_or_pre_ms, 2803 pre_ms_len); 2804 psk_err = 0; 2805 psk_err: 2806 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2807 if (psk_err != 0) 2808 goto f_err; 2809 } else 2810#endif 2811#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2812 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { 2813 int param_len; 2814 2815 n2s(p, i); 2816 param_len = i + 2; 2817 if (param_len > n) { 2818 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2820 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); 2821 goto f_err; 2822 } 2823 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { 2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2825 goto err; 2826 } 2827 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 2828 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { 2829 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2831 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); 2832 goto f_err; 2833 } 2834 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) 2835 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 2836 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 2837 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { 2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2839 goto err; 2840 } 2841 2842 if ((s->session->master_key_length = 2843 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s, 2844 s->session->master_key)) < 0) { 2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2846 goto err; 2847 } 2848 2849 p += i; 2850 } else 2851#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ 2852 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 2853 int ret = 0; 2854 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 2855 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 2856 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; 2857 size_t outlen = 32, inlen; 2858 unsigned long alg_a; 2859 int Ttag, Tclass; 2860 long Tlen; 2861 2862 /* Get our certificate private key */ 2863 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2864 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 2865 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; 2866 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 2867 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 2868 2869 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); 2870 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); 2871 /* 2872 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 2873 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 2874 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a 2875 * client certificate for authorization only. 2876 */ 2877 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2878 if (client_pub_pkey) { 2879 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2880 ERR_clear_error(); 2881 } 2882 /* Decrypt session key */ 2883 if (ASN1_get_object 2884 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, 2885 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE 2886 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { 2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2888 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2889 goto gerr; 2890 } 2891 start = p; 2892 inlen = Tlen; 2893 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt 2894 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { 2895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2896 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2897 goto gerr; 2898 } 2899 /* Generate master secret */ 2900 s->session->master_key_length = 2901 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2902 s-> 2903 session->master_key, 2904 premaster_secret, 32); 2905 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret)); 2906 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2907 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl 2908 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2909 ret = 2; 2910 else 2911 ret = 1; 2912 gerr: 2913 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2914 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2915 if (ret) 2916 return ret; 2917 else 2918 goto err; 2919 } else { 2920 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2922 goto f_err; 2923 } 2924 2925 return (1); 2926 f_err: 2927 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2928#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) 2929 err: 2930#endif 2931#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2932 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2933 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2934 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2935 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2936 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2937#endif 2938 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2939 return (-1); 2940} 2941 2942int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2943{ 2944 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2945 unsigned char *p; 2946 int al, ok, ret = 0; 2947 long n; 2948 int type = 0, i, j; 2949 X509 *peer; 2950 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2951 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 2952 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 2953 2954 /* 2955 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received 2956 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non 2957 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even 2958 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static 2959 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the 2960 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here. 2961 */ 2962 if (s->session->peer == NULL) { 2963 ret = 1; 2964 goto end; 2965 } 2966 2967 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2968 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2969 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 2970 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, 2971 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 2972 2973 if (!ok) 2974 return ((int)n); 2975 2976 peer = s->session->peer; 2977 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2978 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); 2979 2980 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { 2981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 2982 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 2983 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2984 goto f_err; 2985 } 2986 2987 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 2988 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2989 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ 2990 /* 2991 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without 2992 * length field 2993 */ 2994 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 2995 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) { 2996 i = 64; 2997 } else { 2998 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2999 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey); 3000 if (rv == -1) { 3001 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3002 goto f_err; 3003 } else if (rv == 0) { 3004 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3005 goto f_err; 3006 } 3007#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3008 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 3009#endif 3010 p += 2; 3011 n -= 2; 3012 } 3013 n2s(p, i); 3014 n -= 2; 3015 if (i > n) { 3016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3017 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3018 goto f_err; 3019 } 3020 } 3021 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 3022 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { 3023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 3024 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3025 goto f_err; 3026 } 3027 3028 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 3029 long hdatalen = 0; 3030 void *hdata; 3031 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 3032 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3034 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3035 goto f_err; 3036 } 3037#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3038 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", 3039 EVP_MD_name(md)); 3040#endif 3041 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) 3042 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { 3043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3044 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3045 goto f_err; 3046 } 3047 3048 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) { 3049 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 3051 goto f_err; 3052 } 3053 } else 3054#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3055 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { 3056 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3057 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 3058 pkey->pkey.rsa); 3059 if (i < 0) { 3060 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 3062 goto f_err; 3063 } 3064 if (i == 0) { 3065 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 3067 goto f_err; 3068 } 3069 } else 3070#endif 3071#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3072 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { 3073 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3074 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3075 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa); 3076 if (j <= 0) { 3077 /* bad signature */ 3078 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 3080 goto f_err; 3081 } 3082 } else 3083#endif 3084#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3085 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 3086 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3087 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3088 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec); 3089 if (j <= 0) { 3090 /* bad signature */ 3091 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3093 goto f_err; 3094 } 3095 } else 3096#endif 3097 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 3098 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { 3099 unsigned char signature[64]; 3100 int idx; 3101 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); 3102 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); 3103 if (i != 64) { 3104 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i); 3105 } 3106 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) { 3107 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx]; 3108 } 3109 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3110 32); 3111 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3112 if (j <= 0) { 3113 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3115 goto f_err; 3116 } 3117 } else { 3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3119 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 3120 goto f_err; 3121 } 3122 3123 ret = 1; 3124 if (0) { 3125 f_err: 3126 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3127 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3128 } 3129 end: 3130 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 3131 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); 3132 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; 3133 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 3134 } 3135 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 3136 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 3137 return (ret); 3138} 3139 3140int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 3141{ 3142 int i, ok, al, ret = -1; 3143 X509 *x = NULL; 3144 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n; 3145 const unsigned char *p, *q; 3146 unsigned char *d; 3147 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 3148 3149 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3150 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 3151 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 3152 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); 3153 3154 if (!ok) 3155 return ((int)n); 3156 3157 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 3158 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3159 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3161 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3162 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3163 goto f_err; 3164 } 3165 /* 3166 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list 3167 */ 3168 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3170 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 3171 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3172 goto f_err; 3173 } 3174 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 3175 return (1); 3176 } 3177 3178 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 3179 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 3181 goto f_err; 3182 } 3183 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3184 3185 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 3186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3187 goto err; 3188 } 3189 3190 n2l3(p, llen); 3191 if (llen + 3 != n) { 3192 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3194 goto f_err; 3195 } 3196 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) { 3197 n2l3(p, l); 3198 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) { 3199 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3201 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3202 goto f_err; 3203 } 3204 3205 q = p; 3206 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l); 3207 if (x == NULL) { 3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 3209 goto err; 3210 } 3211 if (p != (q + l)) { 3212 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3214 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3215 goto f_err; 3216 } 3217 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 3218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3219 goto err; 3220 } 3221 x = NULL; 3222 nc += l + 3; 3223 } 3224 3225 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { 3226 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 3227 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 3228 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3230 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 3231 goto f_err; 3232 } 3233 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 3234 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3235 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3237 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3238 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3239 goto f_err; 3240 } 3241 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 3242 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 3243 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3244 goto f_err; 3245 } 3246 } else { 3247 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 3248 if (i <= 0) { 3249 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 3250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3251 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); 3252 goto f_err; 3253 } 3254 } 3255 3256 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 3257 X509_free(s->session->peer); 3258 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); 3259 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 3260 3261 /* 3262 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we 3263 * arrive here. 3264 */ 3265 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { 3266 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 3267 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { 3268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3269 goto err; 3270 } 3271 } 3272 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 3273 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 3274 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; 3275 /* 3276 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own 3277 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c 3278 */ 3279 3280 sk = NULL; 3281 3282 ret = 1; 3283 if (0) { 3284 f_err: 3285 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3286 err: 3287 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3288 } 3289 3290 if (x != NULL) 3291 X509_free(x); 3292 if (sk != NULL) 3293 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 3294 return (ret); 3295} 3296 3297int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 3298{ 3299 CERT_PKEY *cpk; 3300 3301 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { 3302 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); 3303 if (cpk == NULL) { 3304 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 3305 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || 3306 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) { 3307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 3308 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3309 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3310 return (0); 3311 } 3312 } 3313 3314 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) { 3315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3316 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3317 return (0); 3318 } 3319 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 3320 } 3321 3322 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 3323 return ssl_do_write(s); 3324} 3325 3326#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 3327/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 3328int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 3329{ 3330 unsigned char *senc = NULL; 3331 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3332 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3333 3334 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { 3335 unsigned char *p, *macstart; 3336 const unsigned char *const_p; 3337 int len, slen_full, slen; 3338 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3339 unsigned int hlen; 3340 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3341 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3342 unsigned char key_name[16]; 3343 3344 /* get session encoding length */ 3345 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3346 /* 3347 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too 3348 * long 3349 */ 3350 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { 3351 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3352 return -1; 3353 } 3354 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); 3355 if (!senc) { 3356 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3357 return -1; 3358 } 3359 3360 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3361 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3362 3363 p = senc; 3364 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) 3365 goto err; 3366 3367 /* 3368 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up 3369 */ 3370 const_p = senc; 3371 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 3372 if (sess == NULL) 3373 goto err; 3374 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ 3375 3376 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 3377 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ 3378 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3379 goto err; 3380 } 3381 p = senc; 3382 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { 3383 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3384 goto err; 3385 } 3386 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3387 3388 /*- 3389 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3390 * follows handshake_header_length + 3391 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 3392 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 3393 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 3394 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 3395 */ 3396 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 3397 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + 3398 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 3399 goto err; 3400 3401 p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 3402 /* 3403 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does 3404 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. 3405 */ 3406 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 3407 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 3408 &hctx, 1) < 0) 3409 goto err; 3410 } else { 3411 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0) 3412 goto err; 3413 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3414 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) 3415 goto err; 3416 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3417 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL)) 3418 goto err; 3419 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 3420 } 3421 3422 /* 3423 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified 3424 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for 3425 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. 3426 */ 3427 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); 3428 3429 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 3430 p += 2; 3431 /* Output key name */ 3432 macstart = p; 3433 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 3434 p += 16; 3435 /* output IV */ 3436 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 3437 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3438 /* Encrypt session data */ 3439 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) 3440 goto err; 3441 p += len; 3442 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len)) 3443 goto err; 3444 p += len; 3445 3446 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) 3447 goto err; 3448 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) 3449 goto err; 3450 3451 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3452 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3453 3454 p += hlen; 3455 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 3456 /* Total length */ 3457 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s); 3458 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */ 3459 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4; 3460 s2n(len - 6, p); 3461 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len); 3462 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 3463 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3464 } 3465 3466 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 3467 return ssl_do_write(s); 3468 err: 3469 if (senc) 3470 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3471 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3472 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3473 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3474 return -1; 3475} 3476 3477int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 3478{ 3479 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { 3480 unsigned char *p; 3481 /*- 3482 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3483 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + 3484 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 3485 * + (ocsp response) 3486 */ 3487 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) { 3488 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3489 return -1; 3490 } 3491 3492 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3493 3494 /* do the header */ 3495 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 3496 /* message length */ 3497 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); 3498 /* status type */ 3499 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; 3500 /* length of OCSP response */ 3501 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 3502 /* actual response */ 3503 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 3504 /* number of bytes to write */ 3505 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 3506 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 3507 s->init_off = 0; 3508 } 3509 3510 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 3511 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3512} 3513 3514# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 3515/* 3516 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. 3517 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found 3518 */ 3519int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) 3520{ 3521 int ok; 3522 int proto_len, padding_len; 3523 long n; 3524 const unsigned char *p; 3525 3526 /* 3527 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the 3528 * extension in their ClientHello 3529 */ 3530 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { 3531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, 3532 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); 3533 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3534 return -1; 3535 } 3536 3537 /* See the payload format below */ 3538 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3539 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, 3540 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, 3541 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok); 3542 3543 if (!ok) 3544 return ((int)n); 3545 3546 /* 3547 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in 3548 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by 3549 * ssl3_get_finished). 3550 */ 3551 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { 3552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); 3553 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3554 return -1; 3555 } 3556 3557 if (n < 2) { 3558 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3559 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ 3560 } 3561 3562 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3563 3564 /*- 3565 * The payload looks like: 3566 * uint8 proto_len; 3567 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 3568 * uint8 padding_len; 3569 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 3570 */ 3571 proto_len = p[0]; 3572 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) { 3573 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3574 return 0; 3575 } 3576 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; 3577 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) { 3578 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3579 return 0; 3580 } 3581 3582 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); 3583 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { 3584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3585 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3586 return 0; 3587 } 3588 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); 3589 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; 3590 3591 return 1; 3592} 3593# endif 3594 3595#endif 3596