Searched refs:x1OrderPlus (Results 1 - 22 of 22) sorted by relevance

/macosx-10.9.5/Security-55471.14.18/include/security_cryptkit/
H A DCryptKitAsn1.h41 x1OrderPlus BigIntegerStr,
60 CSSM_DATA x1OrderPlus; member in struct:__anon3662
H A DcurveParams.c78 const arrayDigit *x1OrderPlus; member in struct:__anon3677
807 cp->x1OrderPlus = arrayToGiant(cps->x1OrderPlus);
858 newcp->x1OrderPlus = copyGiant(cp->x1OrderPlus);
911 if(cp->x1OrderPlus != NULL) {
912 freeGiant(cp->x1OrderPlus);
987 if(gcompg(cp1->x1OrderPlus, cp2->x1OrderPlus)) {
1002 * Obtain the lesser of {x1OrderPlus, x1OrderMinu
[all...]
H A DcurveParams.h103 giant x1OrderPlus; member in struct:__anon3678
132 * Reciprocals of lesserX1Order() and x1OrderPlus. Calculated
194 * Obtain the lesser of {x1OrderPlus, x1OrderMinus}. Returned value is not
H A DCryptKitAsn1.cpp30 { SEC_ASN1_SIGNED, offsetof(FEECurveParametersASN1,x1OrderPlus) },
H A DbyteRep.c164 ENC_GIANT(cp->x1OrderPlus, buf, numBytes, i);
228 lengthOfByteRepGiant(cp->x1OrderPlus) +
417 DEC_GIANT(cp->x1OrderPlus, buf, bufLen, gLen, bytes, abort);
H A DNSFEEPublicKey.m390 if(!ECDSA_SIG_DEFAULT || isZero(cp->x1OrderPlus)) {
424 if(!ECDSA_SIG_DEFAULT || isZero(cp->x1OrderPlus)) {
H A Delliptic.c1095 if((lesserX1Ord == cp->x1OrderPlus) &&
1098 * lesserX1Ord happens to be x1OrderPlus, and we
1099 * have a reciprocal for x1OrderPlus. Copy it over.
1119 * reciprocal of x1OrderPlus.
1125 if((cp->x1OrderPlus == lesserX1Order(cp)) &&
1128 * lesserX1Order happens to be x1OrderPlus, and we
1138 make_recip(cp->x1OrderPlus, cp->x1OrderPlusRecip);
1148 CKASSERT(!isZero(cp->x1OrderPlus));
1154 curveOrderJustifyWithRecip(g, cp->x1OrderPlus, cp->x1OrderPlusRecip);
1158 * g := g mod x1OrderPlus
[all...]
H A DCryptKitDER.cpp387 giantToCssmData(cp->x1OrderPlus, asnCp.x1OrderPlus, coder);
420 cp->x1OrderPlus = cssmDataToGiant(asnCp.x1OrderPlus);
H A Dckutilities.c254 printf(" x1OrderPlus : ");
255 printGiant(p->x1OrderPlus);
H A DfeeDigitalSignature.c59 * true : justify randGiant to [2, x1OrderPlus-2]
140 * Justify randGiant to be in [2, x1OrderPlus]
310 /* u := u mod x1OrderPlus */
318 modg_via_recip(cp->x1OrderPlus, cp->x1OrderPlusRecip, sinst->u);
H A DfeeECDSA.c31 x1OrderPlus = IEEE r = (always prime) order of x1Plus
40 1) Obtain random u in [2, x1OrderPlus-2];
42 3) Reduce: c := c mod x1OrderPlus;
44 5) Compute u^(-1) (mod x1OrderPlus);
47 d = [u^(-1) (f + (s*c))] (mod x1OrderPlus)
51 in the pair must be in [1, x1OrderPlus-1].
58 1) Compute h = d^(-1) (mod x1OrderPlus);
61 3) Compute h1 = h1 * h (mod x1OrderPlus) (i.e., = f * h)
62 4) Compute h2 = c * h (mod x1OrderPlus);
67 9) cPrime = x coordinate of elliptic sum, mod x1OrderPlus
[all...]
/macosx-10.9.5/Security-55471.14.18/libsecurity_cryptkit/lib/
H A DCryptKitAsn1.h41 x1OrderPlus BigIntegerStr,
60 CSSM_DATA x1OrderPlus; member in struct:__anon4377
H A DcurveParams.c78 const arrayDigit *x1OrderPlus; member in struct:__anon4392
807 cp->x1OrderPlus = arrayToGiant(cps->x1OrderPlus);
858 newcp->x1OrderPlus = copyGiant(cp->x1OrderPlus);
911 if(cp->x1OrderPlus != NULL) {
912 freeGiant(cp->x1OrderPlus);
987 if(gcompg(cp1->x1OrderPlus, cp2->x1OrderPlus)) {
1002 * Obtain the lesser of {x1OrderPlus, x1OrderMinu
[all...]
H A DcurveParams.h103 giant x1OrderPlus; member in struct:__anon4393
132 * Reciprocals of lesserX1Order() and x1OrderPlus. Calculated
194 * Obtain the lesser of {x1OrderPlus, x1OrderMinus}. Returned value is not
H A DCryptKitAsn1.cpp30 { SEC_ASN1_SIGNED, offsetof(FEECurveParametersASN1,x1OrderPlus) },
H A DbyteRep.c164 ENC_GIANT(cp->x1OrderPlus, buf, numBytes, i);
228 lengthOfByteRepGiant(cp->x1OrderPlus) +
417 DEC_GIANT(cp->x1OrderPlus, buf, bufLen, gLen, bytes, abort);
H A DNSFEEPublicKey.m390 if(!ECDSA_SIG_DEFAULT || isZero(cp->x1OrderPlus)) {
424 if(!ECDSA_SIG_DEFAULT || isZero(cp->x1OrderPlus)) {
H A Delliptic.c1095 if((lesserX1Ord == cp->x1OrderPlus) &&
1098 * lesserX1Ord happens to be x1OrderPlus, and we
1099 * have a reciprocal for x1OrderPlus. Copy it over.
1119 * reciprocal of x1OrderPlus.
1125 if((cp->x1OrderPlus == lesserX1Order(cp)) &&
1128 * lesserX1Order happens to be x1OrderPlus, and we
1138 make_recip(cp->x1OrderPlus, cp->x1OrderPlusRecip);
1148 CKASSERT(!isZero(cp->x1OrderPlus));
1154 curveOrderJustifyWithRecip(g, cp->x1OrderPlus, cp->x1OrderPlusRecip);
1158 * g := g mod x1OrderPlus
[all...]
H A DCryptKitDER.cpp387 giantToCssmData(cp->x1OrderPlus, asnCp.x1OrderPlus, coder);
420 cp->x1OrderPlus = cssmDataToGiant(asnCp.x1OrderPlus);
H A Dckutilities.c254 printf(" x1OrderPlus : ");
255 printGiant(p->x1OrderPlus);
H A DfeeDigitalSignature.c59 * true : justify randGiant to [2, x1OrderPlus-2]
140 * Justify randGiant to be in [2, x1OrderPlus]
310 /* u := u mod x1OrderPlus */
318 modg_via_recip(cp->x1OrderPlus, cp->x1OrderPlusRecip, sinst->u);
H A DfeeECDSA.c31 x1OrderPlus = IEEE r = (always prime) order of x1Plus
40 1) Obtain random u in [2, x1OrderPlus-2];
42 3) Reduce: c := c mod x1OrderPlus;
44 5) Compute u^(-1) (mod x1OrderPlus);
47 d = [u^(-1) (f + (s*c))] (mod x1OrderPlus)
51 in the pair must be in [1, x1OrderPlus-1].
58 1) Compute h = d^(-1) (mod x1OrderPlus);
61 3) Compute h1 = h1 * h (mod x1OrderPlus) (i.e., = f * h)
62 4) Compute h2 = c * h (mod x1OrderPlus);
67 9) cPrime = x coordinate of elliptic sum, mod x1OrderPlus
[all...]

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