Searched hist:100082 (Results 1 - 5 of 5) sorted by relevance
| /freebsd-10.0-release/sys/dev/random/ | ||
| H A D | hash.c | diff 100082 Mon Jul 15 11:58:35 MDT 2002 markm Upgrade the random device to use a "real" hash instead of building one out of a block cipher. This has 2 advantages: 1) The code is _much_ simpler 2) We aren't committing our security to one algorithm (much as we may think we trust AES). While I'm here, make an explicit reseed do a slow reseed instead of a fast; this is in line with what the original paper suggested. |
| H A D | hash.h | diff 100082 Mon Jul 15 11:58:35 MDT 2002 markm Upgrade the random device to use a "real" hash instead of building one out of a block cipher. This has 2 advantages: 1) The code is _much_ simpler 2) We aren't committing our security to one algorithm (much as we may think we trust AES). While I'm here, make an explicit reseed do a slow reseed instead of a fast; this is in line with what the original paper suggested. |
| H A D | yarrow.c | diff 100082 Mon Jul 15 11:58:35 MDT 2002 markm Upgrade the random device to use a "real" hash instead of building one out of a block cipher. This has 2 advantages: 1) The code is _much_ simpler 2) We aren't committing our security to one algorithm (much as we may think we trust AES). While I'm here, make an explicit reseed do a slow reseed instead of a fast; this is in line with what the original paper suggested. |
| /freebsd-10.0-release/sys/modules/random/ | ||
| H A D | Makefile | diff 100082 Mon Jul 15 11:58:35 MDT 2002 markm Upgrade the random device to use a "real" hash instead of building one out of a block cipher. This has 2 advantages: 1) The code is _much_ simpler 2) We aren't committing our security to one algorithm (much as we may think we trust AES). While I'm here, make an explicit reseed do a slow reseed instead of a fast; this is in line with what the original paper suggested. |
| /freebsd-10.0-release/sys/conf/ | ||
| H A D | files | diff 100082 Mon Jul 15 11:58:35 MDT 2002 markm Upgrade the random device to use a "real" hash instead of building one out of a block cipher. This has 2 advantages: 1) The code is _much_ simpler 2) We aren't committing our security to one algorithm (much as we may think we trust AES). While I'm here, make an explicit reseed do a slow reseed instead of a fast; this is in line with what the original paper suggested. |
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