(* Title: HOL/UNITY/Simple/Mutex.thy Author: Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory Copyright 1998 University of Cambridge Based on "A Family of 2-Process Mutual Exclusion Algorithms" by J Misra. *) theory Mutex imports "../UNITY_Main" begin record state = p :: bool m :: int n :: int u :: bool v :: bool type_synonym command = "(state*state) set" (** The program for process U **) definition U0 :: command where "U0 = {(s,s'). s' = s (|u:=True, m:=1|) & m s = 0}" definition U1 :: command where "U1 = {(s,s'). s' = s (|p:= v s, m:=2|) & m s = 1}" definition U2 :: command where "U2 = {(s,s'). s' = s (|m:=3|) & ~ p s & m s = 2}" definition U3 :: command where "U3 = {(s,s'). s' = s (|u:=False, m:=4|) & m s = 3}" definition U4 :: command where "U4 = {(s,s'). s' = s (|p:=True, m:=0|) & m s = 4}" (** The program for process V **) definition V0 :: command where "V0 = {(s,s'). s' = s (|v:=True, n:=1|) & n s = 0}" definition V1 :: command where "V1 = {(s,s'). s' = s (|p:= ~ u s, n:=2|) & n s = 1}" definition V2 :: command where "V2 = {(s,s'). s' = s (|n:=3|) & p s & n s = 2}" definition V3 :: command where "V3 = {(s,s'). s' = s (|v:=False, n:=4|) & n s = 3}" definition V4 :: command where "V4 = {(s,s'). s' = s (|p:=False, n:=0|) & n s = 4}" definition Mutex :: "state program" where "Mutex = mk_total_program ({s. ~ u s & ~ v s & m s = 0 & n s = 0}, {U0, U1, U2, U3, U4, V0, V1, V2, V3, V4}, UNIV)" (** The correct invariants **) definition IU :: "state set" where "IU = {s. (u s = (1 \ m s & m s \ 3)) & (m s = 3 --> ~ p s)}" definition IV :: "state set" where "IV = {s. (v s = (1 \ n s & n s \ 3)) & (n s = 3 --> p s)}" (** The faulty invariant (for U alone) **) definition bad_IU :: "state set" where "bad_IU = {s. (u s = (1 \ m s & m s \ 3)) & (3 \ m s & m s \ 4 --> ~ p s)}" declare Mutex_def [THEN def_prg_Init, simp] declare U0_def [THEN def_act_simp, simp] declare U1_def [THEN def_act_simp, simp] declare U2_def [THEN def_act_simp, simp] declare U3_def [THEN def_act_simp, simp] declare U4_def [THEN def_act_simp, simp] declare V0_def [THEN def_act_simp, simp] declare V1_def [THEN def_act_simp, simp] declare V2_def [THEN def_act_simp, simp] declare V3_def [THEN def_act_simp, simp] declare V4_def [THEN def_act_simp, simp] declare IU_def [THEN def_set_simp, simp] declare IV_def [THEN def_set_simp, simp] declare bad_IU_def [THEN def_set_simp, simp] lemma IU: "Mutex \ Always IU" apply (rule AlwaysI, force) apply (unfold Mutex_def, safety) done lemma IV: "Mutex \ Always IV" apply (rule AlwaysI, force) apply (unfold Mutex_def, safety) done (*The safety property: mutual exclusion*) lemma mutual_exclusion: "Mutex \ Always {s. ~ (m s = 3 & n s = 3)}" apply (rule Always_weaken) apply (rule Always_Int_I [OF IU IV], auto) done (*The bad invariant FAILS in V1*) lemma "Mutex \ Always bad_IU" apply (rule AlwaysI, force) apply (unfold Mutex_def, safety, auto) (*Resulting state: n=1, p=false, m=4, u=false. Execution of V1 (the command of process v guarded by n=1) sets p:=true, violating the invariant!*) oops lemma eq_123: "((1::int) \ i & i \ 3) = (i = 1 | i = 2 | i = 3)" by arith (*** Progress for U ***) lemma U_F0: "Mutex \ {s. m s=2} Unless {s. m s=3}" by (unfold Unless_def Mutex_def, safety) lemma U_F1: "Mutex \ {s. m s=1} LeadsTo {s. p s = v s & m s = 2}" by (unfold Mutex_def, ensures_tac U1) lemma U_F2: "Mutex \ {s. ~ p s & m s = 2} LeadsTo {s. m s = 3}" apply (cut_tac IU) apply (unfold Mutex_def, ensures_tac U2) done lemma U_F3: "Mutex \ {s. m s = 3} LeadsTo {s. p s}" apply (rule_tac B = "{s. m s = 4}" in LeadsTo_Trans) apply (unfold Mutex_def) apply (ensures_tac U3) apply (ensures_tac U4) done lemma U_lemma2: "Mutex \ {s. m s = 2} LeadsTo {s. p s}" apply (rule LeadsTo_Diff [OF LeadsTo_weaken_L Int_lower2 [THEN subset_imp_LeadsTo]]) apply (rule LeadsTo_Trans [OF U_F2 U_F3], auto) done lemma U_lemma1: "Mutex \ {s. m s = 1} LeadsTo {s. p s}" by (rule LeadsTo_Trans [OF U_F1 [THEN LeadsTo_weaken_R] U_lemma2], blast) lemma U_lemma123: "Mutex \ {s. 1 \ m s & m s \ 3} LeadsTo {s. p s}" by (simp add: eq_123 Collect_disj_eq LeadsTo_Un_distrib U_lemma1 U_lemma2 U_F3) (*Misra's F4*) lemma u_Leadsto_p: "Mutex \ {s. u s} LeadsTo {s. p s}" by (rule Always_LeadsTo_weaken [OF IU U_lemma123], auto) (*** Progress for V ***) lemma V_F0: "Mutex \ {s. n s=2} Unless {s. n s=3}" by (unfold Unless_def Mutex_def, safety) lemma V_F1: "Mutex \ {s. n s=1} LeadsTo {s. p s = (~ u s) & n s = 2}" by (unfold Mutex_def, ensures_tac "V1") lemma V_F2: "Mutex \ {s. p s & n s = 2} LeadsTo {s. n s = 3}" apply (cut_tac IV) apply (unfold Mutex_def, ensures_tac "V2") done lemma V_F3: "Mutex \ {s. n s = 3} LeadsTo {s. ~ p s}" apply (rule_tac B = "{s. n s = 4}" in LeadsTo_Trans) apply (unfold Mutex_def) apply (ensures_tac V3) apply (ensures_tac V4) done lemma V_lemma2: "Mutex \ {s. n s = 2} LeadsTo {s. ~ p s}" apply (rule LeadsTo_Diff [OF LeadsTo_weaken_L Int_lower2 [THEN subset_imp_LeadsTo]]) apply (rule LeadsTo_Trans [OF V_F2 V_F3], auto) done lemma V_lemma1: "Mutex \ {s. n s = 1} LeadsTo {s. ~ p s}" by (rule LeadsTo_Trans [OF V_F1 [THEN LeadsTo_weaken_R] V_lemma2], blast) lemma V_lemma123: "Mutex \ {s. 1 \ n s & n s \ 3} LeadsTo {s. ~ p s}" by (simp add: eq_123 Collect_disj_eq LeadsTo_Un_distrib V_lemma1 V_lemma2 V_F3) (*Misra's F4*) lemma v_Leadsto_not_p: "Mutex \ {s. v s} LeadsTo {s. ~ p s}" by (rule Always_LeadsTo_weaken [OF IV V_lemma123], auto) (** Absence of starvation **) (*Misra's F6*) lemma m1_Leadsto_3: "Mutex \ {s. m s = 1} LeadsTo {s. m s = 3}" apply (rule LeadsTo_cancel2 [THEN LeadsTo_Un_duplicate]) apply (rule_tac [2] U_F2) apply (simp add: Collect_conj_eq) apply (subst Un_commute) apply (rule LeadsTo_cancel2 [THEN LeadsTo_Un_duplicate]) apply (rule_tac [2] PSP_Unless [OF v_Leadsto_not_p U_F0]) apply (rule U_F1 [THEN LeadsTo_weaken_R], auto) done (*The same for V*) lemma n1_Leadsto_3: "Mutex \ {s. n s = 1} LeadsTo {s. n s = 3}" apply (rule LeadsTo_cancel2 [THEN LeadsTo_Un_duplicate]) apply (rule_tac [2] V_F2) apply (simp add: Collect_conj_eq) apply (subst Un_commute) apply (rule LeadsTo_cancel2 [THEN LeadsTo_Un_duplicate]) apply (rule_tac [2] PSP_Unless [OF u_Leadsto_p V_F0]) apply (rule V_F1 [THEN LeadsTo_weaken_R], auto) done end