/* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients, * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and * authentication agent connections. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 implementation: * Privilege Separation: * * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. */ #include "includes.h" RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.260 2002/09/27 10:42:09 mickey Exp $"); #include #include #include #include #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "packet.h" #include "mpaux.h" #include "log.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "compat.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "key.h" #include "dh.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "auth.h" #include "misc.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "g11n.h" #include "sshlogin.h" #include "xlist.h" #include "engine.h" #ifdef HAVE_BSM #include "bsmaudit.h" #endif /* HAVE_BSM */ #ifdef ALTPRIVSEP #include "altprivsep.h" #endif /* ALTPRIVSEP */ #ifdef HAVE_SOLARIS_CONTRACTS #include #include #include #include #endif /* HAVE_SOLARIS_CONTRACTS */ #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif /* GSSAPI */ #ifdef LIBWRAP #include #include #ifndef lint int allow_severity = LOG_INFO; int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; #endif /* lint */ #endif /* LIBWRAP */ #ifndef O_NOCTTY #define O_NOCTTY 0 #endif #ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME extern char *__progname; #else char *__progname; #endif /* Server configuration options. */ ServerOptions options; /* Name of the server configuration file. */ static char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE; /* * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line. * Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */ #ifdef IPV4_DEFAULT int IPv4or6 = AF_INET; #else int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; #endif /* * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing * the first connection. */ int debug_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */ static int test_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ static int inetd_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */ static int no_daemon_flag = 0; /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */ int log_stderr = 0; /* Saved arguments to main(). */ static char **saved_argv; static int saved_argc; /* * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP * signal handler. */ #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16 static int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS]; static int num_listen_socks = 0; /* * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL, * sshd will skip the version-number exchange */ static char *client_version_string = NULL; static char *server_version_string = NULL; /* for rekeying XXX fixme */ Kex *xxx_kex; /* * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle) * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented. */ static struct { Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */ Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */ Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */ int have_ssh1_key; int have_ssh2_key; u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; } sensitive_data; /* * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated. * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0; /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0; static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */ u_char session_id[16]; /* same for ssh2 */ u_char *session_id2 = NULL; int session_id2_len = 0; /* record remote hostname or ip */ u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN; /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */ static int *startup_pipes = NULL; static int startup_pipe = -1; /* in child */ /* sshd_config buffer */ Buffer cfg; #ifdef GSSAPI static gss_OID_set mechs = GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET; #endif /* GSSAPI */ /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ void destroy_sensitive_data(void); static void demote_sensitive_data(void); static void do_ssh1_kex(void); static void do_ssh2_kex(void); /* * Close all listening sockets */ static void close_listen_socks(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) (void) close(listen_socks[i]); num_listen_socks = -1; } static void close_startup_pipes(void) { int i; if (startup_pipes) for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) (void) close(startup_pipes[i]); } /* * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP; * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate * the server key). */ static void sighup_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; received_sighup = 1; (void) signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); errno = save_errno; } /* * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP. * Restarts the server. */ static void sighup_restart(void) { log("Received SIGHUP; restarting."); close_listen_socks(); close_startup_pipes(); (void) execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv); log("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], strerror(errno)); exit(1); } /* * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon. */ static void sigterm_handler(int sig) { received_sigterm = sig; } /* * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then * reap any zombies left by exited children. */ static void main_sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; pid_t pid; int status; while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR)) ; (void) signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); errno = save_errno; } /* * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired. This * is for the (soon-to-be) unprivileged child only. The monitor gets an event on * the communication pipe and exits as well. */ static void grace_alarm_handler(int sig) { /* Log error and exit. */ fatal("Timeout before authentication for %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr()); } #ifdef HAVE_SOLARIS_CONTRACTS static int contracts_fd = -1; void contracts_pre_fork() { const char *during = "opening process contract template"; /* * Failure should not be treated as fatal on the theory that * it's better to start with children in the same contract as * the master listener than not at all. */ if (contracts_fd == -1) { if ((contracts_fd = open64(CTFS_ROOT "/process/template", O_RDWR)) == -1) goto cleanup; during = "setting sundry contract terms"; if ((errno = ct_pr_tmpl_set_param(contracts_fd, CT_PR_PGRPONLY))) goto cleanup; if ((errno = ct_tmpl_set_informative(contracts_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR))) goto cleanup; if ((errno = ct_pr_tmpl_set_fatal(contracts_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR))) goto cleanup; if ((errno = ct_tmpl_set_critical(contracts_fd, 0))) goto cleanup; } during = "setting active template"; if ((errno = ct_tmpl_activate(contracts_fd))) goto cleanup; debug3("Set active contract"); return; cleanup: if (contracts_fd != -1) (void) close(contracts_fd); contracts_fd = -1; if (errno) debug2("Error while trying to set up active contract" " template: %s while %s", strerror(errno), during); } void contracts_post_fork_child() { /* Clear active template so fork() creates no new contracts. */ if (contracts_fd == -1) return; if ((errno = (ct_tmpl_clear(contracts_fd)))) debug2("Error while trying to clear active contract template" " (child): %s", strerror(errno)); else debug3("Cleared active contract template (child)"); (void) close(contracts_fd); contracts_fd = -1; } void contracts_post_fork_parent(int fork_succeeded) { char path[PATH_MAX]; int cfd, n; ct_stathdl_t st; ctid_t latest; /* Clear active template, abandon latest contract. */ if (contracts_fd == -1) return; if ((errno = ct_tmpl_clear(contracts_fd))) debug2("Error while clearing active contract template: %s", strerror(errno)); else debug3("Cleared active contract template (parent)"); if (!fork_succeeded) return; if ((cfd = open64(CTFS_ROOT "/process/latest", O_RDONLY)) == -1) { debug2("Error while getting latest contract: %s", strerror(errno)); return; } if ((errno = ct_status_read(cfd, CTD_COMMON, &st)) != 0) { debug2("Error while getting latest contract ID: %s", strerror(errno)); (void) close(cfd); return; } latest = ct_status_get_id(st); ct_status_free(st); (void) close(cfd); n = snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, CTFS_ROOT "/all/%ld/ctl", latest); if (n >= PATH_MAX) { debug2("Error while opening the latest contract ctl file: %s", strerror(ENAMETOOLONG)); return; } if ((cfd = open64(path, O_WRONLY)) == -1) { debug2("Error while opening the latest contract ctl file: %s", strerror(errno)); return; } if ((errno = ct_ctl_abandon(cfd))) debug2("Error while abandoning latest contract: %s", strerror(errno)); else debug3("Abandoned latest contract"); (void) close(cfd); } #endif /* HAVE_SOLARIS_CONTRACTS */ /* * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not * do anything with the private key or random state before forking. * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution * problems. */ static void generate_ephemeral_server_key(void) { u_int32_t rnd = 0; int i; verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.", sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits); if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL) key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1, options.server_key_bits); verbose("RSA key generation complete."); for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff; rnd >>= 8; } arc4random_stir(); } static void key_regeneration_alarm(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; (void) signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); errno = save_errno; key_do_regen = 1; } static void sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) { int i, mismatch; int remote_major, remote_minor; int major, minor; char *s; char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */ char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) { major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; minor = 99; } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2; minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2; } else { major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1; } (void) snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION); server_version_string = xstrdup(buf); if (client_version_string == NULL) { /* Send our protocol version identification. */ if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string)) != strlen(server_version_string)) { log("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); fatal_cleanup(); } /* Read other sides version identification. */ (void) memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) { log("Did not receive identification string from %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); fatal_cleanup(); } if (buf[i] == '\r') { buf[i] = 0; /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */ if (i == 12 && strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0) break; continue; } if (buf[i] == '\n') { buf[i] = 0; break; } } buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; client_version_string = xstrdup(buf); } /* * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. */ if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) { s = "Protocol mismatch.\n"; (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); (void) close(sock_in); (void) close(sock_out); log("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s", client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr()); fatal_cleanup(); } debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s", remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); compat_datafellows(remote_version); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) { log("probed from %s with %s. Don't panic.", get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string); fatal_cleanup(); } if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) { log("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.", get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string); fatal_cleanup(); } mismatch = 0; switch (remote_major) { case 1: if (remote_minor == 99) { if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) enable_compat20(); else mismatch = 1; break; } if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) { mismatch = 1; break; } if (remote_minor < 3) { packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and " "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version."); } else if (remote_minor == 3) { /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */ enable_compat13(); } break; case 2: if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { enable_compat20(); break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: mismatch = 1; break; } chop(server_version_string); debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string); if (mismatch) { s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n"; (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); (void) close(sock_in); (void) close(sock_out); log("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr(), server_version_string, client_version_string); fatal_cleanup(); } } /* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ void destroy_sensitive_data(void) { int i; if (sensitive_data.server_key) { key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; } } sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; (void) memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); } /* Demote private to public keys for network child */ static void demote_sensitive_data(void) { Key *tmp; int i; if (sensitive_data.server_key) { tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key); key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = tmp; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1) sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp; } } /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */ } static char * list_hostkey_types(void) { Buffer b; char *p; int i; buffer_init(&b); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; if (key == NULL) continue; switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); p = key_ssh_name(key); buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p)); break; } } buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1); p = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b)); buffer_free(&b); debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", p); return p; } #ifdef lint static #endif /* lint */ Key * get_hostkey_by_type(int type) { int i; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; if (key != NULL && key->type == type) return key; } return NULL; } #ifdef lint static #endif /* lint */ Key * get_hostkey_by_index(int ind) { if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files) return (NULL); return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]); } #ifdef lint static #endif /* lint */ int get_hostkey_index(Key *key) { int i; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) return (i); } return (-1); } /* * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise. * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups */ static int drop_connection(int startups) { double p, r; if (startups < options.max_startups_begin) return 0; if (startups >= options.max_startups) return 1; if (options.max_startups_rate == 100) return 1; p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate; p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin; p /= (double) (options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin); p += options.max_startups_rate; p /= 100.0; r = arc4random() / (double) UINT_MAX; debug("drop_connection: p %g, r %g", p, r); return (r < p) ? 1 : 0; } static void usage(void) { (void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("sshd version %s\n"), SSH_VERSION); (void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("Usage: %s [options]\n" "Options:\n" " -f file Configuration file (default %s)\n" " -d Debugging mode (multiple -d means more " "debugging)\n" " -i Started from inetd\n" " -D Do not fork into daemon mode\n" " -t Only test configuration file and keys\n" " -q Quiet (no logging)\n" " -p port Listen on the specified port (default: 22)\n" " -k seconds Regenerate server key every this many seconds " "(default: 3600)\n" " -g seconds Grace period for authentication (default: 600)\n" " -b bits Size of server RSA key (default: 768 bits)\n" " -h file File from which to read host key (default: %s)\n" " -4 Use IPv4 only\n" " -6 Use IPv6 only\n" " -o option Process the option as if it was read from " "a configuration file.\n"), __progname, _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE, _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE); exit(1); } /* * Main program for the daemon. */ int main(int ac, char **av) { extern char *optarg; extern int optind; int opt, j, i, fdsetsz, sock_in = 0, sock_out = 0, newsock = -1, on = 1; pid_t pid; socklen_t fromlen; fd_set *fdset; struct sockaddr_storage from; const char *remote_ip; int remote_port; FILE *f; struct addrinfo *ai; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int listen_sock, maxfd; int startup_p[2]; int startups = 0; Authctxt *authctxt = NULL; Key *key; int ret, key_used = 0; #ifdef HAVE_BSM au_id_t auid = AU_NOAUDITID; #endif /* HAVE_BSM */ int mpipe; __progname = get_progname(av[0]); (void) g11n_setlocale(LC_ALL, ""); init_rng(); /* Save argv. */ saved_argc = ac; saved_argv = av; /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */ initialize_server_options(&options); /* Parse command-line arguments. */ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:V:u:o:dDeiqtQ46")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case '4': IPv4or6 = AF_INET; break; case '6': IPv4or6 = AF_INET6; break; case 'f': config_file_name = optarg; break; case 'd': if (0 == debug_flag) { debug_flag = 1; options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { options.log_level++; } else { (void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("Debug level too high.\n")); exit(1); } break; case 'D': no_daemon_flag = 1; break; case 'e': log_stderr = 1; break; case 'i': inetd_flag = 1; break; case 'Q': /* ignored */ break; case 'q': options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; break; case 'b': options.server_key_bits = atoi(optarg); break; case 'p': options.ports_from_cmdline = 1; if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) { (void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("too many ports.\n")); exit(1); } options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg); if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] == 0) { (void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("Bad port number.\n")); exit(1); } break; case 'g': if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { (void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("Invalid login grace time.\n")); exit(1); } break; case 'k': if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { (void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("Invalid key regeneration " "interval.\n")); exit(1); } break; case 'h': if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) { (void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("too many host keys.\n")); exit(1); } options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = optarg; break; case 'V': client_version_string = optarg; /* only makes sense with inetd_flag, i.e. no listen() */ inetd_flag = 1; break; case 't': test_flag = 1; break; case 'o': if (process_server_config_line(&options, optarg, "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0) exit(1); break; case '?': default: usage(); break; } } /* * There is no need to use the PKCS#11 engine in the master SSH process. */ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); seed_rng(); channel_set_af(IPv4or6); /* * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host * key (unless started from inetd) */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility, !inetd_flag); #ifdef _UNICOS /* Cray can define user privs drop all prives now! * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems! */ drop_cray_privs(); #endif /* Fetch our configuration */ buffer_init(&cfg); load_server_config(config_file_name, &cfg); parse_server_config(&options, config_file_name, &cfg, NULL, NULL, NULL); /* * ChallengeResponseAuthentication is deprecated for protocol 2 which is * the default setting on Solaris. Warn the user about it. Note that * ChallengeResponseAuthentication is on by default but the option is * not set until fill_default_server_options() is called. If the option * is already set now, the user must have set it manually. */ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && options.challenge_response_authentication != -1) { log("ChallengeResponseAuthentication has been " "deprecated for the SSH Protocol 2. You should use " "KbdInteractiveAuthentication instead (which defaults to " "\"yes\")."); } /* * While PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt was not documented, it was * previously set in our default sshd_config and also the only way to * switch off the keyboard-interactive authentication. To maintain * backward compatibility, if PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt is manually set * to "no" and KbdInteractiveAuthentication is not set, switch off the * keyboard-interactive authentication method as before. As with the * challenge response auth situation dealt above, we have not called * fill_default_server_options() yet so if KbdInteractiveAuthentication * is already set to 1 here the admin must have set it manually and we * will honour it. */ if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication != 1 && options.pam_authentication_via_kbd_int == 0) { options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; } /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ fill_default_server_options(&options); utmp_len = options.lookup_client_hostnames ? utmp_len : 0; /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */ if (optind < ac) { (void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("Extra argument %s.\n"), av[optind]); exit(1); } debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION); /* load private host keys */ if (options.num_host_key_files > 0) sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files * sizeof(Key *)); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0; sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key; if (key == NULL) { error("Could not load host key: %s", options.host_key_files[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; continue; } switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA1: sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key; sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1; break; case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1; break; } debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type, key_type(key)); } if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) { log("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; } if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { #ifdef GSSAPI if (options.gss_keyex) ssh_gssapi_server_mechs(&mechs); if (mechs == GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET) { log("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host" "key or GSS-API mechanisms"); options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; } #else log("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; #endif /* GSSAPI */ } if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { log("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); exit(1); } /* Check certain values for sanity. */ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { if (options.server_key_bits < 512 || options.server_key_bits > 32768) { (void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("Bad server key size.\n")); exit(1); } /* * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels */ if (options.server_key_bits > BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits < BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { options.server_key_bits = BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED; debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.", options.server_key_bits); } } /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */ if (test_flag) exit(0); /* * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every * module which might be used). */ if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0) debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */ if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag) log_stderr = 1; log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* * Solaris 9 and systems upgraded from it may have the Ciphers option * explicitly set to "aes128-cbc,blowfish-cbc,3des-cbc" in the * sshd_config. Since the default server cipher list completely changed * since then we rather notify the administator on startup. We do this * check after log_init() so that the message goes to syslogd and not to * stderr (unless the server is in the debug mode). Note that since * Solaris 10 we no longer ship sshd_config with explicit settings for * Ciphers or MACs. Do not try to augment the cipher list here since * that might end up in a very confusing situation. */ #define OLD_DEFAULT_CIPHERS_LIST "aes128-cbc,blowfish-cbc,3des-cbc" if (options.ciphers != NULL && strcmp(options.ciphers, OLD_DEFAULT_CIPHERS_LIST) == 0) { notice("Old default value \"%s\" for the \"Ciphers\" " "option found in use. In general it is prudent to let " "the server choose the defaults unless your environment " "specifically needs an explicit setting. See " "sshd_config(4) for more information.", OLD_DEFAULT_CIPHERS_LIST); } #ifdef HAVE_BSM (void) setauid(&auid); #endif /* HAVE_BSM */ /* * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process * exits. */ if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) { #ifdef TIOCNOTTY int fd; #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ if (daemon(0, 0) < 0) fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */ #ifdef TIOCNOTTY fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); if (fd >= 0) { (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL); (void) close(fd); } #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ } /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* Initialize the random number generator. */ arc4random_stir(); /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be unmounted if desired. */ (void) chdir("/"); /* ignore SIGPIPE */ (void) signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */ if (inetd_flag) { int s1; s1 = dup(0); /* Make sure descriptors 0, 1, and 2 are in use. */ (void) dup(s1); sock_in = dup(0); sock_out = dup(1); startup_pipe = -1; /* we need this later for setting audit context */ newsock = sock_in; /* * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2 * as our code for setting the descriptors won\'t work if * ttyfd happens to be one of those. */ debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out); if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) generate_ephemeral_server_key(); } else { for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS) fatal("Too many listen sockets. " "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS"); if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { error("getnameinfo failed"); continue; } /* Create socket for listening. */ listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (listen_sock < 0) { /* kernel may not support ipv6 */ verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) { error("listen_sock O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno)); (void) close(listen_sock); continue; } /* * Set socket options. * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT. */ if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno)); debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { if (!ai->ai_next) error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.", strport, ntop, strerror(errno)); (void) close(listen_sock); continue; } listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock; num_listen_socks++; /* Start listening on the port. */ log("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport); if (listen(listen_sock, 5) < 0) fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs); if (!num_listen_socks) fatal("Cannot bind any address."); if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) generate_ephemeral_server_key(); /* * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs * listen_sock. */ (void) signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); (void) signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); (void) signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */ (void) signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); /* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is setup */ if (!debug_flag) { /* * Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it * easier to kill the correct sshd. We don't want to * do this before the bind above because the bind will * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will * overwrite any old pid in the file. */ f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb"); if (f) { (void) fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid()); (void) fclose(f); } } /* setup fd set for listen */ fdset = NULL; maxfd = 0; for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd) maxfd = listen_socks[i]; /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */ startup_pipes = xmalloc(options.max_startups * sizeof(int)); for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) startup_pipes[i] = -1; /* * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or * the daemon is killed with a signal. */ for (;;) { if (received_sighup) sighup_restart(); if (fdset != NULL) xfree(fdset); fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz); (void) memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz); for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset); for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset); /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */ ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (received_sigterm) { log("Received signal %d; terminating.", (int) received_sigterm); close_listen_socks(); (void) unlink(options.pid_file); exit(255); } if (key_used && key_do_regen) { generate_ephemeral_server_key(); key_used = 0; key_do_regen = 0; } if (ret < 0) continue; for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 && FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) { /* * the read end of the pipe is ready * if the child has closed the pipe * after successful authentication * or if the child has died */ (void) close(startup_pipes[i]); startup_pipes[i] = -1; startups--; } for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) { if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset)) continue; fromlen = sizeof(from); newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen); if (newsock < 0) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (fcntl(newsock, F_SETFL, 0) < 0) { error("newsock del O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno)); (void) close(newsock); continue; } if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) { debug("drop connection #%d", startups); (void) close(newsock); continue; } if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) { (void) close(newsock); continue; } for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) { startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0]; if (maxfd < startup_p[0]) maxfd = startup_p[0]; startups++; break; } /* * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless * we are in debugging mode. */ if (debug_flag) { /* * In debugging mode. Close the listening * socket, and start processing the * connection without forking. */ debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode."); close_listen_socks(); sock_in = newsock; sock_out = newsock; startup_pipe = -1; pid = getpid(); break; } else { /* * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have * the child process the connection. The * parent continues listening. */ #ifdef HAVE_SOLARIS_CONTRACTS /* * Setup Solaris contract template so * the child process is in a different * process contract than the parent; * prevents established connections from * being killed when the sshd master * listener service is stopped. */ contracts_pre_fork(); #endif /* HAVE_SOLARIS_CONTRACTS */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { /* * Child. Close the listening and max_startup * sockets. Start using the accepted socket. * Reinitialize logging (since our pid has * changed). We break out of the loop to handle * the connection. */ #ifdef HAVE_SOLARIS_CONTRACTS contracts_post_fork_child(); #endif /* HAVE_SOLARIS_CONTRACTS */ xfree(fdset); startup_pipe = startup_p[1]; close_startup_pipes(); close_listen_socks(); sock_in = newsock; sock_out = newsock; log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); break; } /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */ if (pid < 0) error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid); #ifdef HAVE_SOLARIS_CONTRACTS contracts_post_fork_parent((pid > 0)); #endif /* HAVE_SOLARIS_CONTRACTS */ } (void) close(startup_p[1]); /* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && key_used == 0) { /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */ (void) signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm); (void) alarm(options.key_regeneration_time); key_used = 1; } arc4random_stir(); /* * Close the accepted socket since the child * will now take care of the new connection. */ (void) close(newsock); } /* child process check (or debug mode) */ if (num_listen_socks < 0) break; } } /* * This is the child processing a new connection, the SSH master process * stays in the ( ; ; ) loop above. */ #ifdef HAVE_BSM audit_sshd_settid(newsock); #endif /* * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't * want the child to be able to affect the parent. */ #if 0 /* XXX: this breaks Solaris */ if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0) error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #endif /* * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. */ (void) alarm(0); (void) signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); (void) signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); (void) signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); (void) signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); (void) signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); (void) signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); /* Set keepalives if requested. */ if (options.keepalives && setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0) debug2("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do * not have a key. */ packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out); remote_port = get_remote_port(); remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); #ifdef LIBWRAP /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */ { struct request_info req; (void) request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0); fromhost(&req); if (!hosts_access(&req)) { debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper"); refuse(&req); /* NOTREACHED */ fatal("libwrap refuse returns"); } } #endif /* LIBWRAP */ /* Log the connection. */ verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out); /* * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port. * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from privileged * programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local * machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use these * authentication methods from machines that you do not trust. */ if (options.rhosts_authentication && (remote_port >= IPPORT_RESERVED || remote_port < IPPORT_RESERVED / 2)) { debug("Rhosts Authentication disabled, " "originating port %d not trusted.", remote_port); options.rhosts_authentication = 0; } #if defined(KRB4) && !defined(KRB5) if (!packet_connection_is_ipv4() && options.kerberos_authentication) { debug("Kerberos Authentication disabled, only available for IPv4."); options.kerberos_authentication = 0; } #endif /* KRB4 && !KRB5 */ #ifdef AFS /* If machine has AFS, set process authentication group. */ if (k_hasafs()) { k_setpag(); k_unlog(); } #endif /* AFS */ packet_set_nonblocking(); /* * Start the monitor. That way both processes will have their own * PKCS#11 sessions. See the PKCS#11 standard for more information on * fork safety and packet.c for information about forking with the * engine. * * Note that the monitor stays in the function while the child is the * only one that returns. */ altprivsep_start_and_do_monitor(options.use_openssl_engine, inetd_flag, newsock, startup_pipe); /* * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side successfully * authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is cleared after * successful authentication. A limit of zero indicates no limit. Note * that we don't set the alarm in debugging mode; it is just annoying to * have the server exit just when you are about to discover the bug. */ (void) signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler); if (!debug_flag) (void) alarm(options.login_grace_time); /* * The child is about to start the first key exchange while the monitor * stays in altprivsep_start_and_do_monitor() function. */ (void) pkcs11_engine_load(options.use_openssl_engine); /* perform the key exchange */ /* authenticate user and start session */ if (compat20) { do_ssh2_kex(); authctxt = do_authentication2(); } else { do_ssh1_kex(); authctxt = do_authentication(); } /* Authentication complete */ (void) alarm(0); /* we no longer need an alarm handler */ (void) signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); if (startup_pipe != -1) { (void) close(startup_pipe); startup_pipe = -1; } /* ALTPRIVSEP Child */ /* * Drop privileges, access to privileged resources. * * Destroy private host keys, if any. * * No need to release any GSS credentials -- sshd only acquires * creds to determine what mechs it can negotiate then releases * them right away and uses GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to accept * contexts. */ debug2("Unprivileged server process dropping privileges"); permanently_set_uid(authctxt->pw, options.chroot_directory); destroy_sensitive_data(); /* Just another safety check. */ if (getuid() != authctxt->pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != authctxt->pw->pw_uid) { fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int)authctxt->pw->pw_uid); } ssh_gssapi_server_mechs(NULL); /* release cached mechs list */ packet_set_server(); /* now send the authentication context to the monitor */ altprivsep_send_auth_context(authctxt); mpipe = altprivsep_get_pipe_fd(); if (fcntl(mpipe, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) error("fcntl O_NONBLOCK: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #ifdef HAVE_BSM fatal_remove_cleanup( (void (*)(void *))audit_failed_login_cleanup, (void *)authctxt); #endif /* HAVE_BSM */ if (compat20) { debug3("setting handler to forward re-key packets to the monitor"); dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &altprivsep_rekey); } /* Logged-in session. */ do_authenticated(authctxt); /* The connection has been terminated. */ verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip); packet_close(); #ifdef USE_PAM finish_pam(authctxt); #endif /* USE_PAM */ return (0); } /* * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key * (key with larger modulus first). */ int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int) { int rsafail = 0; if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) { /* Server key has bigger modulus. */ if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) < BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", get_remote_ipaddr(), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n), SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); } if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0) rsafail++; if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0) rsafail++; } else { /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */ if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) < BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", get_remote_ipaddr(), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); } if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0) rsafail++; if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0) rsafail++; } return (rsafail); } /* * SSH1 key exchange */ static void do_ssh1_kex(void) { int i, len; int rsafail = 0; BIGNUM *session_key_int; u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; u_char cookie[8]; u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags; u_int32_t rnd = 0; /* * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure. */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff; rnd >>= 8; } /* * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP * spoofing. */ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) packet_put_char(cookie[i]); /* Store our public server RSA key. */ packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n)); packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e); packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); /* Store our public host RSA key. */ packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n)); packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e); packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n); /* Put protocol flags. */ packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN); /* Declare which ciphers we support. */ packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0)); /* Declare supported authentication types. */ auth_mask = 0; if (options.rhosts_authentication) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS; if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA; if (options.rsa_authentication) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA; #if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) if (options.kerberos_authentication) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS; #endif #if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) if (options.kerberos_tgt_passing) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT; #endif #ifdef AFS if (options.afs_token_passing) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN; #endif if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS; if (options.password_authentication) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD; packet_put_int(auth_mask); /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */ packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.", BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n)); /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */ packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */ cipher_type = packet_get_char(); if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type))) { packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher."); } /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we sent earlier with the public key packet. */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char()) { packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match."); } } debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); /* Get the encrypted integer. */ if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed"); packet_get_bignum(session_key_int); protocol_flags = packet_get_int(); packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags); packet_check_eom(); /* Decrypt session_key_int using host/server keys */ rsafail = ssh1_session_key(session_key_int); /* * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the * key is in the highest bits. */ if (!rsafail) { (void) BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8); len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) { error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: " "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu", get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key)); rsafail++; } else { (void) memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); (void) BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len); compute_session_id(session_id, cookie, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); /* * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the * session id. */ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) session_key[i] ^= session_id[i]; } } if (rsafail) { int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes); MD5_CTX md; log("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key"); (void) BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf); MD5_Init(&md); MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes); MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); MD5_Final(session_key, &md); MD5_Init(&md); MD5_Update(&md, session_key, 16); MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes); MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); MD5_Final(session_key + 16, &md); (void) memset(buf, 0, bytes); xfree(buf); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16]; } /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */ destroy_sensitive_data(); /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */ BN_clear_free(session_key_int); /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */ packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type); /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */ (void) memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); debug("Received session key; encryption turned on."); /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } /* * Prepare for SSH2 key exchange. */ Kex * prepare_for_ssh2_kex(void) { Kex *kex; Kex_hook_func kex_hook = NULL; char **locales; static char **myproposal; myproposal = my_srv_proposal; if (options.ciphers != NULL) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; } myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]); if (options.macs != NULL) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; } if (!options.compression) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none"; } /* * Prepare kex algs / hostkey algs (excluding GSS, which is * handled in the kex hook. * * XXX This should probably move to the kex hook as well, where * all non-constant kex offer material belongs. */ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types(); /* If we have no host key algs we can't offer KEXDH/KEX_DH_GEX */ if (myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] == NULL || *myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] == '\0') myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = ""; if ((locales = g11n_getlocales()) != NULL) { /* Solaris 9 SSH expects a list of locales */ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_LOCALES_NOT_LANGTAGS) myproposal[PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC] = xjoin(locales, ','); else myproposal[PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC] = g11n_locales2langs(locales); } if (locales != NULL) g11n_freelist(locales); if ((myproposal[PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC] != NULL) && (strcmp(myproposal[PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC], "")) != 0) myproposal[PROPOSAL_LANG_CTOS] = xstrdup(myproposal[PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC]); #ifdef GSSAPI if (options.gss_keyex) kex_hook = ssh_gssapi_server_kex_hook; #endif /* GSSAPI */ kex = kex_setup(NULL, myproposal, kex_hook); /* * Note that the my_srv_proposal variable (ie., myproposal) is staticly * initialized with "" for the language fields; we must not xfree such * strings. */ if (myproposal[PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC] != NULL && strcmp(myproposal[PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC], "") != 0) xfree(myproposal[PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC]); if (myproposal[PROPOSAL_LANG_CTOS] != NULL && strcmp(myproposal[PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC], "") != 0) xfree(myproposal[PROPOSAL_LANG_CTOS]); kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; #ifdef GSSAPI kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; #endif /* GSSAPI */ kex->server = 1; kex->client_version_string = client_version_string; kex->server_version_string = server_version_string; kex->load_host_key = &get_hostkey_by_type; kex->host_key_index = &get_hostkey_index; xxx_kex = kex; return (kex); } /* * Do SSH2 key exchange. */ static void do_ssh2_kex(void) { Kex *kex; kex = prepare_for_ssh2_kex(); kex_start(kex); dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); if (kex->name) { xfree(kex->name); kex->name = NULL; } session_id2 = kex->session_id; session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE); packet_put_cstring("markus"); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); #endif debug("KEX done"); }