/* * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public * License Version 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file * except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of * the License at http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/ * * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS * IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or * implied. See the License for the specific language governing * rights and limitations under the License. * * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries. * * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is Netscape * Communications Corporation. Portions created by Netscape are * Copyright (C) 1994-2000 Netscape Communications Corporation. All * Rights Reserved. * * Contributor(s): * * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the * terms of the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the * "GPL"), in which case the provisions of the GPL are applicable * instead of those above. If you wish to allow use of your * version of this file only under the terms of the GPL and not to * allow others to use your version of this file under the MPL, * indicate your decision by deleting the provisions above and * replace them with the notice and other provisions required by * the GPL. If you do not delete the provisions above, a recipient * may use your version of this file under either the MPL or the * GPL. */ /* * Stuff specific to S/MIME policy and interoperability. */ #include "cmslocal.h" #include "secoid.h" #include "secitem.h" #include "cert.h" #include "SecSMIMEPriv.h" #include #include #include #include SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(CERT_IssuerAndSNTemplate) SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SEC_OctetStringTemplate) SEC_ASN1_CHOOSER_DECLARE(CERT_IssuerAndSNTemplate) /* various integer's ASN.1 encoding */ static unsigned char asn1_int40[] = { SEC_ASN1_INTEGER, 0x01, 0x28 }; static unsigned char asn1_int64[] = { SEC_ASN1_INTEGER, 0x01, 0x40 }; static unsigned char asn1_int128[] = { SEC_ASN1_INTEGER, 0x02, 0x00, 0x80 }; /* RC2 algorithm parameters (used in smime_cipher_map) */ static CSSM_DATA param_int40 = { sizeof(asn1_int40), asn1_int40 }; static CSSM_DATA param_int64 = { sizeof(asn1_int64), asn1_int64 }; static CSSM_DATA param_int128 = { sizeof(asn1_int128), asn1_int128 }; /* * XXX Would like the "parameters" field to be a CSSM_DATA_PTR , but the * encoder is having trouble with optional pointers to an ANY. Maybe * once that is fixed, can change this back... */ typedef struct { CSSM_DATA capabilityID; CSSM_DATA parameters; long cipher; /* optimization */ } NSSSMIMECapability; static const SecAsn1Template NSSSMIMECapabilityTemplate[] = { { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0, NULL, sizeof(NSSSMIMECapability) }, { SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, offsetof(NSSSMIMECapability,capabilityID), }, { SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_ANY, offsetof(NSSSMIMECapability,parameters), }, { 0, } }; static const SecAsn1Template NSSSMIMECapabilitiesTemplate[] = { { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, NSSSMIMECapabilityTemplate } }; /* * NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPreference - if we find one of these, it needs to prompt us * to store this and only this certificate permanently for the sender email address. */ typedef enum { NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPref_IssuerSN, NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPref_RKeyID, NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPref_SubjectKeyID } NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPrefSelector; typedef struct { NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPrefSelector selector; union { SecCmsIssuerAndSN *issuerAndSN; SecCmsRecipientKeyIdentifier *recipientKeyID; CSSM_DATA_PTR subjectKeyID; } id; } NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPreference; extern const SecAsn1Template SecCmsRecipientKeyIdentifierTemplate[]; static const SecAsn1Template smime_encryptionkeypref_template[] = { { SEC_ASN1_CHOICE, offsetof(NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPreference,selector), NULL, sizeof(NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPreference) }, { SEC_ASN1_POINTER | SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | SEC_ASN1_XTRN | 0, offsetof(NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPreference,id.issuerAndSN), SEC_ASN1_SUB(SecCmsIssuerAndSNTemplate), NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPref_IssuerSN }, { SEC_ASN1_POINTER | SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 1, offsetof(NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPreference,id.recipientKeyID), SecCmsRecipientKeyIdentifierTemplate, NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPref_IssuerSN }, { SEC_ASN1_POINTER | SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | SEC_ASN1_XTRN | 2, offsetof(NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPreference,id.subjectKeyID), SEC_ASN1_SUB(kSecAsn1OctetStringTemplate), NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPref_SubjectKeyID }, { 0, } }; /* smime_cipher_map - map of SMIME symmetric "ciphers" to algtag & parameters */ typedef struct { unsigned long cipher; SECOidTag algtag; CSSM_DATA_PTR parms; Boolean enabled; /* in the user's preferences */ Boolean allowed; /* per export policy */ } smime_cipher_map_entry; /* global: list of supported SMIME symmetric ciphers, ordered roughly by increasing strength */ static smime_cipher_map_entry smime_cipher_map[] = { /* cipher algtag parms enabled allowed */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ { SMIME_RC2_CBC_40, SEC_OID_RC2_CBC, ¶m_int40, PR_TRUE, PR_TRUE }, { SMIME_DES_CBC_56, SEC_OID_DES_CBC, NULL, PR_TRUE, PR_TRUE }, { SMIME_RC2_CBC_64, SEC_OID_RC2_CBC, ¶m_int64, PR_TRUE, PR_TRUE }, { SMIME_RC2_CBC_128, SEC_OID_RC2_CBC, ¶m_int128, PR_TRUE, PR_TRUE }, { SMIME_DES_EDE3_168, SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC, NULL, PR_TRUE, PR_TRUE }, { SMIME_AES_CBC_128, SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC, NULL, PR_TRUE, PR_TRUE }, { SMIME_FORTEZZA, SEC_OID_FORTEZZA_SKIPJACK, NULL, PR_TRUE, PR_TRUE } }; static const int smime_cipher_map_count = sizeof(smime_cipher_map) / sizeof(smime_cipher_map_entry); /* * smime_mapi_by_cipher - find index into smime_cipher_map by cipher */ static int smime_mapi_by_cipher(unsigned long cipher) { int i; for (i = 0; i < smime_cipher_map_count; i++) { if (smime_cipher_map[i].cipher == cipher) return i; /* bingo */ } return -1; /* should not happen if we're consistent, right? */ } /* * NSS_SMIME_EnableCipher - this function locally records the user's preference */ OSStatus SecSMIMEEnableCipher(uint32 which, Boolean on) { unsigned long mask; int mapi; mask = which & CIPHER_FAMILYID_MASK; PORT_Assert (mask == CIPHER_FAMILYID_SMIME); if (mask != CIPHER_FAMILYID_SMIME) /* XXX set an error! */ return SECFailure; mapi = smime_mapi_by_cipher(which); if (mapi < 0) /* XXX set an error */ return SECFailure; /* do we try to turn on a forbidden cipher? */ if (!smime_cipher_map[mapi].allowed && on) { PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_BAD_EXPORT_ALGORITHM); return SECFailure; } if (smime_cipher_map[mapi].enabled != on) smime_cipher_map[mapi].enabled = on; return SECSuccess; } /* * this function locally records the export policy */ OSStatus SecSMIMEAllowCipher(uint32 which, Boolean on) { unsigned long mask; int mapi; mask = which & CIPHER_FAMILYID_MASK; PORT_Assert (mask == CIPHER_FAMILYID_SMIME); if (mask != CIPHER_FAMILYID_SMIME) /* XXX set an error! */ return SECFailure; mapi = smime_mapi_by_cipher(which); if (mapi < 0) /* XXX set an error */ return SECFailure; if (smime_cipher_map[mapi].allowed != on) smime_cipher_map[mapi].allowed = on; return SECSuccess; } /* * Based on the given algorithm (including its parameters, in some cases!) * and the given key (may or may not be inspected, depending on the * algorithm), find the appropriate policy algorithm specification * and return it. If no match can be made, -1 is returned. */ static OSStatus nss_smime_get_cipher_for_alg_and_key(SECAlgorithmID *algid, SecSymmetricKeyRef key, unsigned long *cipher) { SECOidTag algtag; unsigned int keylen_bits; unsigned long c; algtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algid); switch (algtag) { case SEC_OID_RC2_CBC: if (SecKeyGetStrengthInBits(key, algid, &keylen_bits)) return SECFailure; switch (keylen_bits) { case 40: c = SMIME_RC2_CBC_40; break; case 64: c = SMIME_RC2_CBC_64; break; case 128: c = SMIME_RC2_CBC_128; break; default: return SECFailure; } break; case SEC_OID_DES_CBC: c = SMIME_DES_CBC_56; break; case SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC: c = SMIME_DES_EDE3_168; break; case SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC: c = SMIME_AES_CBC_128; break; case SEC_OID_FORTEZZA_SKIPJACK: c = SMIME_FORTEZZA; break; default: return SECFailure; } *cipher = c; return SECSuccess; } static Boolean nss_smime_cipher_allowed(unsigned long which) { int mapi; mapi = smime_mapi_by_cipher(which); if (mapi < 0) return PR_FALSE; return smime_cipher_map[mapi].allowed; } Boolean SecSMIMEDecryptionAllowed(SECAlgorithmID *algid, SecSymmetricKeyRef key) { unsigned long which; if (nss_smime_get_cipher_for_alg_and_key(algid, key, &which) != SECSuccess) return PR_FALSE; return nss_smime_cipher_allowed(which); } /* * NSS_SMIME_EncryptionPossible - check if any encryption is allowed * * This tells whether or not *any* S/MIME encryption can be done, * according to policy. Callers may use this to do nicer user interface * (say, greying out a checkbox so a user does not even try to encrypt * a message when they are not allowed to) or for any reason they want * to check whether S/MIME encryption (or decryption, for that matter) * may be done. * * It takes no arguments. The return value is a simple boolean: * PR_TRUE means encryption (or decryption) is *possible* * (but may still fail due to other reasons, like because we cannot * find all the necessary certs, etc.; PR_TRUE is *not* a guarantee) * PR_FALSE means encryption (or decryption) is not permitted * * There are no errors from this routine. */ Boolean SecSMIMEEncryptionPossible(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < smime_cipher_map_count; i++) { if (smime_cipher_map[i].allowed) return PR_TRUE; } return PR_FALSE; } static unsigned long nss_SMIME_FindCipherForSMIMECap(NSSSMIMECapability *cap) { int i; SECOidTag capIDTag; /* we need the OIDTag here */ capIDTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&(cap->capabilityID)); /* go over all the SMIME ciphers we know and see if we find a match */ for (i = 0; i < smime_cipher_map_count; i++) { if (smime_cipher_map[i].algtag != capIDTag) continue; /* * XXX If SECITEM_CompareItem allowed NULLs as arguments (comparing * 2 NULLs as equal and NULL and non-NULL as not equal), we could * use that here instead of all of the following comparison code. */ if (cap->parameters.Data == NULL && smime_cipher_map[i].parms == NULL) break; /* both empty: bingo */ if (cap->parameters.Data != NULL && smime_cipher_map[i].parms != NULL && cap->parameters.Length == smime_cipher_map[i].parms->Length && PORT_Memcmp (cap->parameters.Data, smime_cipher_map[i].parms->Data, cap->parameters.Length) == 0) { break; /* both not empty, same length & equal content: bingo */ } } if (i == smime_cipher_map_count) return 0; /* no match found */ else return smime_cipher_map[i].cipher; /* match found, point to cipher */ } /* * smime_choose_cipher - choose a cipher that works for all the recipients * * "scert" - sender's certificate * "rcerts" - recipient's certificates */ static long smime_choose_cipher(SecCertificateRef scert, SecCertificateRef *rcerts) { PRArenaPool *poolp; long cipher; long chosen_cipher; int *cipher_abilities; int *cipher_votes; int weak_mapi; int strong_mapi; int rcount, mapi, max, i; #if 1 // @@@ We Don't support Fortezza yet. Boolean scert_is_fortezza = PR_FALSE; #else Boolean scert_is_fortezza = (scert == NULL) ? PR_FALSE : PK11_FortezzaHasKEA(scert); #endif chosen_cipher = SMIME_RC2_CBC_40; /* the default, LCD */ weak_mapi = smime_mapi_by_cipher(chosen_cipher); poolp = PORT_NewArena (1024); /* XXX what is right value? */ if (poolp == NULL) goto done; cipher_abilities = (int *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, smime_cipher_map_count * sizeof(int)); cipher_votes = (int *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, smime_cipher_map_count * sizeof(int)); if (cipher_votes == NULL || cipher_abilities == NULL) goto done; /* If the user has the Fortezza preference turned on, make * that the strong cipher. Otherwise, use triple-DES. */ strong_mapi = smime_mapi_by_cipher (SMIME_DES_EDE3_168); if (scert_is_fortezza) { mapi = smime_mapi_by_cipher(SMIME_FORTEZZA); if (mapi >= 0 && smime_cipher_map[mapi].enabled) strong_mapi = mapi; } /* walk all the recipient's certs */ for (rcount = 0; rcerts[rcount] != NULL; rcount++) { CSSM_DATA_PTR profile; NSSSMIMECapability **caps; int pref; /* the first cipher that matches in the user's SMIME profile gets * "smime_cipher_map_count" votes; the next one gets "smime_cipher_map_count" - 1 * and so on. If every cipher matches, the last one gets 1 (one) vote */ pref = smime_cipher_map_count; /* find recipient's SMIME profile */ profile = CERT_FindSMimeProfile(rcerts[rcount]); if (profile != NULL && profile->Data != NULL && profile->Length > 0) { /* we have a profile (still DER-encoded) */ caps = NULL; /* decode it */ if (SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(poolp, &caps, NSSSMIMECapabilitiesTemplate, profile) == SECSuccess && caps != NULL) { /* walk the SMIME capabilities for this recipient */ for (i = 0; caps[i] != NULL; i++) { cipher = nss_SMIME_FindCipherForSMIMECap(caps[i]); mapi = smime_mapi_by_cipher(cipher); if (mapi >= 0) { /* found the cipher */ cipher_abilities[mapi]++; cipher_votes[mapi] += pref; --pref; } } } } else { /* no profile found - so we can only assume that the user can do * the mandatory algorithms which is RC2-40 (weak crypto) and 3DES (strong crypto) */ SecPublicKeyRef key; unsigned int pklen_bits; /* * if recipient's public key length is > 512, vote for a strong cipher * please not that the side effect of this is that if only one recipient * has an export-level public key, the strong cipher is disabled. * * XXX This is probably only good for RSA keys. What I would * really like is a function to just say; Is the public key in * this cert an export-length key? Then I would not have to * know things like the value 512, or the kind of key, or what * a subjectPublicKeyInfo is, etc. */ key = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(rcerts[rcount]); pklen_bits = 0; if (key != NULL) { SecKeyGetStrengthInBits(key, NULL, &pklen_bits); SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey (key); } if (pklen_bits > 512) { /* cast votes for the strong algorithm */ cipher_abilities[strong_mapi]++; cipher_votes[strong_mapi] += pref; pref--; } /* always cast (possibly less) votes for the weak algorithm */ cipher_abilities[weak_mapi]++; cipher_votes[weak_mapi] += pref; } if (profile != NULL) SECITEM_FreeItem(profile, PR_TRUE); } /* find cipher that is agreeable by all recipients and that has the most votes */ max = 0; for (mapi = 0; mapi < smime_cipher_map_count; mapi++) { /* if not all of the recipients can do this, forget it */ if (cipher_abilities[mapi] != rcount) continue; /* if cipher is not enabled or not allowed by policy, forget it */ if (!smime_cipher_map[mapi].enabled || !smime_cipher_map[mapi].allowed) continue; /* if we're not doing fortezza, but the cipher is fortezza, forget it */ if (!scert_is_fortezza && (smime_cipher_map[mapi].cipher == SMIME_FORTEZZA)) continue; /* now see if this one has more votes than the last best one */ if (cipher_votes[mapi] >= max) { /* if equal number of votes, prefer the ones further down in the list */ /* with the expectation that these are higher rated ciphers */ chosen_cipher = smime_cipher_map[mapi].cipher; max = cipher_votes[mapi]; } } /* if no common cipher was found, chosen_cipher stays at the default */ done: if (poolp != NULL) PORT_FreeArena (poolp, PR_FALSE); return chosen_cipher; } /* * XXX This is a hack for now to satisfy our current interface. * Eventually, with more parameters needing to be specified, just * looking up the keysize is not going to be sufficient. */ static int smime_keysize_by_cipher (unsigned long which) { int keysize; switch (which) { case SMIME_RC2_CBC_40: keysize = 40; break; case SMIME_RC2_CBC_64: keysize = 64; break; case SMIME_RC2_CBC_128: case SMIME_AES_CBC_128: keysize = 128; break; case SMIME_DES_CBC_56: keysize = 64; break; case SMIME_DES_EDE3_168: keysize = 192; break; case SMIME_FORTEZZA: /* * This is special; since the key size is fixed, we actually * want to *avoid* specifying a key size. */ keysize = 0; break; default: keysize = -1; break; } return keysize; } /* * SecSMIMEFindBulkAlgForRecipients - find bulk algorithm suitable for all recipients * * it would be great for UI purposes if there would be a way to find out which recipients * prevented a strong cipher from being used... */ OSStatus SecSMIMEFindBulkAlgForRecipients(SecCertificateRef *rcerts, SECOidTag *bulkalgtag, int *keysize) { unsigned long cipher; int mapi; cipher = smime_choose_cipher(NULL, rcerts); mapi = smime_mapi_by_cipher(cipher); *bulkalgtag = smime_cipher_map[mapi].algtag; *keysize = smime_keysize_by_cipher(smime_cipher_map[mapi].cipher); return SECSuccess; } /* * SecSMIMECreateSMIMECapabilities - get S/MIME capabilities for this instance of NSS * * scans the list of allowed and enabled ciphers and construct a PKCS9-compliant * S/MIME capabilities attribute value. * * XXX Please note that, in contradiction to RFC2633 2.5.2, the capabilities only include * symmetric ciphers, NO signature algorithms or key encipherment algorithms. * * "poolp" - arena pool to create the S/MIME capabilities data on * "dest" - CSSM_DATA to put the data in * "includeFortezzaCiphers" - PR_TRUE if fortezza ciphers should be included */ OSStatus SecSMIMECreateSMIMECapabilities(SecArenaPoolRef pool, CSSM_DATA_PTR dest, Boolean includeFortezzaCiphers) { PLArenaPool *poolp = (PLArenaPool *)pool; NSSSMIMECapability *cap; NSSSMIMECapability **smime_capabilities; smime_cipher_map_entry *map; SECOidData *oiddata; CSSM_DATA_PTR dummy; int i, capIndex; /* if we have an old NSSSMIMECapability array, we'll reuse it (has the right size) */ /* smime_cipher_map_count + 1 is an upper bound - we might end up with less */ smime_capabilities = (NSSSMIMECapability **)PORT_ZAlloc((smime_cipher_map_count + 1) * sizeof(NSSSMIMECapability *)); if (smime_capabilities == NULL) return SECFailure; capIndex = 0; /* Add all the symmetric ciphers * We walk the cipher list backwards, as it is ordered by increasing strength, * we prefer the stronger cipher over a weaker one, and we have to list the * preferred algorithm first */ for (i = smime_cipher_map_count - 1; i >= 0; i--) { /* Find the corresponding entry in the cipher map. */ map = &(smime_cipher_map[i]); if (!map->enabled) continue; /* If we're using a non-Fortezza cert, only advertise non-Fortezza capabilities. (We advertise all capabilities if we have a Fortezza cert.) */ if ((!includeFortezzaCiphers) && (map->cipher == SMIME_FORTEZZA)) continue; /* get next SMIME capability */ cap = (NSSSMIMECapability *)PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(NSSSMIMECapability)); if (cap == NULL) break; smime_capabilities[capIndex++] = cap; oiddata = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(map->algtag); if (oiddata == NULL) break; cap->capabilityID.Data = oiddata->oid.Data; cap->capabilityID.Length = oiddata->oid.Length; cap->parameters.Data = map->parms ? map->parms->Data : NULL; cap->parameters.Length = map->parms ? map->parms->Length : 0; cap->cipher = smime_cipher_map[i].cipher; } /* XXX add signature algorithms */ /* XXX add key encipherment algorithms */ smime_capabilities[capIndex] = NULL; /* last one - now encode */ dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(poolp, dest, &smime_capabilities, NSSSMIMECapabilitiesTemplate); /* now that we have the proper encoded SMIMECapabilities (or not), * free the work data */ for (i = 0; smime_capabilities[i] != NULL; i++) PORT_Free(smime_capabilities[i]); PORT_Free(smime_capabilities); return (dummy == NULL) ? SECFailure : SECSuccess; } /* * SecSMIMECreateSMIMEEncKeyPrefs - create S/MIME encryption key preferences attr value * * "poolp" - arena pool to create the attr value on * "dest" - CSSM_DATA to put the data in * "cert" - certificate that should be marked as preferred encryption key * cert is expected to have been verified for EmailRecipient usage. */ OSStatus SecSMIMECreateSMIMEEncKeyPrefs(SecArenaPoolRef pool, CSSM_DATA_PTR dest, SecCertificateRef cert) { PLArenaPool *poolp = (PLArenaPool *)pool; NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPreference ekp; CSSM_DATA_PTR dummy = NULL; PLArenaPool *tmppoolp = NULL; if (cert == NULL) goto loser; tmppoolp = PORT_NewArena(1024); if (tmppoolp == NULL) goto loser; /* XXX hardcoded IssuerSN choice for now */ ekp.selector = NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPref_IssuerSN; ekp.id.issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(tmppoolp, cert); if (ekp.id.issuerAndSN == NULL) goto loser; dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(poolp, dest, &ekp, smime_encryptionkeypref_template); loser: if (tmppoolp) PORT_FreeArena(tmppoolp, PR_FALSE); return (dummy == NULL) ? SECFailure : SECSuccess; } /* * SecSMIMECreateSMIMEEncKeyPrefs - create S/MIME encryption key preferences attr value using MS oid * * "poolp" - arena pool to create the attr value on * "dest" - CSSM_DATA to put the data in * "cert" - certificate that should be marked as preferred encryption key * cert is expected to have been verified for EmailRecipient usage. */ OSStatus SecSMIMECreateMSSMIMEEncKeyPrefs(SecArenaPoolRef pool, CSSM_DATA_PTR dest, SecCertificateRef cert) { PLArenaPool *poolp = (PLArenaPool *)pool; CSSM_DATA_PTR dummy = NULL; PLArenaPool *tmppoolp = NULL; SecCmsIssuerAndSN *isn; if (cert == NULL) goto loser; tmppoolp = PORT_NewArena(1024); if (tmppoolp == NULL) goto loser; isn = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(tmppoolp, cert); if (isn == NULL) goto loser; dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(poolp, dest, isn, SEC_ASN1_GET(SecCmsIssuerAndSNTemplate)); loser: if (tmppoolp) PORT_FreeArena(tmppoolp, PR_FALSE); return (dummy == NULL) ? SECFailure : SECSuccess; } /* * SecSMIMEGetCertFromEncryptionKeyPreference - * find cert marked by EncryptionKeyPreference attribute * * "keychainOrArray" - handle for the cert database to look in * "DERekp" - DER-encoded value of S/MIME Encryption Key Preference attribute * * if certificate is supposed to be found among the message's included certificates, * they are assumed to have been imported already. */ SecCertificateRef SecSMIMEGetCertFromEncryptionKeyPreference(SecKeychainRef keychainOrArray, CSSM_DATA_PTR DERekp) { PLArenaPool *tmppoolp = NULL; SecCertificateRef cert = NULL; NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPreference ekp; tmppoolp = PORT_NewArena(1024); if (tmppoolp == NULL) return NULL; /* decode DERekp */ if (SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(tmppoolp, &ekp, smime_encryptionkeypref_template, DERekp) != SECSuccess) goto loser; /* find cert */ switch (ekp.selector) { case NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPref_IssuerSN: cert = CERT_FindCertByIssuerAndSN(keychainOrArray, NULL, NULL, ekp.id.issuerAndSN); break; case NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPref_RKeyID: case NSSSMIMEEncryptionKeyPref_SubjectKeyID: /* XXX not supported yet - we need to be able to look up certs by SubjectKeyID */ break; default: PORT_Assert(0); } loser: if (tmppoolp) PORT_FreeArena(tmppoolp, PR_FALSE); return cert; } #if 0 extern const char __nss_smime_rcsid[]; extern const char __nss_smime_sccsid[]; #endif #if 0 /* -- unused */ Boolean NSSSMIME_VersionCheck(const char *importedVersion) { #if 1 return PR_TRUE; #else /* * This is the secret handshake algorithm. * * This release has a simple version compatibility * check algorithm. This release is not backward * compatible with previous major releases. It is * not compatible with future major, minor, or * patch releases. */ volatile char c; /* force a reference that won't get optimized away */ c = __nss_smime_rcsid[0] + __nss_smime_sccsid[0]; return NSS_VersionCheck(importedVersion); #endif } #endif