inet/kssl/ksslrec.c

1204 #define	IS_BAD_PRE_MASTER_SECRET(pms, pmslen, ssl)			\
1205 	(pms == NULL || pmslen != SSL3_PRE_MASTER_SECRET_LEN ||		\
1206 	pms[0] != ssl->major_version || pms[1] != ssl->minor_version)
1208 #define	FAKE_PRE_MASTER_SECRET(pms, pmslen, ssl, buf) {			\
1210 		pms = buf;						\
1212 		pms[0] = ssl->major_version;				\
1213 		pms[1] = ssl->minor_version;				\
1218 kssl_generate_tls_ms(ssl_t *ssl, uchar_t *pms, size_t pmslen)
1226 	 * master_secret = PRF (pms, "master secret",
1233 	/* if pms is bad fake it to thwart Bleichenbacher attack */
1234 	if (IS_BAD_PRE_MASTER_SECRET(pms, pmslen, ssl)) {
1236 		FAKE_PRE_MASTER_SECRET(pms, pmslen, ssl, buf);
1240 	    pms, pmslen,
1250 kssl_generate_ssl_ms(ssl_t *ssl, uchar_t *pms, size_t pmslen)
1258 	/* if pms is bad fake it to thwart Bleichenbacher attack */
1259 	if (IS_BAD_PRE_MASTER_SECRET(pms, pmslen, ssl)) {
1261 		FAKE_PRE_MASTER_SECRET(pms, pmslen, ssl, buf);
1264 	kssl_ssl3_key_material_derive_step(ssl, pms, pmslen, 1, ms, 0);
1265 	kssl_ssl3_key_material_derive_step(ssl, pms, pmslen, 2, ms + hlen, 0);
1266 	kssl_ssl3_key_material_derive_step(ssl, pms, pmslen, 3, ms + 2 * hlen,
1851 	uchar_t *pms;
1881 	 * value of the wrapped pms from the client, then room for the
1986 	pms = kssl_rsa_unwrap((uchar_t *)pms_data->cd_raw.iov_base, &pmslen);
1990 		err = kssl_generate_tls_ms(ssl, pms, pmslen);
1994 		kssl_generate_ssl_ms(ssl, pms, pmslen);
2245 	uchar_t *pms;
2270 	pms = kssl_rsa_unwrap((uchar_t *)pms_data->cd_raw.iov_base, &pmslen);
2274 		ret = kssl_generate_tls_ms(ssl, pms, pmslen);
2278 		kssl_generate_ssl_ms(ssl, pms, pmslen);