linux-master/crypto/drbg.c

218  * Note, this function disregards the nonce trailing the entropy data during
224  * @entropy buffer of seed data to be checked
232 				     const unsigned char *entropy)
249 		memcpy(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen);
254 	ret = memcmp(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen);
257 	memcpy(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen);
1061 					unsigned char *entropy,
1067 		get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen);
1068 		ret = drbg_fips_continuous_test(drbg, entropy);
1081 	unsigned char entropy[32];
1085 	BUG_ON(entropylen > sizeof(entropy));
1087 	drbg_string_fill(&data, entropy, entropylen);
1090 	ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
1097 	memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen);
1110 	 * Obtain fresh entropy for the nopr DRBGs after 300s have
1136 	unsigned char entropy[((32 + 16) * 2)];
1152 		pr_devel("DRBG: using test entropy\n");
1155 		 * Gather entropy equal to the security strength of the DRBG.
1157 		 * to the entropy. A nonce must be at least 1/2 of the security
1158 		 * strength of the DRBG in size. Thus, entropy + nonce is 3/2
1165 		BUG_ON((entropylen * 2) > sizeof(entropy));
1171 		ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
1176 			drbg_string_fill(&data1, entropy, entropylen);
1177 			pr_devel("DRBG: (re)seeding with %u bytes of entropy\n",
1185 						   entropy + entropylen,
1208 			drbg_string_fill(&data1, entropy, entropylen * 2);
1209 			pr_devel("DRBG: (re)seeding with %u bytes of entropy\n",
1216 	 * concatenation of entropy with personalization str / addtl input)
1233 	memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen * 2);
1361  *	  the entropy is pulled by the DRBG internally unconditionally
1363  *	  the state in addition to the pulled entropy.
1548  *	 the entropy is pulled by the DRBG internally unconditionally
1550  *	 the state in addition to the pulled entropy.