fs: Pass AT_GETATTR_NOSEC flag to getattr interface function

When vfs_getattr_nosec() calls a filesystem's getattr interface function
then the 'nosec' should propagate into this function so that
vfs_getattr_nosec() can again be called from the filesystem's gettattr
rather than vfs_getattr(). The latter would add unnecessary security
checks that the initial vfs_getattr_nosec() call wanted to avoid.
Therefore, introduce the getattr flag GETATTR_NOSEC and allow to pass
with the new getattr_flags parameter to the getattr interface function.
In overlayfs and ecryptfs use this flag to determine which one of the
two functions to call.

In a recent code change introduced to IMA vfs_getattr_nosec() ended up
calling vfs_getattr() in overlayfs, which in turn called
security_inode_getattr() on an exiting process that did not have
current->fs set anymore, which then caused a kernel NULL pointer
dereference. With this change the call to security_inode_getattr() can
be avoided, thus avoiding the NULL pointer dereference.

Reported-by: <syzbot+a67fc5321ffb4b311c98@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Fixes: db1d1e8b9867 ("IMA: use vfs_getattr_nosec to get the i_version")
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231002125733.1251467-1-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

exportfs: allow exporting non-decodeable file handles to userspace

Some userspace programs use st_ino as a unique object identifier, even
though inode numbers may be recycable.

This issue has been addressed for NFS export long ago using the exportfs
file handle API and the unique file handle identifiers are also exported
to userspace via name_to_handle_at(2).

fanotify also uses file handles to identify objects in events, but only
for filesystems that support NFS export.

Relax the requirement for NFS export support and allow more filesystems
to export a unique object identifier via name_to_handle_at(2) with the
flag AT_HANDLE_FID.

A file handle requested with the AT_HANDLE_FID flag, may or may not be
usable as an argument to open_by_handle_at(2).

To allow filesystems to opt-in to supporting AT_HANDLE_FID, a struct
export_operations is required, but even an empty struct is sufficient
for encoding FIDs.

Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-Id: <20230502124817.3070545-4-amir73il@gmail.com>

mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_EXEC

Patch series "mm/memfd: introduce MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC", v8.

Since Linux introduced the memfd feature, memfd have always had their
execute bit set, and the memfd_create() syscall doesn't allow setting it
differently.

However, in a secure by default system, such as ChromeOS, (where all
executables should come from the rootfs, which is protected by Verified
boot), this executable nature of memfd opens a door for NoExec bypass and
enables “confused deputy attack”. E.g, in VRP bug [1]: cros_vm
process created a memfd to share the content with an external process,
however the memfd is overwritten and used for executing arbitrary code and
root escalation. [2] lists more VRP in this kind.

On the other hand, executable memfd has its legit use, runc uses memfd’s
seal and executable feature to copy the contents of the binary then
execute them, for such system, we need a solution to differentiate runc's
use of executable memfds and an attacker's [3].

To address those above, this set of patches add following:
1> Let memfd_create() set X bit at creation time.
2> Let memfd to be sealed for modifying X bit.
3> A new pid namespace sysctl: vm.memfd_noexec to control the behavior of
X bit.For example, if a container has vm.memfd_noexec=2, then
memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected.
4> A new security hook in memfd_create(). This make it possible to a new
LSM, which rejects or allows executable memfd based on its security policy.


This patch (of 5):

The new F_SEAL_EXEC flag will prevent modification of the exec bits:
written as traditional octal mask, 0111, or as named flags, S_IXUSR |
S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH. Any chmod(2) or similar call that attempts to modify
any of these bits after the seal is applied will fail with errno EPERM.

This will preserve the execute bits as they are at the time of sealing, so
the memfd will become either permanently executable or permanently
un-executable.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215001205.51969-1-jeffxu@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215001205.51969-2-jeffxu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
Co-developed-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

vfs: add faccessat2 syscall

POSIX defines faccessat() as having a fourth "flags" argument, while the
linux syscall doesn't have it. Glibc tries to emulate AT_EACCESS and
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, but AT_EACCESS emulation is broken.

Add a new faccessat(2) syscall with the added flags argument and implement
both flags.

The value of AT_EACCESS is defined in glibc headers to be the same as
AT_REMOVEDIR. Use this value for the kernel interface as well, together
with the explanatory comment.

Also add AT_EMPTY_PATH support, which is not documented by POSIX, but can
be useful and is trivial to implement.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

open: introduce openat2(2) syscall

/* Background. */
For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown flags
are present[1].

This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road to
being added to openat(2).

Userspace also has a hard time figuring out whether a particular flag is
supported on a particular kernel. While it is now possible with
contemporary kernels (thanks to [3]), older kernels will expose unknown
flag bits through fcntl(F_GETFL). Giving a clear -EINVAL during
openat(2) time matches modern syscall designs and is far more
fool-proof.

In addition, the newly-added path resolution restriction LOOKUP flags
(which we would like to expose to user-space) don't feel related to the
pre-existing O_* flag set -- they affect all components of path lookup.
We'd therefore like to add a new flag argument.

Adding a new syscall allows us to finally fix the flag-ignoring problem,
and we can make it extensible enough so that we will hopefully never
need an openat3(2).

/* Syscall Prototype. */
/*
* open_how is an extensible structure (similar in interface to
* clone3(2) or sched_setattr(2)). The size parameter must be set to
* sizeof(struct open_how), to allow for future extensions. All future
* extensions will be appended to open_how, with their zero value
* acting as a no-op default.
*/
struct open_how { /* ... */ };

int openat2(int dfd, const char *pathname,
struct open_how *how, size_t size);

/* Description. */
The initial version of 'struct open_how' contains the following fields:

flags
Used to specify openat(2)-style flags. However, any unknown flag
bits or otherwise incorrect flag combinations (like O_PATH|O_RDWR)
will result in -EINVAL. In addition, this field is 64-bits wide to
allow for more O_ flags than currently permitted with openat(2).

mode
The file mode for O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

Must be set to zero if flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

resolve
Restrict path resolution (in contrast to O_* flags they affect all
path components). The current set of flags are as follows (at the
moment, all of the RESOLVE_ flags are implemented as just passing
the corresponding LOOKUP_ flag).

RESOLVE_NO_XDEV => LOOKUP_NO_XDEV
RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS
RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS
RESOLVE_BENEATH => LOOKUP_BENEATH
RESOLVE_IN_ROOT => LOOKUP_IN_ROOT

open_how does not contain an embedded size field, because it is of
little benefit (userspace can figure out the kernel open_how size at
runtime fairly easily without it). It also only contains u64s (even
though ->mode arguably should be a u16) to avoid having padding fields
which are never used in the future.

Note that as a result of the new how->flags handling, O_PATH|O_TMPFILE
is no longer permitted for openat(2). As far as I can tell, this has
always been a bug and appears to not be used by userspace (and I've not
seen any problems on my machines by disallowing it). If it turns out
this breaks something, we can special-case it and only permit it for
openat(2) but not openat2(2).

After input from Florian Weimer, the new open_how and flag definitions
are inside a separate header from uapi/linux/fcntl.h, to avoid problems
that glibc has with importing that header.

/* Testing. */
In a follow-up patch there are over 200 selftests which ensure that this
syscall has the correct semantics and will correctly handle several
attack scenarios.

In addition, I've written a userspace library[4] which provides
convenient wrappers around openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) (this is necessary
because no other syscalls support RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, and thus lots of care
must be taken when using RESOLVE_IN_ROOT'd file descriptors with other
syscalls). During the development of this patch, I've run numerous
verification tests using libpathrs (showing that the API is reasonably
usable by userspace).

/* Future Work. */
Additional RESOLVE_ flags have been suggested during the review period.
These can be easily implemented separately (such as blocking auto-mount
during resolution).

Furthermore, there are some other proposed changes to the openat(2)
interface (the most obvious example is magic-link hardening[5]) which
would be a good opportunity to add a way for userspace to restrict how
O_PATH file descriptors can be re-opened.

Another possible avenue of future work would be some kind of
CHECK_FIELDS[6] flag which causes the kernel to indicate to userspace
which openat2(2) flags and fields are supported by the current kernel
(to avoid userspace having to go through several guesses to figure it
out).

[1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/588444/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFyyxJL1LyXZeBsf2ypriraj5ut1XkNDsunRBqgVjZU_6Q@mail.gmail.com
[3]: commit 629e014bb834 ("fs: completely ignore unknown open flags")
[4]: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17523
[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190930183316.10190-2-cyphar@cyphar.com/
[6]: https://youtu.be/ggD-eb3yPVs

Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

fcntl: fix typo in RWH_WRITE_LIFE_NOT_SET r/w hint name

According to commit message in the original commit c75b1d9421f8 ("fs:
add fcntl() interface for setting/getting write life time hints"),
as well as userspace library[1] and man page update[2], R/W hint constants
are intended to have RWH_* prefix. However, RWF_WRITE_LIFE_NOT_SET retained
"RWF_*" prefix used in the early versions of the proposed patch set[3].
Rename it and provide the old name as a synonym for the new one
for backward compatibility.

[1] https://github.com/axboe/fio/commit/bd553af6c849
[2] https://github.com/mkerrisk/man-pages/commit/580082a186fd
[3] https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-block@vger.kernel.org/msg09638.html

Fixes: c75b1d9421f8 ("fs: add fcntl() interface for setting/getting write life time hints")
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

vfs: syscall: Add open_tree(2) to reference or clone a mount

open_tree(dfd, pathname, flags)

Returns an O_PATH-opened file descriptor or an error.
dfd and pathname specify the location to open, in usual
fashion (see e.g. fstatat(2)). flags should be an OR of
some of the following:
* AT_PATH_EMPTY, AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW -
same meanings as usual
* OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC - make the resulting descriptor
close-on-exec
* OPEN_TREE_CLONE or OPEN_TREE_CLONE | AT_RECURSIVE -
instead of opening the location in question, create a detached
mount tree matching the subtree rooted at location specified by
dfd/pathname. With AT_RECURSIVE the entire subtree is cloned,
without it - only the part within in the mount containing the
location in question. In other words, the same as mount --rbind
or mount --bind would've taken. The detached tree will be
dissolved on the final close of obtained file. Creation of such
detached trees requires the same capabilities as doing mount --bind.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

mm/memfd: add an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal to memfd

Android uses ashmem for sharing memory regions. We are looking forward
to migrating all usecases of ashmem to memfd so that we can possibly
remove the ashmem driver in the future from staging while also
benefiting from using memfd and contributing to it. Note staging
drivers are also not ABI and generally can be removed at anytime.

One of the main usecases Android has is the ability to create a region
and mmap it as writeable, then add protection against making any
"future" writes while keeping the existing already mmap'ed
writeable-region active. This allows us to implement a usecase where
receivers of the shared memory buffer can get a read-only view, while
the sender continues to write to the buffer. See CursorWindow
documentation in Android for more details:

https://developer.android.com/reference/android/database/CursorWindow

This usecase cannot be implemented with the existing F_SEAL_WRITE seal.
To support the usecase, this patch adds a new F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal
which prevents any future mmap and write syscalls from succeeding while
keeping the existing mmap active.

A better way to do F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal was discussed [1] last week
where we don't need to modify core VFS structures to get the same
behavior of the seal. This solves several side-effects pointed by Andy.
self-tests are provided in later patch to verify the expected semantics.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181111173650.GA256781@google.com/

Thanks a lot to Andy for suggestions to improve code.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190112203816.85534-2-joel@joelfernandes.org
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc-Andr Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with no license

Many user space API headers are missing licensing information, which
makes it hard for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default are files without license information under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPLV2. Marking them GPLV2 would exclude
them from being included in non GPLV2 code, which is obviously not
intended. The user space API headers fall under the syscall exception
which is in the kernels COPYING file:

NOTE! This copyright does *not* cover user programs that use kernel
services by normal system calls - this is merely considered normal use
of the kernel, and does *not* fall under the heading of "derived work".

otherwise syscall usage would not be possible.

Update the files which contain no license information with an SPDX
license identifier. The chosen identifier is 'GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note' which is the officially assigned identifier for the
Linux syscall exception. SPDX license identifiers are a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne. See the previous patch in this series for the
methodology of how this patch was researched.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

fs: add fcntl() interface for setting/getting write life time hints

Define a set of write life time hints:

RWH_WRITE_LIFE_NOT_SET No hint information set
RWH_WRITE_LIFE_NONE No hints about write life time
RWH_WRITE_LIFE_SHORT Data written has a short life time
RWH_WRITE_LIFE_MEDIUM Data written has a medium life time
RWH_WRITE_LIFE_LONG Data written has a long life time
RWH_WRITE_LIFE_EXTREME Data written has an extremely long life time

The intent is for these values to be relative to each other, no
absolute meaning should be attached to these flag names.

Add an fcntl interface for querying these flags, and also for
setting them as well:

F_GET_RW_HINT Returns the read/write hint set on the
underlying inode.

F_SET_RW_HINT Set one of the above write hints on the
underlying inode.

F_GET_FILE_RW_HINT Returns the read/write hint set on the
file descriptor.

F_SET_FILE_RW_HINT Set one of the above write hints on the
file descriptor.

The user passes in a 64-bit pointer to get/set these values, and
the interface returns 0/-1 on success/error.

Sample program testing/implementing basic setting/getting of write
hints is below.

Add support for storing the write life time hint in the inode flags
and in struct file as well, and pass them to the kiocb flags. If
both a file and its corresponding inode has a write hint, then we
use the one in the file, if available. The file hint can be used
for sync/direct IO, for buffered writeback only the inode hint
is available.

This is in preparation for utilizing these hints in the block layer,
to guide on-media data placement.

/*
* writehint.c: get or set an inode write hint
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <inttypes.h>

#ifndef F_GET_RW_HINT
#define F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE 1024
#define F_GET_RW_HINT (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 11)
#define F_SET_RW_HINT (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 12)
#endif

static char *str[] = { "RWF_WRITE_LIFE_NOT_SET", "RWH_WRITE_LIFE_NONE",
"RWH_WRITE_LIFE_SHORT", "RWH_WRITE_LIFE_MEDIUM",
"RWH_WRITE_LIFE_LONG", "RWH_WRITE_LIFE_EXTREME" };

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
uint64_t hint;
int fd, ret;

if (argc < 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: file <hint>\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}

fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("open");
return 2;
}

if (argc > 2) {
hint = atoi(argv[2]);
ret = fcntl(fd, F_SET_RW_HINT, &hint);
if (ret < 0) {
perror("fcntl: F_SET_RW_HINT");
return 4;
}
}

ret = fcntl(fd, F_GET_RW_HINT, &hint);
if (ret < 0) {
perror("fcntl: F_GET_RW_HINT");
return 3;
}

printf("%s: hint %s\n", argv[1], str[hint]);
close(fd);
return 0;
}

Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

statx: Add a system call to make enhanced file info available

Add a system call to make extended file information available, including
file creation and some attribute flags where available through the
underlying filesystem.

The getattr inode operation is altered to take two additional arguments: a
u32 request_mask and an unsigned int flags that indicate the
synchronisation mode. This change is propagated to the vfs_getattr*()
function.

Functions like vfs_stat() are now inline wrappers around new functions
vfs_statx() and vfs_statx_fd() to reduce stack usage.

========
OVERVIEW
========

The idea was initially proposed as a set of xattrs that could be retrieved
with getxattr(), but the general preference proved to be for a new syscall
with an extended stat structure.

A number of requests were gathered for features to be included. The
following have been included:

(1) Make the fields a consistent size on all arches and make them large.

(2) Spare space, request flags and information flags are provided for
future expansion.

(3) Better support for the y2038 problem [Arnd Bergmann] (tv_sec is an
__s64).

(4) Creation time: The SMB protocol carries the creation time, which could
be exported by Samba, which will in turn help CIFS make use of
FS-Cache as that can be used for coherency data (stx_btime).

This is also specified in NFSv4 as a recommended attribute and could
be exported by NFSD [Steve French].

(5) Lightweight stat: Ask for just those details of interest, and allow a
netfs (such as NFS) to approximate anything not of interest, possibly
without going to the server [Trond Myklebust, Ulrich Drepper, Andreas
Dilger] (AT_STATX_DONT_SYNC).

(6) Heavyweight stat: Force a netfs to go to the server, even if it thinks
its cached attributes are up to date [Trond Myklebust]
(AT_STATX_FORCE_SYNC).

And the following have been left out for future extension:

(7) Data version number: Could be used by userspace NFS servers [Aneesh
Kumar].

Can also be used to modify fill_post_wcc() in NFSD which retrieves
i_version directly, but has just called vfs_getattr(). It could get
it from the kstat struct if it used vfs_xgetattr() instead.

(There's disagreement on the exact semantics of a single field, since
not all filesystems do this the same way).

(8) BSD stat compatibility: Including more fields from the BSD stat such
as creation time (st_btime) and inode generation number (st_gen)
[Jeremy Allison, Bernd Schubert].

(9) Inode generation number: Useful for FUSE and userspace NFS servers
[Bernd Schubert].

(This was asked for but later deemed unnecessary with the
open-by-handle capability available and caused disagreement as to
whether it's a security hole or not).

(10) Extra coherency data may be useful in making backups [Andreas Dilger].

(No particular data were offered, but things like last backup
timestamp, the data version number and the DOS archive bit would come
into this category).

(11) Allow the filesystem to indicate what it can/cannot provide: A
filesystem can now say it doesn't support a standard stat feature if
that isn't available, so if, for instance, inode numbers or UIDs don't
exist or are fabricated locally...

(This requires a separate system call - I have an fsinfo() call idea
for this).

(12) Store a 16-byte volume ID in the superblock that can be returned in
struct xstat [Steve French].

(Deferred to fsinfo).

(13) Include granularity fields in the time data to indicate the
granularity of each of the times (NFSv4 time_delta) [Steve French].

(Deferred to fsinfo).

(14) FS_IOC_GETFLAGS value. These could be translated to BSD's st_flags.
Note that the Linux IOC flags are a mess and filesystems such as Ext4
define flags that aren't in linux/fs.h, so translation in the kernel
may be a necessity (or, possibly, we provide the filesystem type too).

(Some attributes are made available in stx_attributes, but the general
feeling was that the IOC flags were to ext[234]-specific and shouldn't
be exposed through statx this way).

(15) Mask of features available on file (eg: ACLs, seclabel) [Brad Boyer,
Michael Kerrisk].

(Deferred, probably to fsinfo. Finding out if there's an ACL or
seclabal might require extra filesystem operations).

(16) Femtosecond-resolution timestamps [Dave Chinner].

(A __reserved field has been left in the statx_timestamp struct for
this - if there proves to be a need).

(17) A set multiple attributes syscall to go with this.

===============
NEW SYSTEM CALL
===============

The new system call is:

int ret = statx(int dfd,
const char *filename,
unsigned int flags,
unsigned int mask,
struct statx *buffer);

The dfd, filename and flags parameters indicate the file to query, in a
similar way to fstatat(). There is no equivalent of lstat() as that can be
emulated with statx() by passing AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW in flags. There is
also no equivalent of fstat() as that can be emulated by passing a NULL
filename to statx() with the fd of interest in dfd.

Whether or not statx() synchronises the attributes with the backing store
can be controlled by OR'ing a value into the flags argument (this typically
only affects network filesystems):

(1) AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT tells statx() to behave as stat() does in this
respect.

(2) AT_STATX_FORCE_SYNC will require a network filesystem to synchronise
its attributes with the server - which might require data writeback to
occur to get the timestamps correct.

(3) AT_STATX_DONT_SYNC will suppress synchronisation with the server in a
network filesystem. The resulting values should be considered
approximate.

mask is a bitmask indicating the fields in struct statx that are of
interest to the caller. The user should set this to STATX_BASIC_STATS to
get the basic set returned by stat(). It should be noted that asking for
more information may entail extra I/O operations.

buffer points to the destination for the data. This must be 256 bytes in
size.

======================
MAIN ATTRIBUTES RECORD
======================

The following structures are defined in which to return the main attribute
set:

struct statx_timestamp {
__s64 tv_sec;
__s32 tv_nsec;
__s32 __reserved;
};

struct statx {
__u32 stx_mask;
__u32 stx_blksize;
__u64 stx_attributes;
__u32 stx_nlink;
__u32 stx_uid;
__u32 stx_gid;
__u16 stx_mode;
__u16 __spare0[1];
__u64 stx_ino;
__u64 stx_size;
__u64 stx_blocks;
__u64 __spare1[1];
struct statx_timestamp stx_atime;
struct statx_timestamp stx_btime;
struct statx_timestamp stx_ctime;
struct statx_timestamp stx_mtime;
__u32 stx_rdev_major;
__u32 stx_rdev_minor;
__u32 stx_dev_major;
__u32 stx_dev_minor;
__u64 __spare2[14];
};

The defined bits in request_mask and stx_mask are:

STATX_TYPE Want/got stx_mode & S_IFMT
STATX_MODE Want/got stx_mode & ~S_IFMT
STATX_NLINK Want/got stx_nlink
STATX_UID Want/got stx_uid
STATX_GID Want/got stx_gid
STATX_ATIME Want/got stx_atime{,_ns}
STATX_MTIME Want/got stx_mtime{,_ns}
STATX_CTIME Want/got stx_ctime{,_ns}
STATX_INO Want/got stx_ino
STATX_SIZE Want/got stx_size
STATX_BLOCKS Want/got stx_blocks
STATX_BASIC_STATS [The stuff in the normal stat struct]
STATX_BTIME Want/got stx_btime{,_ns}
STATX_ALL [All currently available stuff]

stx_btime is the file creation time, stx_mask is a bitmask indicating the
data provided and __spares*[] are where as-yet undefined fields can be
placed.

Time fields are structures with separate seconds and nanoseconds fields
plus a reserved field in case we want to add even finer resolution. Note
that times will be negative if before 1970; in such a case, the nanosecond
fields will also be negative if not zero.

The bits defined in the stx_attributes field convey information about a
file, how it is accessed, where it is and what it does. The following
attributes map to FS_*_FL flags and are the same numerical value:

STATX_ATTR_COMPRESSED File is compressed by the fs
STATX_ATTR_IMMUTABLE File is marked immutable
STATX_ATTR_APPEND File is append-only
STATX_ATTR_NODUMP File is not to be dumped
STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED File requires key to decrypt in fs

Within the kernel, the supported flags are listed by:

KSTAT_ATTR_FS_IOC_FLAGS

[Are any other IOC flags of sufficient general interest to be exposed
through this interface?]

New flags include:

STATX_ATTR_AUTOMOUNT Object is an automount trigger

These are for the use of GUI tools that might want to mark files specially,
depending on what they are.

Fields in struct statx come in a number of classes:

(0) stx_dev_*, stx_blksize.

These are local system information and are always available.

(1) stx_mode, stx_nlinks, stx_uid, stx_gid, stx_[amc]time, stx_ino,
stx_size, stx_blocks.

These will be returned whether the caller asks for them or not. The
corresponding bits in stx_mask will be set to indicate whether they
actually have valid values.

If the caller didn't ask for them, then they may be approximated. For
example, NFS won't waste any time updating them from the server,
unless as a byproduct of updating something requested.

If the values don't actually exist for the underlying object (such as
UID or GID on a DOS file), then the bit won't be set in the stx_mask,
even if the caller asked for the value. In such a case, the returned
value will be a fabrication.

Note that there are instances where the type might not be valid, for
instance Windows reparse points.

(2) stx_rdev_*.

This will be set only if stx_mode indicates we're looking at a
blockdev or a chardev, otherwise will be 0.

(3) stx_btime.

Similar to (1), except this will be set to 0 if it doesn't exist.

=======
TESTING
=======

The following test program can be used to test the statx system call:

samples/statx/test-statx.c

Just compile and run, passing it paths to the files you want to examine.
The file is built automatically if CONFIG_SAMPLES is enabled.

Here's some example output. Firstly, an NFS directory that crosses to
another FSID. Note that the AUTOMOUNT attribute is set because transiting
this directory will cause d_automount to be invoked by the VFS.

[root@andromeda ~]# /tmp/test-statx -A /warthog/data
statx(/warthog/data) = 0
results=7ff
Size: 4096 Blocks: 8 IO Block: 1048576 directory
Device: 00:26 Inode: 1703937 Links: 125
Access: (3777/drwxrwxrwx) Uid: 0 Gid: 4041
Access: 2016-11-24 09:02:12.219699527+0000
Modify: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000
Change: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000
Attributes: 0000000000001000 (-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- ---m---- --------)

Secondly, the result of automounting on that directory.

[root@andromeda ~]# /tmp/test-statx /warthog/data
statx(/warthog/data) = 0
results=7ff
Size: 4096 Blocks: 8 IO Block: 1048576 directory
Device: 00:27 Inode: 2 Links: 125
Access: (3777/drwxrwxrwx) Uid: 0 Gid: 4041
Access: 2016-11-24 09:02:12.219699527+0000
Modify: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000
Change: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

shm: add sealing API

If two processes share a common memory region, they usually want some
guarantees to allow safe access. This often includes:
- one side cannot overwrite data while the other reads it
- one side cannot shrink the buffer while the other accesses it
- one side cannot grow the buffer beyond previously set boundaries

If there is a trust-relationship between both parties, there is no need
for policy enforcement. However, if there's no trust relationship (eg.,
for general-purpose IPC) sharing memory-regions is highly fragile and
often not possible without local copies. Look at the following two
use-cases:

1) A graphics client wants to share its rendering-buffer with a
graphics-server. The memory-region is allocated by the client for
read/write access and a second FD is passed to the server. While
scanning out from the memory region, the server has no guarantee that
the client doesn't shrink the buffer at any time, requiring rather
cumbersome SIGBUS handling.
2) A process wants to perform an RPC on another process. To avoid huge
bandwidth consumption, zero-copy is preferred. After a message is
assembled in-memory and a FD is passed to the remote side, both sides
want to be sure that neither modifies this shared copy, anymore. The
source may have put sensible data into the message without a separate
copy and the target may want to parse the message inline, to avoid a
local copy.

While SIGBUS handling, POSIX mandatory locking and MAP_DENYWRITE provide
ways to achieve most of this, the first one is unproportionally ugly to
use in libraries and the latter two are broken/racy or even disabled due
to denial of service attacks.

This patch introduces the concept of SEALING. If you seal a file, a
specific set of operations is blocked on that file forever. Unlike locks,
seals can only be set, never removed. Hence, once you verified a specific
set of seals is set, you're guaranteed that no-one can perform the blocked
operations on this file, anymore.

An initial set of SEALS is introduced by this patch:
- SHRINK: If SEAL_SHRINK is set, the file in question cannot be reduced
in size. This affects ftruncate() and open(O_TRUNC).
- GROW: If SEAL_GROW is set, the file in question cannot be increased
in size. This affects ftruncate(), fallocate() and write().
- WRITE: If SEAL_WRITE is set, no write operations (besides resizing)
are possible. This affects fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE), mmap() and
write().
- SEAL: If SEAL_SEAL is set, no further seals can be added to a file.
This basically prevents the F_ADD_SEAL operation on a file and
can be set to prevent others from adding further seals that you
don't want.

The described use-cases can easily use these seals to provide safe use
without any trust-relationship:

1) The graphics server can verify that a passed file-descriptor has
SEAL_SHRINK set. This allows safe scanout, while the client is
allowed to increase buffer size for window-resizing on-the-fly.
Concurrent writes are explicitly allowed.
2) For general-purpose IPC, both processes can verify that SEAL_SHRINK,
SEAL_GROW and SEAL_WRITE are set. This guarantees that neither
process can modify the data while the other side parses it.
Furthermore, it guarantees that even with writable FDs passed to the
peer, it cannot increase the size to hit memory-limits of the source
process (in case the file-storage is accounted to the source).

The new API is an extension to fcntl(), adding two new commands:
F_GET_SEALS: Return a bitset describing the seals on the file. This
can be called on any FD if the underlying file supports
sealing.
F_ADD_SEALS: Change the seals of a given file. This requires WRITE
access to the file and F_SEAL_SEAL may not already be set.
Furthermore, the underlying file must support sealing and
there may not be any existing shared mapping of that file.
Otherwise, EBADF/EPERM is returned.
The given seals are _added_ to the existing set of seals
on the file. You cannot remove seals again.

The fcntl() handler is currently specific to shmem and disabled on all
files. A file needs to explicitly support sealing for this interface to
work. A separate syscall is added in a follow-up, which creates files that
support sealing. There is no intention to support this on other
file-systems. Semantics are unclear for non-volatile files and we lack any
use-case right now. Therefore, the implementation is specific to shmem.

Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate include/linux

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>