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cb46fca8 |
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29-Aug-2023 |
Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> |
cxl: Add Support for Get Timestamp Add the call to the UAPI such that userspace may corelate the timestamps from the device log with system wall time, if, for example there's any sort of inaccuracy or skew in the device. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230829152014.15452-1-dave@stgolabs.net Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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3db166d6 |
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18-Apr-2023 |
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> |
cxl/mbox: Deprecate poison commands The CXL subsystem is adding formal mechanisms for managing device poison. Minimize the maintenance burden going forward, and maximize the investment in common tooling by deprecating direct user access to poison commands outside of CXL_MEM_RAW_COMMANDS debug scenarios. A new cxl_deprecated_commands[] list is created for querying which command ids defined in previous kernels are now deprecated. CXL Media and Poison Management commands, opcodes 0x43XX, defined in CXL 3.0 Spec, Table 8-93 are deprecated with one exception: Get Scan Media Capabilities. Keep Get Scan Media Capabilities as it simply provides information and has no impact on the device state. Effectively all of the commands defined in: commit 87815ee9d006 ("cxl/pci: Add media provisioning required commands") ...were defined prematurely and should have waited until the kernel implementation was decided. To my knowledge there are no shipping devices with poison support and no known tools that would regress with this change. Co-developed-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/652197e9bc8885e6448d989405b9e50ee9d6b0a6.1681838291.git.alison.schofield@intel.com Tested-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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af73370d |
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02-Feb-2023 |
Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> |
cxl/mem: Fix UAPI command comment The command comment had grammatical errors. In an attempt to fix those it was noted that the comment and the query command were not in sync. Now that the query command returns excluded and device unsupported command information. Update the kdoc and fix the grammatical errors. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/63b4ec4e37cc1_5178e2941d@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com.notmuch/ Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221222-cxl-misc-v4-4-62f701c1cdd1@intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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814a15f3 |
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02-Feb-2023 |
Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> |
cxl/uapi: Tag commands from cxl_query_cmd() It was pointed out that commands not supported by the device or excluded by the kernel were being returned in cxl_query_cmd().[1] While libcxl correctly handles failing commands, it is more efficient to not issue an invalid command in the first place. This can't be done without additional information being returned from cxl_query_cmd(). In addition, information about the availability of commands can be useful for debugging. Add flags to struct cxl_command_info which reflect if a command is enabled and/or exclusive to the kernel. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/63b4ec4e37cc1_5178e2941d@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com.notmuch/ Suggested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221222-cxl-misc-v4-3-62f701c1cdd1@intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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11ef026e |
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02-Feb-2023 |
Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> |
cxl/uapi: Add warning on CXL command enum The CXL command enum is exported to user space and must maintain backwards compatibility. Add comment that new defines must be added to the end of the list. Suggested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221222-cxl-misc-v4-2-62f701c1cdd1@intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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7fe89804 |
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05-Dec-2022 |
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> |
cxl/security: Drop security command ioctl uapi CXL PMEM security operations are routed through the NVDIMM sysfs interface. For this reason the corresponding commands are marked "exclusive" to preclude collisions between the ioctl ABI and the sysfs ABI. However, a better way to preclude that collision is to simply remove the ioctl ABI (command-id definitions) for those operations. Now that cxl_internal_send_cmd() (formerly cxl_mbox_send_cmd()) no longer needs to talk the cxl_mem_commands array, all of the uapi definitions for the security commands can be dropped. These never appeared in a released kernel, so no regression risk. Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/167030056464.4044561.11486507095384253833.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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3b502e88 |
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30-Nov-2022 |
Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> |
cxl/pmem: Add "Passphrase Secure Erase" security command support Create callback function to support the nvdimm_security_ops() ->erase() callback. Translate the operation to send "Passphrase Secure Erase" security command for CXL memory device. When the mem device is secure erased, cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion() is called in order to invalidate all CPU caches before attempting to access the mem device again. See CXL 3.0 spec section 8.2.9.8.6.6 for reference. Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166983615293.2734609.10358657600295932156.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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2bb692f7 |
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30-Nov-2022 |
Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> |
cxl/pmem: Add "Unlock" security command support Create callback function to support the nvdimm_security_ops() ->unlock() callback. Translate the operation to send "Unlock" security command for CXL mem device. When the mem device is unlocked, cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion() is called in order to invalidate all CPU caches before attempting to access the mem device. See CXL rev3.0 spec section 8.2.9.8.6.4 for reference. Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166983614167.2734609.15124543712487741176.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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a072f7b7 |
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30-Nov-2022 |
Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> |
cxl/pmem: Add "Freeze Security State" security command support Create callback function to support the nvdimm_security_ops() ->freeze() callback. Translate the operation to send "Freeze Security State" security command for CXL memory device. See CXL rev3.0 spec section 8.2.9.8.6.5 for reference. Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166983613019.2734609.10645754779802492122.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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c4ef680d |
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30-Nov-2022 |
Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> |
cxl/pmem: Add Disable Passphrase security command support Create callback function to support the nvdimm_security_ops ->disable() callback. Translate the operation to send "Disable Passphrase" security command for CXL memory device. The operation supports disabling a passphrase for the CXL persistent memory device. In the original implementation of nvdimm_security_ops, this operation only supports disabling of the user passphrase. This is due to the NFIT version of disable passphrase only supported disabling of user passphrase. The CXL spec allows disabling of the master passphrase as well which nvidmm_security_ops does not support yet. In this commit, the callback function will only support user passphrase. See CXL rev3.0 spec section 8.2.9.8.6.3 for reference. Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166983611878.2734609.10602135274526390127.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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99746940 |
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30-Nov-2022 |
Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> |
cxl/pmem: Add "Set Passphrase" security command support Create callback function to support the nvdimm_security_ops ->change_key() callback. Translate the operation to send "Set Passphrase" security command for CXL memory device. The operation supports setting a passphrase for the CXL persistent memory device. It also supports the changing of the currently set passphrase. The operation allows manipulation of a user passphrase or a master passphrase. See CXL rev3.0 spec section 8.2.9.8.6.2 for reference. However, the spec leaves a gap WRT master passphrase usages. The spec does not define any ways to retrieve the status of if the support of master passphrase is available for the device, nor does the commands that utilize master passphrase will return a specific error that indicates master passphrase is not supported. If using a device does not support master passphrase and a command is issued with a master passphrase, the error message returned by the device will be ambiguous. Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166983610751.2734609.4445075071552032091.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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32828115 |
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30-Nov-2022 |
Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> |
cxl/pmem: Introduce nvdimm_security_ops with ->get_flags() operation Add nvdimm_security_ops support for CXL memory device with the introduction of the ->get_flags() callback function. This is part of the "Persistent Memory Data-at-rest Security" command set for CXL memory device support. The ->get_flags() function provides the security state of the persistent memory device defined by the CXL 3.0 spec section 8.2.9.8.6.1. Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166983609611.2734609.13231854299523325319.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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26f89535 |
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13-Apr-2022 |
Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> |
cxl/mbox: Use type __u32 for mailbox payload sizes Payload sizes for mailbox commands are expected to be positive values coming from userspace. The documentation correctly describes these as always unsigned values. The mailbox and send structures that support the mailbox commands however, use __s32 types for the payloads. Replace __s32 with __u32 in the mailbox and send command structures and update usages. Kernel users of the interface already block all negative values and there is no known ability for userspace to have grown a dependency on submitting negative values to the kernel. The known user of the IOCTL, the CXL command line interface (cxl-cli) already enforces positive size values. A Smatch warning of a signedness uncovered this issue. Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220414051246.1244575-1-alison.schofield@intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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9d1b3afd |
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03-Sep-2021 |
Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> |
cxl/uapi: Fix defined but not used warnings Fix unused-const-variable warnings emitted by gcc when cxlmem.h is used by pretty much all files except pci.c Signed-off-by: Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163072205652.2250120.16833548560832424468.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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87815ee9 |
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13-Apr-2021 |
Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> |
cxl/pci: Add media provisioning required commands Some of the commands have already been defined for the support of RAW commands (to be blocked). Unlike their usage in the RAW interface, when used through the supported interface, they will be coordinated and marshalled along with other commands being issued by userspace and the driver itself. That coordination will be added later. The list of commands was determined based on the learnings from libnvdimm and this list is provided directly from Dan. Recommended-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210413140907.534404-1-ben.widawsky@intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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57ee605b |
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16-Feb-2021 |
Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> |
cxl/mem: Add set of informational commands Add initial set of formal commands beyond basic identify and command enumeration. Signed-off-by: Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> (v2) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210217040958.1354670-8-ben.widawsky@intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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472b1ce6 |
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16-Feb-2021 |
Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> |
cxl/mem: Enable commands via CEL CXL devices identified by the memory-device class code must implement the Device Command Interface (described in 8.2.9 of the CXL 2.0 spec). While the driver already maintains a list of commands it supports, there is still a need to be able to distinguish between commands that the driver knows about from commands that are optionally supported by the hardware. The Command Effects Log (CEL) is specified in the CXL 2.0 specification. The CEL is one of two types of logs, the other being vendor specific. They are distinguished in hardware/spec via UUID. The CEL is useful for 2 things: 1. Determine which optional commands are supported by the CXL device. 2. Enumerate any vendor specific commands The CEL is used by the driver to determine which commands are available in the hardware and therefore which commands userspace is allowed to execute. The set of enabled commands might be a subset of commands which are advertised in UAPI via CXL_MEM_SEND_COMMAND IOCTL. With the CEL enabling comes a internal flag to indicate a base set of commands that are enabled regardless of CEL. Such commands are required for basic interaction with the hardware and thus can be useful in debug cases, for example if the CEL is corrupted. The implementation leaves the statically defined table of commands and supplements it with a bitmap to determine commands that are enabled. This organization was chosen for the following reasons: - Smaller memory footprint. Doesn't need a table per device. - Reduce memory allocation complexity. - Fixed command IDs to opcode mapping for all devices makes development and debugging easier. - Certain helpers are easily achievable, like cxl_for_each_cmd(). Signed-off-by: Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> (v2) Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> (v3) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210217040958.1354670-7-ben.widawsky@intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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13237183 |
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16-Feb-2021 |
Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> |
cxl/mem: Add a "RAW" send command The CXL memory device send interface will have a number of supported commands. The raw command is not such a command. Raw commands allow userspace to send a specified opcode to the underlying hardware and bypass all driver checks on the command. The primary use for this command is to [begrudgingly] allow undocumented vendor specific hardware commands. While not the main motivation, it also allows prototyping new hardware commands without a driver patch and rebuild. While this all sounds very powerful it comes with a couple of caveats: 1. Bug reports using raw commands will not get the same level of attention as bug reports using supported commands (via taint). 2. Supported commands will be rejected by the RAW command. With this comes new debugfs knob to allow full access to your toes with your weapon of choice. Signed-off-by: Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> (v2) Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Cc: Ariel Sibley <Ariel.Sibley@microchip.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210217040958.1354670-6-ben.widawsky@intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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583fa5e7 |
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16-Feb-2021 |
Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> |
cxl/mem: Add basic IOCTL interface Add a straightforward IOCTL that provides a mechanism for userspace to query the supported memory device commands. CXL commands as they appear to userspace are described as part of the UAPI kerneldoc. The command list returned via this IOCTL will contain the full set of commands that the driver supports, however, some of those commands may not be available for use by userspace. Memory device commands first appear in the CXL 2.0 specification. They are submitted through a mailbox mechanism specified in the CXL 2.0 specification. The send command allows userspace to issue mailbox commands directly to the hardware. The list of available commands to send are the output of the query command. The driver verifies basic properties of the command and possibly inspect the input (or output) payload to determine whether or not the command is allowed (or might taint the kernel). Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # bug in earlier revision Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> (v2) Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210217040958.1354670-5-ben.widawsky@intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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