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986d93f5 |
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30-Oct-2022 |
Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com> |
audit: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for AUDIT_BIT Shifting signed 32-bit value by 31 bits is undefined, so changing significant bit to unsigned. The UBSAN warning calltrace like below: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in kernel/auditfilter.c:179:23 left shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type 'int' Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x7d/0xa5 dump_stack+0x15/0x1b ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x4e __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e7/0x20c audit_register_class+0x9d/0x137 audit_classes_init+0x4d/0xb8 do_one_initcall+0x76/0x430 kernel_init_freeable+0x3b3/0x422 kernel_init+0x24/0x1e0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com> [PM: remove bad 'Fixes' tag as issue predates git, added in v2.6.6-rc1] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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#
08145b08 |
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31-May-2022 |
Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> |
LoongArch: Add ELF-related definitions Add ELF-related definitions for LoongArch, including: EM_LOONGARCH, KEXEC_ARCH_LOONGARCH, AUDIT_ARCH_LOONGARCH32, AUDIT_ARCH_LOONGARCH64 and NT_LOONGARCH_*. Reviewed-by: WANG Xuerui <git@xen0n.name> Reviewed-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
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ed98ea21 |
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16-Dec-2021 |
Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> |
audit: replace zero-length array with flexible-array member Zero-length arrays are deprecated and should be replaced with flexible-array members. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/78 Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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2cc1ae48 |
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04-Sep-2021 |
Michael Weiß <michael.weiss@aisec.fraunhofer.de> |
dm: introduce audit event module for device mapper To be able to send auditing events to user space, we introduce a generic dm-audit module. It provides helper functions to emit audit events through the kernel audit subsystem. We claim the AUDIT_DM_CTRL type=1336 and AUDIT_DM_EVENT type=1337 out of the audit event messages range in the corresponding userspace api in 'include/uapi/linux/audit.h' for those events. AUDIT_DM_CTRL is used to provide information about creation and destruction of device mapper targets which are triggered by user space admin control actions. AUDIT_DM_EVENT is used to provide information about actual errors during operation of the mapped device, showing e.g. integrity violations in audit log. Following commits to device mapper targets actually will make use of this to emit those events in relevant cases. The audit logs look like this if executing the following simple test: # dd if=/dev/zero of=test.img bs=1M count=1024 # losetup -f test.img # integritysetup -vD format --integrity sha256 -t 32 /dev/loop0 # integritysetup open -D /dev/loop0 --integrity sha256 integritytest # integritysetup status integritytest # integritysetup close integritytest # integritysetup open -D /dev/loop0 --integrity sha256 integritytest # integritysetup status integritytest # dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/loop0 bs=512 count=1 seek=100000 # dd if=/dev/mapper/integritytest of=/dev/null ------------------------- audit.log from auditd type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1630425039.363:184): module=integrity op=ctr ppid=3807 pid=3819 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts2 ses=3 comm="integritysetup" exe="/sbin/integritysetup" subj==unconfined dev=254:3 error_msg='success' res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1630425039.471:185): module=integrity op=dtr ppid=3807 pid=3819 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts2 ses=3 comm="integritysetup" exe="/sbin/integritysetup" subj==unconfined dev=254:3 error_msg='success' res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1630425039.611:186): module=integrity op=ctr ppid=3807 pid=3819 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts2 ses=3 comm="integritysetup" exe="/sbin/integritysetup" subj==unconfined dev=254:3 error_msg='success' res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1630425054.475:187): module=integrity op=dtr ppid=3807 pid=3819 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts2 ses=3 comm="integritysetup" exe="/sbin/integritysetup" subj==unconfined dev=254:3 error_msg='success' res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1630425073.171:191): module=integrity op=ctr ppid=3807 pid=3883 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts2 ses=3 comm="integritysetup" exe="/sbin/integritysetup" subj==unconfined dev=254:3 error_msg='success' res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1630425087.239:192): module=integrity op=dtr ppid=3807 pid=3902 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts2 ses=3 comm="integritysetup" exe="/sbin/integritysetup" subj==unconfined dev=254:3 error_msg='success' res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1630425093.755:193): module=integrity op=ctr ppid=3807 pid=3906 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts2 ses=3 comm="integritysetup" exe="/sbin/integritysetup" subj==unconfined dev=254:3 error_msg='success' res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:194): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:195): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:196): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:197): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:198): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:199): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:200): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:201): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:202): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 type=UNKNOWN[1337] msg=audit(1630425112.119:203): module=integrity op=integrity-checksum dev=254:3 sector=77480 res=0 Signed-off-by: Michael Weiß <michael.weiss@aisec.fraunhofer.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> # fix audit.h numbering Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
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571e5c0e |
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19-May-2021 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: add OPENAT2 record to list "how" info Since the openat2(2) syscall uses a struct open_how pointer to communicate its parameters they are not usefully recorded by the audit SYSCALL record's four existing arguments. Add a new audit record type OPENAT2 that reports the parameters in its third argument, struct open_how with fields oflag, mode and resolve. The new record in the context of an event would look like: time->Wed Mar 17 16:28:53 2021 type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): proctitle= 73797363616C6C735F66696C652F6F70656E617432002F746D702F61756469742D 7465737473756974652D737641440066696C652D6F70656E617432 type=PATH msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): item=1 name="file-openat2" inode=29 dev=00:1f mode=0100600 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0 type=PATH msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): item=0 name="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests" inode=25 dev=00:1f mode=040700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0 type=CWD msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): cwd="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests" type=OPENAT2 msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): oflag=0100302 mode=0600 resolve=0xa type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): arch=c000003e syscall=437 success=yes exit=4 a0=3 a1=7ffe315f1c53 a2=7ffe315f1550 a3=18 items=2 ppid=528 pid=540 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm="openat2" exe="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests/syscalls_file/openat2" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key="testsuite-1616012933-bjAUcEPO" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d23fbb89186754487850367224b060e26f9b7181.1621363275.git.rgb@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> [PM: tweak subject, wrap example, move AUDIT_OPENAT2 to 1337] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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67daf270 |
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18-Apr-2021 |
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
audit: add filtering for io_uring records This patch adds basic audit io_uring filtering, using as much of the existing audit filtering infrastructure as possible. In order to do this we reuse the audit filter rule's syscall mask for the io_uring operation and we create a new filter for io_uring operations as AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT/audit_filter_list[7]. Thanks to Richard Guy Briggs for his review, feedback, and work on the corresponding audit userspace changes. Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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#
5bd2182d |
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16-Feb-2021 |
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring This patch adds basic auditing to io_uring operations, regardless of their context. This is accomplished by allocating audit_context structures for the io-wq worker and io_uring SQPOLL kernel threads as well as explicitly auditing the io_uring operations in io_issue_sqe(). Individual io_uring operations can bypass auditing through the "audit_skip" field in the struct io_op_def definition for the operation; although great care must be taken so that security relevant io_uring operations do not bypass auditing; please contact the audit mailing list (see the MAINTAINERS file) with any questions. The io_uring operations are audited using a new AUDIT_URINGOP record, an example is shown below: type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1631800225.981:37289): uring_op=19 success=yes exit=0 items=0 ppid=15454 pid=15681 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) Thanks to Richard Guy Briggs for review and feedback. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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#
6ddb5680 |
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08-Jun-2021 |
Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com> |
audit: remove trailing spaces and tabs Run the following command to find and remove the trailing spaces and tabs: sed -r -i 's/[ \t]+$//' <audit_files> The files to be checked are as follows: kernel/audit* include/linux/audit.h include/uapi/linux/audit.h Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com> Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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#
b43870c7 |
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04-Jul-2020 |
Max Englander <max.englander@gmail.com> |
audit: report audit wait metric in audit status reply In environments where the preservation of audit events and predictable usage of system memory are prioritized, admins may use a combination of --backlog_wait_time and -b options at the risk of degraded performance resulting from backlog waiting. In some cases, this risk may be preferred to lost events or unbounded memory usage. Ideally, this risk can be mitigated by making adjustments when backlog waiting is detected. However, detection can be difficult using the currently available metrics. For example, an admin attempting to debug degraded performance may falsely believe a full backlog indicates backlog waiting. It may turn out the backlog frequently fills up but drains quickly. To make it easier to reliably track degraded performance to backlog waiting, this patch makes the following changes: Add a new field backlog_wait_time_total to the audit status reply. Initialize this field to zero. Add to this field the total time spent by the current task on scheduled timeouts while the backlog limit is exceeded. Reset field to zero upon request via AUDIT_SET. Tested on Ubuntu 18.04 using complementary changes to the audit-userspace and audit-testsuite: - https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/pull/134 - https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/pull/97 Signed-off-by: Max Englander <max.englander@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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#
9d2161be |
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22-Apr-2020 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: log audit netlink multicast bind and unbind Log information about programs connecting to and disconnecting from the audit netlink multicast socket. This is needed so that during investigations a security officer can tell who or what had access to the audit trail. This helps to meet the FAU_SAR.2 requirement for Common Criteria. Here is the systemd startup event: type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(2020-04-22 10:10:21.787:10) : proctitle=/init type=SYSCALL msg=audit(2020-04-22 10:10:21.787:10) : arch=x86_64 syscall=bind success=yes exit=0 a0=0x19 a1=0x555f4aac7e90 a2=0xc a3=0x7ffcb792ff44 items=0 ppid=0 pid=1 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=systemd exe=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd subj=kernel key=(null) type=UNKNOWN[1335] msg=audit(2020-04-22 10:10:21.787:10) : pid=1 uid=root auid=unset tty=(none) ses=unset subj=kernel comm=systemd exe=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd nl-mcgrp=1 op=connect res=yes And events from the test suite that just uses close(): type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:47:08.501:442) : proctitle=/usr/bin/perl -w amcast_joinpart/test type=SYSCALL msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:47:08.501:442) : arch=x86_64 syscall=bind success=yes exit=0 a0=0x7 a1=0x563004378760 a2=0xc a3=0x0 items=0 ppid=815 pid=818 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=UNKNOWN[1335] msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:47:08.501:442) : pid=818 uid=root auid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl nl-mcgrp=1 op=connect res=yes type=UNKNOWN[1335] msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:47:08.501:443) : pid=818 uid=root auid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl nl-mcgrp=1 op=disconnect res=yes And the events from the test suite using setsockopt with NETLINK_DROP_MEMBERSHIP: type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:39:53.291:439) : proctitle=/usr/bin/perl -w amcast_joinpart/test type=SYSCALL msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:39:53.291:439) : arch=x86_64 syscall=bind success=yes exit=0 a0=0x7 a1=0x5560877c2d20 a2=0xc a3=0x0 items=0 ppid=772 pid=775 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=UNKNOWN[1335] msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:39:53.291:439) : pid=775 uid=root auid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl nl-mcgrp=1 op=connect res=yes type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:39:53.292:440) : proctitle=/usr/bin/perl -w amcast_joinpart/test type=SYSCALL msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:39:53.292:440) : arch=x86_64 syscall=setsockopt success=yes exit=0 a0=0x7 a1=SOL_NETLINK a2=0x2 a3=0x7ffc8366f000 items=0 ppid=772 pid=775 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=UNKNOWN[1335] msg=audit(2020-04-22 11:39:53.292:440) : pid=775 uid=root auid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl nl-mcgrp=1 op=disconnect res=yes Please see the upstream issue tracker at https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/28 With the feature description at https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Multicast-Socket-Join-Part The testsuite support is at https://github.com/rgbriggs/audit-testsuite/compare/ghak28-mcast-part-join https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/pull/93 And the userspace support patch is at https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/pull/114 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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bae141f5 |
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06-Dec-2019 |
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> |
bpf: Emit audit messages upon successful prog load and unload Allow for audit messages to be emitted upon BPF program load and unload for having a timeline of events. The load itself is in syscall context, so additional info about the process initiating the BPF prog creation can be logged and later directly correlated to the unload event. The only info really needed from BPF side is the globally unique prog ID where then audit user space tooling can query / dump all info needed about the specific BPF program right upon load event and enrich the record, thus these changes needed here can be kept small and non-intrusive to the core. Raw example output: # auditctl -D # auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=x86_64 -S bpf # ausearch --start recent -m 1334 ... ---- time->Wed Nov 27 16:04:13 2019 type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1574867053.120:84664): proctitle="./bpf" type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1574867053.120:84664): arch=c000003e syscall=321 \ success=yes exit=3 a0=5 a1=7ffea484fbe0 a2=70 a3=0 items=0 ppid=7477 \ pid=12698 auid=1001 uid=1001 gid=1001 euid=1001 suid=1001 fsuid=1001 \ egid=1001 sgid=1001 fsgid=1001 tty=pts2 ses=4 comm="bpf" \ exe="/home/jolsa/auditd/audit-testsuite/tests/bpf/bpf" \ subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=UNKNOWN[1334] msg=audit(1574867053.120:84664): prog-id=76 op=LOAD ---- time->Wed Nov 27 16:04:13 2019 type=UNKNOWN[1334] msg=audit(1574867053.120:84665): prog-id=76 op=UNLOAD ... Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Co-developed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191206214934.11319-1-jolsa@kernel.org
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84bb46cd |
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23-Nov-2019 |
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> |
Revert "bpf: Emit audit messages upon successful prog load and unload" This commit reverts commit 91e6015b082b ("bpf: Emit audit messages upon successful prog load and unload") and its follow up commit 7599a896f2e4 ("audit: Move audit_log_task declaration under CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL") as requested by Paul Moore. The change needs close review on linux-audit, tests etc. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
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91e6015b |
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20-Nov-2019 |
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> |
bpf: Emit audit messages upon successful prog load and unload Allow for audit messages to be emitted upon BPF program load and unload for having a timeline of events. The load itself is in syscall context, so additional info about the process initiating the BPF prog creation can be logged and later directly correlated to the unload event. The only info really needed from BPF side is the globally unique prog ID where then audit user space tooling can query / dump all info needed about the specific BPF program right upon load event and enrich the record, thus these changes needed here can be kept small and non-intrusive to the core. Raw example output: # auditctl -D # auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=x86_64 -S bpf # ausearch --start recent -m 1334 [...] ---- time->Wed Nov 20 12:45:51 2019 type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1574271951.590:8974): proctitle="./test_verifier" type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1574271951.590:8974): arch=c000003e syscall=321 success=yes exit=14 a0=5 a1=7ffe2d923e80 a2=78 a3=0 items=0 ppid=742 pid=949 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=2 comm="test_verifier" exe="/root/bpf-next/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=UNKNOWN[1334] msg=audit(1574271951.590:8974): auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 ses=2 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 pid=949 comm="test_verifier" exe="/root/bpf-next/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier" prog-id=3260 event=LOAD ---- time->Wed Nov 20 12:45:51 2019 type=UNKNOWN[1334] msg=audit(1574271951.590:8975): prog-id=3260 event=UNLOAD ---- [...] Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191120213816.8186-1-jolsa@kernel.org
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245d7369 |
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02-Oct-2019 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
audit: Report suspicious O_CREAT usage This renames the very specific audit_log_link_denied() to audit_log_path_denied() and adds the AUDIT_* type as an argument. This allows for the creation of the new AUDIT_ANOM_CREAT that can be used to report the fifo/regular file creation restrictions that were introduced in commit 30aba6656f61 ("namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files"). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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bf361231 |
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09-May-2019 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: add saddr_fam filter field Provide a method to filter out sockaddr and bind calls by network address family. Existing SOCKADDR records are listed for any network activity. Implement the AUDIT_SADDR_FAM field selector to be able to classify or limit records to specific network address families, such as AF_INET or AF_INET6. An example of a network record that is unlikely to be useful and flood the logs: type=SOCKADDR msg=audit(07/27/2017 12:18:27.019:845) : saddr={ fam=local path=/var/run/nscd/socket } type=SYSCALL msg=audit(07/27/2017 12:18:27.019:845) : arch=x86_64 syscall=connect success=no exit=ENOENT(No such file or directory) a0=0x3 a1=0x7fff229c4980 a2=0x6e a3=0x6 items=1 ppid=3301 pid=6145 auid=sgrubb uid=sgrubb gid=sgrubb euid=sgrubb suid=sgrubb fsuid=sgrubb egid=sgrubb sgid=sgrubb fsgid=sgrubb tty=pts3 ses=4 comm=bash exe=/usr/bin/bash subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=network-test Please see the audit-testsuite PR at https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/pull/87 Please see the github issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/64 Please see the github issue for the accompanying userspace support https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/93 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: merge fuzz in auditfilter.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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7e8eda73 |
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10-Apr-2019 |
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> |
ntp: Audit NTP parameters adjustment Emit an audit record every time selected NTP parameters are modified from userspace (via adjtimex(2) or clock_adjtime(2)). These parameters may be used to indirectly change system clock, and thus their modifications should be audited. Such events will now generate records of type AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL containing the following fields: - op -- which value was adjusted: - offset -- corresponding to the time_offset variable - freq -- corresponding to the time_freq variable - status -- corresponding to the time_status variable - adjust -- corresponding to the time_adjust variable - tick -- corresponding to the tick_usec variable - tai -- corresponding to the timekeeping's TAI offset - old -- the old value - new -- the new value Example records: type=TIME_ADJNTPVAL msg=audit(1530616044.507:7): op=status old=64 new=8256 type=TIME_ADJNTPVAL msg=audit(1530616044.511:11): op=freq old=0 new=49180377088000 The records of this type will be associated with the corresponding syscall records. An overview of parameter changes that can be done via do_adjtimex() (based on information from Miroslav Lichvar) and whether they are audited: __timekeeping_set_tai_offset() -- sets the offset from the International Atomic Time (AUDITED) NTP variables: time_offset -- can adjust the clock by up to 0.5 seconds per call and also speed it up or slow down by up to about 0.05% (43 seconds per day) (AUDITED) time_freq -- can speed up or slow down by up to about 0.05% (AUDITED) time_status -- can insert/delete leap seconds and it also enables/ disables synchronization of the hardware real-time clock (AUDITED) time_maxerror, time_esterror -- change error estimates used to inform userspace applications (NOT AUDITED) time_constant -- controls the speed of the clock adjustments that are made when time_offset is set (NOT AUDITED) time_adjust -- can temporarily speed up or slow down the clock by up to 0.05% (AUDITED) tick_usec -- a more extreme version of time_freq; can speed up or slow down the clock by up to 10% (AUDITED) Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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2d87a067 |
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10-Apr-2019 |
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> |
timekeeping: Audit clock adjustments Emit an audit record whenever the system clock is changed (i.e. shifted by a non-zero offset) by a syscall from userspace. The syscalls than can (at the time of writing) trigger such record are: - settimeofday(2), stime(2), clock_settime(2) -- via do_settimeofday64() - adjtimex(2), clock_adjtime(2) -- via do_adjtimex() The new records have type AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET and contain the following fields: - sec -- the 'seconds' part of the offset - nsec -- the 'nanoseconds' part of the offset Example record (time was shifted backwards by ~15.875 seconds): type=TIME_INJOFFSET msg=audit(1530616049.652:13): sec=-16 nsec=124887145 The records of this type will be associated with the corresponding syscall records. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> [PM: fixed a line width problem in __audit_tk_injoffset()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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b15fe94a |
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17-Mar-2019 |
Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> |
unicore32: define syscall_get_arch() syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in addition to already implemented syscall_get_nr(), syscall_get_arguments(), syscall_get_error(), and syscall_get_return_value() functions in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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1660aac4 |
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17-Mar-2019 |
Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> |
nios2: define syscall_get_arch() syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in addition to already implemented syscall_get_nr(), syscall_get_arguments(), syscall_get_error(), and syscall_get_return_value() functions in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Ley Foon Tan <ley.foon.tan@intel.com> Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: nios2-dev@lists.rocketboards.org Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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fa562447 |
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17-Mar-2019 |
Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> |
nds32: define syscall_get_arch() syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in addition to already implemented syscall_get_nr(), syscall_get_arguments(), syscall_get_error(), and syscall_get_return_value() functions in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Vincent Chen <vincentc@andestech.com> Acked-by: Greentime Hu <greentime@andestech.com> Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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d0931534 |
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17-Mar-2019 |
Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> |
hexagon: define syscall_get_arch() syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in addition to already implemented syscall_get_nr(), syscall_get_arguments(), syscall_get_error(), and syscall_get_return_value() functions in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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122a43b1 |
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17-Mar-2019 |
Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> |
h8300: define syscall_get_arch() syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in addition to already implemented syscall_get_nr(), syscall_get_arguments(), syscall_get_error(), and syscall_get_return_value() functions in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: uclinux-h8-devel@lists.sourceforge.jp Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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a43e6647 |
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17-Mar-2019 |
Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> |
c6x: define syscall_get_arch() syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in addition to already implemented syscall_get_nr(), syscall_get_arguments(), syscall_get_error(), and syscall_get_return_value() functions in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Acked-by: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <jacquiot.aurelien@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linux-c6x-dev@linux-c6x.org Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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67f2a8a2 |
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17-Mar-2019 |
Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> |
arc: define syscall_get_arch() syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in addition to already implemented syscall_get_nr(), syscall_get_arguments(), syscall_get_error(), and syscall_get_return_value() functions in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Acked-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Brodkin <alexey.brodkin@synopsys.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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efe75c49 |
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29-Oct-2018 |
David Abdurachmanov <david.abdurachmanov@gmail.com> |
riscv: add audit support On RISC-V (riscv) audit is supported through generic lib/audit.c. The patch adds required arch specific definitions. Signed-off-by: David Abdurachmanov <david.abdurachmanov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
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d770b256 |
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13-Dec-2018 |
Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> |
csky: define syscall_get_arch() syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> arch/csky/include/asm/syscall.h | 7 +++++++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
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98c3115a |
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19-Nov-2018 |
Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> |
xtensa: define syscall_get_arch() syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request. Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
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dba31ee7 |
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04-Jun-2018 |
Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and the IMA "audit" policy action. This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules. Since we defined a new message type we can now also pass the audit_context and get an associated SYSCALL record. This now produces the following records when parsing IMA policy's rules: type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \ func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ res=1 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): arch=c000003e syscall=1 \ success=yes exit=17 a0=1 a1=55bcfcca9030 a2=11 a3=7fcc1b55fb38 \ items=0 ppid=1567 pid=1601 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 \ fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=tty2 ses=2 comm="echo" \ exe="/usr/bin/echo" \ subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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d904ac03 |
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05-Jun-2018 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: rename FILTER_TYPE to FILTER_EXCLUDE The AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE name is vague and misleading due to not describing where or when the filter is applied and obsolete due to its available filter fields having been expanded. Userspace has already renamed it from AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE to AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE without checking if it already exists. The userspace maintainer assures that as long as it is set to the same value it will not be a problem since the userspace code does not treat compiler warnings as errors. If this policy changes then checks if it already exists can be added at the same time. See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/89 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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fa516b66 |
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15-May-2018 |
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> |
EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs Sites may wish to provide additional metadata alongside files in order to make more fine-grained security decisions[1]. The security of this is enhanced if this metadata is protected, something that EVM makes possible. However, the kernel cannot know about the set of extended attributes that local admins may wish to protect, and hardcoding this policy in the kernel makes it difficult to change over time and less convenient for distributions to enable. This patch adds a new /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs node, which can be read to obtain the current set of EVM-protected extended attributes or written to in order to add new entries. Extending this list will not change the validity of any existing signatures provided that the file in question does not have any of the additional extended attributes - missing xattrs are skipped when calculating the EVM hash. [1] For instance, a package manager could install information about the package uploader in an additional extended attribute. Local LSM policy could then be associated with that extended attribute in order to restrict the privileges available to packages from less trusted uploaders. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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f0b75216 |
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12-May-2018 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: convert sessionid unset to a macro Use a macro, "AUDIT_SID_UNSET", to replace each instance of initialization and comparison to an audit session ID. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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42d5e376 |
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23-Aug-2017 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic Tracefs or debugfs were causing hundreds to thousands of PATH records to be associated with the init_module and finit_module SYSCALL records on a few modules when the following rule was in place for startup: -a always,exit -F arch=x86_64 -S init_module -F key=mod-load Provide a method to ignore these large number of PATH records from overwhelming the logs if they are not of interest. Introduce a new filter list "AUDIT_FILTER_FS", with a new field type AUDIT_FSTYPE, which keys off the filesystem 4-octet hexadecimal magic identifier to filter specific filesystem PATH records. An example rule would look like: -a never,filesystem -F fstype=0x74726163 -F key=ignore_tracefs -a never,filesystem -F fstype=0x64626720 -F key=ignore_debugfs Arguably the better way to address this issue is to disable tracefs and debugfs on boot from production systems. See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16 See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/8 Test case: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/42 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: fixed the whitespace damage in kernel/auditsc.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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e2be04c7 |
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01-Nov-2017 |
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with a license Many user space API headers have licensing information, which is either incomplete, badly formatted or just a shorthand for referring to the license under which the file is supposed to be. This makes it hard for compliance tools to determine the correct license. Update these files with an SPDX license identifier. The identifier was chosen based on the license information in the file. GPL/LGPL licensed headers get the matching GPL/LGPL SPDX license identifier with the added 'WITH Linux-syscall-note' exception, which is the officially assigned exception identifier for the kernel syscall exception: NOTE! This copyright does *not* cover user programs that use kernel services by normal system calls - this is merely considered normal use of the kernel, and does *not* fall under the heading of "derived work". This exception makes it possible to include GPL headers into non GPL code, without confusing license compliance tools. Headers which have either explicit dual licensing or are just licensed under a non GPL license are updated with the corresponding SPDX identifier and the GPLv2 with syscall exception identifier. The format is: ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR SPDX-ID-OF-OTHER-LICENSE) SPDX license identifiers are a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. The update does not remove existing license information as this has to be done on a case by case basis and the copyright holders might have to be consulted. This will happen in a separate step. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. See the previous patch in this series for the methodology of how this patch was researched. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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de8cd83e |
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02-Oct-2017 |
Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> |
audit: Record fanotify access control decisions The fanotify interface allows user space daemons to make access control decisions. Under common criteria requirements, we need to optionally record decisions based on policy. This patch adds a bit mask, FAN_AUDIT, that a user space daemon can 'or' into the response decision which will tell the kernel that it made a decision and record it. It would be used something like this in user space code: response.response = FAN_DENY | FAN_AUDIT; write(fd, &response, sizeof(struct fanotify_response)); When the syscall ends, the audit system will record the decision as a AUDIT_FANOTIFY auxiliary record to denote that the reason this event occurred is the result of an access control decision from fanotify rather than DAC or MAC policy. A sample event looks like this: type=PATH msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): item=0 name="./evil-ls" inode=1319561 dev=fc:03 mode=0100755 ouid=1000 ogid=1000 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL type=CWD msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): cwd="/home/sgrubb" type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): arch=c000003e syscall=2 success=no exit=-1 a0=32cb3fca90 a1=0 a2=43 a3=8 items=1 ppid=901 pid=959 auid=1000 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=1000 suid=1000 fsuid=1000 egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts1 ses=3 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t: s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=FANOTIFY msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): resp=2 Prior to using the audit flag, the developer needs to call fanotify_init or'ing in FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT to ensure that the kernel supports auditing. The calling process must also have the CAP_AUDIT_WRITE capability. Signed-off-by: sgrubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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ca86cad7 |
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04-Feb-2017 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: log module name on init_module This adds a new auxiliary record MODULE_INIT to the SYSCALL event. We get finit_module for free since it made most sense to hook this in to load_module(). https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/7 https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Module-Load-Record-Format Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com> [PM: corrected links in the commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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92c82e8a |
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13-Jan-2017 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: add feature audit_lost reset Add a method to reset the audit_lost value. An AUDIT_SET message with the AUDIT_STATUS_LOST flag set by itself will return a positive value repesenting the current audit_lost value and reset the counter to zero. If AUDIT_STATUS_LOST is not the only flag set, the reset command will be ignored. The value sent with the command is ignored. The return value will be the +ve lost value at reset time. An AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE message will be queued to the listening audit daemon. The message will be a standard CONFIG_CHANGE message with the fields "lost=0" and "old=" with the latter containing the value of audit_lost at reset time. See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/3 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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8fae4770 |
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20-Nov-2016 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: add support for session ID user filter Define AUDIT_SESSIONID in the uapi and add support for specifying user filters based on the session ID. Also add the new session ID filter to the feature bitmap so userspace knows it is available. https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/4 RFE: add a session ID filter to the kernel's user filter Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: combine multiple patches from Richard into this one] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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7ff89ac6 |
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17-Aug-2016 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: add exclude filter extension to feature bitmap Add to the audit feature bitmap to indicate availability of the extension of the exclude filter to include PID, UID, AUID, GID, SUBJ_*. RFE: add additional fields for use in audit filter exclude rules https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/5 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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cb72d382 |
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27-Jun-2016 |
Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> |
netlabel: Initial support for the CALIPSO netlink protocol. CALIPSO is a packet labelling protocol for IPv6 which is very similar to CIPSO. It is specified in RFC 5570. Much of the code is based on the current CIPSO code. This adds support for adding passthrough-type CALIPSO DOIs through the NLBL_CALIPSO_C_ADD command. It requires attributes: NLBL_CALIPSO_A_TYPE which must be CALIPSO_MAP_PASS. NLBL_CALIPSO_A_DOI. In passthrough mode the CALIPSO engine will map MLS secattr levels and categories directly to the packet label. At this stage, the major difference between this and the CIPSO code is that IPv6 may be compiled as a module. To allow for this the CALIPSO functions are registered at module init time. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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133e1e5a |
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25-Jan-2016 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: stop an old auditd being starved out by a new auditd Nothing prevents a new auditd starting up and replacing a valid audit_pid when an old auditd is still running, effectively starving out the old auditd since audit_pid no longer points to the old valid auditd. If no message to auditd has been attempted since auditd died unnaturally or got killed, audit_pid will still indicate it is alive. There isn't an easy way to detect if an old auditd is still running on the existing audit_pid other than attempting to send a message to see if it fails. An -ECONNREFUSED almost certainly means it disappeared and can be replaced. Other errors are not so straightforward and may indicate transient problems that will resolve themselves and the old auditd will recover. Yet others will likely need manual intervention for which a new auditd will not solve the problem. Send a new message type (AUDIT_REPLACE) to the old auditd containing a u32 with the PID of the new auditd. If the audit replace message succeeds (or doesn't fail with certainty), fail to register the new auditd and return an error (-EEXIST). This is expected to make the patch preventing an old auditd orphaning a new auditd redundant. V3: Switch audit message type from 1000 to 1300 block. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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34d99af5 |
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05-Aug-2015 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: implement audit by executable This adds the ability audit the actions of a not-yet-running process. This patch implements the ability to filter on the executable path. Instead of just hard coding the ino and dev of the executable we care about at the moment the rule is inserted into the kernel, use the new audit_fsnotify infrastructure to manage this dynamically. This means that if the filename does not yet exist but the containing directory does, or if the inode in question is unlinked and creat'd (aka updated) the rule will just continue to work. If the containing directory is moved or deleted or the filesystem is unmounted, the rule is deleted automatically. A future enhancement would be to have the rule survive across directory disruptions. This is a heavily modified version of a patch originally submitted by Eric Paris with some ideas from Peter Moody. Cc: Peter Moody <peter@hda3.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: minor whitespace clean to satisfy ./scripts/checkpatch] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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a0ddef81 |
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22-Jul-2015 |
Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> |
tile: enable full SECCOMP support Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
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63f13448 |
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09-Dec-2014 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
powerpc: add little endian flag to syscall_get_arch() Since both ppc and ppc64 have LE variants which are now reported by uname, add that flag (__AUDIT_ARCH_LE) to syscall_get_arch() and add AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE variant. Without this, perf trace and auditctl fail. Mainline kernel reports ppc64le (per a058801) but there is no matching AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE. Since 32-bit PPC LE is not supported by audit, don't advertise it in AUDIT_ARCH_PPC* variants. See: https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2014-August/msg00082.html https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2014-December/msg00004.html Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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0288d718 |
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17-Nov-2014 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: convert status version to a feature bitmap The version field defined in the audit status structure was found to have limitations in terms of its expressibility of features supported. This is distict from the get/set features call to be able to command those features that are present. Converting this field from a version number to a feature bitmap will allow distributions to selectively backport and support certain features and will allow upstream to be able to deprecate features in the future. It will allow userspace clients to first query the kernel for which features are actually present and supported. Currently, EINVAL is returned rather than EOPNOTSUP, which isn't helpful in determining if there was an error in the command, or if it simply isn't supported yet. Past features are not represented by this bitmap, but their use may be converted to EOPNOTSUP if needed in the future. Since "version" is too generic to convert with a #define, use a union in the struct status, introducing the member "feature_bitmap" unionized with "version". Convert existing AUDIT_VERSION_* macros over to AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP* counterparts, leaving the former for backwards compatibility. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: minor whitespace tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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ce5d1128 |
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11-Mar-2014 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
ARCH: AUDIT: implement syscall_get_arch for all arches For all arches which support audit implement syscall_get_arch() They are all pretty easy and straight forward, stolen from how the call to audit_syscall_entry() determines the arch. Based-on-patch-by: Richard Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org Cc: microblaze-uclinux@itee.uq.edu.au Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: linux@lists.openrisc.net Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
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7e51aa44 |
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02-Apr-2014 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
audit: drop unused struct audit_rule definition The kernel only uses struct audit_rule_data. We dropped support for struct audit_rule a long time ago. Drop the definition in the header file. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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875cbf3e |
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04-Jul-2014 |
AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> |
arm64: Add audit support On AArch64, audit is supported through generic lib/audit.c and compat_audit.c, and so this patch adds arch specific definitions required. Acked-by Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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8b2e62cc |
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20-May-2014 |
Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> |
MIPS: Fix a typo error in AUDIT_ARCH definition Missing a "|" in AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32 macro definition. Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com> Reviewed-by: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org> Cc: Steven J. Hill <Steven.Hill@imgtec.com> Cc: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Fuxin Zhang <zhangfx@lemote.com> Cc: Zhangjin Wu <wuzhangjin@gmail.com> Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/6978/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
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dc93f7b6 |
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20-May-2014 |
Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> |
MIPS: Fix a typo error in AUDIT_ARCH definition Missing a "|" in AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32 macro definition. Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com> Reviewed-by: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org> Cc: Steven J. Hill <Steven.Hill@imgtec.com> Cc: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Fuxin Zhang <zhangfx@lemote.com> Cc: Zhangjin Wu <wuzhangjin@gmail.com> Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/6978/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
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f2d0801f |
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22-Apr-2014 |
Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> |
MIPS: Add new AUDIT_ARCH token for the N32 ABI on MIPS64 A MIPS64 kernel may support ELF files for all 3 MIPS ABIs (O32, N32, N64). Furthermore, the AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS{,EL}64 token does not provide enough information about the ABI for the 64-bit process. As a result of which, userland needs to use complex seccomp filters to decide whether a syscall belongs to the o32 or n32 or n64 ABI. Therefore, a new arch token for MIPS64/n32 is added so it can be used by seccomp to explicitely set syscall filters for this ABI. Signed-off-by: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Link: http://sourceforge.net/p/libseccomp/mailman/message/32239040/ Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/6818/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
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451f9216 |
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22-Apr-2014 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: add netlink multicast group for log read Add a netlink multicast socket with one group to kaudit for "best-effort" delivery to read-only userspace clients such as systemd, in addition to the existing bidirectional unicast auditd userspace client. Currently, auditd is intended to use the CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL and CAP_AUDIT_WRITE capabilities, but actually uses CAP_NET_ADMIN. The CAP_AUDIT_READ capability is added for use by read-only AUDIT_NLGRP_READLOG netlink multicast group clients to the kaudit subsystem. This will safely give access to services such as systemd to consume audit logs while ensuring write access remains restricted for integrity. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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ab9705f3 |
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02-Apr-2014 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
audit: renumber AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE into the 1300 range 1000-1099 is for configuring things. So auditd ignored such messages. This is about actually logging what was configured. Move it into the range for such types of messages. Reported-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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356750e3 |
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23-Mar-2014 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
audit: define audit_is_compat in kernel internal header We were exposing a function based on kernel config options to userspace. This is wrong. Move it to the audit internal header. Suggested-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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4b588411 |
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14-Mar-2014 |
AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> |
audit: Add generic compat syscall support lib/audit.c provides a generic function for auditing system calls. This patch extends it for compat syscall support on bi-architectures (32/64-bit) by adding lib/compat_audit.c. What is required to support this feature are: * add asm/unistd32.h for compat system call names * select CONFIG_AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT_GENERIC Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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3f1c8250 |
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11-Feb-2014 |
William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@gmail.com> |
audit: Audit proc/<pid>/cmdline aka proctitle During an audit event, cache and print the value of the process's proctitle value (proc/<pid>/cmdline). This is useful in situations where processes are started via fork'd virtual machines where the comm field is incorrect. Often times, setting the comm field still is insufficient as the comm width is not very wide and most virtual machine "package names" do not fit. Also, during execution, many threads have their comm field set as well. By tying it back to the global cmdline value for the process, audit records will be more complete in systems with these properties. An example of where this is useful and applicable is in the realm of Android. With Android, their is no fork/exec for VM instances. The bare, preloaded Dalvik VM listens for a fork and specialize request. When this request comes in, the VM forks, and the loads the specific application (specializing). This was done to take advantage of COW and to not require a load of basic packages by the VM on very app spawn. When this spawn occurs, the package name is set via setproctitle() and shows up in procfs. Many of these package names are longer then 16 bytes, the historical width of task->comm. Having the cmdline in the audit records will couple the application back to the record directly. Also, on my Debian development box, some audit records were more useful then what was printed under comm. The cached proctitle is tied to the life-cycle of the audit_context structure and is built on demand. Proctitle is controllable by userspace, and thus should not be trusted. It is meant as an aid to assist in debugging. The proctitle event is emitted during syscall audits, and can be filtered with auditctl. Example: type=AVC msg=audit(1391217013.924:386): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=1971 comm="mkdir" name="/" dev="selinuxfs" ino=1 scontext=system_u:system_r:consolekit_t:s0-s0:c0.c255 tcontext=system_u:object_r:security_t:s0 tclass=filesystem type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1391217013.924:386): arch=c000003e syscall=137 success=yes exit=0 a0=7f019dfc8bd7 a1=7fffa6aed2c0 a2=fffffffffff4bd25 a3=7fffa6aed050 items=0 ppid=1967 pid=1971 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm="mkdir" exe="/bin/mkdir" subj=system_u:system_r:consolekit_t:s0-s0:c0.c255 key=(null) type=UNKNOWN[1327] msg=audit(1391217013.924:386): proctitle=6D6B646972002D70002F7661722F72756E2F636F6E736F6C65 Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> (wrt record formating) Signed-off-by: William Roberts <wroberts@tresys.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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70249a9c |
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13-Jan-2014 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
audit: use define's for audit version Give names to the audit versions. Just something for a userspace programmer to know what the version provides. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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51cc83f0 |
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18-Sep-2013 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: add audit_backlog_wait_time configuration option reaahead-collector abuses the audit logging facility to discover which files are accessed at boot time to make a pre-load list Add a tuning option to audit_backlog_wait_time so that if auditd can't keep up, or gets blocked, the callers won't be blocked. Bump audit_status API version to "2". Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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09f883a9 |
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18-Sep-2013 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: clean up AUDIT_GET/SET local variables and future-proof API Re-named confusing local variable names (status_set and status_get didn't agree with their command type name) and reduced their scope. Future-proof API changes by not depending on the exact size of the audit_status struct and by adding an API version field. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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21b85c31 |
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23-May-2013 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
audit: audit feature to set loginuid immutable This adds a new 'audit_feature' bit which allows userspace to set it such that the loginuid is absolutely immutable, even if you have CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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d040e5af |
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24-May-2013 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
audit: audit feature to only allow unsetting the loginuid This is a new audit feature which only grants processes with CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL the ability to unset their loginuid. They cannot directly set it from a valid uid to another valid uid. The ability to unset the loginuid is nice because a priviledged task, like that of container creation, can unset the loginuid and then priv is not needed inside the container when a login daemon needs to set the loginuid. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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b0fed402 |
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21-May-2013 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
audit: implement generic feature setting and retrieving The audit_status structure was not designed with extensibility in mind. Define a new AUDIT_SET_FEATURE message type which takes a new structure of bits where things can be enabled/disabled/locked one at a time. This structure should be able to grow in the future while maintaining forward and backward compatibility (based loosly on the ideas from capabilities and prctl) This does not actually add any features, but is just infrastructure to allow new on/off types of audit system features. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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42f74461 |
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20-May-2013 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: change decimal constant to macro for invalid uid SFR reported this 2013-05-15: > After merging the final tree, today's linux-next build (i386 defconfig) > produced this warning: > > kernel/auditfilter.c: In function 'audit_data_to_entry': > kernel/auditfilter.c:426:3: warning: this decimal constant is unsigned only > in ISO C90 [enabled by default] > > Introduced by commit 780a7654cee8 ("audit: Make testing for a valid > loginuid explicit") from Linus' tree. Replace this decimal constant in the code with a macro to make it more readable (add to the unsigned cast to quiet the warning). Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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b50eba7e |
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16-Sep-2013 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: format user messages to size of MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH Messages of type AUDIT_USER_TTY were being formatted to 1024 octets, truncating messages approaching MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH (8970 octets). Set the formatting to 8560 characters, given maximum estimates for prefix and suffix budgets. See the problem discussion: https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2009-January/msg00030.html And the new size rationale: https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2013-September/msg00016.html Test ~8k messages with: auditctl -m "$(for i in $(seq -w 001 820);do echo -n "${i}0______";done)" Reported-by: LC Bruzenak <lenny@magitekltd.com> Reported-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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6f6f467e |
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30-Aug-2013 |
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> |
Drop remaining references to H8/300 architecture With the architecture gone, any references to it are no longer needed. Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
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780a7654 |
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09-Apr-2013 |
Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
audit: Make testing for a valid loginuid explicit. audit rule additions containing "-F auid!=4294967295" were failing with EINVAL because of a regression caused by e1760bd. Apparently some userland audit rule sets want to know if loginuid uid has been set and are using a test for auid != 4294967295 to determine that. In practice that is a horrible way to ask if a value has been set, because it relies on subtle implementation details and will break every time the uid implementation in the kernel changes. So add a clean way to test if the audit loginuid has been set, and silently convert the old idiom to the cleaner and more comprehensible new idiom. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.7 Reported-By: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Tested-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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46e959ea |
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03-May-2013 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
audit: add an option to control logging of passwords with pam_tty_audit Most commands are entered one line at a time and processed as complete lines in non-canonical mode. Commands that interactively require a password, enter canonical mode to do this while shutting off echo. This pair of features (icanon and !echo) can be used to avoid logging passwords by audit while still logging the rest of the command. Adding a member (log_passwd) to the struct audit_tty_status passed in by pam_tty_audit allows control of canonical mode without echo per task. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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c0a3a20b |
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11-Jan-2013 |
Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> |
linux/audit.h: move ptrace.h include to kernel header While the kernel internals want pt_regs (and so it includes linux/ptrace.h), the user version of audit.h does not need it. So move the include out of the uapi version. This avoids issues where people want the audit defines and userland ptrace api. Including both the kernel ptrace and the userland ptrace headers can easily lead to failure. Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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7b9205bd |
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11-Jan-2013 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
audit: create explicit AUDIT_SECCOMP event type The seccomp path was using AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND from when seccomp mode 1 could only kill a process. While we still want to make sure an audit record is forced on a kill, this should use a separate record type since seccomp mode 2 introduces other behaviors. In the case of "handled" behaviors (process wasn't killed), only emit a record if the process is under inspection. This change also fixes userspace examination of seccomp audit events, since it was considered malformed due to missing fields of the AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND event type. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com> Acked-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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607ca46e |
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13-Oct-2012 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate include/linux Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
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