History log of /linux-master/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
Revision Date Author Comments
# 4bfe6cce 23-May-2020 Jay Lang <jaytlang@mit.edu>

x86/ioperm: Prevent a memory leak when fork fails

In the copy_process() routine called by _do_fork(), failure to allocate
a PID (or further along in the function) will trigger an invocation to
exit_thread(). This is done to clean up from an earlier call to
copy_thread_tls(). Naturally, the child task is passed into exit_thread(),
however during the process, io_bitmap_exit() nullifies the parent's
io_bitmap rather than the child's.

As copy_thread_tls() has been called ahead of the failure, the reference
count on the calling thread's io_bitmap is incremented as we would expect.
However, io_bitmap_exit() doesn't accept any arguments, and thus assumes
it should trash the current thread's io_bitmap reference rather than the
child's. This is pretty sneaky in practice, because in all instances but
this one, exit_thread() is called with respect to the current task and
everything works out.

A determined attacker can issue an appropriate ioctl (i.e. KDENABIO) to
get a bitmap allocated, and force a clone3() syscall to fail by passing
in a zeroed clone_args structure. The kernel handles the erroneous struct
and the buggy code path is followed, and even though the parent's reference
to the io_bitmap is trashed, the child still holds a reference and thus
the structure will never be freed.

Fix this by tweaking io_bitmap_exit() and its subroutines to accept a
task_struct argument which to operate on.

Fixes: ea5f1cd7ab49 ("x86/ioperm: Remove bitmap if all permissions dropped")
Signed-off-by: Jay Lang <jaytlang@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable#@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200524162742.253727-1-jaytlang@mit.edu


# cdcb58cc 23-Jan-2020 Benjamin Thiel <b.thiel@posteo.de>

x86/iopl: Include prototype header for ksys_ioperm()

.. in order to fix a -Wmissing-prototype warning.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Thiel <b.thiel@posteo.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200123133051.5974-1-b.thiel@posteo.de


# 111e7b15 12-Nov-2019 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

x86/ioperm: Extend IOPL config to control ioperm() as well

If iopl() is disabled, then providing ioperm() does not make much sense.

Rename the config option and disable/enable both syscalls with it. Guard
the code with #ifdefs where appropriate.

Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>


# a24ca997 11-Nov-2019 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

x86/iopl: Remove legacy IOPL option

The IOPL emulation via the I/O bitmap is sufficient. Remove the legacy
cruft dealing with the (e)flags based IOPL mechanism.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> (Paravirt and Xen parts)
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>


# c8137ace 11-Nov-2019 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

x86/iopl: Restrict iopl() permission scope

The access to the full I/O port range can be also provided by the TSS I/O
bitmap, but that would require to copy 8k of data on scheduling in the
task. As shown with the sched out optimization TSS.io_bitmap_base can be
used to switch the incoming task to a preallocated I/O bitmap which has all
bits zero, i.e. allows access to all I/O ports.

Implementing this allows to provide an iopl() emulation mode which restricts
the IOPL level 3 permissions to I/O port access but removes the STI/CLI
permission which is coming with the hardware IOPL mechansim.

Provide a config option to switch IOPL to emulation mode, make it the
default and while at it also provide an option to disable IOPL completely.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>


# be9afb4b 11-Nov-2019 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

x86/iopl: Fixup misleading comment

The comment for the sys_iopl() implementation is outdated and actively
misleading in some parts. Fix it up.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>


# 4804e382 11-Nov-2019 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

x86/ioperm: Share I/O bitmap if identical

The I/O bitmap is duplicated on fork. That's wasting memory and slows down
fork. There is no point to do so. As long as the bitmap is not modified it
can be shared between threads and processes.

Add a refcount and just share it on fork. If a task modifies the bitmap
then it has to do the duplication if and only if it is shared.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>


# ea5f1cd7 11-Nov-2019 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

x86/ioperm: Remove bitmap if all permissions dropped

If ioperm() results in a bitmap with all bits set (no permissions to any
I/O port), then handling that bitmap on context switch and exit to user
mode is pointless. Drop it.

Move the bitmap exit handling to the ioport code and reuse it for both the
thread exit path and dropping it. This allows to reuse this code for the
upcoming iopl() emulation.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>


# 22fe5b04 11-Nov-2019 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

x86/ioperm: Move TSS bitmap update to exit to user work

There is no point to update the TSS bitmap for tasks which use I/O bitmaps
on every context switch. It's enough to update it right before exiting to
user space.

That reduces the context switch bitmap handling to invalidating the io
bitmap base offset in the TSS when the outgoing task has TIF_IO_BITMAP
set. The invaldiation is done on purpose when a task with an IO bitmap
switches out to prevent any possible leakage of an activated IO bitmap.

It also removes the requirement to update the tasks bitmap atomically in
ioperm().

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>


# 060aa16f 11-Nov-2019 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

x86/ioperm: Add bitmap sequence number

Add a globally unique sequence number which is incremented when ioperm() is
changing the I/O bitmap of a task. Store the new sequence number in the
io_bitmap structure and compare it with the sequence number of the I/O
bitmap which was last loaded on a CPU. Only update the bitmap if the
sequence is different.

That should further reduce the overhead of I/O bitmap scheduling when there
are only a few I/O bitmap users on the system.

The 64bit sequence counter is sufficient. A wraparound of the sequence
counter assuming an ioperm() call every nanosecond would require about 584
years of uptime.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>


# 577d5cd7 11-Nov-2019 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

x86/ioperm: Move iobitmap data into a struct

No point in having all the data in thread_struct, especially as upcoming
changes add more.

Make the bitmap in the new struct accessible as array of longs and as array
of characters via a union, so both the bitmap functions and the update
logic can avoid type casts.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>


# f5848e5f 12-Nov-2019 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

x86/tss: Move I/O bitmap data into a seperate struct

Move the non hardware portion of I/O bitmap data into a seperate struct for
readability sake.

Originally-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>


# ecc7e37d 11-Nov-2019 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

x86/io: Speedup schedule out of I/O bitmap user

There is no requirement to update the TSS I/O bitmap when a thread using it is
scheduled out and the incoming thread does not use it.

For the permission check based on the TSS I/O bitmap the CPU calculates the memory
location of the I/O bitmap by the address of the TSS and the io_bitmap_base member
of the tss_struct. The easiest way to invalidate the I/O bitmap is to switch the
offset to an address outside of the TSS limit.

If an I/O instruction is issued from user space the TSS limit causes #GP to be
raised in the same was as valid I/O bitmap with all bits set to 1 would do.

This removes the extra work when an I/O bitmap using task is scheduled out
and puts the burden on the rare I/O bitmap users when they are scheduled
in.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>


# 32f3bf67 12-Nov-2019 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

x86/ioperm: Avoid bitmap allocation if no permissions are set

If ioperm() is invoked the first time and the @turn_on argument is 0, then
there is no point to allocate a bitmap just to clear permissions which are
not set.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>


# ae31cea8 12-Nov-2019 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

x86/ioperm: Simplify first ioperm() invocation logic

On the first allocation of a task the I/O bitmap needs to be
allocated. After the allocation it is installed as an empty bitmap and
immediately afterwards updated.

Avoid that and just do the initial updates (store bitmap pointer, set TIF
flag and make TSS limit valid) in the update path unconditionally. If the
bitmap was already active this is redundant but harmless.

Preparatory change for later optimizations in the context switch code.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>


# b800fc4d 11-Nov-2019 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

x86/iopl: Cleanup include maze

Get rid of superfluous includes.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>


# 96c4f672 19-Aug-2019 Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>

x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down

IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO
register space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary
DMA, so lock it down by default.

This also implicitly locks down the KDADDIO, KDDELIO, KDENABIO and
KDDISABIO console ioctls.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>


# 66f4e88c 11-Mar-2018 Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>

x86/ioport: add ksys_ioperm() helper; remove in-kernel calls to sys_ioperm()

Using this helper allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to the
sys_ioperm() syscall. The ksys_ prefix denotes that this function is meant
as a drop-in replacement for the syscall. In particular, it uses the same
calling convention as sys_ioperm().

This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net

Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>


# 7c2178c1 06-Mar-2018 Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>

x86/syscalls: Use proper syscall definition for sys_ioperm()

Using SYSCALL_DEFINEx() is recommended, so use it also here.

Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: luto@amacapital.net
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>


# c482feef 04-Dec-2017 Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only

The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS
is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR. Make it
read-only on x86_64.

On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task
switches, and we use a task gate for double faults. I'd also be
nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations
without double fault handling.

[ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO. So
it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel
might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for
confirmation. ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>


# b2441318 01-Nov-2017 Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license

Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.

For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139

and resulted in the first patch in this series.

If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:

SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930

and resulted in the second patch in this series.

- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:

SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1

and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).

- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>


# 68db0cf1 08-Feb-2017 Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/task_stack.h>

We are going to split <linux/sched/task_stack.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.

Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task_stack.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.

Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>


# b7ceaec1 22-Feb-2017 Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

x86/asm: Tidy up TSS limit code

In an earlier version of the patch ("x86/kvm/vmx: Defer TR reload
after VM exit") that introduced TSS limit validity tracking, I
confused which helper was which. On reflection, the names I chose
sucked. Rename the helpers to make it more obvious what's going on
and add some comments.

While I'm at it, clear __tss_limit_invalid when force-reloading as
well as when contitionally reloading, since any TR reload fixes the
limit.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>


# b7ffc44d 20-Feb-2017 Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

x86/kvm/vmx: Defer TR reload after VM exit

Intel's VMX is daft and resets the hidden TSS limit register to 0x67
on VMX reload, and the 0x67 is not configurable. KVM currently
reloads TR using the LTR instruction on every exit, but this is quite
slow because LTR is serializing.

The 0x67 limit is entirely harmless unless ioperm() is in use, so
defer the reload until a task using ioperm() is actually running.

Here's some poorly done benchmarking using kvm-unit-tests:

Before:

cpuid 1313
vmcall 1195
mov_from_cr8 11
mov_to_cr8 17
inl_from_pmtimer 6770
inl_from_qemu 6856
inl_from_kernel 2435
outl_to_kernel 1402

After:

cpuid 1291
vmcall 1181
mov_from_cr8 11
mov_to_cr8 16
inl_from_pmtimer 6457
inl_from_qemu 6209
inl_from_kernel 2339
outl_to_kernel 1391

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
[Force-reload TR in invalidate_tss_limit. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>


# c29016cf 16-Mar-2016 Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

x86/iopl: Fix iopl capability check on Xen PV

iopl(3) is supposed to work if iopl is already 3, even if
unprivileged. This didn't work right on Xen PV. Fix it.

Reviewewd-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8ce12013e6e4c0a44a97e316be4a6faff31bd5ea.1458162709.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>


# 24933b82 05-Mar-2015 Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>

x86/asm/entry: Rename 'init_tss' to 'cpu_tss'

It has nothing to do with init -- there's only one TSS per cpu.

Other names considered include:

- current_tss: Confusing because we never switch the tss.
- singleton_tss: Too long.

This patch was generated with 's/init_tss/cpu_tss/g'. Followup
patches will fix INIT_TSS and INIT_TSS_IST by hand.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/da29fb2a793e4f649d93ce2d1ed320ebe8516262.1425611534.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>


# b3af11af 19-Nov-2012 Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

x86: get rid of pt_regs argument of iopl(2)

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>


# da1016df 16-Feb-2011 Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>

x86: Use bitmap library functions

Use bitmap_set()/bitmap_clear() to fill/zero a region of a
bitmap instead of doing set_bit()/clear_bit() each bit.

This change has been tested with ioperm() and there's no
change in behavior.

Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
LKML-Reference: <1297867715-20394-1-git-send-email-akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>


# fc380cee 09-Dec-2009 H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>

x86-64, paravirt: Call set_iopl_mask() on 64 bits

set_iopl_mask() is a no-op on 64 bits, but it is also a paravirt hook,
so call it even on 64 bits.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
LKML-Reference: <1260403316-5679-3-git-send-email-brgerst@gmail.com>


# 27f59559 09-Dec-2009 Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>

x86: Merge sys_iopl

Change 32-bit sys_iopl to PTREGSCALL1, and merge with 64-bit.

Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
LKML-Reference: <1260403316-5679-3-git-send-email-brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>


# db949bba 27-Feb-2009 Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>

x86-32: use non-lazy io bitmap context switching

Impact: remove 32-bit optimization to prepare unification

x86-32 and -64 differ in the way they context-switch tasks
with io permission bitmaps. x86-64 simply copies the next
tasks io bitmap into place (if any) on context switch. x86-32
invalidates the bitmap on context switch, so that the next
IO instruction will fault; at that point it installs the
appropriate IO bitmap.

This makes context switching IO-bitmap-using tasks a bit more
less expensive, at the cost of making the next IO instruction
slower due to the extra fault. This tradeoff only makes sense
if IO-bitmap-using processes are relatively common, but they
don't actually use IO instructions very often.

However, in a typical desktop system, the only process likely
to be using IO bitmaps is the X server, and nothing at all on
a server. Therefore the lazy context switch doesn't really win
all that much, and its just a gratuitious difference from
64-bit code.

This patch removes the lazy context switch, with a view to
unifying this code in a later change.

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>


# b12bdaf1 11-Feb-2009 Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>

x86: use regparm(3) for passed-in pt_regs pointer

Some syscalls need to access the pt_regs structure, either to copy
user register state or to modifiy it. This patch adds stubs to load
the address of the pt_regs struct into the %eax register, and changes
the syscalls to take the pointer as an argument instead of relying on
the assumption that the pt_regs structure overlaps the function
arguments.

Drop the use of regparm(1) due to concern about gcc bugs, and to move
in the direction of the eventual removal of regparm(0) for asmlinkage.

Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>


# 253f29a4 10-Feb-2009 Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>

x86: pass in pt_regs pointer for syscalls that need it

Some syscalls need to access the pt_regs structure, either to copy
user register state or to modifiy it. This patch adds stubs to load
the address of the pt_regs struct into the %eax register, and changes
the syscalls to regparm(1) to receive the pt_regs pointer as the
first argument.

Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>


# 5866e1b4 04-Jan-2009 Jaswinder Singh Rajput <jaswinder@infradead.org>

x86: ioport.c fix style problems

Impact: cleanup

Fix:

ERROR: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"

total: 2 errors, 0 warnings

Signed-off-by: Jaswinder Singh Rajput <jaswinderrajput@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>


# bbc1f698 21-Jul-2008 Jaswinder Singh <jaswinder@infradead.org>

x86: Introducing asm/syscalls.h

Declaring arch-dependent syscalls for x86 architecture

Signed-off-by: Jaswinder Singh <jaswinder@infradead.org>


# a1bf250a 30-Jan-2008 Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>

x86: refactor ioport unification

Refactor ioport unification to pull out common code.

Cc: mboton@gmail.com
Cc: Kevin Winchester <kjwinchester@gmail.com>
Cc: Zach Brown <zach.brown@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>


# 9718769d 30-Jan-2008 Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>

x86: fix ioport unification on 32-bit

ioport unification was broken for 32-bit; it was missing
the acutal pushf/popf EFLAGS manipulation (set_iopl_mask()).
Also, use of volatile looks like leftover cruft.

Cc: mboton@gmail.com
Cc: Kevin Winchester <kjwinchester@gmail.com>
Cc: Zach Brown <zach.brown@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>


# ccafa59a 30-Jan-2008 mboton@gmail.com <mboton@gmail.com>

x86: ioport_{32|64}.c unification

ioport_{32|64}.c unification.

This patch unifies the code from the ioport_32.c and ioport_64.c files.

Tested and working fine with i386 and x86_64 kernels.

Signed-off-by: Miguel Botón <mboton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>