#
b9bd9f60 |
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02-May-2023 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
x86: uaccess: move 32-bit and 64-bit parts into proper <asm/uaccess_N.h> header The x86 <asm/uaccess.h> file has grown features that are specific to x86-64 like LAM support and the related access_ok() changes. They really should be in the <asm/uaccess_64.h> file and not pollute the generic x86 header. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
4b842e4e |
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15-Feb-2020 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
x86: get rid of small constant size cases in raw_copy_{to,from}_user() Very few call sites where that would be triggered remain, and none of those is anywhere near hot enough to bother. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
304ec1b0 |
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29-Jan-2018 |
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> |
x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Quoting Linus: I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends, but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_ accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache. __uaccess_begin_nospec() covers __get_user() and copy_from_iter() where the limit check is far away from the user pointer de-reference. In those cases a barrier_nospec() prevents speculation with a potential pointer to privileged memory. uaccess_try_nospec covers get_user_try. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727416953.33451.10508284228526170604.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
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#
b2441318 |
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01-Nov-2017 |
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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#
beba3a20 |
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25-Mar-2017 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
x86: switch to RAW_COPY_USER Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
3f763453 |
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25-Mar-2017 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
kill __copy_from_user_nocache() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
af1d5b37 |
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27-Dec-2016 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
uaccess: drop duplicate includes from asm/uaccess.h Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
5b710f34 |
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23-Jun-2016 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on x86. This is done both in copy_*_user() and __copy_*_user() because copy_*_user() actually calls down to _copy_*_user() and not __copy_*_user(). Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
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#
bd28b145 |
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22-May-2016 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
x86: remove more uaccess_32.h complexity I'm looking at trying to possibly merge the 32-bit and 64-bit versions of the x86 uaccess.h implementation, but first this needs to be cleaned up. For example, the 32-bit version of "__copy_from_user_inatomic()" is mostly the special cases for the constant size, and it's actually almost never relevant. Most users aren't actually using a constant size anyway, and the few cases that do small constant copies are better off just using __get_user() instead. So get rid of the unnecessary complexity. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
5b09c3ed |
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22-May-2016 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
x86: remove pointless uaccess_32.h complexity I'm looking at trying to possibly merge the 32-bit and 64-bit versions of the x86 uaccess.h implementation, but first this needs to be cleaned up. For example, the 32-bit version of "__copy_to_user_inatomic()" is mostly the special cases for the constant size, and it's actually never relevant. Every user except for one aren't actually using a constant size anyway, and the one user that uses it is better off just using __put_user() instead. So get rid of the unnecessary complexity. [ The same cleanup should likely happen to __copy_from_user_inatomic() as well, but that one has a lot more users that I need to take a look at first ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
de9e478b |
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23-Feb-2016 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
x86: fix SMAP in 32-bit environments In commit 11f1a4b9755f ("x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses") I changed how the stac/clac instructions were generated around the user space accesses, which then made it possible to do batched accesses efficiently for user string copies etc. However, in doing so, I completely spaced out, and didn't even think about the 32-bit case. And nobody really even seemed to notice, because SMAP doesn't even exist until modern Skylake processors, and you'd have to be crazy to run 32-bit kernels on a modern CPU. Which brings us to Andy Lutomirski. He actually tested the 32-bit kernel on new hardware, and noticed that it doesn't work. My bad. The trivial fix is to add the required uaccess begin/end markers around the raw accesses in <asm/uaccess_32.h>. I feel a bit bad about this patch, just because that header file really should be cleaned up to avoid all the duplicated code in it, and this commit just expands on the problem. But this just fixes the bug without any bigger cleanup surgery. Reported-and-tested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
b3c395ef |
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11-May-2015 |
David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
mm/uaccess, mm/fault: Clarify that uaccess may only sleep if pagefaults are enabled In general, non-atomic variants of user access functions must not sleep if pagefaults are disabled. Let's update all relevant comments in uaccess code. This also reflects the might_sleep() checks in might_fault(). Reviewed-and-tested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: David.Laight@ACULAB.COM Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: airlied@linux.ie Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: benh@kernel.crashing.org Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de Cc: borntraeger@de.ibm.com Cc: daniel.vetter@intel.com Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Cc: hocko@suse.cz Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: mst@redhat.com Cc: paulus@samba.org Cc: ralf@linux-mips.org Cc: schwidefsky@de.ibm.com Cc: yang.shi@windriver.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1431359540-32227-4-git-send-email-dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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#
6a907738 |
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15-Apr-2015 |
Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> |
x86/asm: Enable fast 32-bit put_user_64() for copy_to_user() For fixed sized copies, copy_to_user() will utilize __put_user_size() fastpaths. However, it is missing the translation for 64-bit copies on x86/32. Testing on a Pinetrail Atom, the 64 bit put_user() fastpath is substantially faster than the generic copy_to_user() fallback. Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1429091486-11443-1-git-send-email-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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7a3d9b0f |
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21-Oct-2013 |
Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> |
x86: Unify copy_to_user() and add size checking to it Similarly to copy_from_user(), where the range check is to protect against kernel memory corruption, copy_to_user() can benefit from such checking too: Here it protects against kernel information leaks. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Cc: <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5265059502000078000FC4F6@nat28.tlf.novell.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
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#
3df7b41a |
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21-Oct-2013 |
Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> |
x86: Unify copy_from_user() size checking Commits 4a3127693001c61a21d1ce680db6340623f52e93 ("x86: Turn the copy_from_user check into an (optional) compile time warning") and 63312b6a6faae3f2e5577f2b001e3b504f10a2aa ("x86: Add a Kconfig option to turn the copy_from_user warnings into errors") touched only the 32-bit variant of copy_from_user(), whereas the original commit 9f0cf4adb6aa0bfccf675c938124e68f7f06349d ("x86: Use __builtin_object_size() to validate the buffer size for copy_from_user()") also added the same code to the 64-bit one. Further the earlier conversion from an inline WARN() to the call to copy_from_user_overflow() went a little too far: When the number of bytes to be copied is not a constant (e.g. [looking at 3.11] in drivers/net/tun.c:__tun_chr_ioctl() or drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aer_inject.c:aer_inject_write()), the compiler will always have to keep the funtion call, and hence there will always be a warning. By using __builtin_constant_p() we can avoid this. And then this slightly extends the effect of CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS in that apart from converting warnings to errors in the constant size case, it retains the (possibly wrong) warnings in the non-constant size case, such that if someone is prepared to get a few false positives, (s)he'll be able to recover the current behavior (except that these diagnostics now will never be converted to errors). Since the 32-bit variant (intentionally) didn't call might_fault(), the unification results in this being called twice now. Adding a suitable #ifdef would be the alternative if that's a problem. I'd like to point out though that with __compiletime_object_size() being restricted to gcc before 4.6, the whole construct is going to become more and more pointless going forward. I would question however that commit 2fb0815c9ee6b9ac50e15dd8360ec76d9fa46a2 ("gcc4: disable __compiletime_object_size for GCC 4.6+") was really necessary, and instead this should have been dealt with as is done here from the beginning. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5265056D02000078000FC4F3@nat28.tlf.novell.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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#
a052858f |
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21-Sep-2012 |
H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> |
x86, uaccess: Merge prototypes for clear_user/__clear_user The prototypes for clear_user() and __clear_user() are identical in the 32- and 64-bit headers. No functionality change. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348256595-29119-8-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com
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#
5723aa99 |
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26-May-2012 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
x86: use the new generic strnlen_user() function This throws away the old x86-specific functions in favor of the generic optimized version. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
92ae03f2 |
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06-Apr-2012 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
x86: merge 32/64-bit versions of 'strncpy_from_user()' and speed it up This merges the 32- and 64-bit versions of the x86 strncpy_from_user() by just rewriting it in C rather than the ancient inline asm versions that used lodsb/stosb and had been duplicated for (trivial) differences between the 32-bit and 64-bit versions. While doing that, it also speeds them up by doing the accesses a word at a time. Finally, the new routines also properly handle the case of hitting the end of the address space, which we have never done correctly before (fs/namei.c has a hack around it for that reason). Despite all these improvements, it actually removes more lines than it adds, due to the de-duplication. Also, we no longer export (or define) the legacy __strncpy_from_user() function (that was defined to not do the user permission checks), since it's not actually used anywhere, and the user address space checks are built in to the new code. Other architecture maintainers have been notified that the old hack in fs/namei.c will be going away in the 3.5 merge window, in case they copied the x86 approach of being a bit cavalier about the end of the address space. Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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268bb0ce |
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20-May-2011 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
sanitize <linux/prefetch.h> usage Commit e66eed651fd1 ("list: remove prefetching from regular list iterators") removed the include of prefetch.h from list.h, which uncovered several cases that had apparently relied on that rather obscure header file dependency. So this fixes things up a bit, using grep -L linux/prefetch.h $(git grep -l '[^a-z_]prefetchw*(' -- '*.[ch]') grep -L 'prefetchw*(' $(git grep -l 'linux/prefetch.h' -- '*.[ch]') to guide us in finding files that either need <linux/prefetch.h> inclusion, or have it despite not needing it. There are more of them around (mostly network drivers), but this gets many core ones. Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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409d02ef |
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05-Jan-2010 |
Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> |
x86: copy_from_user() should not return -EFAULT Callers of copy_from_user() expect it to return the number of bytes it could not copy. In no case it is supposed to return -EFAULT. In case of a detected buffer overflow just return the requested length. In addition one could think of a memset that would clear the size of the target object. [ hpa: code is not in .32 so not needed for -stable ] Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> LKML-Reference: <20100105131911.GC5480@osiris.boeblingen.de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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#
63312b6a |
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02-Oct-2009 |
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> |
x86: Add a Kconfig option to turn the copy_from_user warnings into errors For automated testing it is useful to have the option to turn the warnings on copy_from_user() etc checks into errors: In function ‘copy_from_user’, inlined from ‘fd_copyin’ at drivers/block/floppy.c:3080, inlined from ‘fd_ioctl’ at drivers/block/floppy.c:3503: linux/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:213: error: call to ‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user buffer size is not provably correct Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> LKML-Reference: <20091002075050.4e9f7641@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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#
4a312769 |
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30-Sep-2009 |
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> |
x86: Turn the copy_from_user check into an (optional) compile time warning A previous patch added the buffer size check to copy_from_user(). One of the things learned from analyzing the result of the previous patch is that in general, gcc is really good at proving that the code contains sufficient security checks to not need to do a runtime check. But that for those cases where gcc could not prove this, there was a relatively high percentage of real security issues. This patch turns the case of "gcc cannot prove" into a compile time warning, as long as a sufficiently new gcc is in use that supports this. The objective is that these warnings will trigger developers checking new cases out before a security hole enters a linux kernel release. Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> LKML-Reference: <20090930130523.348ae6c4@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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#
9f0cf4ad |
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26-Sep-2009 |
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> |
x86: Use __builtin_object_size() to validate the buffer size for copy_from_user() gcc (4.x) supports the __builtin_object_size() builtin, which reports the size of an object that a pointer point to, when known at compile time. If the buffer size is not known at compile time, a constant -1 is returned. This patch uses this feature to add a sanity check to copy_from_user(); if the target buffer is known to be smaller than the copy size, the copy is aborted and a WARNing is emitted in memory debug mode. These extra checks compile away when the object size is not known, or if both the buffer size and the copy length are constants. Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> LKML-Reference: <20090926143301.2c396b94@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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#
4fe48782 |
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17-Sep-2009 |
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> |
x86: Fix uaccess_32.h typo Trivial: correct "that the we don't" typo. Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> LKML-Reference: <20090917125401.GU3717@localdomain.by> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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f1800536 |
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02-Mar-2009 |
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> |
x86, mm: dont use non-temporal stores in pagecache accesses Impact: standardize IO on cached ops On modern CPUs it is almost always a bad idea to use non-temporal stores, as the regression in this commit has shown it: 30d697f: x86: fix performance regression in write() syscall The kernel simply has no good information about whether using non-temporal stores is a good idea or not - and trying to add heuristics only increases complexity and inserts fragility. The regression on cached write()s took very long to be found - over two years. So dont take any chances and let the hardware decide how it makes use of its caches. The only exception is drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem.c: there were we are absolutely sure that another entity (the GPU) will pick up the dirty data immediately and that the CPU will not touch that data before the GPU will. Also, keep the _nocache() primitives to make it easier for people to experiment with these details. There may be more clear-cut cases where non-cached copies can be used, outside of filemap.c. Cc: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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#
3255aa2e |
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25-Feb-2009 |
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> |
x86, mm: pass in 'total' to __copy_from_user_*nocache() Impact: cleanup, enable future change Add a 'total bytes copied' parameter to __copy_from_user_*nocache(), and update all the callsites. The parameter is not used yet - architecture code can use it to more intelligently decide whether the copy should be cached or non-temporal. Cc: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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1965aae3 |
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22-Oct-2008 |
H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> |
x86: Fix ASM_X86__ header guards Change header guards named "ASM_X86__*" to "_ASM_X86_*" since: a. the double underscore is ugly and pointless. b. no leading underscore violates namespace constraints. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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bb898558 |
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17-Aug-2008 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
x86, um: ... and asm-x86 move Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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