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428080c9 |
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27-Feb-2024 |
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> |
x86/sev: Move early startup code into .head.text section In preparation for implementing rigorous build time checks to enforce that only code that can support it will be called from the early 1:1 mapping of memory, move SEV init code that is called in this manner to the .head.text section. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227151907.387873-19-ardb+git@google.com
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d7b69b59 |
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19-Feb-2024 |
Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
x86/sev: Dump SEV_STATUS It is, and will be even more useful in the future, to dump the SEV features enabled according to SEV_STATUS. Do so: [ 0.542753] Memory Encryption Features active: AMD SEV SEV-ES SEV-SNP [ 0.544425] SEV: Status: SEV SEV-ES SEV-SNP DebugSwap Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240219094216.GAZdMieDHKiI8aaP3n@fat_crate.local
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103bf75f |
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12-Jan-2024 |
Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de> |
x86: Do not include <asm/bootparam.h> in several files Remove the include statement for <asm/bootparam.h> from several files that don't require it and limit the exposure of those definitions within the Linux kernel code. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240112095000.8952-5-tzimmermann@suse.de
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e3ef461a |
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05-Jan-2024 |
Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
x86/sev: Harden #VC instruction emulation somewhat Compare the opcode bytes at rIP for each #VC exit reason to verify the instruction which raised the #VC exception is actually the right one. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240105101407.11694-1-bp@alien8.de
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d55d5bc5 |
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17-Oct-2023 |
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> |
x86/boot: Rename conflicting 'boot_params' pointer to 'boot_params_ptr' The x86 decompressor is built and linked as a separate executable, but it shares components with the kernel proper, which are either #include'd as C files, or linked into the decompresor as a static library (e.g, the EFI stub) Both the kernel itself and the decompressor define a global symbol 'boot_params' to refer to the boot_params struct, but in the former case, it refers to the struct directly, whereas in the decompressor, it refers to a global pointer variable referring to the struct boot_params passed by the bootloader or constructed from scratch. This ambiguity is unfortunate, and makes it impossible to assign this decompressor variable from the x86 EFI stub, given that declaring it as extern results in a clash. So rename the decompressor version (whose scope is limited) to boot_params_ptr. [ mingo: Renamed 'boot_params_p' to 'boot_params_ptr' for clarity ] Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
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bfb32e20 |
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01-Aug-2023 |
GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> |
x86/sev: Make boot_ghcb_page[] static boot_ghcb_page is not used by any other file, so make it static. This also resolves sparse warning: arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c:28:13: warning: symbol 'boot_ghcb_page' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
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63e44bc5 |
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16-Oct-2023 |
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> |
x86/sev: Check for user-space IOIO pointing to kernel space Check the memory operand of INS/OUTS before emulating the instruction. The #VC exception can get raised from user-space, but the memory operand can be manipulated to access kernel memory before the emulation actually begins and after the exception handler has run. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: 597cfe48212a ("x86/boot/compressed/64: Setup a GHCB-based VC Exception handler") Reported-by: Tom Dohrmann <erbse.13@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
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b9cb9c45 |
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21-Jun-2023 |
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> |
x86/sev: Check IOBM for IOIO exceptions from user-space Check the IO permission bitmap (if present) before emulating IOIO #VC exceptions for user-space. These permissions are checked by hardware already before the #VC is raised, but due to the VC-handler decoding race it needs to be checked again in software. Fixes: 25189d08e516 ("x86/sev-es: Add support for handling IOIO exceptions") Reported-by: Tom Dohrmann <erbse.13@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Tested-by: Tom Dohrmann <erbse.13@gmx.de> Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
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e221804d |
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15-Aug-2023 |
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com> |
x86/sev: Do not handle #VC for DR7 read/write With MSR_AMD64_SEV_DEBUG_SWAP enabled, the guest is not expected to receive a #VC for reads or writes of DR7. Update the SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT mask with MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP so an SNP guest doesn't gracefully terminate during SNP feature negotiation if MSR_AMD64_SEV_DEBUG_SWAP is enabled. Since a guest is not expected to receive a #VC on DR7 accesses when MSR_AMD64_SEV_DEBUG_SWAP is enabled, return an error from the #VC handler in this situation. Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230816022122.981998-1-aik@amd.com
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31c77a50 |
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07-Aug-2023 |
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> |
x86/efistub: Perform SNP feature test while running in the firmware Before refactoring the EFI stub boot flow to avoid the legacy bare metal decompressor, duplicate the SNP feature check in the EFI stub before handing over to the kernel proper. The SNP feature check can be performed while running under the EFI boot services, which means it can force the boot to fail gracefully and return an error to the bootloader if the loaded kernel does not implement support for all the features that the hypervisor enabled. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230807162720.545787-23-ardb@kernel.org
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bee6cf1a |
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16-Jul-2023 |
Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
x86/sev: Do not try to parse for the CC blob on non-AMD hardware Tao Liu reported a boot hang on an Intel Atom machine due to an unmapped EFI config table. The reason being that the CC blob which contains the CPUID page for AMD SNP guests is parsed for before even checking whether the machine runs on AMD hardware. Usually that's not a problem on !AMD hw - it simply won't find the CC blob's GUID and return. However, if any parts of the config table pointers array is not mapped, the kernel will #PF very early in the decompressor stage without any opportunity to recover. Therefore, do a superficial CPUID check before poking for the CC blob. This will fix the current issue on real hardware. It would also work as a guest on a non-lying hypervisor. For the lying hypervisor, the check is done again, *after* parsing the CC blob as the real CPUID page will be present then. Clear the #VC handler in case SEV-{ES,SNP} hasn't been detected, as a precaution. Fixes: c01fce9cef84 ("x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup") Reported-by: Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Tested-by: Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230601072043.24439-1-ltao@redhat.com
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6c321179 |
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06-Jun-2023 |
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> |
x86/sev: Add SNP-specific unaccepted memory support Add SNP-specific hooks to the unaccepted memory support in the boot path (__accept_memory()) and the core kernel (accept_memory()) in order to support booting SNP guests when unaccepted memory is present. Without this support, SNP guests will fail to boot and/or panic() when unaccepted memory is present in the EFI memory map. The process of accepting memory under SNP involves invoking the hypervisor to perform a page state change for the page to private memory and then issuing a PVALIDATE instruction to accept the page. Since the boot path and the core kernel paths perform similar operations, move the pvalidate_pages() and vmgexit_psc() functions into sev-shared.c to avoid code duplication. Create the new header file arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.h because adding the function declaration to any of the existing SEV related header files pulls in too many other header files, causing the build to fail. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a52fa69f460fd1876d70074b20ad68210dfc31dd.1686063086.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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5462ade6 |
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30-Mar-2023 |
Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> |
x86/boot: Centralize __pa()/__va() definitions Replace multiple __pa()/__va() definitions with a single one in misc.h. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230330114956.20342-2-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com
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8c29f016 |
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17-Jan-2023 |
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> |
x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support The hypervisor can enable various new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63]) and start a SNP guest. Some of these features need guest side implementation. If any of these features are enabled without it, the behavior of the SNP guest will be undefined. It may fail booting in a non-obvious way making it difficult to debug. Instead of allowing the guest to continue and have it fail randomly later, detect this early and fail gracefully. The SEV_STATUS MSR indicates features which the hypervisor has enabled. While booting, SNP guests should ascertain that all the enabled features have guest side implementation. In case a feature is not implemented in the guest, the guest terminates booting with GHCB protocol Non-Automatic Exit(NAE) termination request event, see "SEV-ES Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block Standardization" document (currently at https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf), section "Termination Request". Populate SW_EXITINFO2 with mask of unsupported features that the hypervisor can easily report to the user. More details in the AMD64 APM Vol 2, Section "SEV_STATUS MSR". [ bp: - Massage. - Move snp_check_features() call to C code. Note: the CC:stable@ aspect here is to be able to protect older, stable kernels when running on newer hypervisors. Or not "running" but fail reliably and in a well-defined manner instead of randomly. ] Fixes: cbd3d4f7c4e5 ("x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support") Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230118061943.534309-1-nikunj@amd.com
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4b1c7424 |
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23-Aug-2022 |
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> |
x86/boot: Don't propagate uninitialized boot_params->cc_blob_address In some cases, bootloaders will leave boot_params->cc_blob_address uninitialized rather than zeroing it out. This field is only meant to be set by the boot/compressed kernel in order to pass information to the uncompressed kernel when SEV-SNP support is enabled. Therefore, there are no cases where the bootloader-provided values should be treated as anything other than garbage. Otherwise, the uncompressed kernel may attempt to access this bogus address, leading to a crash during early boot. Normally, sanitize_boot_params() would be used to clear out such fields but that happens too late: sev_enable() may have already initialized it to a valid value that should not be zeroed out. Instead, have sev_enable() zero it out unconditionally beforehand. Also ensure this happens for !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT as well by also including this handling in the sev_enable() stub function. [ bp: Massage commit message and comments. ] Fixes: b190a043c49a ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup") Reported-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> Reported-by: watnuss@gmx.de Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216387 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220823160734.89036-1-michael.roth@amd.com
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30612045 |
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07-Mar-2022 |
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> |
x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests SEV-SNP guests will be provided the location of special 'secrets' and 'CPUID' pages via the Confidential Computing blob. This blob is provided to the run-time kernel either through a boot_params field that was initialized by the boot/compressed kernel, or via a setup_data structure as defined by the Linux Boot Protocol. Locate the Confidential Computing blob from these sources and, if found, use the provided CPUID page/table address to create a copy that the run-time kernel will use when servicing CPUID instructions via a #VC handler. Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-40-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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b190a043 |
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24-Feb-2022 |
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> |
x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Initial/preliminary detection of SEV-SNP is done via the Confidential Computing blob. Check for it prior to the normal SEV/SME feature initialization, and add some sanity checks to confirm it agrees with SEV-SNP CPUID/MSR bits. Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-39-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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76f61e1e |
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24-Feb-2022 |
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> |
x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob The run-time kernel will need to access the Confidential Computing blob very early during boot to access the CPUID table it points to. At that stage, it will be relying on the identity-mapped page table set up by the boot/compressed kernel, so make sure the blob and the CPUID table it points to are mapped in advance. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-38-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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5f211f4f |
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24-Feb-2022 |
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> |
x86/compressed: Use firmware-validated CPUID leaves for SEV-SNP guests SEV-SNP guests will be provided the location of special 'secrets' 'CPUID' pages via the Confidential Computing blob. This blob is provided to the boot kernel either through an EFI config table entry, or via a setup_data structure as defined by the Linux Boot Protocol. Locate the Confidential Computing from these sources and, if found, use the provided CPUID page/table address to create a copy that the boot kernel will use when servicing CPUID instructions via a #VC CPUID handler. [ bp: s/cpuid/CPUID/ ] Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-36-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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c01fce9c |
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24-Feb-2022 |
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> |
x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Initial/preliminary detection of SEV-SNP is done via the Confidential Computing blob. Check for it prior to the normal SEV/SME feature initialization, and add some sanity checks to confirm it agrees with SEV-SNP CPUID/MSR bits. Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-35-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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801baa69 |
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24-Feb-2022 |
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> |
x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper This code will also be used later for SEV-SNP-validated CPUID code in some cases, so move it to a common helper. While here, also add a check to terminate in cases where the CPUID function/subfunction is indexed and the subfunction is non-zero, since the GHCB MSR protocol does not support non-zero subfunctions. Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-32-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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87294bdb |
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08-Feb-2022 |
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> |
x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active The SEV-SNP guest is required by the GHCB spec to register the GHCB's Guest Physical Address (GPA). This is because the hypervisor may prefer that a guest use a consistent and/or specific GPA for the GHCB associated with a vCPU. For more information, see the GHCB specification section "GHCB GPA Registration". If hypervisor can not work with the guest provided GPA then terminate the guest boot. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-17-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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4f9c403e |
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08-Feb-2022 |
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> |
x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Each RMP entry contains the GPA at which a particular page of DRAM should be mapped. The VMs can request the hypervisor to add pages in the RMP table via the Page State Change VMGEXIT defined in the GHCB specification. Inside each RMP entry is a Validated flag; this flag is automatically cleared to 0 by the CPU hardware when a new RMP entry is created for a guest. Each VM page can be either validated or invalidated, as indicated by the Validated flag in the RMP entry. Memory access to a private page that is not validated generates a #VC. A VM must use the PVALIDATE instruction to validate a private page before using it. To maintain the security guarantee of SEV-SNP guests, when transitioning pages from private to shared, the guest must invalidate the pages before asking the hypervisor to change the page state to shared in the RMP table. After the pages are mapped private in the page table, the guest must issue a page state change VMGEXIT to mark the pages private in the RMP table and validate them. Upon boot, BIOS should have validated the entire system memory. During the kernel decompression stage, early_setup_ghcb() uses set_page_decrypted() to make the GHCB page shared (i.e. clear encryption attribute). And while exiting from the decompression, it calls set_page_encrypted() to make the page private. Add snp_set_page_{private,shared}() helpers that are used by set_page_{decrypted,encrypted}() to change the page state in the RMP table. [ bp: Massage commit message and comments. ] Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-16-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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81cc3df9 |
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08-Feb-2022 |
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> |
x86/sev: Check the VMPL level The Virtual Machine Privilege Level (VMPL) feature in the SEV-SNP architecture allows a guest VM to divide its address space into four levels. The level can be used to provide hardware isolated abstraction layers within a VM. VMPL0 is the highest privilege level, and VMPL3 is the least privilege level. Certain operations must be done by the VMPL0 software, such as: * Validate or invalidate memory range (PVALIDATE instruction) * Allocate VMSA page (RMPADJUST instruction when VMSA=1) The initial SNP support requires that the guest kernel is running at VMPL0. Add such a check to verify the guest is running at level 0 before continuing the boot. There is no easy method to query the current VMPL level, so use the RMPADJUST instruction to determine whether the guest is running at the VMPL0. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-15-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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cbd3d4f7 |
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08-Feb-2022 |
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> |
x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support Version 2 of the GHCB specification added the advertisement of features that are supported by the hypervisor. If the hypervisor supports SEV-SNP then it must set the SEV-SNP features bit to indicate that the base functionality is supported. Check that feature bit while establishing the GHCB; if failed, terminate the guest. Version 2 of the GHCB specification adds several new Non-Automatic Exits (NAEs), most of them are optional except the hypervisor feature. Now that the hypervisor feature NAE is implemented, bump the GHCB maximum supported protocol version. While at it, move the GHCB protocol negotiation check from the #VC exception handler to sev_enable() so that all feature detection happens before the first #VC exception. While at it, document why the GHCB page cannot be setup from load_stage2_idt(). [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-13-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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6c0f74d6 |
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08-Feb-2022 |
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> |
x86/sev: Define the Linux-specific guest termination reasons The GHCB specification defines the reason code for reason set 0. The reason codes defined in the set 0 do not cover all possible causes for a guest to request termination. The reason sets 1 to 255 are reserved for the vendor-specific codes. Reserve the reason set 1 for the Linux guest. Define the error codes for reason set 1 so that one can have meaningful termination reasons and thus better guest failure diagnosis. While at it, change sev_es_terminate() to accept a reason set parameter. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-11-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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ec1c66af |
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08-Feb-2022 |
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> |
x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier during boot With upcoming SEV-SNP support, SEV-related features need to be initialized earlier during boot, at the same point the initial #VC handler is set up, so that the SEV-SNP CPUID table can be utilized during the initial feature checks. Also, SEV-SNP feature detection will rely on EFI helper functions to scan the EFI config table for the Confidential Computing blob, and so would need to be implemented at least partially in C. Currently set_sev_encryption_mask() is used to initialize the sev_status and sme_me_mask globals that advertise what SEV/SME features are available in a guest. Rename it to sev_enable() to better reflect that (SME is only enabled in the case of SEV guests in the boot/compressed kernel), and move it to just after the stage1 #VC handler is set up so that it can be used to initialize SEV-SNP as well in future patches. While at it, re-implement it as C code so that all SEV feature detection can be better consolidated with upcoming SEV-SNP feature detection, which will also be in C. The 32-bit entry path remains unchanged, as it never relied on the set_sev_encryption_mask() initialization to begin with. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-8-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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950d0055 |
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08-Feb-2022 |
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> |
x86/boot: Use MSR read/write helpers instead of inline assembly Update all C code to use the new boot_rdmsr()/boot_wrmsr() helpers instead of relying on inline assembly. Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-7-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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18c3933c |
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10-Nov-2021 |
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> |
x86/sev: Shorten GHCB terminate macro names Shorten macro names for improved readability. Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211110220731.2396491-5-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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e759959f |
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27-Apr-2021 |
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> |
x86/sev-es: Rename sev-es.{ch} to sev.{ch} SEV-SNP builds upon the SEV-ES functionality while adding new hardware protection. Version 2 of the GHCB specification adds new NAE events that are SEV-SNP specific. Rename the sev-es.{ch} to sev.{ch} so that all SEV* functionality can be consolidated in one place. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210427111636.1207-2-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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