mm/treewide: replace pmd_large() with pmd_leaf()

pmd_large() is always defined as pmd_leaf(). Merge their usages. Chose
pmd_leaf() because pmd_leaf() is a global API, while pmd_large() is not.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240305043750.93762-8-peterx@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

x86/boot: Add a message about ignored early NMIs

Commit

78a509fba9c9 ("x86/boot: Ignore NMIs during very early boot")

added an empty handler in early boot stage to avoid boot failure due to
spurious NMIs.

Add a diagnostic message to show that early NMIs have occurred.

[ bp: Touchups. ]

[ Committer note: tested by stopping the guest really early and
injecting NMIs through qemu's monitor. Result:

early console in setup code
Spurious early NMIs ignored: 13
... ]

Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun'ichi Nomura <junichi.nomura@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231130103339.GCZWhlA196uRklTMNF@fat_crate.local

x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION => CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION

Step 4/10 of the namespace unification of CPU mitigations related Kconfig options.

[ mingo: Converted new uses that got added since the series was posted. ]

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121160740.1249350-5-leitao@debian.org

x86/boot: Ignore NMIs during very early boot

When there are two racing NMIs on x86, the first NMI invokes NMI handler and
the 2nd NMI is latched until IRET is executed.

If panic on NMI and panic kexec are enabled, the first NMI triggers
panic and starts booting the next kernel via kexec. Note that the 2nd
NMI is still latched. During the early boot of the next kernel, once
an IRET is executed as a result of a page fault, then the 2nd NMI is
unlatched and invokes the NMI handler.

However, NMI handler is not set up at the early stage of boot, which
results in a boot failure.

Avoid such problems by setting up a NOP handler for early NMIs.

[ mingo: Refined the changelog. ]

Signed-off-by: Jun'ichi Nomura <junichi.nomura@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Derek Barbosa <debarbos@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

x86/boot: Rename conflicting 'boot_params' pointer to 'boot_params_ptr'

The x86 decompressor is built and linked as a separate executable, but
it shares components with the kernel proper, which are either #include'd
as C files, or linked into the decompresor as a static library (e.g, the
EFI stub)

Both the kernel itself and the decompressor define a global symbol
'boot_params' to refer to the boot_params struct, but in the former
case, it refers to the struct directly, whereas in the decompressor, it
refers to a global pointer variable referring to the struct boot_params
passed by the bootloader or constructed from scratch.

This ambiguity is unfortunate, and makes it impossible to assign this
decompressor variable from the x86 EFI stub, given that declaring it as
extern results in a clash. So rename the decompressor version (whose
scope is limited) to boot_params_ptr.

[ mingo: Renamed 'boot_params_p' to 'boot_params_ptr' for clarity ]

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org

x86/boot/compressed: Reserve more memory for page tables

The decompressor has a hard limit on the number of page tables it can
allocate. This limit is defined at compile-time and will cause boot
failure if it is reached.

The kernel is very strict and calculates the limit precisely for the
worst-case scenario based on the current configuration. However, it is
easy to forget to adjust the limit when a new use-case arises. The
worst-case scenario is rarely encountered during sanity checks.

In the case of enabling 5-level paging, a use-case was overlooked. The
limit needs to be increased by one to accommodate the additional level.
This oversight went unnoticed until Aaron attempted to run the kernel
via kexec with 5-level paging and unaccepted memory enabled.

Update wost-case calculations to include 5-level paging.

To address this issue, let's allocate some extra space for page tables.
128K should be sufficient for any use-case. The logic can be simplified
by using a single value for all kernel configurations.

[ Also add a warning, should this memory run low - by Dave Hansen. ]

Fixes: 34bbb0009f3b ("x86/boot/compressed: Enable 5-level paging during decompression stage")
Reported-by: Aaron Lu <aaron.lu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230915070221.10266-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com

x86/boot: Centralize __pa()/__va() definitions

Replace multiple __pa()/__va() definitions with a single one in misc.h.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230330114956.20342-2-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com

x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support

The hypervisor can enable various new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63]) and start a
SNP guest. Some of these features need guest side implementation. If any of
these features are enabled without it, the behavior of the SNP guest will be
undefined. It may fail booting in a non-obvious way making it difficult to
debug.

Instead of allowing the guest to continue and have it fail randomly later,
detect this early and fail gracefully.

The SEV_STATUS MSR indicates features which the hypervisor has enabled. While
booting, SNP guests should ascertain that all the enabled features have guest
side implementation. In case a feature is not implemented in the guest, the
guest terminates booting with GHCB protocol Non-Automatic Exit(NAE) termination
request event, see "SEV-ES Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block Standardization"
document (currently at https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf),
section "Termination Request".

Populate SW_EXITINFO2 with mask of unsupported features that the hypervisor can
easily report to the user.

More details in the AMD64 APM Vol 2, Section "SEV_STATUS MSR".

[ bp:
- Massage.
- Move snp_check_features() call to C code.
Note: the CC:stable@ aspect here is to be able to protect older, stable
kernels when running on newer hypervisors. Or not "running" but fail
reliably and in a well-defined manner instead of randomly. ]

Fixes: cbd3d4f7c4e5 ("x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support")
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230118061943.534309-1-nikunj@amd.com

x86/compressed/64: Add identity mappings for setup_data entries

The decompressed kernel initially relies on the identity map set up by
the boot/compressed kernel for accessing things like boot_params. With
the recent introduction of SEV-SNP support, the decompressed kernel
also needs to access the setup_data entries pointed to by
boot_params->hdr.setup_data.

This can lead to a crash in the kexec kernel during early boot due to
these entries not currently being included in the initial identity map,
see thread at Link below.

Include mappings for the setup_data entries in the initial identity map.

[ bp: Massage commit message and use a helper var for better readability. ]

Fixes: b190a043c49a ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup")
Reported-by: Jun'ichi Nomura <junichi.nomura@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/TYCPR01MB694815CD815E98945F63C99183B49@TYCPR01MB6948.jpnprd01.prod.outlook.com

x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob

The run-time kernel will need to access the Confidential Computing blob
very early during boot to access the CPUID table it points to. At that
stage, it will be relying on the identity-mapped page table set up by
the boot/compressed kernel, so make sure the blob and the CPUID table it
points to are mapped in advance.

[ bp: Massage. ]

Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-38-brijesh.singh@amd.com

x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map()

SEV-specific code will need to add some additional mappings, but doing
this within ident_map_64.c requires some SEV-specific helpers to be
exported and some SEV-specific struct definitions to be pulled into
ident_map_64.c. Instead, export add_identity_map() so SEV-specific (and
other subsystem-specific) code can be better contained outside of
ident_map_64.c.

While at it, rename the function to kernel_add_identity_map(), similar
to the kernel_ident_mapping_init() function it relies upon.

No functional changes.

Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-37-brijesh.singh@amd.com

x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage

Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through the
Reverse Map Table (RMP). Each RMP entry contains the GPA at which a
particular page of DRAM should be mapped. The VMs can request the
hypervisor to add pages in the RMP table via the Page State Change
VMGEXIT defined in the GHCB specification.

Inside each RMP entry is a Validated flag; this flag is automatically
cleared to 0 by the CPU hardware when a new RMP entry is created for a
guest. Each VM page can be either validated or invalidated, as indicated
by the Validated flag in the RMP entry. Memory access to a private page
that is not validated generates a #VC. A VM must use the PVALIDATE
instruction to validate a private page before using it.

To maintain the security guarantee of SEV-SNP guests, when transitioning
pages from private to shared, the guest must invalidate the pages before
asking the hypervisor to change the page state to shared in the RMP table.

After the pages are mapped private in the page table, the guest must
issue a page state change VMGEXIT to mark the pages private in the RMP
table and validate them.

Upon boot, BIOS should have validated the entire system memory.
During the kernel decompression stage, early_setup_ghcb() uses
set_page_decrypted() to make the GHCB page shared (i.e. clear encryption
attribute). And while exiting from the decompression, it calls
set_page_encrypted() to make the page private.

Add snp_set_page_{private,shared}() helpers that are used by
set_page_{decrypted,encrypted}() to change the page state in the RMP
table.

[ bp: Massage commit message and comments. ]

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-16-brijesh.singh@amd.com

x86/boot: Remove unused finalize_identity_maps()

Commit

8570978ea030 ("x86/boot/compressed/64: Don't pre-map memory in KASLR code")

removed all the references to finalize_identity_maps(), but neglected to
delete the actual function. Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201005151208.2212886-2-nivedita@alum.mit.edu

x86/boot/compressed/64: Check SEV encryption in 64-bit boot-path

Check whether the hypervisor reported the correct C-bit when running as
an SEV guest. Using a wrong C-bit position could be used to leak
sensitive data from the guest to the hypervisor.

The check function is in a separate file:

arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S

so that it can be re-used in the running kernel image.

[ bp: Massage. ]

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201028164659.27002-4-joro@8bytes.org

x86/boot/64: Explicitly map boot_params and command line

Commits

ca0e22d4f011 ("x86/boot/compressed/64: Always switch to own page table")
8570978ea030 ("x86/boot/compressed/64: Don't pre-map memory in KASLR code")

set up a new page table in the decompressor stub, but without explicit
mappings for boot_params and the kernel command line, relying on the #PF
handler instead.

This is fragile, as boot_params and the command line mappings are
required for the main kernel. If EARLY_PRINTK and RANDOMIZE_BASE are
disabled, a QEMU/OVMF boot never accesses the command line in the
decompressor stub, and so it never gets mapped. The main kernel accesses
it from the identity mapping if AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is enabled, and will
crash.

Fix this by adding back the explicit mapping of boot_params and the
command line.

Note: the changes also removed the explicit mapping of the main kernel,
with the result that .bss and .brk may not be in the identity mapping,
but those don't get accessed by the main kernel before it switches to
its own page tables.

[ bp: Pass boot_params with a MOV %rsp... instead of PUSH/POP. Use
block formatting for the comment. ]

Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201016200404.1615994-1-nivedita@alum.mit.edu

x86/boot/64: Initialize 5-level paging variables earlier

Commit

ca0e22d4f011 ("x86/boot/compressed/64: Always switch to own page table")

started using a new set of pagetables even without KASLR.

After that commit, initialize_identity_maps() is called before the
5-level paging variables are setup in choose_random_location(), which
will not work if 5-level paging is actually enabled.

Fix this by moving the initialization of __pgtable_l5_enabled,
pgdir_shift and ptrs_per_p4d into cleanup_trampoline(), which is called
immediately after the finalization of whether the kernel is executing
with 4- or 5-level paging. This will be earlier than anything that might
require those variables, and keeps the 4- vs 5-level paging code all in
one place.

Fixes: ca0e22d4f011 ("x86/boot/compressed/64: Always switch to own page table")
Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Tested-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Tested-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201010191110.4060905-1-nivedita@alum.mit.edu

x86/boot/compressed/64: Unmap GHCB page before booting the kernel

Force a page-fault on any further accesses to the GHCB page when they
shouldn't happen anymore. This will catch any bugs where a #VC exception
is raised even though none is expected anymore.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-25-joro@8bytes.org

x86/boot/compressed/64: Add set_page_en/decrypted() helpers

The functions are needed to map the GHCB for SEV-ES guests. The GHCB
is used for communication with the hypervisor, so its content must not
be encrypted. After the GHCB is not needed anymore it must be mapped
encrypted again so that the running kernel image can safely re-use the
memory.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-23-joro@8bytes.org

x86/boot/compressed/64: Check return value of kernel_ident_mapping_init()

The function can fail to create an identity mapping, check for that
and bail out if it happens.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-22-joro@8bytes.org

x86/boot/compressed/64: Call set_sev_encryption_mask() earlier

Call set_sev_encryption_mask() while still on the stage 1 #VC-handler
because the stage 2 handler needs the kernel's own page tables to be
set up, to which calling set_sev_encryption_mask() is a prerequisite.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-21-joro@8bytes.org

x86/boot/compressed/64: Change add_identity_map() to take start and end

Changing the function to take start and end as parameters instead of
start and size simplifies the callers which don't need to calculate the
size if they already have start and end.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-19-joro@8bytes.org

x86/boot/compressed/64: Don't pre-map memory in KASLR code

With the page-fault handler in place, he identity mapping can be built
on-demand. So remove the code which manually creates the mappings and
unexport/remove the functions used for it.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-18-joro@8bytes.org

x86/boot/compressed/64: Always switch to own page table

When booted through startup_64(), the kernel keeps running on the EFI
page table until the KASLR code sets up its own page table. Without
KASLR, the pre-decompression boot code never switches off the EFI page
table. Change that by unconditionally switching to a kernel-controlled
page table after relocation.

This makes sure the kernel can make changes to the mapping when
necessary, for example map pages unencrypted in SEV and SEV-ES guests.

Also, remove the debug_putstr() calls in initialize_identity_maps()
because the function now runs before console_init() is called.

[ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-17-joro@8bytes.org

x86/boot/compressed/64: Add page-fault handler

Install a page-fault handler to add an identity mapping to addresses
not yet mapped. Also do some checking whether the error code is sane.

This makes non SEV-ES machines use the exception handling
infrastructure in the pre-decompressions boot code too, making it less
likely to break in the future.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-16-joro@8bytes.org

x86/boot/compressed/64: Rename kaslr_64.c to ident_map_64.c

The file contains only code related to identity-mapped page tables.
Rename the file and compile it always in.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-15-joro@8bytes.org