KVM: s390: pv: Allow AP-instructions for pv-guests

Introduces new feature bits and enablement flags for AP and AP IRQ
support.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mueller <mimu@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815151415.379760-5-seiden@linux.ibm.com
Message-Id: <20230815151415.379760-5-seiden@linux.ibm.com>

s390/uv: UV feature check utility

Introduces a function to check the existence of an UV feature.
Refactor feature bit checks to use the new function.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mueller <mimu@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815151415.379760-3-seiden@linux.ibm.com
Message-Id: <20230815151415.379760-3-seiden@linux.ibm.com>

s390/uv: export uv_pin_shared for direct usage

Export the uv_pin_shared function so that it can be called from other
modules that carry a GPL-compatible license.

Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Krowiak <akrowiak@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Viktor Mihajlovski <mihajlov@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815184333.6554-11-akrowiak@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>

s390/uv: Update query for secret-UVCs

Update the query struct such that secret-UVC related
information can be parsed.
Add sysfs files for these new values.

'supp_add_secret_req_ver' notes the supported versions for the
Add Secret UVC. Bit 0 indicates that version 0x100 is supported,
bit 1 indicates 0x200, and so on.

'supp_add_secret_pcf' notes the supported plaintext flags for
the Add Secret UVC.

'supp_secret_types' notes the supported types of secrets.
Bit 0 indicates secret type 1, bit 1 indicates type 2, and so on.

'max_secrets' notes the maximum amount of secrets the secret store can
store per pv guest.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230615100533.3996107-8-seiden@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20230615100533.3996107-8-seiden@linux.ibm.com>

s390/uvdevice: Add 'Lock Secret Store' UVC

Userspace can call the Lock Secret Store Ultravisor Call
using IOCTLs on the uvdevice. The Lock Secret Store UV call
disables all additions of secrets for the future.

The uvdevice is merely transporting the request from userspace to the
Ultravisor.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230615100533.3996107-6-seiden@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20230615100533.3996107-6-seiden@linux.ibm.com>

s390/uvdevice: Add 'List Secrets' UVC

Userspace can call the List Secrets Ultravisor Call
using IOCTLs on the uvdevice. The List Secrets UV call lists the
identifier of the secrets in the UV secret store.

The uvdevice is merely transporting the request from userspace to
Ultravisor. It's neither checking nor manipulating the request or
response data.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230615100533.3996107-5-seiden@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20230615100533.3996107-5-seiden@linux.ibm.com>

s390/uvdevice: Add 'Add Secret' UVC

Userspace can call the Add Secret Ultravisor Call using IOCTLs on the
uvdevice. The Add Secret UV call sends an encrypted and
cryptographically verified request to the Ultravisor. The request
inserts a protected guest's secret into the Ultravisor for later use.

The uvdevice is merely transporting the request from userspace to the
Ultravisor. It's neither checking nor manipulating the request data.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230615100533.3996107-4-seiden@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20230615100533.3996107-4-seiden@linux.ibm.com>

KVM: s390: pv: support for Destroy fast UVC

Add support for the Destroy Secure Configuration Fast Ultravisor call,
and take advantage of it for asynchronous destroy.

When supported, the protected guest is destroyed immediately using the
new UVC, leaving only the memory to be cleaned up asynchronously.

Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221111170632.77622-6-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com
Message-Id: <20221111170632.77622-6-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>

KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage violations for protected guests

A secure storage violation is triggered when a protected guest tries to
access secure memory that has been mapped erroneously, or that belongs
to a different protected guest or to the ultravisor.

With upcoming patches, protected guests will be able to trigger secure
storage violations in normal operation. This happens for example if a
protected guest is rebooted with deferred destroy enabled and the new
guest is also protected.

When the new protected guest touches pages that have not yet been
destroyed, and thus are accounted to the previous protected guest, a
secure storage violation is raised.

This patch adds handling of secure storage violations for protected
guests.

This exception is handled by first trying to destroy the page, because
it is expected to belong to a defunct protected guest where a destroy
should be possible. Note that a secure page can only be destroyed if
its protected VM does not have any CPUs, which only happens when the
protected VM is being terminated. If that fails, a normal export of
the page is attempted.

This means that pages that trigger the exception will be made
non-secure (in one way or another) before attempting to use them again
for a different secure guest.

Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628135619.32410-3-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com
Message-Id: <20220628135619.32410-3-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>

s390: Add attestation query information

We have information about the supported attestation header version
and plaintext attestation flag bits.
Let's expose it via the sysfs files.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220601100245.3189993-1-seiden@linux.ibm.com/
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>

KVM: s390: pv: Add dump support definitions

Let's add the constants and structure definitions needed for the dump
support.

Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517163629.3443-5-frankja@linux.ibm.com
Message-Id: <20220517163629.3443-5-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>

s390/uv: Add dump fields to query

The new dump feature requires us to know how much memory is needed for
the "dump storage state" and "dump finalize" ultravisor call. These
values are reported via the UV query call.

Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517163629.3443-3-frankja@linux.ibm.com
Message-Id: <20220517163629.3443-3-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>

s390/uv: Add SE hdr query information

We have information about the supported se header version and pcf bits
so let's expose it via the sysfs files.

Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517163629.3443-2-frankja@linux.ibm.com
Message-Id: <20220517163629.3443-2-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>

drivers/s390/char: Add Ultravisor io device

This patch adds a new miscdevice to expose some Ultravisor functions
to userspace. Userspace can send IOCTLs to the uvdevice that will then
emit a corresponding Ultravisor Call and hands the result over to
userspace. The uvdevice is available if the Ultravisor Call facility is
present.
Userspace can call the Retrieve Attestation Measurement
Ultravisor Call using IOCTLs on the uvdevice.

The uvdevice will do some sanity checks first.
Then, copy the request data to kernel space, build the UVCB,
perform the UV call, and copy the result back to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20220516113335.338212-1-seiden@linux.ibm.com/
Message-Id: <20220516113335.338212-1-seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> (whitespace and tristate fixes, pick)

KVM: s390: pv: make use of ultravisor AIV support

This patch enables the ultravisor adapter interruption vitualization
support indicated by UV feature BIT_UV_FEAT_AIV. This allows ISC
interruption injection directly into the GISA IPM for PV kvm guests.

Hardware that does not support this feature will continue to use the
UV interruption interception method to deliver ISC interruptions to
PV kvm guests. For this purpose, the ECA_AIV bit for all guest cpus
will be cleared and the GISA will be disabled during PV CPU setup.

In addition a check in __inject_io() has been removed. That reduces the
required instructions for interruption handling for PV and traditional
kvm guests.

Signed-off-by: Michael Mueller <mimu@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220209152217.1793281-2-mimu@linux.ibm.com
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>

s390: uv: Add offset comments to UV query struct and fix naming

Changes to the struct are easier to manage with offset comments so
let's add some. And now that we know that the last struct member has
the wrong name let's also fix this.

Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>

KVM: s390: pv: properly handle page flags for protected guests

Introduce variants of the convert and destroy page functions that also
clear the PG_arch_1 bit used to mark them as secure pages.

The PG_arch_1 flag is always allowed to overindicate; using the new
functions introduced here allows to reduce the extent of overindication
and thus improve performance.

These new functions can only be called on pages for which a reference
is already being held.

Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210920132502.36111-7-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

KVM: s390: pv: add macros for UVC CC values

Add macros to describe the 4 possible CC values returned by the UVC
instruction.

Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20210920132502.36111-2-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

s390/boot: move uv function declarations to boot/uv.h

The functions adjust_to_uv_max() and uv_query_info() are used only
in the decompressor. Therefore, move the function declarations from
the global arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h to arch/s390/boot/uv.h.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Egorenkov <egorenar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>

s390: mm: Fix secure storage access exception handling

Turns out that the bit 61 in the TEID is not always 1 and if that's
the case the address space ID and the address are
unpredictable. Without an address and its address space ID we can't
export memory and hence we can only send a SIGSEGV to the process or
panic the kernel depending on who caused the exception.

Unfortunately bit 61 is only reliable if we have the "misc" UV feature
bit.

Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Fixes: 084ea4d611a3d ("s390/mm: add (non)secure page access exceptions handlers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>

s390: uv: Fix sysfs max number of VCPUs reporting

The number reported by the query is N-1 and I think people reading the
sysfs file would expect N instead. For users creating VMs there's no
actual difference because KVM's limit is currently below the UV's
limit.

Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: a0f60f8431999 ("s390/protvirt: Add sysfs firmware interface for Ultravisor information")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>

s390/uv: add destroy page call

We don't need to export pages if we destroy the VM configuration
afterwards anyway. Instead we can destroy the page which will zero it
and then make it accessible to the host.

Destroying is about twice as fast as the export.

Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20200907124700.10374-2-frankja@linux.ibm.com/
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>

KVM: s390: protvirt: Add UV cpu reset calls

For protected VMs, the VCPU resets are done by the Ultravisor, as KVM
has no access to the VCPU registers.

Note that the ultravisor will only accept a call for the exact reset
that has been requested.

Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

KVM: s390: protvirt: Support cmd 5 operation state

Code 5 for the set cpu state UV call tells the UV to load a PSW from
the SE header (first IPL) or from guest location 0x0 (diag 308 subcode
0/1). Also it sets the cpu into operating state afterwards, so we can
start it.

Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

KVM: s390: protvirt: Report CPU state to Ultravisor

VCPU states have to be reported to the ultravisor for SIGP
interpretation, kdump, kexec and reboot.

Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

KVM: s390: protvirt: UV calls in support of diag308 0, 1

diag 308 subcode 0 and 1 require several KVM and Ultravisor interactions.
Specific to these "soft" reboots are

* The "unshare all" UVC
* The "prepare for reset" UVC

Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

KVM: s390: protvirt: Add initial vm and cpu lifecycle handling

This contains 3 main changes:
1. changes in SIE control block handling for secure guests
2. helper functions for create/destroy/unpack secure guests
3. KVM_S390_PV_COMMAND ioctl to allow userspace dealing with secure
machines

Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

KVM: s390: add new variants of UV CALL

This adds two new helper functions for doing UV CALLs.

The first variant handles UV CALLs that might have longer busy
conditions or just need longer when doing partial completion. We should
schedule when necessary.

The second variant handles UV CALLs that only need the handle but have
no payload (e.g. destroying a VM). We can provide a simple wrapper for
those.

Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests

This provides the basic ultravisor calls and page table handling to cope
with secure guests:
- provide arch_make_page_accessible
- make pages accessible after unmapping of secure guests
- provide the ultravisor commands convert to/from secure
- provide the ultravisor commands pin/unpin shared
- provide callbacks to make pages secure (inacccessible)
- we check for the expected pin count to only make pages secure if the
host is not accessing them
- we fence hugetlbfs for secure pages
- add missing radix-tree include into gmap.h

The basic idea is that a page can have 3 states: secure, normal or
shared. The hypervisor can call into a firmware function called
ultravisor that allows to change the state of a page: convert from/to
secure. The convert from secure will encrypt the page and make it
available to the host and host I/O. The convert to secure will remove
the host capability to access this page.
The design is that on convert to secure we will wait until writeback and
page refs are indicating no host usage. At the same time the convert
from secure (export to host) will be called in common code when the
refcount or the writeback bit is already set. This avoids races between
convert from and to secure.

Then there is also the concept of shared pages. Those are kind of secure
where the host can still access those pages. We need to be notified when
the guest "unshares" such a page, basically doing a convert to secure by
then. There is a call "pin shared page" that we use instead of convert
from secure when possible.

We do use PG_arch_1 as an optimization to minimize the convert from
secure/pin shared.

Several comments have been added in the code to explain the logic in
the relevant places.

Co-developed-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

s390/protvirt: add ultravisor initialization

Before being able to host protected virtual machines, donate some of
the memory to the ultravisor. Besides that the ultravisor might impose
addressing limitations for memory used to back protected VM storage. Treat
that limit as protected virtualization host's virtual memory limit.

Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

s390/protvirt: introduce host side setup

Add "prot_virt" command line option which controls if the kernel
protected VMs support is enabled at early boot time. This has to be
done early, because it needs large amounts of memory and will disable
some features like STP time sync for the lpar.

Extend ultravisor info definitions and expose it via uv_info struct
filled in during startup.

Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

s390/uv: use EOPNOTSUPP instead of ENOTSUPP

ENOTSUP is just an internal kernel error and should never reach
userspace. The return value of the share function is not exported to
userspace, but to avoid giving bad examples let us use EOPNOTSUPP:

Suggested-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>

s390/uv: introduce guest side ultravisor code

The Ultravisor Call Facility (stfle bit 158) defines an API to the
Ultravisor (UV calls), a mini hypervisor located at machine
level. With help of the Ultravisor, KVM will be able to run
"protected" VMs, special VMs whose memory and management data are
unavailable to KVM.

The protected VMs can also request services from the Ultravisor.
The guest api consists of UV calls to share and unshare memory with the
kvm hypervisor.

To enable this feature support PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST kconfig
option has been introduced.

Co-developed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>