| 370508 |
04-Sep-2021 |
kevans |
caroot: update CA bundle processor
Our current processor was identified as trusting cert not explicitly
marked for SERVER_AUTH, as well as certs that were tagged with
DISTRUST_AFTER.
Update the script to handle both scenarios. This patch was originally
authored by mandree@ for ports, and it was subsequently ported to base
caroot.
(cherry picked from commit c3510c941c0dddd09389915a9395e6f059088bab)
Git Hash: a12641eaecc3dab730b27149b7d48fb0a86d38c7
Git Author: kevans@FreeBSD.org |
| 364793 |
26-Aug-2020 |
kevans |
Partial revert of r364792: caroot: switch to using echo+shell glob
On stable/11, I mistakenly only tested installation of trusted certs.
When the dir is empty, the glob remains unexpanded when it gets added to
FILES.
On stable/11 (but not 12 or head), this ends up being erroneous; it kind of
looks like the glob is being expanded to a single-word empty string rather
than leaving us with an empty FILES. Regardless, this isn't worth fixing on
stable/11, so back it out. |
| 364792 |
26-Aug-2020 |
kevans |
MFC r364600: caroot: switch to using echo+shell glob to enumerate certs
This solves an issue on stable/12 that causes certs to not get installed.
ls is apparently not in PATH during installworld, so TRUSTED_CERTS ends up
blank and nothing gets installed. We don't really require anything
ls-specific, though, so let's just simplify it. |
| 357633 |
06-Feb-2020 |
kevans |
MFC r357193: caroot: blacklisted: automatically pick up *.pem in the tree
This kind of automagica got picked up in trusted/ prior to the initial
commit, but never got applied over in blacklisted. Ideally no one will be
using blacklisted/ to store arbitrary certs that they don't intend to
blacklist, so we should just install anything that's in here rather than
force consumer to first copy cert into place and then modify the file
listing in the Makefile.
Wise man once say: "it is better to restrict too much, than not enough.
sometimes." |
| 357192 |
28-Jan-2020 |
kevans |
MFC r357084: caroot: use bsd.obj.mk, not bsd.prog.mk
This directory stages certdata into .OBJDIR and processes it, but does not
actually build a prog-shaped object; bsd.obj.mk provides the minimal support
that we actually need, an .OBJDIR and descent into subdirs. This is
admittedly the nittiest of nits. |
| 357082 |
24-Jan-2020 |
kevans |
MFC r352948-r352951, r353002, r353066, r353070: caroot infrastructure
Infrastructure only -- no plans in place currently to commit any certs to
these branches.
r352948:
[1/3] Initial infrastructure for SSL root bundle in base
This setup will add the trusted certificates from the Mozilla NSS bundle
to base.
This commit includes:
- CAROOT option to opt out of installation of certs
- mtree amendments for final destinations
- infrastructure to fetch/update certs, along with instructions
A follow-up commit will add a certctl(8) utility to give the user control
over trust specifics. Another follow-up commit will actually commit the
initial result of updatecerts.
This work was done primarily by allanjude@, with minor contributions by
myself.
r352949:
[2/3] Add certctl(8)
This is a simple utility to hash all trusted on the system into
/etc/ssl/certs. It also allows the user to blacklist certificates they do
not trust.
This work was done primarily by allanjude@, with minor contributions by
myself.
r352950:
[3/3] etcupdate and mergemaster support for certctl
This commit add support for certctl in mergemaster and etcupdate. Both will
either rehash or prompt for rehash as new certificates are
trusted/blacklisted.
This work was done primarily by allanjude@, with minor contributions by
myself.
r352951:
caroot: add @generated tags to extracted .pem
As is the current trend; while these files are manually curated, they are
still generated. If they end up in a review, it would be helpful to also
take the hint and hide them.
r353002:
Unbreak etcupdate(8) and mergemaster(8) after r352950
r352950 introduced improper case fall-through for shell scripts. Fix it with
a pipe.
r353066:
certctl(8): realpath the file before creating the symlink
Otherwise we end up creating broken relative symlinks in
/etc/ssl/blacklisted.
r353070:
certctl(8): let one blacklist based on hashed filenames
It seems reasonable to allow, for instance:
$ certctl list
# reviews output -- ah, yeah, I don't trust that one
$ certctl blacklist ce5e74ef.0
$ certctl rehash
We can unambiguously determine what cert "ce5e74ef.0" refers to, and we've
described it to them in `certctl list` output -- I see little sense in
forcing another level of filesystem inspection to determien what cert file
this physically corresponds to.
Relnotes: yes |
| 352948 |
02-Oct-2019 |
kevans |
[1/3] Initial infrastructure for SSL root bundle in base
This setup will add the trusted certificates from the Mozilla NSS bundle
to base.
This commit includes:
- CAROOT option to opt out of installation of certs
- mtree amendments for final destinations
- infrastructure to fetch/update certs, along with instructions
A follow-up commit will add a certctl(8) utility to give the user control
over trust specifics. Another follow-up commit will actually commit the
initial result of updatecerts.
This work was done primarily by allanjude@, with minor contributions by
myself.
No objection from: secteam
Relnotes: yes
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D16856
|