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vfs_acl.c (150262) vfs_acl.c (160146)
1/*-
1/*-
2 * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Robert N. M. Watson
2 * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Robert N. M. Watson
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
6 *
7 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9 * are met:
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright

--- 11 unchanged lines hidden (view full) ---

22 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
23 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
24 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
25 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
26 * SUCH DAMAGE.
27 */
28/*
29 * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
6 *
7 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9 * are met:
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright

--- 11 unchanged lines hidden (view full) ---

22 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
23 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
24 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
25 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
26 * SUCH DAMAGE.
27 */
28/*
29 * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
30 * Support for POSIX.1e access control lists.
30 *
31 * ACL system calls and other functions common across different ACL types.
32 * Type-specific routines go into subr_acl_<type>.c.
31 */
32
33#include <sys/cdefs.h>
33 */
34
35#include <sys/cdefs.h>
34__FBSDID("$FreeBSD: head/sys/kern/vfs_acl.c 150262 2005-09-17 22:01:14Z csjp $");
36__FBSDID("$FreeBSD: head/sys/kern/vfs_acl.c 160146 2006-07-06 23:37:39Z rwatson $");
35
36#include "opt_mac.h"
37
38#include <sys/param.h>
39#include <sys/systm.h>
40#include <sys/sysproto.h>
41#include <sys/kernel.h>
42#include <sys/mac.h>
43#include <sys/malloc.h>
44#include <sys/mount.h>
45#include <sys/vnode.h>
46#include <sys/lock.h>
47#include <sys/mutex.h>
48#include <sys/namei.h>
49#include <sys/file.h>
50#include <sys/filedesc.h>
51#include <sys/proc.h>
52#include <sys/sysent.h>
37
38#include "opt_mac.h"
39
40#include <sys/param.h>
41#include <sys/systm.h>
42#include <sys/sysproto.h>
43#include <sys/kernel.h>
44#include <sys/mac.h>
45#include <sys/malloc.h>
46#include <sys/mount.h>
47#include <sys/vnode.h>
48#include <sys/lock.h>
49#include <sys/mutex.h>
50#include <sys/namei.h>
51#include <sys/file.h>
52#include <sys/filedesc.h>
53#include <sys/proc.h>
54#include <sys/sysent.h>
53#include <sys/errno.h>
54#include <sys/stat.h>
55#include <sys/acl.h>
56
57#include <vm/uma.h>
58
59uma_zone_t acl_zone;
60static int vacl_set_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
61 acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
62static int vacl_get_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
63 acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
64static int vacl_aclcheck(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
65 acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
66
67/*
55#include <sys/acl.h>
56
57#include <vm/uma.h>
58
59uma_zone_t acl_zone;
60static int vacl_set_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
61 acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
62static int vacl_get_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
63 acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
64static int vacl_aclcheck(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
65 acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
66
67/*
68 * Implement a version of vaccess() that understands POSIX.1e ACL semantics.
69 * Return 0 on success, else an errno value. Should be merged into
70 * vaccess() eventually.
71 */
72int
73vaccess_acl_posix1e(enum vtype type, uid_t file_uid, gid_t file_gid,
74 struct acl *acl, mode_t acc_mode, struct ucred *cred, int *privused)
75{
76 struct acl_entry *acl_other, *acl_mask;
77 mode_t dac_granted;
78 mode_t cap_granted;
79 mode_t acl_mask_granted;
80 int group_matched, i;
81
82 /*
83 * Look for a normal, non-privileged way to access the file/directory
84 * as requested. If it exists, go with that. Otherwise, attempt
85 * to use privileges granted via cap_granted. In some cases,
86 * which privileges to use may be ambiguous due to "best match",
87 * in which case fall back on first match for the time being.
88 */
89 if (privused != NULL)
90 *privused = 0;
91
92 /*
93 * Determine privileges now, but don't apply until we've found
94 * a DAC entry that matches but has failed to allow access.
95 */
96#ifndef CAPABILITIES
97 if (suser_cred(cred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) == 0)
98 cap_granted = VALLPERM;
99 else
100 cap_granted = 0;
101#else
102 cap_granted = 0;
103
104 if (type == VDIR) {
105 if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && !cap_check(cred, NULL,
106 CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
107 cap_granted |= VEXEC;
108 } else {
109 if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && !cap_check(cred, NULL,
110 CAP_DAC_EXECUTE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
111 cap_granted |= VEXEC;
112 }
113
114 if ((acc_mode & VREAD) && !cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH,
115 SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
116 cap_granted |= VREAD;
117
118 if (((acc_mode & VWRITE) || (acc_mode & VAPPEND)) &&
119 !cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_DAC_WRITE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
120 cap_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
121
122 if ((acc_mode & VADMIN) && !cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_FOWNER,
123 SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
124 cap_granted |= VADMIN;
125#endif /* CAPABILITIES */
126
127 /*
128 * The owner matches if the effective uid associated with the
129 * credential matches that of the ACL_USER_OBJ entry. While we're
130 * doing the first scan, also cache the location of the ACL_MASK
131 * and ACL_OTHER entries, preventing some future iterations.
132 */
133 acl_mask = acl_other = NULL;
134 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
135 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
136 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
137 if (file_uid != cred->cr_uid)
138 break;
139 dac_granted = 0;
140 dac_granted |= VADMIN;
141 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
142 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
143 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
144 dac_granted |= VREAD;
145 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
146 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
147 if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
148 return (0);
149 if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) ==
150 acc_mode) {
151 if (privused != NULL)
152 *privused = 1;
153 return (0);
154 }
155 goto error;
156
157 case ACL_MASK:
158 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i];
159 break;
160
161 case ACL_OTHER:
162 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i];
163 break;
164
165 default:
166 break;
167 }
168 }
169
170 /*
171 * An ACL_OTHER entry should always exist in a valid access
172 * ACL. If it doesn't, then generate a serious failure. For now,
173 * this means a debugging message and EPERM, but in the future
174 * should probably be a panic.
175 */
176 if (acl_other == NULL) {
177 /*
178 * XXX This should never happen
179 */
180 printf("vaccess_acl_posix1e: ACL_OTHER missing\n");
181 return (EPERM);
182 }
183
184 /*
185 * Checks against ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, and ACL_GROUP fields
186 * are masked by an ACL_MASK entry, if any. As such, first identify
187 * the ACL_MASK field, then iterate through identifying potential
188 * user matches, then group matches. If there is no ACL_MASK,
189 * assume that the mask allows all requests to succeed.
190 */
191 if (acl_mask != NULL) {
192 acl_mask_granted = 0;
193 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
194 acl_mask_granted |= VEXEC;
195 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
196 acl_mask_granted |= VREAD;
197 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
198 acl_mask_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
199 } else
200 acl_mask_granted = VEXEC | VREAD | VWRITE | VAPPEND;
201
202 /*
203 * Iterate through user ACL entries. Do checks twice, first
204 * without privilege, and then if a match is found but failed,
205 * a second time with privilege.
206 */
207
208 /*
209 * Check ACL_USER ACL entries.
210 */
211 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
212 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
213 case ACL_USER:
214 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != cred->cr_uid)
215 break;
216 dac_granted = 0;
217 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
218 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
219 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
220 dac_granted |= VREAD;
221 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
222 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
223 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
224 if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
225 return (0);
226 if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) !=
227 acc_mode)
228 goto error;
229
230 if (privused != NULL)
231 *privused = 1;
232 return (0);
233 }
234 }
235
236 /*
237 * Group match is best-match, not first-match, so find a
238 * "best" match. Iterate across, testing each potential group
239 * match. Make sure we keep track of whether we found a match
240 * or not, so that we know if we should try again with any
241 * available privilege, or if we should move on to ACL_OTHER.
242 */
243 group_matched = 0;
244 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
245 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
246 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
247 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
248 break;
249 dac_granted = 0;
250 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
251 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
252 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
253 dac_granted |= VREAD;
254 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
255 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
256 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
257
258 if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
259 return (0);
260
261 group_matched = 1;
262 break;
263
264 case ACL_GROUP:
265 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, cred))
266 break;
267 dac_granted = 0;
268 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
269 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
270 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
271 dac_granted |= VREAD;
272 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
273 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
274 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
275
276 if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
277 return (0);
278
279 group_matched = 1;
280 break;
281
282 default:
283 break;
284 }
285 }
286
287 if (group_matched == 1) {
288 /*
289 * There was a match, but it did not grant rights via
290 * pure DAC. Try again, this time with privilege.
291 */
292 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
293 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
294 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
295 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
296 break;
297 dac_granted = 0;
298 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
299 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
300 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
301 dac_granted |= VREAD;
302 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
303 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
304 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
305
306 if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) !=
307 acc_mode)
308 break;
309
310 if (privused != NULL)
311 *privused = 1;
312 return (0);
313
314 case ACL_GROUP:
315 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id,
316 cred))
317 break;
318 dac_granted = 0;
319 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
320 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
321 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
322 dac_granted |= VREAD;
323 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
324 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
325 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
326
327 if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) !=
328 acc_mode)
329 break;
330
331 if (privused != NULL)
332 *privused = 1;
333 return (0);
334
335 default:
336 break;
337 }
338 }
339 /*
340 * Even with privilege, group membership was not sufficient.
341 * Return failure.
342 */
343 goto error;
344 }
345
346 /*
347 * Fall back on ACL_OTHER. ACL_MASK is not applied to ACL_OTHER.
348 */
349 dac_granted = 0;
350 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
351 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
352 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
353 dac_granted |= VREAD;
354 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
355 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
356
357 if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
358 return (0);
359 if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) == acc_mode) {
360 if (privused != NULL)
361 *privused = 1;
362 return (0);
363 }
364
365error:
366 return ((acc_mode & VADMIN) ? EPERM : EACCES);
367}
368
369/*
370 * For the purposes of filesystems maintaining the _OBJ entries in an
371 * inode with a mode_t field, this routine converts a mode_t entry
372 * to an acl_perm_t.
373 */
374acl_perm_t
375acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(acl_tag_t tag, mode_t mode)
376{
377 acl_perm_t perm = 0;
378
379 switch(tag) {
380 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
381 if (mode & S_IXUSR)
382 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
383 if (mode & S_IRUSR)
384 perm |= ACL_READ;
385 if (mode & S_IWUSR)
386 perm |= ACL_WRITE;
387 return (perm);
388
389 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
390 if (mode & S_IXGRP)
391 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
392 if (mode & S_IRGRP)
393 perm |= ACL_READ;
394 if (mode & S_IWGRP)
395 perm |= ACL_WRITE;
396 return (perm);
397
398 case ACL_OTHER:
399 if (mode & S_IXOTH)
400 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
401 if (mode & S_IROTH)
402 perm |= ACL_READ;
403 if (mode & S_IWOTH)
404 perm |= ACL_WRITE;
405 return (perm);
406
407 default:
408 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
409 return (0);
410 }
411}
412
413/*
414 * Given inode information (uid, gid, mode), return an acl entry of the
415 * appropriate type.
416 */
417struct acl_entry
418acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry(acl_tag_t tag, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
419{
420 struct acl_entry acl_entry;
421
422 acl_entry.ae_tag = tag;
423 acl_entry.ae_perm = acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(tag, mode);
424 switch(tag) {
425 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
426 acl_entry.ae_id = uid;
427 break;
428
429 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
430 acl_entry.ae_id = gid;
431 break;
432
433 case ACL_OTHER:
434 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
435 break;
436
437 default:
438 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
439 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
440 }
441
442 return (acl_entry);
443}
444
445/*
446 * Utility function to generate a file mode given appropriate ACL entries.
447 */
448mode_t
449acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(struct acl_entry *acl_user_obj_entry,
450 struct acl_entry *acl_group_obj_entry, struct acl_entry *acl_other_entry)
451{
452 mode_t mode;
453
454 mode = 0;
455 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
456 mode |= S_IXUSR;
457 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
458 mode |= S_IRUSR;
459 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
460 mode |= S_IWUSR;
461 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
462 mode |= S_IXGRP;
463 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
464 mode |= S_IRGRP;
465 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
466 mode |= S_IWGRP;
467 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
468 mode |= S_IXOTH;
469 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
470 mode |= S_IROTH;
471 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
472 mode |= S_IWOTH;
473
474 return (mode);
475}
476
477/*
478 * Utility function to generate a file mode given a complete POSIX.1e
479 * access ACL. Note that if the ACL is improperly formed, this may
480 * result in a panic.
481 */
482mode_t
483acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(struct acl *acl)
484{
485 struct acl_entry *acl_mask, *acl_user_obj, *acl_group_obj, *acl_other;
486 int i;
487
488 /*
489 * Find the ACL entries relevant to a POSIX permission mode.
490 */
491 acl_user_obj = acl_group_obj = acl_other = acl_mask = NULL;
492 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
493 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
494 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
495 acl_user_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i];
496 break;
497
498 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
499 acl_group_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i];
500 break;
501
502 case ACL_OTHER:
503 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i];
504 break;
505
506 case ACL_MASK:
507 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i];
508 break;
509
510 case ACL_USER:
511 case ACL_GROUP:
512 break;
513
514 default:
515 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: bad ae_tag");
516 }
517 }
518
519 if (acl_user_obj == NULL || acl_group_obj == NULL || acl_other == NULL)
520 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: missing base ae_tags");
521
522 /*
523 * POSIX.1e specifies that if there is an ACL_MASK entry, we replace
524 * the mode "group" bits with its permissions. If there isn't, we
525 * use the ACL_GROUP_OBJ permissions.
526 */
527 if (acl_mask != NULL)
528 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_mask,
529 acl_other));
530 else
531 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_group_obj,
532 acl_other));
533}
534
535/*
536 * Perform a syntactic check of the ACL, sufficient to allow an
537 * implementing filesystem to determine if it should accept this and
538 * rely on the POSIX.1e ACL properties.
539 */
540int
541acl_posix1e_check(struct acl *acl)
542{
543 int num_acl_user_obj, num_acl_user, num_acl_group_obj, num_acl_group;
544 int num_acl_mask, num_acl_other, i;
545
546 /*
547 * Verify that the number of entries does not exceed the maximum
548 * defined for acl_t.
549 * Verify that the correct number of various sorts of ae_tags are
550 * present:
551 * Exactly one ACL_USER_OBJ
552 * Exactly one ACL_GROUP_OBJ
553 * Exactly one ACL_OTHER
554 * If any ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP entries appear, then exactly one
555 * ACL_MASK entry must also appear.
556 * Verify that all ae_perm entries are in ACL_PERM_BITS.
557 * Verify all ae_tag entries are understood by this implementation.
558 * Note: Does not check for uniqueness of qualifier (ae_id) field.
559 */
560 num_acl_user_obj = num_acl_user = num_acl_group_obj = num_acl_group =
561 num_acl_mask = num_acl_other = 0;
562 if (acl->acl_cnt > ACL_MAX_ENTRIES || acl->acl_cnt < 0)
563 return (EINVAL);
564 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
565 /*
566 * Check for a valid tag.
567 */
568 switch(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
569 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
570 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
571 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
572 return (EINVAL);
573 num_acl_user_obj++;
574 break;
575 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
576 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
577 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
578 return (EINVAL);
579 num_acl_group_obj++;
580 break;
581 case ACL_USER:
582 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
583 return (EINVAL);
584 num_acl_user++;
585 break;
586 case ACL_GROUP:
587 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
588 return (EINVAL);
589 num_acl_group++;
590 break;
591 case ACL_OTHER:
592 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
593 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
594 return (EINVAL);
595 num_acl_other++;
596 break;
597 case ACL_MASK:
598 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
599 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
600 return (EINVAL);
601 num_acl_mask++;
602 break;
603 default:
604 return (EINVAL);
605 }
606 /*
607 * Check for valid perm entries.
608 */
609 if ((acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm | ACL_PERM_BITS) !=
610 ACL_PERM_BITS)
611 return (EINVAL);
612 }
613 if ((num_acl_user_obj != 1) || (num_acl_group_obj != 1) ||
614 (num_acl_other != 1) || (num_acl_mask != 0 && num_acl_mask != 1))
615 return (EINVAL);
616 if (((num_acl_group != 0) || (num_acl_user != 0)) &&
617 (num_acl_mask != 1))
618 return (EINVAL);
619 return (0);
620}
621
622/*
623 * Given a requested mode for a new object, and a default ACL, combine
624 * the two to produce a new mode. Be careful not to clear any bits that
625 * aren't intended to be affected by the POSIX.1e ACL. Eventually,
626 * this might also take the cmask as an argument, if we push that down
627 * into per-filesystem-code.
628 */
629mode_t
630acl_posix1e_newfilemode(mode_t cmode, struct acl *dacl)
631{
632 mode_t mode;
633
634 mode = cmode;
635 /*
636 * The current composition policy is that a permission bit must
637 * be set in *both* the ACL and the requested creation mode for
638 * it to appear in the resulting mode/ACL. First clear any
639 * possibly effected bits, then reconstruct.
640 */
641 mode &= ACL_PRESERVE_MASK;
642 mode |= (ACL_OVERRIDE_MASK & cmode & acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(dacl));
643
644 return (mode);
645}
646
647/*
648 * These calls wrap the real vnode operations, and are called by the
649 * syscall code once the syscall has converted the path or file
650 * descriptor to a vnode (unlocked). The aclp pointer is assumed
651 * still to point to userland, so this should not be consumed within
652 * the kernel except by syscall code. Other code should directly
653 * invoke VOP_{SET,GET}ACL.
654 */
655

--- 381 unchanged lines hidden --- 		68 * These calls wrap the real vnode operations, and are called by the
69 * syscall code once the syscall has converted the path or file
70 * descriptor to a vnode (unlocked). The aclp pointer is assumed
71 * still to point to userland, so this should not be consumed within
72 * the kernel except by syscall code. Other code should directly
73 * invoke VOP_{SET,GET}ACL.
74 */
75

--- 381 unchanged lines hidden ---