1/*
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2 * validator/val_nsec.c - validator NSEC denial of existance functions.
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2 * validator/val_nsec.c - validator NSEC denial of existence functions. |
3 * 4 * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved. 5 * 6 * This software is open source. 7 * 8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 10 * are met: 11 * 12 * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, 13 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 14 * 15 * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, 16 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation 17 * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 18 * 19 * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may 20 * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without 21 * specific prior written permission. 22 * 23 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS 24 * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT 25 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR 26 * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT 27 * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 28 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED 29 * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR 30 * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF 31 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING 32 * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS 33 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 34 */ 35 36/** 37 * \file 38 * 39 * This file contains helper functions for the validator module. 40 * The functions help with NSEC checking, the different NSEC proofs
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41 * for denial of existance, and proofs for presence of types.
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41 * for denial of existence, and proofs for presence of types. |
42 */ 43#include "config.h" 44#include "validator/val_nsec.h" 45#include "validator/val_utils.h" 46#include "util/data/msgreply.h" 47#include "util/data/dname.h" 48#include "util/net_help.h" 49#include "util/module.h" 50#include "services/cache/rrset.h" 51 52/** get ttl of rrset */ 53static uint32_t 54rrset_get_ttl(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* k) 55{ 56 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)k->entry.data; 57 return d->ttl; 58} 59 60int 61nsecbitmap_has_type_rdata(uint8_t* bitmap, size_t len, uint16_t type) 62{ 63 /* Check type present in NSEC typemap with bitmap arg */ 64 /* bitmasks for determining type-lowerbits presence */ 65 uint8_t masks[8] = {0x80, 0x40, 0x20, 0x10, 0x08, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01}; 66 uint8_t type_window = type>>8; 67 uint8_t type_low = type&0xff; 68 uint8_t win, winlen; 69 /* read each of the type bitmap windows and see if the searched 70 * type is amongst it */ 71 while(len > 0) { 72 if(len < 3) /* bad window, at least window# winlen bitmap */ 73 return 0; 74 win = *bitmap++; 75 winlen = *bitmap++; 76 len -= 2; 77 if(len < winlen || winlen < 1 || winlen > 32) 78 return 0; /* bad window length */ 79 if(win == type_window) { 80 /* search window bitmap for the correct byte */ 81 /* mybyte is 0 if we need the first byte */ 82 size_t mybyte = type_low>>3; 83 if(winlen <= mybyte) 84 return 0; /* window too short */ 85 return (int)(bitmap[mybyte] & masks[type_low&0x7]); 86 } else { 87 /* not the window we are looking for */ 88 bitmap += winlen; 89 len -= winlen; 90 } 91 } 92 /* end of bitmap reached, no type found */ 93 return 0; 94} 95 96int 97nsec_has_type(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, uint16_t type) 98{ 99 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)nsec-> 100 entry.data; 101 size_t len; 102 if(!d || d->count == 0 || d->rr_len[0] < 2+1) 103 return 0; 104 len = dname_valid(d->rr_data[0]+2, d->rr_len[0]-2); 105 if(!len) 106 return 0; 107 return nsecbitmap_has_type_rdata(d->rr_data[0]+2+len, 108 d->rr_len[0]-2-len, type); 109} 110 111/** 112 * Get next owner name from nsec record 113 * @param nsec: the nsec RRset. 114 * If there are multiple RRs, then this will only return one of them. 115 * @param nm: the next name is returned. 116 * @param ln: length of nm is returned. 117 * @return false on a bad NSEC RR (too short, malformed dname). 118 */ 119static int 120nsec_get_next(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, uint8_t** nm, size_t* ln) 121{ 122 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)nsec-> 123 entry.data; 124 if(!d || d->count == 0 || d->rr_len[0] < 2+1) { 125 *nm = 0; 126 *ln = 0; 127 return 0; 128 } 129 *nm = d->rr_data[0]+2; 130 *ln = dname_valid(*nm, d->rr_len[0]-2); 131 if(!*ln) { 132 *nm = 0; 133 *ln = 0; 134 return 0; 135 } 136 return 1; 137} 138 139/** 140 * For an NSEC that matches the DS queried for, check absence of DS type. 141 * 142 * @param nsec: NSEC for proof, must be trusted. 143 * @param qinfo: what is queried for. 144 * @return if secure the nsec proves that no DS is present, or 145 * insecure if it proves it is not a delegation point. 146 * or bogus if something was wrong. 147 */ 148static enum sec_status 149val_nsec_proves_no_ds(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, 150 struct query_info* qinfo) 151{ 152 log_assert(qinfo->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS); 153 log_assert(ntohs(nsec->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC); 154 155 if(nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA) && qinfo->qname_len != 1) { 156 /* SOA present means that this is the NSEC from the child, 157 * not the parent (so it is the wrong one). */ 158 return sec_status_bogus; 159 } 160 if(nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS)) { 161 /* DS present means that there should have been a positive 162 * response to the DS query, so there is something wrong. */ 163 return sec_status_bogus; 164 } 165 166 if(!nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS)) { 167 /* If there is no NS at this point at all, then this 168 * doesn't prove anything one way or the other. */ 169 return sec_status_insecure; 170 } 171 /* Otherwise, this proves no DS. */ 172 return sec_status_secure; 173} 174 175/** check security status from cache or verify rrset, returns true if secure */ 176static int 177nsec_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 178 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, struct key_entry_key* kkey, 179 char** reason) 180{ 181 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*) 182 nsec->entry.data; 183 if(d->security == sec_status_secure) 184 return 1; 185 rrset_check_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, nsec, *env->now); 186 if(d->security == sec_status_secure) 187 return 1; 188 d->security = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, nsec, kkey, reason); 189 if(d->security == sec_status_secure) { 190 rrset_update_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, nsec, *env->now); 191 return 1; 192 } 193 return 0; 194} 195 196enum sec_status 197val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 198 struct query_info* qinfo, struct reply_info* rep, 199 struct key_entry_key* kkey, time_t* proof_ttl, char** reason) 200{ 201 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec = reply_find_rrset_section_ns( 202 rep, qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC, 203 qinfo->qclass); 204 enum sec_status sec; 205 size_t i; 206 uint8_t* wc = NULL, *ce = NULL; 207 int valid_nsec = 0; 208 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* wc_nsec = NULL; 209 210 /* If we have a NSEC at the same name, it must prove one 211 * of two things 212 * -- 213 * 1) this is a delegation point and there is no DS 214 * 2) this is not a delegation point */ 215 if(nsec) { 216 if(!nsec_verify_rrset(env, ve, nsec, kkey, reason)) { 217 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC RRset for the " 218 "referral did not verify."); 219 return sec_status_bogus; 220 } 221 sec = val_nsec_proves_no_ds(nsec, qinfo); 222 if(sec == sec_status_bogus) { 223 /* something was wrong. */ 224 *reason = "NSEC does not prove absence of DS"; 225 return sec; 226 } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { 227 /* this wasn't a delegation point. */ 228 return sec; 229 } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 230 /* this proved no DS. */ 231 *proof_ttl = ub_packed_rrset_ttl(nsec); 232 return sec; 233 } 234 /* if unchecked, fall through to next proof */ 235 } 236 237 /* Otherwise, there is no NSEC at qname. This could be an ENT. 238 * (ENT=empty non terminal). If not, this is broken. */ 239 240 /* verify NSEC rrsets in auth section */ 241 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i < rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; 242 i++) { 243 if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type != htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC)) 244 continue; 245 if(!nsec_verify_rrset(env, ve, rep->rrsets[i], kkey, reason)) { 246 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC for empty non-terminal " 247 "did not verify."); 248 return sec_status_bogus; 249 } 250 if(nsec_proves_nodata(rep->rrsets[i], qinfo, &wc)) { 251 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC for empty non-terminal " 252 "proved no DS."); 253 *proof_ttl = rrset_get_ttl(rep->rrsets[i]); 254 if(wc && dname_is_wild(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname)) 255 wc_nsec = rep->rrsets[i]; 256 valid_nsec = 1; 257 } 258 if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(rep->rrsets[i], qinfo->qname)) { 259 ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qinfo->qname, 260 rep->rrsets[i]); 261 } 262 } 263 if(wc && !ce) 264 valid_nsec = 0; 265 else if(wc && ce) { 266 /* ce and wc must match */ 267 if(query_dname_compare(wc, ce) != 0) 268 valid_nsec = 0; 269 else if(!wc_nsec) 270 valid_nsec = 0; 271 } 272 if(valid_nsec) { 273 if(wc) { 274 /* check if this is a delegation */ 275 *reason = "NSEC for wildcard does not prove absence of DS"; 276 return val_nsec_proves_no_ds(wc_nsec, qinfo); 277 } 278 /* valid nsec proves empty nonterminal */ 279 return sec_status_insecure; 280 } 281
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282 /* NSEC proof did not conlusively point to DS or no DS */
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282 /* NSEC proof did not conclusively point to DS or no DS */ |
283 return sec_status_unchecked; 284} 285 286int nsec_proves_nodata(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, 287 struct query_info* qinfo, uint8_t** wc) 288{ 289 log_assert(wc); 290 if(query_dname_compare(nsec->rk.dname, qinfo->qname) != 0) { 291 uint8_t* nm; 292 size_t ln; 293 294 /* empty-non-terminal checking. 295 * Done before wildcard, because this is an exact match, 296 * and would prevent a wildcard from matching. */ 297 298 /* If the nsec is proving that qname is an ENT, the nsec owner 299 * will be less than qname, and the next name will be a child 300 * domain of the qname. */ 301 if(!nsec_get_next(nsec, &nm, &ln)) 302 return 0; /* bad nsec */ 303 if(dname_strict_subdomain_c(nm, qinfo->qname) && 304 dname_canonical_compare(nsec->rk.dname, 305 qinfo->qname) < 0) { 306 return 1; /* proves ENT */ 307 } 308 309 /* wildcard checking. */ 310 311 /* If this is a wildcard NSEC, make sure that a) it was 312 * possible to have generated qname from the wildcard and 313 * b) the type map does not contain qtype. Note that this 314 * does NOT prove that this wildcard was the applicable 315 * wildcard. */ 316 if(dname_is_wild(nsec->rk.dname)) { 317 /* the purported closest encloser. */ 318 uint8_t* ce = nsec->rk.dname; 319 size_t ce_len = nsec->rk.dname_len; 320 dname_remove_label(&ce, &ce_len); 321 322 /* The qname must be a strict subdomain of the 323 * closest encloser, for the wildcard to apply 324 */ 325 if(dname_strict_subdomain_c(qinfo->qname, ce)) { 326 /* here we have a matching NSEC for the qname, 327 * perform matching NSEC checks */ 328 if(nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)) { 329 /* should have gotten the wildcard CNAME */ 330 return 0; 331 } 332 if(nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) && 333 !nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)) { 334 /* wrong parentside (wildcard) NSEC used */ 335 return 0; 336 } 337 if(nsec_has_type(nsec, qinfo->qtype)) { 338 return 0; 339 } 340 *wc = ce; 341 return 1; 342 }
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343 } else { 344 /* See if the next owner name covers a wildcard 345 * empty non-terminal. */ 346 while (dname_strict_subdomain_c(nm, nsec->rk.dname)) { 347 /* wildcard does not apply if qname below 348 * the name that exists under the '*' */ 349 if (dname_subdomain_c(qinfo->qname, nm)) 350 break; 351 /* but if it is a wildcard and qname is below 352 * it, then the wildcard applies. The wildcard 353 * is an empty nonterminal. nodata proven. */ 354 if (dname_is_wild(nm)) { 355 size_t ce_len = ln; 356 uint8_t* ce = nm; 357 dname_remove_label(&ce, &ce_len); 358 if(dname_strict_subdomain_c(qinfo->qname, ce)) { 359 *wc = ce; 360 return 1; 361 } 362 } 363 dname_remove_label(&nm, &ln); 364 } |
365 } 366 367 /* Otherwise, this NSEC does not prove ENT and is not a 368 * wildcard, so it does not prove NODATA. */ 369 return 0; 370 } 371 372 /* If the qtype exists, then we should have gotten it. */ 373 if(nsec_has_type(nsec, qinfo->qtype)) { 374 return 0; 375 } 376 377 /* if the name is a CNAME node, then we should have gotten the CNAME*/ 378 if(nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)) { 379 return 0; 380 } 381 382 /* If an NS set exists at this name, and NOT a SOA (so this is a 383 * zone cut, not a zone apex), then we should have gotten a 384 * referral (or we just got the wrong NSEC). 385 * The reverse of this check is used when qtype is DS, since that 386 * must use the NSEC from above the zone cut. */ 387 if(qinfo->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS && 388 nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) && 389 !nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)) { 390 return 0; 391 } else if(qinfo->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS && 392 nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA) && 393 !dname_is_root(qinfo->qname)) { 394 return 0; 395 } 396 397 return 1; 398} 399 400int 401val_nsec_proves_name_error(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, uint8_t* qname) 402{ 403 uint8_t* owner = nsec->rk.dname; 404 uint8_t* next; 405 size_t nlen; 406 if(!nsec_get_next(nsec, &next, &nlen)) 407 return 0; 408 409 /* If NSEC owner == qname, then this NSEC proves that qname exists. */ 410 if(query_dname_compare(qname, owner) == 0) { 411 return 0; 412 } 413 414 /* If NSEC is a parent of qname, we need to check the type map 415 * If the parent name has a DNAME or is a delegation point, then 416 * this NSEC is being misused. */ 417 if(dname_subdomain_c(qname, owner) && 418 (nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) || 419 (nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) 420 && !nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)) 421 )) { 422 return 0; 423 } 424 425 if(query_dname_compare(owner, next) == 0) { 426 /* this nsec is the only nsec */ 427 /* zone.name NSEC zone.name, disproves everything else */ 428 /* but only for subdomains of that zone */ 429 if(dname_strict_subdomain_c(qname, next)) 430 return 1; 431 } 432 else if(dname_canonical_compare(owner, next) > 0) { 433 /* this is the last nsec, ....(bigger) NSEC zonename(smaller) */ 434 /* the names after the last (owner) name do not exist 435 * there are no names before the zone name in the zone 436 * but the qname must be a subdomain of the zone name(next). */ 437 if(dname_canonical_compare(owner, qname) < 0 && 438 dname_strict_subdomain_c(qname, next)) 439 return 1; 440 } else { 441 /* regular NSEC, (smaller) NSEC (larger) */ 442 if(dname_canonical_compare(owner, qname) < 0 && 443 dname_canonical_compare(qname, next) < 0) { 444 return 1; 445 } 446 } 447 return 0; 448} 449 450int val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, 451 struct query_info* qinfo) 452{ 453 if(nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) && 454 !nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS) && 455 !nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)) { 456 /* see if nsec signals an insecure delegation */ 457 if(qinfo->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS) { 458 /* if type is DS and qname is equal to nsec, then it 459 * is an exact match nsec, result not insecure */ 460 if(dname_strict_subdomain_c(qinfo->qname, 461 nsec->rk.dname)) 462 return 1; 463 } else { 464 if(dname_subdomain_c(qinfo->qname, nsec->rk.dname)) 465 return 1; 466 } 467 } 468 return 0; 469} 470 471uint8_t* 472nsec_closest_encloser(uint8_t* qname, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec) 473{ 474 uint8_t* next; 475 size_t nlen; 476 uint8_t* common1, *common2; 477 if(!nsec_get_next(nsec, &next, &nlen)) 478 return NULL; 479 /* longest common with owner or next name */ 480 common1 = dname_get_shared_topdomain(nsec->rk.dname, qname); 481 common2 = dname_get_shared_topdomain(next, qname); 482 if(dname_count_labels(common1) > dname_count_labels(common2)) 483 return common1; 484 return common2; 485} 486 487int val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, 488 struct query_info* qinf, uint8_t* wc) 489{ 490 uint8_t* ce; 491 /* 1) prove that qname doesn't exist and 492 * 2) that the correct wildcard was used 493 * nsec has been verified already. */ 494 if(!val_nsec_proves_name_error(nsec, qinf->qname)) 495 return 0; 496 /* check wildcard name */ 497 ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qinf->qname, nsec); 498 if(!ce) 499 return 0; 500 if(query_dname_compare(wc, ce) != 0) { 501 return 0; 502 } 503 return 1; 504} 505 506int 507val_nsec_proves_no_wc(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, uint8_t* qname, 508 size_t qnamelen) 509{ 510 /* Determine if a NSEC record proves the non-existence of a 511 * wildcard that could have produced qname. */ 512 int labs; 513 int i; 514 uint8_t* ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qname, nsec); 515 uint8_t* strip; 516 size_t striplen; 517 uint8_t buf[LDNS_MAX_DOMAINLEN+3]; 518 if(!ce) 519 return 0; 520 /* we can subtract the closest encloser count - since that is the 521 * largest shared topdomain with owner and next NSEC name, 522 * because the NSEC is no proof for names shorter than the owner 523 * and next names. */ 524 labs = dname_count_labels(qname) - dname_count_labels(ce); 525 526 for(i=labs; i>0; i--) { 527 /* i is number of labels to strip off qname, prepend * wild */ 528 strip = qname; 529 striplen = qnamelen; 530 dname_remove_labels(&strip, &striplen, i); 531 if(striplen > LDNS_MAX_DOMAINLEN-2) 532 continue; /* too long to prepend wildcard */ 533 buf[0] = 1; 534 buf[1] = (uint8_t)'*'; 535 memmove(buf+2, strip, striplen); 536 if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(nsec, buf)) { 537 return 1; 538 } 539 } 540 return 0; 541} 542 543/** 544 * Find shared topdomain that exists 545 */ 546static void 547dlv_topdomain(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, uint8_t* qname, 548 uint8_t** nm, size_t* nm_len) 549{ 550 /* make sure reply is part of nm */ 551 /* take shared topdomain with left of NSEC. */ 552 553 /* because, if empty nonterminal, then right is subdomain of qname. 554 * and any shared topdomain would be empty nonterminals. 555 * 556 * If nxdomain, then the right is bigger, and could have an 557 * interesting shared topdomain, but if it does have one, it is 558 * an empty nonterminal. An empty nonterminal shared with the left 559 * one. */ 560 int n; 561 uint8_t* common = dname_get_shared_topdomain(qname, nsec->rk.dname); 562 n = dname_count_labels(*nm) - dname_count_labels(common); 563 dname_remove_labels(nm, nm_len, n); 564} 565 566int val_nsec_check_dlv(struct query_info* qinfo, 567 struct reply_info* rep, uint8_t** nm, size_t* nm_len) 568{ 569 uint8_t* next; 570 size_t i, nlen; 571 int c; 572 /* we should now have a NOERROR/NODATA or NXDOMAIN message */ 573 if(rep->an_numrrsets != 0) { 574 return 0; 575 } 576 /* is this NOERROR ? */ 577 if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(rep->flags) == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { 578 /* it can be a plain NSEC match - go up one more level. */ 579 /* or its an empty nonterminal - go up to nonempty level */ 580 for(i=0; i<rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 581 if(htons(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type)!=LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC || 582 !nsec_get_next(rep->rrsets[i], &next, &nlen)) 583 continue; 584 c = dname_canonical_compare( 585 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, qinfo->qname); 586 if(c == 0) { 587 /* plain match */ 588 if(nsec_has_type(rep->rrsets[i], 589 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV)) 590 return 0; 591 dname_remove_label(nm, nm_len); 592 return 1; 593 } else if(c < 0 && 594 dname_strict_subdomain_c(next, qinfo->qname)) { 595 /* ENT */ 596 dlv_topdomain(rep->rrsets[i], qinfo->qname, 597 nm, nm_len); 598 return 1; 599 } 600 } 601 return 0; 602 } 603 604 /* is this NXDOMAIN ? */ 605 if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(rep->flags) == LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN) { 606 /* find the qname denial NSEC record. It can tell us 607 * a closest encloser name; or that we not need bother */ 608 for(i=0; i<rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 609 if(htons(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) 610 continue; 611 if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(rep->rrsets[i], 612 qinfo->qname)) { 613 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "topdomain on", 614 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, 615 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type), 0); 616 dlv_topdomain(rep->rrsets[i], qinfo->qname, 617 nm, nm_len); 618 return 1; 619 } 620 } 621 return 0; 622 } 623 return 0; 624}
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